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Abstract
This  thesis  provides  a  modern  historical  study of  the  Chaldean Catholic
Church  in  Iraq  from  2003  to  2013  with  analysis  of  the  origins  and
ecclesiological development of the Chaldean community from the sixteenth
century  onwards.  I  offer  an  insight  into  the  formation  of  Chaldean
ecclesiological identity and organisation in the context of the Chaldeans as a
community originating from the ecclesial  traditions of the Church of the
East and as an eastern Catholic Church in union with the Holy See. I argue
for the gradual if consistent development of a Chaldean identity grounded
and incarnated in the Mesopotamian-Iraqi environment yet open to engaging
with cultures throughout the Middle East and West Asia and especially since
2003 to Europe, north America and Australasia. 
The thesis also provides an assessment of the contemporary status of
the Chaldean dioceses of Iraq highlighting the size, influence and historical
development  of  these  structures  to  October  2013.  I  attempt  to  increase
awareness of the Chaldeans as an essential part of Iraqi society and as to the
crucial  social  ``difference''  which  they  established  and  maintained
throughout their history. A ``difference'' which is only as a result of extreme
persecution being removed from Iraq.  The thesis concludes by opening up
examination for the potential for further ecclesiological developments which
may occur in light of events since the 2003 Iraq War and the rise of Da'esh
in 2014 and considerations of full ecclesial communion with the Chaldeans'
sister community the Assyrian Church of the East.
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Introduction
This  thesis  provides  a  modern  historical  study of  the  Chaldean Catholic
Church in Iraq from 2003 to 2013 against  a  background analysis  of the
origins and ecclesiological development of the Chaldean community from
the sixteenth century onwards.
I  also  attempt  to  bring  the  Chaldeans  into  the  full  light  of  Iraqi
history. Aiming to move away from a scholarly focus on the Shia-Sunni,
Arab-Kurd  dichotomies  which  dominate  contemporary  Iraqi  Studies  and
also to avoid considering the East Syriac tradition in isolation and merely
another aspect of ecclesiastical history: instead considering the tradition and
its communities as integral to the pluralistic societies of Mesopotamia-Iraq.
As  an  ecclesiastical  history  this  thesis  is  distinctive  through
considering  the  Chaldean Church's  ecclesiological  ethos  and maintaining
awareness of its status as an eastern Catholic church in union with the Holy
See and as one of the descendant communities of the undivided Church of
the  East.  Chaldean  identity  expressed  partly  in  accordance  with  the
distinctive Syriac ecclesial  traditions developing from at least  the second
century as the ``church across the border'' and outside of the limits of the
Roman Empire in Persia. (Healey 2010; Brock 1982) The other major aspect
of Chaldean identity linked to the close relationship with the Holy See since
the sixteenth century and other eastern Catholic churches especially those of
the Syriac traditions.
The  origins  of  the  identity  of  the  Chaldean  community  which
emerged from the Church of the East and what it actually means to have
entered into union with the Holy See and to become a Chaldean in the early
history of the community have not been greatly considered in scholarship
nor more widely in the church communities. This study focuses on this issue
due  to  the  increased  loss  of  knowledge  and  awareness  among  the
community,  at  present,2 of  Chaldean  history  in  general  as  a  result  of
enforced migration post-Iraq War of 2003 and the growth of a large diaspora
2 Outside of a few authors such as Antoine Audo SJ, Petrus Yousif, Suha Rassam,
Joseph Yacoub, Louis Sako and Joseph Seferta.
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where  the  strands of  historical  memory are difficult  to  bring together  to
portray the earliest origins of the Chaldean identity and their meaning to the
contemporary community.
Even in those works which pursue a modern historical approach to
provide an introduction to the history of the East Syriac churches they lack a
developed awareness  of  Chaldean ecclesiastical  organisation and identity
and  the  community's  origins  from  the  East  Syriac,  Latin  and  Eastern
Catholic  traditions.  (Baumer  2006;  Baum and  Winkler  2003)  This  is  a
significant gap in the literature when we consider that the primary basis of
Chaldean communal organisation until the early twentieth century was the
ecclesiastical structure of the Church with the patriarch perceived to derive
much of his ecclesiastical authority from his relationship with the Holy See.
The most recent authors to consider the historical development of
the East Syriac churches in detail  have been Wilmshurst  (2011), Rassam
(2010),  Murre-Van  Den  Berg  (2009),  Teule  (2008),  Baumer  (2006) and
Baum  and  Winkler  (2003).  Each  author  has  greatly  contributed  to  the
increasing academic and popular awareness of Christianity in Iraq and the
East  Syriac  communities  especially  since  the  invasion  of  Iraq  in  2003.
However, no study has brought together an overview of Chaldean historical
development  with  discussion  of  the  community's  status  as  an  eastern
Catholic Church in union with the Holy See. Therefore, my contribution to
the  current  scholarship  is  to  develop  an  ecclesiological  study  of  the
development of the Chaldean Church, the status of the ecclesial community
in Iraq as of 2013 and the effects of religious and administrative policies of
the governors of Mesopotamia-Iraq on the Chaldeans since their formation
in the sixteenth century until the installation of the new Chaldean patriarch,
Louis Raphael I Sako, in March 2013.
Nomenclature
The  nomenclature  used  to  describe  the  Church  of  the  East  and  the
Chaldeans does give rise to some confusion particularly in non-specialist
literature.
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Nestorian
The principle query nearly universally raised when first encountering the
East  Syriac  communities  relates  to  the  title  Nestorian as  applied  to  the
Church of the East and as to the view that the Church throughout its history
has consistently pursued an extreme dyophysite Christology and denied that
the Blessed Virgin could be described as the ``Mother of God''. Both issues
which  aligned  with  the  perceived  heresy  which  the  Patriarch  of
Constantinople,  Nestorius,  pursued  in  the  early  fifth  century  –  despite
correction – until the Council of Ephesus in 431 where he was deposed and
subsequently entered exile. (Baum and Winkler  2003, 22–25) As will  be
seen in the main body of the thesis this association with the Christology
which appeared to be expounded and has been termed ``Nestorianism'' has
never been decisively resolved insofar as the East Syriac tradition has been
perceived  to  have  remained  linked  with  Christology  associated  with
Nestorius into the contemporary era.  This  despite  either  direct  rejections
from church  leaders  and researchers,  Christological  treatises  refuting  the
claims or at the very least attempting to give context to the situation and a
comprehensive explanation of the Christology which the churches currently
and  historically  have  ascribed  to  themselves.  (Brock  2004;  Soro  1996;
Chediath 1982) Moreover, scholarship from the mid-twentieth century to the
present arguing that neither was the Church of the East Nestorian nor that
Nestorius  actually  professed  any  un-orthodox  notions.  (Seleznyov  2008;
Brock 1996; Halleux 1993; Braaten 1963; Anastos 1962)
The Christological controversy is not the direct concern of the thesis,
but it is vital to be cognisant of the dispute and aware that it has coloured
views of the Church of the East by nearly all who have interacted with or
studied the community into the present and has been an inhibiting factor in
the Church of the East – and the Chaldeans by extension – from gaining
greater  credence  and  indeed  respect  in  the  contemporary  international
Christian community.  (Cf Thompson 2013) The affects of the association
have  been  unfortunate  and  in  some  respects  have  de-legitimised  the
achievements  of  the  Church  of  the  East  in  its  missionary  work  and  its
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maintenance  of  distinctive  ecclesial  traditions  in  the  eyes  of  external
observers.  Moreover,  causing  the  Church  to  be  under  considered  in
mainstream  academic  and  popular  history  of  the  international  Christian
community. Indeed, not fitting into a Latin, Byzantine or reformed church
paradigm provokes a challenge for the researcher but one which must be
met head on and with the intention to bring the East Syriac tradition into
mainstream ecclesiastical history and as integral to a full account of global
missionary activity.
East Syriac
As a collective term for members of the Church of the East and Chaldeans,
East Syriac or East Syrian is du jour and which fits most appropriately with
the non-Christologically focused identity which Chaldeans and members of
the Church of the East pursue. During the medieval period the East Syriacs
referred to themselves as Maddenhaye or Easterners. (Murre-Van Den Berg
2005) This as a means to consolidate their identity by way of comparison
with those Christians of the West: Miaphysites, Byzantines and Latins and
related  to  their  use  of  the  Syriac  dialect  which  developed  among  the
Christian communities from the city of Nisibis eastwards. Self-association
and identification with Nestorius did take place – he was venerated as a
saint  –  but  was  far  removed  from  forming  the  core  of  their  identity.
(Seleznyov 2010)  During  the missionary  efforts  of  the  late  antique  and
medieval period the focus was to gain converts  through annunciating the
Gospel  and  the  distinctiveness  of  Christian  revelation  not  on  diverting
accusations  of  a  perceived  heresy  among  those  who  had  never  before
encountered Christianity.
The significance of church-state relations in East 
Syriac history
Relations  with  the  contemporary  temporal  power  were  and  are  a  strong
theme  throughout  East  Syriac  history.  The  leadership  of  the  temporal
                                                              14
powers under whose administration East Syriac communities have resided
never  converted  to  their  form  of  Christianity  and  it  was  perceived  as
necessary to engender an amicable working relationship with the lay élites
of the day. Such engagements regarded as vital to the effective operation of
the  East  Syriac  churches  and an  opportunity  to  engage in  aggregating  a
system of  client-patron  relationships  to  gain,  for  example,  permission  to
build churches and monasteries or agreement for the appointment of senior
clergy. The head of the Church of the East in the Sasanian period being
ratified on a de facto basis by the Shah whilst in the Ottoman era the heads
of Chaldean and traditionalist East Syriac factions were in competition for
recognition  by  the  local  governor  as  the legitimate  successor  to  the
patriarchs of the Church of the East. 
From the  disengagement  with  the  Roman  church's  Christological
narrative  from  the  fifth  century  the  Church  of  the  East  was  obliged  to
engage ever more closely with the Sasanian Empire. (Brock 1982) The East
Syriac presence in time becoming a defining aspect of Mesopotamian and
Persian society and a real competitor for the state Zoroastrian religion. With
the  Muslim  invasions  of  south-west  Asia  and  the  disintegration  of  the
Zoroastrian  religion  East  Syriac  élites  were key to  the  sustaining  of  the
Ummayad dynasty's rule in Mesopotamia, for example, and the essentials of
running the administrative processes left by the Sasanians.  (Morony 2009)
In due time East Syriac Christians making themselves indispensable to the
Muslim leadership and such a level of interaction gaining no higher status
than during the Abbasid dynasty. Dickens noting of patriarch Timothy I:
`Although he lived his whole life in the heartland of the Arab Caliphate and thus never
visited most of the extensive territory under his patriarchal authority, Timothy was very
conscious of ruling over a jurisdiction much larger than any other on earth, whether
civil or ecclesiastical. Not only was he a trusted ﬁgure at the caliphal court, the head of
the largest  dhimmi under Muslim rule (those living in ``Babel'', Persia and Assyria);
there were also far-off and exotic territories beyond the pale of Islam that were ``under
this patriarchal throne'', including the lands of the Indians (Beth Hinduwāyē), Chinese
(Beth ināyēṢ ), Tibetans (Beth Tuptāyē) and Turks (Beth urkāyē)Ṭ . This undoubtedly
gave  him  considerable  prestige  and  inﬂuence  in  the  eyes  of  the  Abbasid  caliphs.'
(Dickens 2010, 120)
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The attainment of such a position was maintained under other patriarchs into
the Mongol era with only the rise of the Timurids seeing a definitive shift
away  from  a  normative  working  relationship  due  to  the  extensive
persecution which they enforced upon Christians.  With the emergence of
Ottoman  hegemony  in  the  Middle  East  a  new  system  of  church-state
relations developed on more bureaucratic lines of the millet but this in effect
returned to  the  same  status  quo as  encouraged by the  Sasanians  for  the
temporal  élite to engage with the leaders of each religious community and
that this relationship was the central means for the community to interact
with the state. Following Iraq's establishment in 1921 such a relationship
was retained with the Chaldean patriarch becoming a member of the Iraqi
Senate until  1958. Furthermore,  and until  2003, the state deferred to the
patriarch during interactions with the community. The sustained position of
power  which  such  an  arrangement  granted  to  the  patriarch  added
substantially to the influence of his ecclesiastical authority as only he was
capable of interceding on behalf of the community on issues of universal
concern and of distributing patronage which he derived from the state.
Note on approach
My approach to the East Syriac churches is to maintain awareness of them
as derived from an international Christian tradition or as Murre-Van Den
Berg  describes  them as  a  `world  church'.  (Murre-Van Den Berg 2005) I
suggest the communities largely lacked such an awareness in the modern era
until 2003 with the Chaldean hierarchy able to engage well with the cultural
and societal milieu of Iraq but faced with the need to engage with Western
societies  where  large  proportions  of  the  Chaldean  population  came  to
reside.3 This is  unfortunate when we consider  the precedent  for the East
Syriac community throughout its history to have established a reputation for
engagement with local culture and the acculturation of local tradition to the
Church. A Christian tradition which was once capable of appealing to a far
3 Perhaps more than sixty percent as of 2015.
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wider audience and potential body of converts.
Attempting to approach modern East Syriac ecclesiastical history in
a comprehensive manner and placing it in the broader context of the full
scope of the international and Mesopotamian history of the Church of the
East  is  a  comparatively  ``young"  area  of  study.  This  field  was  largely
instigated by the substantial work of Jean Maurice Fiey OP especially from
the 1960s who attempted to bring together the known threads of East Syriac
history into a contiguous narrative and to provide works which detailed the
development of the Church of the East from its earliest origins to his era.
(Fiey OP 1959; 1965a; 1980) In attempting to build on Fiey's work I aim to
further understand the pragmatic issues with which East Syriac Christians
were faced in their day-to-day lives and as to what was understood to be
their  ecclesiological  identity:  What  did  East  Syriac  bishops  in  sixteenth
century  Mesopotamia  perceive  as  their  ecclesial  relationship  with  the
papacy?; How did the Chaldean communities of northern and southern Iraq
relate one to another under the Baath state and how did the No-Fly-Zone in
northern Iraq affect their governance?; How did the Chaldean community
relate to the patriarch during the Iran-Iraq War?; What was the strength of
East Syriac cultural and social contributions to wider Iraqi society under the
rule of the monarchy? These are but a few suggested areas of scholarship
which could be pursued but have yet to be fully explored if at all in research
on the East Syriac tradition. 
By way of comparison studying the modern history of the Church of
the East and Chaldean Church is often an area of study just as opaque to
consider as those who research the East Syriac communities during their
``golden" era in west and central Asia (c. sixth–eleventh centuries). Tang
and Winkler, for example, particularly picking up on the significant question
of how the Christians in Transoxiana related to the patriarch of Baghdad and
as to the degree of devolved ecclesial authority the local bishops held. (Tang
and Winkler 2013) The opacity they face in answering this question related
to  limits  on  source  material  whether  written  records  or  archaeological
remains  and  is  paralleled  in  the  opacity  scholars  face  studying  the
contemporary East Syriac communities derived from the inability to access
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some areas of Iraq due to security concerns; the near continuous conflicts
which have affected  Iraq since 1980;  lack  of  available  or  extant  written
records and the recent physical destruction of Chaldean communities and
property in Iraq due to attacks by Da'esh. Perhaps the most pressing issue
remains, however, the lack of interest or willingness to engage in historical
reflection – for whatever reason – from native and non-native researchers to
persevere in studies of the modern history of the Chaldean Church and to
provide a greater academic context in which to fit this thesis. For the early
career scholar it  is at  least  then an area of research in which to become
established given the  paucity  of  the  scholarship  in  general  terms and in
comparison with other Syriac churches or western forms of Christianity in
general.
The origins and status of the Church of the East to 
the late medieval period
The Church of  the  East  is  the Christian  community  which  developed in
Mesopotamia  and Persia  from at  least  the  second century  and gradually
gained  a  sense  of  ecclesial  distinctiveness  apart  from the  church  in  the
Roman Empire. A distinctiveness shaped by political  expediency – being
under  Sasanian  Persian  rule  from  224;  a  perception  that  ecclesiastical
organisation  should  follow  a  principle  of  subsidiarity  –  with  the  local
bishops not necessarily reliant on deference to the five patriarchates of the
west4 and a different emphasis in their annunciation of Christology. On the
latter issue following the theological oeuvre of Theodore of Mopsuestia and
the  Antiochene  school:  defending  dyophysite  Christology  and  the
significance of Christ's humanity. 
From the early fifth century the hierarchy of the church in south-
west  Asia  having  consolidated  ecclesiastical  organisation  at  the  local
Mesopotamian  synods  of  Isaac  (410)  and  Dadisho (424)  and  perceiving
their  existing  Christology  as  in  accord  with  the  deposit  of  Faith  of  the
Apostles  saw  less  need  to  engage  with  disputes  conducted  in  arenas
4 Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople, Jerusalem and Rome
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theologically, geographically and politically removed from their community.
There has existed a general perception that the defining cut off point
of the Church of the East's relationship with the Roman church took place at
the Council of Ephesus in 431 over disputes regarding the human and divine
natures of Christ which led to its  de facto  separation from the rest of the
Christian oikumene through unwillingness to condemn Nestorius and ratify
the canons of the Council. In actual fact as Baum and Winkler note: 
`the council of Ephesus is not mentioned in the East Syriac synodical records. Since it
was a synod outside the Persian empire, the Church of the East presumably did not find
it necessary to react. Nevertheless, it should also be emphasized that the Church of the
East did not condemn the Council of Ephesus.' (Baum and Winkler 2003, 30)
We should perhaps instead see the re-focusing of East Syriac communities
towards the east as a gradual if definitive process of incarnating Christianity
in a local Mesopotamian-Persian environment and becoming the church of
the Sasanian world. 
Nonetheless, Ephesus and its shift away from a sufficiently nuanced
Christological paradigm as perceived by members of the Church of the East
expedited  a  reformulation  of  as  to  where  the  future  of  the  East  Syriac
tradition  lay.  The  reinforcement  of  East  Syriac  identity  and  culture  was
formed in the ecclesiastical schools of Edessa and Nisibis and by the late
fifth  century  missionary  clergy  were  active  in  pursuing  a  policy  of
expansion into central Asia.
Missionary  expansion  from  the  fifth  to  eleventh  centuries  saw
ecclesial structures established throughout Asia to China.5 During the early
to high medieval periods the Church of the East had the widest geographical
jurisdiction of any Christian community in the world and held substantial
influence among the Abbasid and Mongol empires. However, the Church
entered into a period of gradual decline from the fourteenth century onward.
From a position of at least 100 dioceses in the late thirteenth century
the Church was reduced to three occupied sees by the mid-sixteenth century.
5 See Maps 1 and 2. Please note all maps, graphs and tables referred to in the text are 
provided in Appendix A. Wherever possible I have localised the major pertinent 
settlements.
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(Wilmshurst 2011, 259–260, 302–303) Such a relatively rapid reversal of
fortune in the face of competing pressure for adherents from Islam, Taoism,
Buddhism and the West Syriac church; the destruction of peoples and the
built environment under Tamerlane and the socio-economic changes which
his invasions brought all very substantial shocks to ecclesiastical structures
which had seemed resolute in the face of previous persecution. 
Those who were to emerge as the Chaldeans were remnants of the
East  Syriac  community  residing  in  northern  Mesopotamia,  eastern  Asia
Minor and north-west Persia. The patriarchs of the late fourteenth and early
fifteenth centuries attempted to consolidate what remained of the Church.
Likely  with  strong  communal  memories  of  the  Church's  missionary
activities but  with limited resources  to attempt new expansion or  indeed
with any feasibility of being able to complete missions in the same way with
the socio-religious nature of west and central Asia irreversibly changed from
the consolidation of Islam to these regions.
A desire to re-create links with the churches internationally perhaps
why engaging with Latin envoys proved attractive to East Syriac leaders
with an awareness maintained of the See of Peter's rôle and status and as an
opening to reclaiming communion with the wider Christian oikumene. From
the thirteenth century onwards such engagements increased in number from
which time and from where the following historical narrative begins.
1. The origins and early development of the 
Chaldean Catholic community (fifteenth–
eighteenth centuries)
Chaldean origins
The first creation of an East Syriac community in union with the Holy See
and use of the term Chaldean came in the mid-fifteenth century. However, in
the two centuries prior to this event encounters with representatives of the
Latin church brought East Syriac community members into short periods of
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communion or near communion with the Holy See.
Pope Innocent IV (1243–1254) sent Dominican missionaries to meet
with the East Syriac patriarch, Sabrisho V ibn al-Masihi (1226–1256).6 In
response Sabrisho V provided a statement of belief in 1247 as evidence of
the compatibility of his theology with that of the Latin church and hence the
suitability of communion with the Church of the East but nothing further
resulted at that time. (Labourt 1908a, 559; Wilmshurst 2011, 238–239) Latin
missionary  expansion  into  south-west  Asia  derived  from  Innocent  IV's
interest  in  engaging  with  the  Mongol  political  élites  who  increasingly
dominated  the  area  from the  1240s and appeared  open to  conversion  to
Christianity;  the  desire  for  aggregating  ecclesial  communities  to  formal
communion with the pope and the consolidation of the Christian presence in
the  Holy  Land  and  wider  Middle  East  in  the  context  of  the  Sixth  and
Seventh Crusades (1228–1229 and 1248–1254).  (Cf Gillman and Klimkeit
1999, 243)
Aside from the direct engagements with the patriarch East Syriac
encounters  with Latin ecclesiastics  and crusader  élites  from the eleventh
century  were  concentrated  in  Damascus,  Jerusalem,  Tripoli,  Edessa  and
Antioch. (Teule 2003b, 108–112) On a popular basis we might suppose that
individual  members  of  the  East  Syriac  community  were  sufficiently
interested in the Latin church to consider transferring their allegiance to it or
took part in Latin religious life whether through mere curiosity or with a
view to gaining influence within the crusader states.  (Weltecke 2011, 108;
Dauvillier 1979, 642–643) The novelty of living under Christian temporal
jurisdiction when for so long they had been governed by largely Muslim
élites may have been highly attractive.
First Union
The first  formal  union of  an East  Syriac bishop with  the Holy See  was
concluded by the Metropolitan of Cyprus in concord with the Council of
Florence  on  7th  July  1445  following  the  encouragement  of  the  Latin
6 Unless otherwise noted dates given after names refer to length of time in office as
bishop, king, pope etc
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archbishop  on  Rhodes,  Andreas  of  Colassae,  OP.  (Labourt  1908a,  559;
Finnerty 1907, 474)  Andreas pursued a papal directed policy which sought
to bring into communion a full sweep of those ecclesial bodies who, it was
perceived,  remained apart  from the  pope's  oversight  and which  required
necessary re-adjustment of ecclesiastical organisation. Those communities
viewed as targets for aggregation to Latin ecclesiastical influence included
members of the Maronite tradition on Cyprus (whose position viz. the Holy
See was distinct from those in the Levant) `Syrian', `Nestorian', Armenian,
`Jacobite',  Coptic,  Ethiopian  and  Byzantine  Christians  everywhere  in
fulfilment  of a chief  purpose of Florence:  to secure the reconciliation of
Byzantium and all the Christian communities of the east with the Latin west
in spiritual as well as temporal affairs. (Gill SJ 1959, 321–327, 335–337)
The choice of the term Chaldean to describe the East Syriac faction
in union with the Holy See had approval of Eugene IV and derived from an
awareness of the community's use of the Syriac language – referred to as
Chaldean in Europe.  (Wilmshurst 2011, 303; Cf Galleti 2003, 45–48) This
Chaldean province was not maintained as conflict occurred over the extent
of Latinisation which was acceptable to the new converts when changes in
East  Syriac  liturgical  practices  were  requested.  (Cf  Le  Coz  1995,  327;
Wilmshurst 2000, 64; Labourt 1908, 559) 
It  appears  the  Church  of  the  East  presence  was  maintained  on
Cyprus  but  was  to  be  vanquished  as  Pope  John  XXII  (1316–1334)  re-
affirmed a 1222 bull  of Pope Honorius III  (1216–1227) which sought to
remove a perceived concentration of heresies on Cyprus including apparent
Nestorianism. Pope John asking the patriarch of Jerusalem to `extirper les
erreurs...du royaume de Chypre'. (Tisserant 1931, col. 225; J. Richard 1977,
196 n. 104) Latin influence was substantial and the then resident East Syriac
metropolitan, Elias, entered into communion with the Latins in 1340 but at
this juncture the term Chaldean was not used.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 63) The
noted  East  Syriac  church  in  Famagusta  was  built  in  1359 and,  as  such,
suggests the community's  presence in  the Cypriot  milieu was maintained
even so. 
As of 1445 it would seem unlikely that a Chaldean ecclesial identity
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to which other East Syriacs could adhere had time to develop distinct from
the Church of the East. The 1445 group existed in isolation and by the mid-
sixteenth century had merged into the Maronite or Latin communities or
returned  to  their  previous  religious  affiliation.  (Wilmshurst  2011,  304;
Tfinkdji 1913, 7) The Holy See was not intending to seek and create an East
Syriac community with which it was to be in union at this juncture, rather
the  opportunity  arose  for  bringing  East  Syriac  Cypriots  into  the  Latin
ordinary's jurisdiction.
The emergence of Chaldean communities  from the Church of the
East should be seen in context of broader trends in the Latin church and
successive popes' interests in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the
108 year period between the first named Chaldean group's establishment in
1445 on Cyprus  to  that  of Mesopotamia in  1553 was bookended by the
Councils  of  Florence  and  Trent  (1431–1449  and  1545–1563).  Florence
which largely focused on defining the status of papal jurisdiction and the
relationship  between  the  Latin  and  Byzantine  worlds  as  well  as  with
Ethiopian, Syriac, Coptic and Armenian churches. Trent affecting virtually
the  entire  ecclesiological  understanding  of  the  Latin  church  and  the
necessity of re-awakening an uncompromising missionary zeal for bringing
all men into union with the Holy See and ensuring they conformed to what
was perceived as orthodox belief. From Trent there was a definitive shift
away from encouraging a plurality of local churches in communion with one
another  to  a  church  of  a  plurality  of  ecclesial  rites  under  the  pope's
leadership and direction. 
Tridentine  Catholic  self-awareness  theoretically  entailed  definitive
juridical  separation  of  identity  and  of  who  could  and  could  not  be
considered within the church.  For those missionaries working to achieve
communion  with  the  East  Syriac  communities  in  a  post-Tridentine
environment  this  required their  submission to  the Holy See's  jurisdiction
who  in  the  person  of  the  contemporary  pope  held  authority  over  all
ecclesiastical affairs for those with whom he was in communion. However,
we should note that Latin engagements with the East Syriacs were on a path
which took several turns prior to settling on a confirmed outlook for gaining
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them  as  adherents.  There  is  a  qualitative  difference  in  seeking  a
metropolitan's  allegiance  to  entering  into  union with  the  patriarch  of  an
entire church. The former a head of a diocese, the latter heir to an institution
which oversaw the East Syriac Christian tradition throughout Asia. 
Context and status of the Church of the East in 1450 
and the development of hereditary succession to 
the patriarchate
During the period 1450–1550 the Church of the East was still in an era of
recovery from the decline it experienced during and after the Islamisation of
the Mongol  empires  from the mid-thirteenth century and Tamerlane's  (b.
c.1330 d 1405)  invasions  during the fourteenth century.  (Cf Gillman and
Klimkeit 1999, 151, 234–237; Wilmshurst 2000, 19) The paths of Mongol
and Timurid expansion mirroring in reverse the East Syriac missionary work
of Late Antique and Medieval eras. 
Following  the  Council  of  Ephesus  East  Syriac  ecclesial  life  was
oriented  away  from  engagement  with  the  Roman  church  and  the
patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria and Constantinople through
sustained missionary activity throughout central and east Asia for much of
the next 900 years. By the end of the early medieval period in the late tenth
century  the  Church  of  the  East  likely  held  the  widest  geographical
jurisdiction of any contemporary church.7  The patriarch's overall direction
of affairs from the early medieval period emanated from his residence in the
Abbasid  capital  Baghdad  and  later  the  Mongol  Il-Khanate  capital  of
Maragha  and  was  mediated  via  the  network  of  dioceses  extending
throughout Asia.
With the conversion to Islam of Mongol  élites;  the withdrawal of
toleration for non-native religious traditions in China and the subsequent
brutality of Tamerlane the status of East Syriac Christianity in Asia changed
from accepted to persecuted.  Those communities far from the patriarchal
leadership struggled to contend with the aggressive stance of the temporal
7 Something  which  the  aforementioned  churches  would  likely  not  have been  fully
aware.
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powers and they slowly acquiesced to Islam or moved to the traditional East
Syriac  heartlands  of  northern  Mesopotamia  where  the  patriarch  had
retreated.
The Church of the East's decline was characterised by five factors:
1. The gradual tempering of the missionary fervour from the Church
ministers  and  adherents.  East  Syriac  expansion  had  been  nearly
continuous from the 430s to c.1300 by which time it had reached its
zenith and could no longer continue its activities on the same scale
and  by  the  early  fifteenth  century  was  exhausted.  In  the  secular
world this was paralleled in the expansion and decline of the Mongol
empires. The devolution of Ghengis Khan 's empire from 1260 was a
natural  process  given  the  difficulties  of  ruling  such  a  vast  area.
(Morgan 2014)
2. A slowdown began in the administration of the community. The lack
of capability to efficiently administer the Church saw a draw down
of intellectual and ecclesial resources. The monastic candidates upon
which the Church had relied for  its  leadership were beginning to
disappear and could not easily be replaced.
3. The  levels  of  persecution  directly  and  the  indirect  effects  of  the
transformation of Eurasia by the Mongols and Tamerlane prevented
recovery  at  the  same  time  as  the  community  was  attempting  to
consolidate  remaining  dioceses.  These  changes  attached  a
psychological  burden  to  the  community's  daily  workings.  The
Church had been affected by persecution but the era from the end of
the fourteenth to the mid-fifteenth centuries was so difficult as to see
questions raised as to the East Syriac tradition's extinction in all but
name.
4. As identified by Baumer: the lack of consistent support from a major
ruling  power  in  the  regions  where  the  Church  predominated.
(Baumer 2006, 266) The Mongol and Chinese  élites showed some
interest in adopting Christianity under the direction of East Syriac
clergy at various times. However, there was never conversion from a
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significant  ruler  or  sufficiently  large  number  of  lesser  nobility  or
widespread  popularity  among  the  lower  classes  to  permit
Christianity to become the state religion. The disadvantages being
consideration as an only partially licit religion with which to become
involved and lacking the means of coercion which the élites had to
enforce adherence to one religion or to at  least  promote it  as the
dominant religion.
5. Outbreaks of the plague also grievously affected the communities in
Central Asia from the thirteenth century and it appears likely this had
substantial implications for the community at all levels. Syriac-script
tombstones found at Semirache, Kirghizstan, for example, providing
indication of the extent of the disease among the faithful.  (Missick
1999, 99–100; Cf Dickens 2009, 14–15 ff)
Despite the strong monastic and literary traditions of the Church of
the  East  written  records  became  very  scant  in  the  fourteenth  to  mid-
sixteenth centuries. Nonetheless, given the physically destructive nature of
military campaigns and anti-Christian persecutions of that period material
produced may have been lost rather than not produced. The period 1000–
1300 saw a renaissance in Syriac literary production among monastics in
south-west  Asia  and  in  the  context  of  the  benign  and  often  supportive
patronage of the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad from the eighth century. (See
Teule 2002; 2003a) At least up until the second decade of the fourteenth
century  advanced theological  material  was produced such as  Abdisho of
Nisibis'  Book  of  the  Pearl.  The  text  provides  a  concise  outline  of
contemporary  East  Syriac  Christological  thought  at  a  time  when  the
community was at  a cross roads in its future and re-engaging with other
Christian traditions. (Wilmshurst 2011, 274) It is suggestive that this was a
community looking for means to re-establish its identity and organisation.
First Chaldean hierarchy
The Church's  shrinking geographical remit and decline in  the number of
qualified candidates for leadership positions afforded the family of Patriarch
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Shemon IV Basidi (1450–1497) an opportunity to consolidate control over
the remaining dioceses.  (Cf Wilmshurst 2000, 193) One method to ensure
control was considered to be via the establishment of hereditary succession
to the patriarchal office and it became normative from 1450 for the patriarch
to name a nephew as the `guardian of the throne' –  Natar Kursya – as his
successor.  (Valognes 1994, 415; Murre-Van Den Berg 1999, 237) A main
benefit of this procedure was for clear continuity in church leadership and
governance following the patriarch's death. 
Murre-Van Den Berg notes how the patriarchs from Timothy II (d. c.
1330) onwards were often drawn from the same family. Nevertheless, this
was not enforced in the same way as took place from the fifteenth century.
(Murre-Van Den Berg 2005,  303–304 n.  8) Hereditary succession in  the
fifteenth  century  also  extended  outside  of  the  patriarchal  line  to  some
episcopal  sees.  We  cannot  be  certain  that  Shemon  IV  was  desirous  of
maintaining such a system indefinitely. The position of decline which the
church was in, however, suggests the measure was considered acceptable
and it was only once increasing nepotism became a sustained procedure that
it  was  viewed  as  necessary  to  actively  oppose  it  as  detrimental  to  East
Syriac ecclesiology.
By  the  time  of  Patriarch  Shemon  VII  (1539-1558)  opposition  to
hereditary succession began to be openly expressed. Shemon VII originally
consecrated his nephew, Hnanisho, as bishop when aged twelve in 1539 and
later appointed him as a metropolitan. However, Hnanisho died in 1545 and
his brother, Eliya, also a minor became Natar Kursya by 1550. (Wilmshurst
2011, 297–298)
Shemon VII’s preferment for his family and their influence in East
Syriac  affairs  was  sufficiently  opposed  among  the  clergy  by  1552  that
Yohannan  Sulaqa  of  the  monastery  of  Rabban  Hormizd  in  Alqosh  was
elected as a new patriarch in resistance with the support of bishops from
Erbil,  Salmas  and  Adarbaigan.  (Wilmshurst  2011,  302–303)  Initially,
Sulaqa held the patriarchal office only as an administrator: for the Sulaqite
faction to conduct their ecclesiastical administration in a canonical manner
and according to East Syriac church tradition Sulaqa required consecration
                                                              27
as  patriarch  from at  least  one  bishop of  metropolitan  rank.  A bishop of
metropolitan  rank  had  greater  seniority  in  church  affairs  and  often  had
responsibility for a geographically larger or more densely populated see than
a  bishop  of  ordinary  rank.  (Cf  Boudinhon  1911) As  the  bishops  who
supported Sulaqa had not  attained this  rank an alternative ecclesiastic  of
sufficient seniority was sought in the person of the pope – an advantage of
which  was  the  distance  geographically  and  politically  from the  ongoing
disputes in northern Mesopotamia.8
However, the Sulaqite faction's interest in the papacy and the pope's
potential interest to support them was only confirmed following meetings
with Franciscan missionaries present in the town of Amid (Diyarbakir), in
south-east Asia Minor from where they were extending their influence into
Mesopotamia. Subsequently they met with representatives of the Custodian
of the Holy Land in Jerusalem to to determine if they should travel onwards
to Rome.9
  Jerusalem's significance to Christians is clear and for East Syriacs it
appears pilgrimage to the city was tied to a specific salvific purpose. The
thirteenth century pilgrim monk Sawma stated prior to visiting Jerusalem
`we could go...so that we might receive complete pardon for our offences,
and  absolution  for  our  sins  of  foolishness'.  (Budge  1928,  133) Such  a
tradition perhaps echoing in the minds of Sulaqa and his coterie. A fruitful
meeting we can assume took place in Jerusalem as Sulaqa received advice to
meet directly with Pope Julius III (1550–1555) from February–April 1553
in  Rome  and  was  subsequently  consecrated  and  received  the  pallium.
(Baumer 2006, 248; Wilmshurst 2000, 22)
It seems unlikely the contemporary actors would have conceived of
the significance with which this event would come to be held; what they
8 See  Map  3  for  major  sites  of  East  Syriac-Chaldean  activity  from  the  sixteenth
century. 
9 Franciscans were originally established in the Holy Land in 1217 from which time
they became the dominant Latin religious order in the Levant and gradually the Middle
East more widely. Their influence becoming such that Pope Clement VI (1342–1352)
in 1342 gave them the responsibility for guardianship of the Holy Places. The chief
Franciscan of the Holy Land gaining substantial oversight in regional Catholic affairs;
appointment as the ``Guardian of Mount Zion in Jerusalem'' and the office of the Latin
Patriarch of Jerusalem. (Labourt 1908b, 231)
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considered  it  to  mean  for  the  future  development  of  the  East  Syriac
community  or  as  to  whether  they  shared  the  same view as  to  its  future
development. One aspect which serves as example of this comes from the
1553 papal bull officially outlining Sulaqa's status. Perhaps unremarkable at
the  time  but  with  possible  connotations  for  the  present  day  Chaldean
patriarch's  authority  the  bull  set  the  limits  of  patriarchal  jurisdiction  to
Mesopotamia and also `les autres pays soumis a la juridiction habituelle du
patriarche  et  les  monasteres  situes  dans  la  Chine  at  dans  les  Indes.'
(Dauvillier 1942, col. 368) 
Establishing an East Syriac patriarchate which derived its legitimacy
from the Holy See was remarkable given the geographical and practical, if
not formal, ecclesiastical separation of over a thousand years between the de
facto  patriarch of the west and the patriarch with jurisdiction for much of
continental Asia. Moreover, Sulaqa's investiture marked out the maintenance
of  this  Latin  attempt  to  reconcile  the  entire  East  Syriac  community  to
communion  with  the  pope  as  a  key  focus  of  missionary  activity.  These
efforts continued consistently despite the difficult situation politically and
religiously which Latin missionaries encountered and in the face of tribal
and familial  divisions among the East Syriac communities. It  was nearly
300 years  later  (1838)  before  a  stable  unified  Chaldean community  was
consolidated. 
From the  Chaldean  perspective  it  appears  Sulaqa  approached  the
pope with an awareness that the occupant of the See of Rome was known to
be the apostolic descendant of St Peter and a validly ordained prelate who
could convey legitimate holy orders. (Murre-Van Den Berg 2005, 315 n. 42;
Wilmshurst  2011,  298) However,  it  is  unclear  if  there  was  especial
awareness  of  the  Tridentine  nature  of  papal  authority  by  the  proto-
Chaldeans.
From the Council of Trent's conclusion the Holy See professed its
teaching and leadership role to be the supreme ecclesial authority which all
other  church  leaders  should  acknowledge.  In  approaching  the  pope  for
ecclesiastical faculties such as holy orders a patriarchal candidate would be
expected  to  submit  to  papal  jurisdiction.  A  formal  acknowledgement
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procedure of this authority for eastern Christian leaders in union with the
pope was the granting of the pallium (an ecclesiastical vestment) and in this
instance for Christians associated with East Syriac Christology – perceived
as  heterodox  due  to  association  with  Nestorius'  suspected  opinions  on
Christ's humanity and divinity – a confirmation of post-Ephesian orthodoxy
and acceptance of the decisions of subsequent ecumenical councils. 
The Church of the East since the late fifth century had developed
largely outside the ecclesiological discourse maintained in the rest of the
Christian  world  and theological  debate  was  conducted  only  to  a  limited
degree other than in areas of Christian focus such as Cyprus, Jerusalem and
Aleppo. Furthermore, as East Syriac expansion until the fourteenth century
had  largely  been  eastward  was  there  still  by  the  sixteenth  century  an
accurate  and  reliable  awareness  of  the  distinctive  features  of  both  East
Syriac  and  Latin  ecclesiologies  and  their  appreciations  of  the  Petrine
ministry? According to the nineteenth century Chaldean patriarch Ebedjesu
V  Khayyath  (1894–1900)  there  was  a  consistent  awareness  of  Petrine
primacy  derived  from  several  Syriac  sources.  Initially  from  St  Ephrem
insofar as he greatly remarks on the significance of St Peter in his works and
in  Narsai  (late  fourth–late  fifth  centuries)  who  compares  the  authority
endowed  on  Peter  as  akin  to  that  of  Moses.  The  editor  of  Khayyath's
collection concludes that `l'Église nestorienne a toujours cru, sans jamais
varier  sur ce point,  à la  primauté de juridiction de saint Pierre sur toute
l'Église'.  Whilst  this  comes from an author compiling his arguments at  a
time  of  consolidating  an  eastern  Catholic  Chaldean  identity  strongly
supportive of the Tridentine ecclesiological model of a Catholic Church of
rites under the leadership of a Supreme Pontiff it does indicate that Petrine
primacy  was  recognised  in  East  Syriac  texts  even  if  there  was  not
widespread awareness or acceptance of these arguments. (Khayyath 1896a,
137–141)
The  most  well  detailed  account  of  interactions  between  Latin
representatives and the Church of the East (prior to the sixteenth century)
comes in  the thirteenth century  travelogue of  the  monk Rabban Sawma.
(Budge  1928  passim) The  text  provides  some  indication  of  East  Syriac
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ecclesiological concerns regarding the contemporary Petrine office and the
Christology of the church in the West.
Sawma was a senior East Syriac monk who undertook a series of
travels with his monastic colleague Markos from their residence in northern
China throughout Asia with the intention of visiting Jerusalem. Markos was
elected patriarch – as Yahbalaha III – during their travels. The new patriarch
requested Sawma to continue his sojourn and to travel directly to Rome for
meetings with Pope Nicholas IV (1288–1292).  (Budge 1928, 172–173 ff;
Labourt 1908a, 559)
A key aspect of the meetings was Christological discussion and the
summary of proceedings in Budge's translation shows both sides calling into
question the accordance of the others'  beliefs with their understanding of
orthodox Christology as derived from church Councils to the fifth century.10 
Murre  van  den  Berg,  following  a  Syriac  text  of  the  Chaldean
Vincentian priest Paul Bedjan infers that during these meetings the cardinals
present largely accepted the rectitude of Sawma's beliefs:  (Murre-Van Den
Berg 2006b, 383 n. 34, 390, 391 n. 75; Bedjan 1895)
`During  that  same  discussion  Rabban  Sauma  produced  a  traditional  ``Nestorian''
confession, in which two qnume (besides two natures and one person) are distinguished
in Jesus Christ, a statement which surprisingly goes unnoticed by the cardinals' (Murre-
Van Den Berg 2006b, 383)
This is curious and indicative that the Latin surprise at receiving an East
Syriac cleric perhaps overrode their desire to be very particular about his
community's  theological  persuasion.  Discussion also  encompassed  the
filioque clause – the belief that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and
the Son – in the Creed which the East Syriacs traditionally did not include in
their professions of faith. This was likewise, according to the account, not
aggressively debated.11 Perhaps there was insufficient interest in questioning
10 The East Syriac Christological paradigm also informed by writers from their own
tradition not as well considered in the west such as Babai `the Great' (611–628). 
11 The filioque was a Latin emphasised Christological trend which gained traction in
the Church in  the West as  a  means to  refute  Arianism's  denial  of  Christ's  Divinity
particularly among the Iberian Goths in the sixth century. Its widespread introduction
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the  Christology  of  a  community  whose  representatives  showed  great
deference  to  the  pope.  Ecclesiological  perceptions  emerging  of  a  sister
church  geographically  if  not  theologically  distant.  The  Latin  community
aware  of  the  distinctiveness  of  the  Byzantine  from  Latin  ecclesiastical
identity but this did not necessarily mean a difference with the East Syriac
tradition:  the  perceived  remoteness  and  age  of  the  community  beyond
Mesopotamia  indicative  of  its  holding  fast  to  traditions  and  Christology
from time prior to substantial ecclesial division in the Christian world.
The culmination of the engagement with the Holy See appears to
have been a union confirmed in a letter of 7th April 1288 but this did not
last.  (J.  Richard  1977,  109) It  may  simply  have  been  a  pragmatic
consideration, friendly gesture or merely granting the benefit of the doubt to
Sawma for his acceptance of the pope as head of the church in the West and
thus  someone  with  whom  normatively  the  Latin  church  should  be  in
communion. Yahballah III also sent a profession of faith to Pope Benedict
XI  (1303–1304)  in  1304.  This  was,  however,  pursued  no further  as  the
patriarch lacked the support of his episcopal hierarchy.
During Sawma's meetings he presumably considered that the pope's
authority and jurisdiction could only extend to the church in the west alone.
(Murre-Van  Den  Berg  2006,  390  n.  74)  This  disavowal  of  the  Petrine
primacy of jurisdiction should be seen in the context of the then still extant
reach of the Church of the East's ecclesiastical organisation throughout Asia;
the geographical distance of these ecclesial provinces from Rome and the
limits of papal ability to extend ecclesial influence into those areas in which
and use in the Roman See came under Pope Benedict VIII (1014–1015). (Maas 1909)
When professing the East  Syriac creed to the Cardinals Sawma does not  explicitly
mention from where the Holy Spirit proceeds whether the Father and the Son or just
the Father. However, when queried he does briefly dispute with the Cardinals the Latin
belief.  Nonetheless,  following  this  conversation  there  appears  to  have  been  little
interest  in  pursuing  the  matter  further.  (Budge  1928,  175–182) It  may  be  that  the
remarkable nature of the Church of the East's missionary endeavours and its spread
throughout  Asia  were  perceived  by  the  Holy  See  as  sufficient  causes  to  override
concerns  about  theological  points  of  difference  which  Sawma  represented.
Alternatively  it  is  possible  that  the  Latins  thought  that  in  due  course  they  could
influence Sawma and his companions to alter their beliefs on the filioque and did not
regard it  as an insurmountable barrier to building an ecclesial  relationship with the
Church of the East. Indeed, it does not appear to have affected Sawma taking a full part
in the Holy Week and Easter celebrations in Rome during his visit – Pope Nicholas IV
personally giving the Holy Eucharist to Sawma –  with discussions on the East Syriac
position on the filioque being put to one side indefinitely. (Budge 1928, 190–196)
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the  Church  of  the  East  was  sole  bearer  of  the  Christian  tradition.  The
expectation of the Holy See to affect the Church of the East's ecclesiology
and  its  understanding  of  where  the  highest  authority  in  the  universal
Christian oikumene subsisted and the acceptance of the pope as this source
of jurisdiction and authority may well have seemed a rather obtuse issue of
limited  relevance  to  the  day-to-day  administration  of  the  East  Syriac
community.
Furthermore,  there  does  not  appear  to  have  been  a  sustained
consensual view of the nature of primacy within the East Syriac milieu. One
of the most comprehensive assessments comes from Murre van Den Berg's
work on the international nature of the Church of the East. (Murre-Van Den
Berg 2005) She considers that the Church of the East held to a multiplicity
of  perspectives  on  the  place  of  primacy  in  the  universal  Christian
community  and  that  no-one  East  Syriac  position  was  defined  and
maintained  from  the  late  antique  to  early  modern  periods.  However,
prevailing themes were consistently present: firstly, the necessity of some
form of union with the Roman Patriarchate as one of the great sees of the
early  Christian  world  but  within  this  relationship  the  contemporary
Catholicos-Patriarch of Seleucia Ctesiphon retaining the  de facto  if not  de
jure  supremacy  of  honour  and  authority.  Secondly,  the  framing  of  their
ecclesiastical relationship in a way that the link with the Roman patriarch
was perceived to be more significant than with any other such as Antioch or
Alexandria  perhaps  largely due the awareness  of the limited ecclesial  or
temporal  influence  which  these  patriarchates  held  within  societies  of
Muslim numerical majorities. Thirdly, there was no apparent notion that the
varying Christological emphases of the patriarchates was a central issue of
concern as to permit or deny communion. Nevertheless, these themes and
their  implementation  as  essential  ecclesiological  aspects  of  East  Syriac
identity  were  dependent  on  the  strength  of  contemporary  East  Syriac
ecclesiastical organisation; the interests of the contemporary religious  élite
and their ability to enforce these views; the East Syriac patriarch's interests
and  style  of  managing  the  community  –  whether  more  monarchical  or
conciliar in approach – and the degree of interaction with the Holy See and
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interest in its ecclesiological model. 
With Sulaqa emerging out of an East Syriac community with limited
geographic and ecclesial horizons as of the sixteenth century it is unclear as
to  his  level  of  awareness  of  the  intricacies  of  the  positions  which  his
community  held  to  during  earlier  eras  where  greater  ecclesiological
reflection  was  possible.  Moreover,  it  seems  unlikely  Sulaqa  would
necessarily accept the jurisdiction of the pope over his patriarchal leadership
as  anything  more  than  a  legitimate  if  convenient  method  to  grant  him
sufficient ecclesiastical rank to return to Mesopotamia as head of the non-
hereditary  East  Syriac  faction.  Sulaqa  perhaps  regarding his  engagement
with the pope as akin to the rôle which the Roman patriarch had in patristic
times as an arbiter in matters of ecclesiological disagreement.  (Murre-Van
Den Berg 2005, 315) If Sulaqa was perhaps not aware of the exact nature of
Sawma's interactions  with the papacy it  is  possible he was aware of the
extent  of  the  Church of  the  East  having fulfilled  the  Great  Commission
throughout Asia since the fifth century apart from Petrine influence. Coming
from a tradition which had developed a sense of its ecclesial jurisdiction
derived at least in part from its missionary exploits and these as proof of the
patriarch's authority Sulaqa perhaps saw little need to accept the juridical
authority of the contemporary pope and to defer to him for the indefinite
future. 
This is disputed by contemporary Chaldean scholars however. Albert
Abouna  suggests  that  Sulaqa  and  his  associates  were  well  aware  of  the
expected  requirements  for  communion  with  the  Latin  church  being  `not
simple  people'.  The  decision  to  engage  with  Latin  representatives  was
preferred  to  those  of  the  Byzantine  church  because  the  Latins  were
considered to be more similar theologically. (Abouna 2013)12  The contacts
between the Byzantines and members of the Church of the East were, by the
sixteenth  century,  likely  limited  due  to  geographical  distance  and  the
complications  of  Ottoman  occupation.  Prior  to  that  time  contacts  were
limited  to  the  Holy  Land  and  Cyprus  or  perceptions  from  communal
memory  of  what  the  other  professed  to  believe.  Although  Byzantine
12 Abouna is one of the oldest living Chaldean priests – in his tenth decade as of 2015
– and has had a long scholarly career.
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expansion  in  Central  Asia  was  not  unheard  of  so  there  were  some
possibilities of connections with the East Syriacs at this juncture.  (See, for
example, Dauvillier 1979) It may have been that the traditional East Syriac
perception of the Catholicos-Patriarch as head of all the churches of the east
was  considered  a  similar  position  as  that  possessed  by the  Holy  See  as
patriarch of the Western Christian oikumene and this seems to have been
emphasised by Rabban Sawma in his meetings in Rome when `Mar Papa'
Nicholas IV himself noted the leadership role which the institution of the
papacy purported to hold over the universal Christian community.  (Budge
1928, 177–178, 191, 196) This in contrast to Byzantine ecclesiology which
affirmed that  ecclesial  authority  was manifested through an Oecumenical
council and not in the office of one man.13
Nevertheless, some deference to the papacy as an institution appears
to  have  been  believed  to  be  necessary  as  the  pope  gave  Sawma a  bull
permitting the East Syriac patriarch to govern the Christians of the East and
confirmed  Sawma  as  the  Visitor-General  in  the  patriarch's  jurisdiction.
(Budge  1928,  196) Whether  this  was  from Sawma's  perspective  a  mere
formality or expression of good will from the pope may never be known but
it shows the inter-relation between the jurisdictions of West and East could
be re-affirmed with relative ease and indicates that Nicholas IV, Benedict XI
and  their  advisers  assumed  the  Church  of  the  East  as  holding  to  a
complementarity  view  of  the  other's  ecclesial  community  as  at  least  a
partner in international Christian life if not a community which should defer
in matters of ecclesiological doubt to the contemporary pope.
Sulaqa's status quo and legacy
In attending upon the  pope Sulaqa  gained a  source  of  legitimisation  for
clerical rank sufficient to act as head of the East Syriac community. This
13 A significant and strong relationship between the Holy See and the Mongol khans
emerged in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with hopes for widepsread Mongol
conversions to Christianity.  Such a relationship perhaps also influenced East Syriac
perceptions of the papacy and acted as an encouragement to engage more closely with
the Latin community. The Il-Khanid rulers Gazan (1295–1304) and his brother Oljaitu
(1304–1316)  had  both  been  baptised  as  children,  for  example,  with  the  latter's
baptismal name Nicholas given in honour of Pope Nicholas IV. (Ryan 1998, 416 n. 33;
Baum and Winkler 2003, 96–97; Cf Morgan 2014, xv–xvii; Budge 1928, 174)
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link  with  the  contemporary  pope  by  extension  granted  Sulaqa  and  his
successors  potential  partnerships  with  Latin  institutions  which  became
substantial influences upon the development of Sulaqa and his community
and of the East Syriac tradition as a whole. Furthermore, it granted him at
least theoretically a degree of protection by the Holy See over his activities:
he  had become the  pope's  man in  Mesopotamia.  The  granting  of  senior
ecclesiastical rank to Sulaqa was vital to shore up his position for his return
home as – unbeknownst to the Holy See at the time of his consecration – the
legitimate, if hereditary, patriarch Shemon VII still held office. It had been
conveyed  to  the  pope  by  the  Sulaqites  that  Shemon  was  incapacitated.
(Wilmshurst  2011,  299;  Baumer  2006,  248) A situation  which  implied
Sulaqa and his supporters were very determined to wrest authority over the
Church of the East away from those who held power.
Nonetheless, I suggest that perhaps the Sulaqites sought a return to a
more just and stronger model of church governance as when the number of
suitable patriarchal relations declined in the line of hereditary succession the
church’s centralised authority could weaken. (Cf Baumer 2006, 233) I also
suggest  the  reduction  in  the  geographical  sphere  in  which  the  church
operated led to altered perceptions of what was attainable for the community
with fewer resources. A smaller geographical sphere in which to organise
the  church  also  leading  to  the  growth  of  more  intensified  and  varied
personal relationships.  Rivalries  which only heightened due to hereditary
succession and limited the opportunities for clergy to advance to the highest
office and senior episcopal  positions.  (Cf Baumer 2006, 247)The rôle  of
monastic involvement is also significant as during the church's missionary
expansion they were at the forefront of nearly all activities. By the time the
church had declined the monks perhaps sought to restore their positions of
influence.  Moreover,  as  they  were  somewhat  isolated  by  nature  the
opportunity for dissent towards the authority could have been co-ordinated
in their  more  closed  monastic  environment.  Ambitious  clergy seeking to
gain office to direct the church and unable to avail themselves of the usual
opportunity for advancement in the episcopate would at least have a base for
personal spiritual and educational advancement within the monastery.
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Early Chaldean identity
A  separate  ecclesial  organisational  identity  among  the  East  Syriac
community as so far as such existed from the 1550s was in the process of
formation  and  diffused  among  those  loyal  to  Sulaqa.  The  dioceses  of
Salmas, Urmia and Erbil which supported him were all traditionally strong
centres  of  East  Syriac  religious  life  and  Sulaqa's  position  was  further
reinforced by the fifty doctors of the East Syriac élite who attended him in
his  travels  via  Jerusalem  to  Rome.  (Murre-Van  Den  Berg  2009,  155;
Babakhan 1900, 489) However, the construction of a specifically Chaldean
religious identity did not take place at the same time as the instigation of the
Sulaqite line other than to form in opposition to the Church of the East and
to identify with the Holy See as a link of episcopal legitimacy.
The formalisation of the Latin perception about the Chaldeans as a
distinct ecclesial identity was held in the context of the term natio. It should
not be understood as the Holy See as having an awareness of the specific
national or ethnic character of those who became Chaldeans if indeed any
such character existed. Natio was used from a Latin perspective in a manner
to  describe  a  group which  had a  shared  ecclesial  identity  drawn from a
distinctive cultural  milieu and according to the geographical and political
circumstances in which it was found. The term was linked also to that of
ritus,  traditio and  Ecclesia which  were  in  the  post-Tridentine  era  used
interchangeably. (Faris 2002, 283)
Natio had a wider application in the context of the Ottoman Empire
which  Heyberger  outlines:  `le  terme  de  <<nation>>  désignait
indifféremment  des  groupes  qui  se  distinguaient  par  leur  costume,  leur
religion,  leur  langue,  leur  organisation  sociale,  leur  mode de  vie  ou  par
pleusieurs de ces critères'  (Heyberger 1994, 63) In this sense it was not a
term exclusive to Christian communities and could be equally applied to
Kurds,  Arabs,  Jews  etc  and  it  was  –  if  nothing  else  –  an  attempt  at
sociological declension of Ottoman society's plurality to ensure a means to
administer such diverse communities.  Natio becoming reinforced through
the millet system under which non-Muslims were governed by the Ottomans
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and thus attaining a meaning which in the context of eastern Christians in
union with the Holy See aided the adoption of the Tridentine concept of a
universal Catholic Church of rites – which were largely coterminous with
natio.
Sulaqa's successors
Despite the initial  enthusiasm for Sulaqa's consecration by his supporters
only in Amid and Mardin was support found for Yohannan VII on his return
to Mesopotamia.  (Baumer 2006,  248) Support  was particularly strong in
Amid from where the Capuchin Franciscans organised their missions and
Sulaqa  first  established  his  patriarchal  headquarters  there  on  his  return.
(Teule 2011c) Perhaps in his absence some were found lukewarm in their
earlier support for upsetting the status quo and despite the despatch of two
Dominicans from Malta to consolidate Sulaqa's work ecclesial separatism
declined in popularity.  (Tisserant 1931, col. 228–229) Sulaqa came to an
ignominious end being murdered by drowning in 1555. It was later alleged
that Shemon VII had bribed the Ottoman authorities 200 gold pieces to carry
out the deed. (Baumer 2006, 248; Babakhan 1900, 489) Whether this was, in
fact, the exact set of circumstances such an accusation is indicative of the
strength of feeling and intensity of relationships among contemporary East
Syriac factions. The event continues to have resonance with Sulaqa regarded
as a martyr by many Chaldeans.
Sulaqa's successors who attempted to maintain a link with the Latin
missionaries  and communion with the  pope were:  (Cf  Wilmshurst  2011,
345, 477)
• Abdisho IV (1555–1570)
• Yahballah IV (1570–1580)14
• Shemon IX (1580–1600)
14 Some authors suggest another patriarch – Abraham – led the Chaldeans from 1570–
1577. This was, however, disproved by the two most recent scholars to consider East
Syriac patriarchal lineages in some depth: Wilmshurst (2011, 345) and Murre van Den
Berg (1999, 251–252 ff).
                                                              38
• Shemon X (1600–1638)
• Shemon XI (1638–1656)
There was a strong Latin missionary interest in maintaining the Sulaqite line
and Le Coz indicates Abdisho IV was closely controlled by the Holy See
and this was perhaps in recognition of his intelligence and ecclesiological
knowledge. Nonetheless, as Abdisho was invited to present his profession of
faith at  the Council  of Trent this  would seem to deny any suggestion of
disloyalty to the pope either in jurisdictional or theological terms. (Le Coz
1995, 329; Labourt 1908a, 559; Dib 1914, 25)
However,  the  movement  of  successive  patriarchs  to  residences  in
remote locations around northern Mesopotamia inhibited their contacts with
Latin missionaries. Abdisho initially established the patriarchal residence in
the  monastery  of  Mar  Jacob  the  Recluse  near  Seert  whilst  Shemon  IX
moved to  Salmas and his  successor  Shemon X left  for  Kochanes  in  the
Hakkari mountains despite expressing a desire to visit Rome to express his
loyalty to the pope and to ensure the education of his clergy in the Papal
States.  (Teule 2011a; Le Coz 1995, 329; Wilmshurst  2011,  317; Labourt
1908a, 560)
Wilmshurst suggests the gradual geographical retreat was to avoid
representatives of the legitimist patriarch and the Holy See engaging with
the Chaldeans. (Wilmshurst 2011, 322–323) Baumer argues it was to avoid
Ottoman persecution  for  having brought  into  their  Empire  agents  of  the
dominant socio-religious actor in Europe and a combination of these factors
was  likely  to  have  been  the  catalyst.  (Baumer  2006,  248) Labourt's
suggestion  that  the  Turco-Persian  Wars  of  the  early  seventeenth  century
limited  the  patriarch's  freedom of  movement  and caused interruptions  in
communication  with  Latin  representatives  is  perhaps  the  most  likely.
(Labourt 1908a, 560; Wilmshurst 2000, 25; Murre-Van Den Berg 1999, 235)
One effort to retain the Holy See's confidence came from Shemon XI
who wrote to Pope Innocent  X (1644–1655) in 1653 stating that  40,000
families were loyal to him across twenty-eight `districts'. (Wilmshurst 2011,
349; Lampart 1966, 233) This attempt to impress the pope does not seem to
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have had the desired effect, however, and as the Latins became aware of the
illegitimate way in which the Sulaqa line originated, through contacts with
the legitimist East Syriac patriarchal line, there was likely far less concern
for advancing the Sulaqite  patriarchal  claimant  as the lawful  East Syriac
leader and in 1672 the Sulaqites finally ended attempts at communion.15
I suggest there was for the Sulaqites no religious reason not to return
to  the  belief  patterns  of  the  Church  of  the  East.  The  development  of  a
separate  ecclesial  identity  was  not  sufficiently  observed  to  ensure  the
widespread  acceptance  of  post-Ephesian  Christology  and  Latin
ecclesiological  beliefs  as  defined  at  the  Council  of  Trent.  Instead  the
Sulaqite community retained its traditional position and until their relative
resurgence  from  the  nineteenth  century  following  the  intervention  of
Anglican,  Latin,  protestant  and Russian  missionaries  became a  narrowly
focused group extremely limited in their geographical reach and religious
influence.
It  should  be  emphasised  that  from  1553  to  1650  the  Chaldean
ecclesial structures were weakened through little notion of how an eastern
Christian community in union with the pope was supposed to develop. The
main other example of an emerging eastern Catholic ecclesial community of
a Syriac tradition were the Maronites. The example of the Maronites to the
best  of  my knowledge was  not  formally  utilised  to  develop  a  Chaldean
community  which  replicated  their  ecclesiastical  organisation.  However,
what the Maronite example provided was a basic outline for the construction
of a Chaldean eastern Catholic rite ecclesiology which could be adapted to
the  particular  requirements  of  the  Mesopotamian  Christian  milieu.
(Heyberger 1994, 232–239) 
Nevertheless,  the  creation  of  ecclesial  structures  with  a  Chaldean
ethos remained challenging with a lack of interest to maintain ``Chaldean-
ness''  from those East  Syriacs who had initially sought support from the
15 The East Syriac communities of India engaged with the Latin church at a different
pace to those in Mesopotamia with the context of Portuguese imperial ambitions in
south  Asia  and  the  Indian  Ocean  seeing  the  eventual  enforcement  of  Latin
ecclesiological norms from the mid-sixteenth century over resident East Syriacs. This
is discussed further below.
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pope. (Valognes 1994, 433) The East Syriac leadership's efforts in attaining
communion with the pope and pursuing a distinctive Chaldean identity were
not always met with support from the laity or other clergy: Shemon XII's
correspondence  with  Pope  Alexander  VII  (1655–1667)  in  1658  strongly
criticised by his congregations.  (Labourt 1908a, 560; Badger 1852a, I:149)
It appears a key stumbling block was the acceptance of Tridentine beliefs on
the  governance  of  the  universal  church  and  the  derivation  of  ecclesial
authority  from  the  Holy  See.  An  issue  which  detracted  from  the
independence  which  the  East  Syriac  church  had enjoyed for  most  of  its
existence. Indeed, if the instructions of Pope Pius IV in `Romanus Pontifex'
(1564) were to be followed the local Latin Catholic ordinary had complete
jurisdiction  over  all  eastern  Christians  regardless  of  ecclesiastical  rank.16
`Romanus  Pontifex'  being  issued  with  a  view  to  ensuring  that  those
communities  in  union with  the  Holy  See  were  protected  from error  and
deviation in their faith. (O’Mahony 2008, 241)
The acceptance of contemporary Christological and ecclesiological
trends by the East Syriac Chaldean faction's leadership was a requirement
by the Holy See for their being accepted into communion. Also there was a
sense  that  personal  loyalty  to  the  contemporary  pope  was  obligatory  as
epitomised by the Chaldean patriarchal claimants normative attendance in
Rome to receive the pallium. This personal  interaction with the pope an
opportunity for the Holy See to impress the need for an avowed Tridentine
ecclesial  identity  among  the  Chaldeans.  Nevertheless,  was  this  such  an
apparently  simple  procedure  and  would  the Chaldean  leadership  have
viewed affirming a  Latin  Credo and receiving  the  pallium as  bestowing
them  authority  and  communion  with  the  Holy  See?  If  the  Chaldean
patriarchal  claimants  were  fully  aware  of  the  traditional  status  of  their
forbears and the influence they wielded throughout Asia did they consider
they lacked true apostolicity, valid clerical orders or the authority to assert
their own jurisdiction? How could the Chaldeans become in effect a junior
partner in an ecclesial community whose leader purported to be the Vicar of
Christ on Earth given their forbears had once held a far wider geographical
16 Not  to  be  confused  with  Pope  Nicholas  V's  bull  of  the  same  name  in  1454
concerning the Portuguese Empire's expansion.
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jurisdiction  than  the  Latin  church?  A leader  who,  further,  viewed  the
Chaldean  community  not  as  a  church  but  as  an  ecclesial  rite  under  his
overarching jurisdiction.
To  combat  any  doubts  as  to  the  superiority  of  the  Tridentine
paradigm and in attempts to align East Syriac with Tridentine ecclesiology, I
suggest,  rapprochement  on  issues  of  ecclesiastical  organisation  and
Christology  became  the  focus  of  Latin  missionary  work  from  the  late
sixteenth century. A process which through sustained education of the East
Syriac communities as to what was considered acceptable ecclesiologically
eventually  resulted  in  moulding  an  eastern  Catholic  Chaldean  rite  fully
cognisant of such an identity by the late nineteenth century. 
However, Latin efforts were complicated because missionaries were
unlikely  to  have  been  entirely  certain  of  the  normative  nature  of  the
Chaldean community.  The intention was not to create more Latin Christians
but to pursue union with those outside of the jurisdiction of the pope whilst
ensuring  they  retained  their  existing  liturgical  practices  and  aspects  of
ecclesial  identity which were in accord with Tridentine ecclesiology. The
close  ecclesial  bond which  the  Chaldean Church came to  have  with  the
papacy was and is  a  key  marker  of  its  identity  and suggestive  that  this
originated as a result of a desire to transcend any theological controversies
by instead promoting the more simplistic ecclesiological link with the pope
as the means to form a union.
Latin presence in Mesopotamia (I)
The Latin presence in Mesopotamia derived from two main factors: (1) the
expectation  of  widespread  change  of  allegiance  among  the  East  Syriac
population during the mid-sixteenth century to union with the Holy See and
(2) the increasingly strong Latin Augustinian and Carmelite  presences  in
Persia and along the trade routes through the Indian Ocean to south Asia and
China. (F. Richard 1990) The connections with India and Persia reflected the
traditional links which the Church of the East had in these regions such as
Basra, Isfahan, Pondichery and Kerala the key points on the trade route and
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subsequently areas of Latin expansion. (Flannery 2013, 78–81)
The impetus of Latin expansion originating from the post-Tridentine
zeal for overseas missions and also Trent's focus upon the Orient to revivify
native  Christian  communities.  (Heyberger  1994,  227–228  ff) With  the
foundation of the Propaganda in 1622 we may surmise that the missions
took on a more organised manner with the establishment of a Latin ecclesial
presence in Baghdad in 1632 related to this. This establishment also segued
with the increasing Ottoman military presence and attempts to definitively
wrestle  control  of  Mesopotamia  from  the  Safavid  Persians.  Growing
Ottoman dominance and relative openness to western powers meant Latin
agents could proceed into Mesopotamia.
Timoteo  Perez  (1632–1639),  first  Latin  Vicar  for  Babylon,17
represented  the  Holy  See's  interests  in  Mesopotamia  and  held  tentative
oversight for Latin engagements with the East Syriac communities.  (Filoni
2008, 24) Latin efforts to gain adherents to a Chaldean ecclesial identity
were particularly successful  in  the regions  surrounding Mosul  and Amid
from the  mid-seventeenth  century.   (Wilmshurst  2000,  26) Nevertheless,
given the internecine conflicts  occurring within the groups and the small
number of persons involved low level political clashes and the influence of
one cleric over a village affected the the populace's religious affiliation and
meant the Holy See's general missionary policy was difficult to direct.
It is not clear what Latin missionary policy was in the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries and whether adoption of a set of theological
views  or  a  different  type  of  ecclesiastical  organisation  was  of  greater
significance  to  the  East  Syriacs.  The  Propaganda  granted  support  in  a
general  sense  and  encouraged  mutual  support  between  each  missionary
order but on a practical basis this would in turn vary as those on the ground
would  be  operating  largely  independently  and  following  pragmatic
approaches. (Cf Flannery 2013, 81–82)
One may note from the missionaries' actions, from a post-Tridentine
Catholic perspective affirming the Pope's primacy, that it was normative to
approach the East Syriac patriarch to convince him of the rectitude of the
Catholic Faith. If in failing to attain this goal a focus then shifted to a lower
17  The then European appellation for Baghdad.
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level of bishops and priests and subsequently to the community at  large.
(Valensi 1997, 263–264 ff)
Legitimist line of patriarchs of Seleucia-Cteisphon 
(1591–1700)
The legitimist hereditary line of patriarchs who resided in and around Mosul
became as active in contacts with Latin missionaries as their proto-Chaldean
peers under Elias VIII (1591–1617).18 (Baumer 2006, 249) From 1610 Elias
VIII's engagements resulted in Franciscans visiting him to investigate the
possibility of union with the Holy See. This was followed by an invitation to
the Franciscan superior at Aleppo, Tommaso da Novana, to a synod held at
Amid in 1616 with the apparent purpose of initiating union.  (Murre-Van
Den Berg  1999,  244;  Abdoulahad and Chabot  1896,  69) If  a  union was
created formally it did not last beyond Elias' death the next year, most likely
due to his continued attachment to Nestorius which ended the opportunity
for establishing his community as Chaldeans. (Frazee 1983, 143; Cf Badger
1852a, I:149)
Discussions continued under Elias IX (1617–1660) who accepted a
Latin creed but commemorated Nestorius in the liturgy and denied the title
of Theotokos to the Blessed Virgin. (Murre-Van Den Berg 1999, 245) In an
attempt to curry favour with the Latins Elias IX withheld the appointment of
a hereditary successor to demonstrate his desire to alter church governance
in conformity with Latin practice in the appointment of bishops. (Murre-Van
Den Berg 1999, 245; Wilmshurst 2011, 326) Possibly the nature of church
governance  could  have  been overlooked were the  legitimists  to  disavow
18 From the fourteenth century the East Syriac patriarch resided in the vicinity  of
Mosul. Ecclesiastically Mosul had been a joint metropolitanate with Erbil  from the
ninth  century  but  in  the  thirteenth  these  were  separated  owing to  a  decline  of  the
Christian  presence.  Despite  Tamerlane's  invasions  of  the  late  fourteenth  and  early
fifteenth centuries the Mosul region was unaffected as its governor surrendered directly
on his  advance thus for  a  time preserving the  city's  safety.  From the  mid-fifteenth
century the patriarchal residence shifted to the monastery of Rabban Hormizd, about
thirty miles north of Mosul in the vicinity of the town of Alqosh. Thus, it is common to
find the legitimist line described as the Mosul patriarchate or as resident in Alqosh.
(Wilmshurst 2011, 286–288; Harrak 2003, 293–294)
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their support for the two Christological points of contention. 
Elias X (1660–1700) attempted some contact with the Holy See in
1669 but on the basis of a request for a chapel at the Holy Sepulchre in
Jerusalem but also an East Syriac seminary in the Papal States. (Wilmshurst
2011, 326; Murre-Van Den Berg 1999, 246) This was perhaps an attempt to
reclaim the  Chapel  of  the  Crucifixion in  the Holy  Sepulchre which  was
permitted for East Syriac use at least as of 1607.  (Brock 2006, 189–190,
198)
Ottoman administrative influence
As the Church of the East consolidated its position following the attacks of
Tamerlane so the Ottomans expanded their empire in the Mediterranean and
south-west Asia. The Ottomans occupied Mesopotamia in 1534 remaining in
control until 1919 and their political and social influence were lasting upon
all  the East  Syriac factions.  However,  from 1501–1732 the Shia Safavid
dynasty in Persia was sufficiently strong to pose as an existential threat to
the Sunni Ottomans. Subsequent wars between the two empires caused a
divide in the work of the East Syriac patriarchs as dioceses were split by
Ottoman-Safavid  jurisdictions.  (Baumer  2006,  248) The  divide  also
prevented a contiguous attempt by Latin missionaries to obtain the ecclesial
allegiance  of  the  East  Syriac  communities  and  develop  a  Chaldean
community homogeneously.
The  impetus  for  Latin  advances  religiously  and  politically  in  the
Ottoman Empire were reinforced through the Catholic  European military
victories  at  Lepanto  (1571),  Vienna  (1683)  and  Belgrade  (1716).  These
successes were only partly responsible for these advances, however, as from
1569, with the Capitulations treaty between the French and Ottomans, Latin
missionaries  were  already  freely  operating  within  the  Empire.  The
Capitulations  were  a  mutually  beneficial  series  of  treaties  between  the
Ottomans  and  French  and  later  other  European  powers.  The  French
capitulations granted freedom of movement to Latin missionaries within the
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Empire  which  extended  French  influence  within  the  Levant  and
Mesopotamia. (Frazee 1983, 67)
The Ottoman Empire's multi-confessional nature presented the ruling
élite with the challenges of maintaining superior legal status for Muslims
whilst  also providing a  framework to  administer  non-Muslims.  The non-
Muslim communities were divided according to confession into millets and
granted  the  right  to  govern  themselves  through  their  own  customs  and
practices. 
The Church of the East was placed under the Armenian millet  in
1461.  The  Armenian  millet  extending  into  those  areas  of  the  eastern
Ottoman Empire where East Syriac communities could be found it perhaps
seemed a reasonable administrative alteration especially given the relatively
small  size of the East Syriac communities.  (Le Coz 1995, 311–312) The
effects  of  such  a  system  upon  the  East  Syriac  community  had  been
experienced  under  the  Sasanian  Empire.  In  the  early  fifth  century  Shah
Yazdgard I (399–420) granted the Church of the East status as a `legitimate
minority group'  and the patriarch the authority  to govern the community
according  to  their  own  customs.  (Gillman  and  Klimkeit  1999,  113)
Following the Arab invasions such a system of control for each non-Muslim
community continued and was reinforced by the Islamic dhimma concept. 
The dhimma paradigm encompasses those ``people of the book'' in
Islamic  jurisprudence  whose  religious  liberties  are  guaranteed  in  law
following the payment of the jizya (poll) tax. Quite apart from the economic
disadvantage,  the gradual  deterioration of Christian communities resulted
from the emphasis upon their lower status – being considered qualitatively
different in legal matters – and regular if not consistently violent incidents
of persecution which they experienced under Ottoman rule.
Ottoman  Mesopotamia  was  divided  into  three  major  provinces
focused on the cities of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra with the northern area of
Ottoman jurisdiction – the province of Sharizoor – administered largely by
autonomous  Kurdish  tribes.  (Tripp  2007,  8–9) Ottoman  administration
should not necessarily be considered as detrimental to East Syriac life with a
renewal  in  Christian  literary  production  from  the  seventeenth  century
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perhaps evidence of the benefits which the combination of Ottoman rule and
a  Latin  missionary  presence  engendered.  (Ainsworth  1841,  52;  Rassam
2010, 105; Murre-Van Den Berg 2006a, 10–11)  Nevertheless, the pressure
applied to the churches by the Ottomans who knew of Christian political
weakness was exploited. The Chaldeans and other eastern Catholics were
protected to an extent as the Holy See's influence via the French diplomatic
corps could alleviate the position of the communities. However, at a local
level some compromises with the Ottoman authorities were very difficult to
escape from and viewed by some Christians as a means of advancement. 
The establishment of the Josephite patriarchal line in 
Amid
The era 1670–1750 for the Chaldeans was defined by the establishment of a
third line of claim to the East Syriac patriarchate at Amid under Capuchin
Franciscan direction. Initially the rejuvenation of the Latin presence in Amid
was intended to restore a previously strong Chaldean diocese but which had
fallen back under the Church of the East's influence. (Badger 1852a, I:150)
With  missionary  success  came  the  intention  of  developing  a  stable
patriarchal line for the Chaldeans loyal to the Holy See and under close
Capuchin direction. Capuchins were present in northern Mesopotamia from
1636 and having consolidated their mission in Mosul were in a position to
expand their activities by the 1670s. (Fiey OP 1965a, I:56)
Shimun XIII Denha (1662–1700) had ended the Sulaqite relationship
with the Holy See in 1672. (Baumer 2006, 248; Bello OAOC 1939, 5) Thus,
until 1681 with the formal establishment of the new Chaldean patriarchal
line a nine year gap existed whereby there was no patriarch, recognised by
the  Holy  See,  among  the  potentially  Chaldean  parties.  The  increasing
preponderance  of  Latin  missionaries  ensured  the  Chaldeans  were  not
without any spiritual  support and direction during this  period.  It  is  quite
probable that some returned to the allegiance of the Church of the East but
the exact nature of this remains unknown. It should not be thought that a
Chaldean  identity  existed  only  among  those  who  had  entered  into
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communion with the Holy See nor that those who were in communion had
completely disavowed their beliefs which accorded with their background in
the Church of the East. The Chaldean community was not created ex nihilo
but primarily through gaining the allegiance of those within the East Syriac
community who were sympathetic to the idea of union with the Holy See
and/or the advantages which association with the Latin missionaries might
bring them.
Aside from restoring the Chaldean patriarchate the expansion of the
Capuchin  mission  in  Amid  also  took  place  in  the  context  of  the  recent
centenary  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Council  of  Trent  in  1663  and  the
consolidation of eastern Catholic populations in the Levant. The perception
that it was an opportune time for a rejuvenation of the Chaldean community
seems likely to have been a theme not far from the minds of the Capuchins.
(Lampart  1966,  87–90) There  was  perhaps  also  a  level  of  competition
between  the  Latins  working  in  the  Levant,  Mesopotamia  and  Persia  to
advance the cause of their own religious orders.
The leader  of  the  new patriarchal  line  was  Joseph,  the  legitimist
Metropolitan of Amid. His intention of entering into union with the Holy
See is found in a letter he wrote in October 1670 affirming his full accord
with  Tridentine  ecclesiological  and Christological  views.  (Lampart  1966,
95–97) He proved zealous for advocating for a Chaldean community and as
of 1672 he was active outside of his own diocese visiting the East Syriacs of
Mardin to this end. (Lampart 1966, 98)
Following Metropolitan Joseph's affiliation with a Chaldean identity,
he and the Capuchins came into conflict with the legitimist patriarch, Elias
X, who sought to overthrow his meddlesome bishop, whether by bribes or
the  intervention  of  the  Ottoman  authorities.  Nonetheless,  Joseph  was
granted recognition by the civil  power in  1677 as  head of the Chaldean
community. Ottoman support for Joseph indicative that the approval of the
local administration was required to freely operate in the Empire.19
19 In 1672 when Joseph's position had been earlier disputed by Elias X, an Ottoman
governor in Amid was called upon to discern his legitimacy as the leader of the local
East Syriac community.  (Abdoulahad and Chabot 1896,  passim) In this instance the
governor upheld Joseph's position.
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Following secular approval Joseph was granted religious authority
from the  Holy  See as  ``patriarch of  the  Chaldean nation  deprived of  its
patriarch''  in 1681.  (Abdoulahad and Chabot 1896, 71–77) The somewhat
unclear nature of this title and as to the authority and/or jurisdiction which it
granted reflected the contemporary ecclesiological theory particular to the
East Syriac situation. It appears to have been based in the notional hope that
at  a  future  time  the  two patriarchal  lineages  within  the  sphere  of  Latin
missionary activity – legitimist and Josephite – could be reconciled into a
single  line.  (Wilmshurst  2011,  331) The  legitimist  patriarch  retained the
cachet  of  legitimacy and  regardless  of  disagreement  with  Tridentine
ecclesiology this lawful status was greatly valued by the Latins. Perhaps it
was considered that were the legitimist patriarch to die his community could
be persuaded to  enter  into union with the  Holy  See under  the  Josephite
claimant  or  alternatively  that  the  legitimist  patriarch  could  himself  be
brought into union with the Holy See and the need for the Josephite line
would cease. (Cf Badger 1852a, I:150)
The patriarchal title also reflects the Holy See's desire to care for
those Chaldeans who had previously been loyal to the Sulaqite patriarchal
claimant. With Shimun XIII Denha ending his relationship with the Holy
See  in  1672  those  who  still  desired  union  with  the  Holy  See  were  the
Chaldean  nation  deprived  of  a  patriarch.  This,  however,  did  leave  the
Chaldean Josephite patriarchal line lacking legitimacy or at least in the same
position  which  Yohannan  Sulaqa  had  experienced  following  his  own
elevation in 1553 insofar as neither had been the legitimate patriarch of the
Church  of  the  East  before  entering  into  union  with  the  Holy  See.
Nonetheless, as of the 1670s the Tridentine paradigm imbued and expressed
by  Latin  missionaries  appears  to  have  ensured  that  regardless  of  the
Josephite line's legitimacy it had a greater sense of purpose, self-awareness
of what was required of an eastern Christian community in union with the
pope and likelihood of success. I suggest this was the time by which it was
well understood that the ideal was for the formation of a universal church of
a plurality of ecclesial rites as opposed to a communion of churches under
the oversight of the pope as had been advanced in Latin ecclesiology prior
                                                              49
to  Trent.  Joseph  I's  letter  to  the  pope  of  October  1670,  for  example,
emphasises especially the union with the Holy See and submission to the
pope's  authoritative jurisdiction.  Albeit  written under  the guidance of the
Capuchins the letter reflects also their awareness of Tridentine ecclesiology:
`Praetera firmiter credo et suscipio quaecumque docet Ecclesia Catholica Romana et
tradit  circa  septem  Sacramenta  novae  legis  et  amplector  omnia  Concilia  et  omnia
quaecumque  constituerent  in  eis  Patres  ex  voluntate  Summi  Pontificis  Capitis
Ecclesiae...Et  tandem  ipsum  Deum  deprecor  ut  me  dignetur  adiuvare  et  faciat  ut
teneam quod dixi et scripsi firmiter exequendo, et Ecclesia redeat ad gremium matris
suae  pristinae  et  oves  ad  Pastorem  qui  est  Summus  Pontifex  sedens  in  Ecclesia
Romana.' (Lampart 1966, 97)
The  pursuit  of  a  Tridentine  influenced  Chaldean  identity  was  strongly
pursued under the new patriarch and his successors Joseph II (1696–1713)
and Joseph III (1713–1757). An identity expressed, for example,  through
Latin devotions  such as the Rosary.  (Murre-Van Den Berg 1999, 258) It
seems  Latin  efforts  were  aided  by  the  Josephite  patriarchs'  leadership
qualities: Joseph I's charismatic personality attracted Christians from as far
as Baghdad to hear his preaching; Joseph II was remarkable for his pastoral
efforts during an outbreak of plague in 1713 and died whilst  ministering
among  the  faithful.  (Abdoulahad  and  Chabot  1896,  86–87;  Wilmshurst
2011, 331)
During  Joseph  II's  rule  Latin  theological  trends  were  firmly
established due to his interest in their application to the Chaldeans and he
outlined his thought in the Book of the Magnet and the Book of the Polished
Mirror works which emphasised a Tridentine approach to ecclesiology and
the necessity of East Syriac union with the Holy See.  (Teule 2011b, 435–
436) Latin  influence  was  also  seen  in  his  consideration  of  sacramental
theology where he emphasised the distinction between mortal  and venial
sins in which had not been common in the Church of the East if at all to that
time. (Teule 2004, 235)
Joseph  II's  expositions  were  related  to  the  influence  of  precise
delineations in theology which were expected of all clergy in union with the
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Holy  See  after  the  Council  of  Trent  where  a  Scholastic  approach  was
considered  necessary  to  defend  and  uphold  the  Faith  due  to  protestant
attacks and a desire to distinguish between the theology of the Byzantine
patriarchates and the Holy See. (Teule 2011b, 436; Heyberger 1994, 435)
The  Josephite  patriarchs'  openness  to  Latin  theological  influence
extended further than any earlier Chaldean group due to frequent visits of
their  clergy to Europe especially the Papal states.  Joseph I,  for example,
spent  five  months  in  Rome  in  1675  as  he  grew  in  his  position  of
responsibility for the Chaldeans of Amid prior to his elevation as patriarch
and from 1694 until his death in 1707 resided in Rome as he was too ill to
conduct his office.  (Abdoulahad and Chabot 1896, 84–85) He must have
imbibed the culture and nature of Tridentine ecclesiology and would have
gained a greater understanding of what was proposed for eastern Catholics.
Whilst Latin efforts focused on the Josephites the relations with the
legitimist line continued under the tutelage of the Discalced Carmelites and
Dominicans.  (Frazee  1983,  210) The Latins  presumably maintaining  this
level of presence throughout Mesopotamia to ensure the Chaldean project
succeeded in some form. The ties of family and tribe powerful influences in
the retention of association with one or other East Syriac community. It is
telling, for example, that in the absence of a key Josephite leader that men
should  revert  back  to  the  Church  of  the  East.  Whilst  Joseph  III  toured
Europe  in  the  1720s  to  gain  funds  for  the  church  in  Mesopotamia  the
legitimist patriarch was able to gain the affiliation of East Syriacs in Seert.
Joseph appears to have made little effort  to stamp his authority over the
Chaldeans leaving much work up to the Capuchins. (Wilmshurst 2011, 332;
Frazee 1983, 210)
This example suggests that the Catholicity of the communities was
limited when not directly supported by leaders staunchly in favour of union
with the Holy See and the adoption of Tridentine ecclesiology. Moreover,
circumstances could change very dramatically: at the death of Joseph III in
1757 only one Josephite Chaldean bishop remained. (Wilmshurst 2011, 332)
Another  problem for  the  Josephite  line  was securing consistent  financial
support  as  despite  the  efforts  of  Joseph III  and his  successor  Joseph IV
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(1757–1780)  in  extensive  fund  raising  in  Europe  there  was  always  a
shortfall. It is not clear, for example, whether this was a direct result of a
shortage of funding from the Holy See or the result of the further payment
of taxes and bribes to the Ottoman authorities. Joseph IV, for example, was
imprisoned by the Ottomans in the 1780s due to an unpaid debt of 20,000
piastres. (Frazee 1983, 212) 
By the 1770s the patriarchal leadership began to stagnate and Joseph
IV  appears  to  have  lacked  the  stamina  or  desire  to  remain  in  office,
gradually  withdrawing  from public  life  and resigning  the  patriarchate  in
1780. The Holy See appointed him patriarchal administrator and he spent
the last five years of his life in Rome. This development suited both Joseph
IV and the papacy as the latter was permitted to wind down the Josephite
line as pressure increased on the legitimist patriarch to enter into union with
the Holy See.  Due to growing popular support among the legitimists  for
engaging with the Latin missionaries by the 1720s the Patriarch Elias XII
(1722–1778) was persuaded of the viability of pursuing a Chaldean identity.
(Frazee 1983, 210–211)
The  Josephite  line  for  all  its  advantages  as  the  first  Chaldean
community formed under direct Latin instruction lacked numerical strength
and  legitimacy  as  the  original  patriarchal  line  still  occupied  the  See  of
Mosul  and  the  contemporary  patriarchal  residence  of  Rabban  Hormizd
monastery.  (Wilmshurst 2011, 333) The travels and absences of patriarchs
Joseph III and IV across the Middle East to Europe emphasised the very
large amount of day-to-day religious work to be carried out by the lower
ranking Chaldean clergy and Latin missionaries. 
Joseph III's  absence in  particular was to the Chaldeans'  detriment
who  required  patriarchal  leadership  to  counter  the  increasingly  effective
missionary efforts of the Church of the East under Elias XII.  (Wilmshurst
2000, 27) Moreover, despite the Latin missionaries preferences for working
with  the  Josephites,  the  legitimists  at  least  maintained  their  patriarch
resident in Mesopotamia. However, if we consider the Chaldean project's
success in  the long term this  period of  international  travelling helped to
emphasise to the Holy See and the Propaganda the vitality and persistence
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of the Chaldeans in looking to achieve success for their mission. If Joseph
III and IV did not appreciate it at that time they were providing a foundation
on which to build the Chaldeans' future as a presence at the heart of the
universal  church.  The  importance  of  supporting  a  literary  revival,  for
example,  should  not  be  underestimated  especially  in  the  context  of  an
increasingly cosmopolitan Chaldean population throughout the Middle East
from the beginning of the nineteenth century.20
Why be a Chaldean?
This section considers the continued appeal which the Chaldean identity and
union with the papacy had for East Syriac community members. I note three
key factors:
1. The argument from authority The Holy See, regardless of whether
East  Syriacs  would  accept  its  jurisdiction  in  the  seventeenth  and
eighteenth centuries, was considered to have authority derived from
the apostolic era. The Roman see held a significant position in the
international Christian community which was never disputed even if
papal supremacy was questioned. (Murre-Van Den Berg 2005, 306–
309) Following contact  with Latin missionaries  and exposition of
their  beliefs  regarding  authority  in  the  universal  church  unity
through  communion  with  the  contemporary  pope  grew  as  an
important  distinguishing  marker  and  one  of  pride  for  those  who
became Chaldeans. (Khayyath 1896a, 146–148)  
In  considering  general  trends  among  the  East  Syriac
community  I  suggest  many  would  have  merely  followed  the
authority figures of their priests or heads of family. Furthermore, if
liturgical  practice  and  ecclesiastical  organisation  largely  remained
the same under Chaldean auspices there were limited objections to
be raised. By way of comparison the transfer of allegiance to one or
other East Syriac faction in this context a free choice outside of the
20 Joseph IV assisting in the publication of liturgical works such as a Syriac-Arabic
Chaldean missal. (Joseph IV 1767)
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European Reformation milieu where alterations in religious identity
were enforced with some violence  and were popularly opposed.21
Nonetheless,  the  opportunity  for  remaining  part  of  a  community
which one knows rather than which may provide better  resources
could have been a factor in retaining membership of the Church of
the East. Formal distinction between Chaldeans and the Church of
the East may have been less common in general as there only latterly
developed  a  notion  of  defined  socio-juridical  barriers  between
ecclesial bodies under the tutelage of Latin missionaries. (Murre-Van
Den Berg 2005, 301 n. 3)
2. The earnest desire for the Catholic Faith To write on the Chaldeans
from the sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries is to bring to light
an  extended  process  of  community  and  identity  formation.  The
maintenance of a Chaldean identity explicitly differentiated from the
Church of the East was at least not initially clear for many of those
East Syriacs who aggregated to the Chaldeans. For those who had a
Western-inspired education and thus more likely an awareness of the
Holy  See's  ecclesiology  and  Christology  the  assent  to  convert  to
Catholicism may have been more from intellectual conviction than
from spiritual, emotional or familial causes. It is evident that many
were sincere  in  their  desire  to  be  in  union with  the  pope with  a
genuine belief in the rectitude of Tridentine ecclesiology. Patriarch
Joseph  II  of  the  Josephite  line  is  one  example.  (Cf  Teule  2004;
Rassam  2010,  111–112) However,  with  a  lack  of  contemporary
accounts and without a window into others' souls one will unlikely
ever  conclusively  prove  if  a  conversion  of  the  heart  took  place
among Chaldean believers on a widespread scale. Such a conversion
being the point  of no return and the time from which a  previous
affiliation and identity is shed in favour or a new one. In our present
era which places much emphasis on the individual, their desires and
interests it is perhaps harder to comprehend the influence which the
leaders of a community can have over the belief patterns of a whole
21 For example the various anti-Protestant risings in England such as the ``Pilgrimage
of Grace" (1536) and Western Rising (1549).
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group. Indeed, as Maggiolini notes regarding the formation of Syrian
Catholic groups: `the particularly clannish and tribal social structures
were  in  fact  favouring  mass  conversions  sustaining  the  fast
development of new local religious communities.' (2012, 262) Thus,
for the Chaldeans we might not support a conversion of the heart and
comprehension of the new faith by the individual as the conversion
process  most  widespread.  Whereas,  the  most  likely  process  was
assent by East Syriac leaders to the Catholic faith as preached by
Latin missionaries followed by the diffusion of such beliefs widely
among the respective tribe/village associated with the leader. Such a
process  was  top-down  and  was  the  general  but  not  universal
procedure for conversions followed by the Latin missionaries in the
Middle East. (Masters 2001, 71) I suggest that the conversion of the
heart was therefore restricted to a few individuals with the majority
accepting the new  status quo for pragmatic reasons. Nevertheless,
through the diffusion of Latin missionary teaching it seems likely
some  would  have  gradually  had  an  experience  related  to  their
personal beliefs about their faith which no longer permitted them to
exist  in  a  state  of  contradiction  –  either  to  go  with  the  Latin
missionaries  and  their  associated  institutions  or  to  remain  solely
within the religious milieu of the Church of the East.
3. As suggested by Murre van den Berg: a growing separation between
Aramaic  and  Arabic  speaking  groups  within  the  East  Syriac
communities  in  Mesopotamia (Murre-Van  Den  Berg  2009,  157)
Maurice Briere's translation of a Syriac history of the monastery of
Rabban Hormizd gives an example of a monk who is said to have
separated from the Church of the East partly as a result of learning
Arabic. The distinction in the text from his actually becoming a true
Christian (from the perspective of the Chaldean author) by becoming
a Catholic is clear: `il vécut avec des chrétiens et se mit à étudier la
langue arabe; après avoir appris la lecture de l'arabe, il renonça à sa
religion et devint chrétien.'  (Gë’dan 1910, 414) This separation has
been maintained to  the present  day as in  general Arabic speakers
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form a larger proportion among the Chaldeans and Syriac speakers
in  the  Church  of  the  East.  (Petrosian  2006,  127) Those  eastern
Catholic communities in the Middle East which had been established
during  the  eighteenth  century  were  specific  conduits  of  western
Christian knowledge via French, Latin and Arabic. These included
the Melkite Catholic (1724), Coptic Catholic (1741) and the Syrian
Catholic (1781). The spread of the use of a common language such
as  Arabic  or  Latin  among  the  Chaldeans  to  engage  with  other
churches in the Middle East and act as a medium of exchange of
ideas was vital  for the importation of Latin theological  ideas and
western cultural and social innovations from other eastern Catholic
communities especially the Maronites. The resources which became
available  and the  linguistic  link  to  the  European Catholic  powers
which appeared to be successfully combating the Ottoman Empire
were strong influences upon those in the churches aware of wider
geopolitical events. (Cf Murre-Van Den Berg 2008, 321–322) These
material  and  intellectual  benefits  influenced  the  continued  East
Syriac engagement with the Holy See despite apparent opposition to
accepting  the  the  contemporary  pope's  authority  as  head  of  the
universal  church.  This  factor  also  ties  in  with  the  economic
advantages which membership of the Chaldean community granted
in  Mosul.  Khoury  argues:  `The  most  prominent  among  them
[Christian  urban  elites]  embraced  Catholicism  as  a  marker  of
affluence'  (Khoury 1997, 148) Affluence which was often closely
tied  to  the  use  of  Arabic  as  a  means  to  expand  one's  mercantile
activities.
Latin presence in Mesopotamia (II) and the 
unification of the Chaldean communities
From the  mid-eighteenth  century  Latin  missionary  efforts  to  expand  the
Chaldean  community  across  Mesopotamia  were  increasingly  successful.
Wilmshurst  highlights  the  conversion  of  the  Metropolitan  of  Salmas,
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Shemon (1777–1789): `taking with him most of the Nestorians of Khosrowa
and  the  other  Christian  villages  in  the  Salmas  plain  [of  north-eastern
Mesopotamia].  Only  one  village,  Ula,  remained  stubbornly  Nestorian.'
(Wilmshurst  2000,  28;  Wilmshurst  2011,  328) The  concentration  of
Capuchins, Dominicans and Carmelites creating an environment in which
the Chaldean project could come to fruition. (Cf Habbi 1971, 128–130)
General Latin missionary policy for the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries in Ottoman territory appears to have been directed at improving
standards of clerical education among the eastern Catholic communities and
a  wider  appreciation  of  their  history  through  the  collation  of  existing
literature.  The  confirmation  from  the  Council  of  Trent  requiring  every
Catholic  hierarchy  to  maintain  seminaries  and  support  the  professional
development  of  the  clergy  as  an  élite  class  perhaps  influencing  this
development in Mesopotamia and the Levant.22
With the increase in the Chaldean community's size the legitimist
patriarchs engaged strongly with the Latins. Elias XII through his contacts
with the Dominicans had a profession of faith approved via the auspices of
Emmanuel, the Latin Archbishop of Babylon in 1771. (Labourt 1908a, 560)
Meanwhile the Sulaqite line patriarch Shemon XV (1740–1780) resident in
Kochannes also affirmed a Latin Christology.  (Dauvillier  1942, 373) The
allegiance of the Sulaqites was not retained beyond Shemon XV's death in
1780.  His  desire  for  union with  the  Holy  See  perhaps  poorly  supported
among his community.
The  next  fifty  years  of  East  Syriac  history  focused  on  familial
disputes  within  the  legitimist  line  and  Josephite  reluctance  to  cede
leadership of the Chaldeans as required by the Holy See. From the 1770s
explicit  Christological  and  ecclesiological  disputes  whilst  used  to  smear
opponents  for  political  advantage  seem not  to  have been at  the  heart  of
contentions  between  the  Josephites  and  legitimists.  (Baumer  2006,  248,
250) Disputes  instead concentrated on the emerging claims of  Yohannan
Hormizd as patriarch of a united East Syriac community in union with the
22 An exemplary type of this new clerical class was the Maronite J S Assemani (b.
1687 d 1768) who greatly aided the furtherance of knowledge of the Syriac churches
through his work Biblioteca Orientalis. (Assemani 1719)
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Holy See.
Yohannan was born in Alqosh in 1760 and rose to influence as the
Natar Kursya to Elias XII. Yohannan had replaced the original successor to
Elias, Ishoyab, in 1776 who Yohannan asserted:
`joined  himself  to  the  holy Church [of  Rome],  and six  times  he recanted,  and the
oftener  he  left  the  orthodox  faith  the  more  he  used  to  blaspheme,  and  that  from
covetousness, and a love of money which were inherent in him' (Badger 1852a, I:151)
Ishoyab also sought to gain the Holy See's support to displace his uncle and
after Elias XII's death he became patriarch of the legitimist line as Elias XIII
(1778–1804) establishing a line of hereditary succession in his family but
gaining  favour  with  the  Latin  missionaries  by  asserting  a  post-Ephesian
Christology.  (Wilmshurst  2000,  29;  2011,  335) However,  his  Latin
sympathies  were  merely  a  façade  for  advancing  his  own  interests  and
abandoned them as soon as the Ottomans granted him the civil recognition
of patriarchal authority. (Bello OAOC 1939, 11)
Yohannan, meanwhile, became Metropolitan of Mosul in 1780 with
the  Holy  See's  approval  following  his  adherence  to  Tridentine
ecclesiological  and Christological  norms from 1778.  Subsequently,  those
legitimists with sympathies for union with the Holy See supported him as a
patriarchal  candidate  in  resistance.  Yohannan's  efforts  to  undermine  his
cousin’s patriarchal leadership saw the start of a fractious twenty year period
of competition by both leaders for diocesan bishops' loyalties. (Habbi 1971,
134–135; Wilmshurst 2011, 335)
Although  Yohannan  affirmed  an  apparently  strong  belief  in  post-
Ephesian Christology and Tridentine ecclesiology the Holy See declined to
grant  him  patriarchal  authority  instead  naming  him  as  patriarchal
administrator.  (Badger  1852a,  I:152) Following  this  apparent  snub  from
1783–1830  Yohannan’s  position  of  loyalty  fluctuated  from  a  close
relationship with the Holy See to a near complete withdrawal of support
with some accusations that he was still `nestorien de coeur'.23 (Bello OAOC
23 A first hand account by Yohannan is found as an English translation from the Syriac 
original in Badger (1852a, I:150–160).
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1939, 12) 
Divisions  between  the  East  Syriacs  were  complicated  by  the
interventions of the local Ottoman authorities who patronised one or other
patriarchal  claimant  with  a  view to  political  and financial  gain.  (Badger
1852a,  I:156) Thus,  when a  Yohannan loyalist  visited  an  area  under  the
control of an Ottoman leader supporting Elias, imprisonment and corporal
punishment  followed.  (Badger  1852a,  I:153) Fortunately  for  Yohannan's
ambitions Elias XIII died in 1804. However, his position was not assured
and further challenges emerged from within the Chaldean community from
the lay leader Gabriel  Dembo and the Josephite line patriarchal claimant
Augustin Hindi. 
Joseph IV had died in retirement in Rome in 1796 and his nephew
Augustin Hindi acted as  de facto patriarch to the Amidite Chaldeans from
that time until his death in 1827. Hindi was a strong threat to Hormizd's
potential  advancement.  Bello  presents  East  Syriac  population  figures  for
1796 with the Josephite adherents at least twenty-five percent of the entire
community with a third of the priests.24 
Meanwhile, Gabriel Dembo sought to reinvigorate the East Syriac
monastic  tradition  through occupying the monastery of  Rabban Hormizd
and  establishing  the  religious  order  of  the  Chaldean  Antonians  of  the
Congregation of St Hormisdas (OAOC) similar to that founded among the
Maronites  in  the  seventeenth  century.  (Gë’dan  1910,  410,  415) The
Antonians  were  a  well  established  group  from  a  similar  linguistic
environment in whose footsteps it  was relatively easy to tread – Dembo
having  become familiar  with  their  community  in  Aleppo.  (Bello  OAOC
1939, 41–45)
The  independent  work  undertaken  by  Dembo  was  met  with
suspicion by Yohannan. Dembo was potentially a very dangerous threat to
his  position  because  he  was  a  ``new  man''  with  organisational  acumen
gained from his  earlier  life  as  a  merchant  which,  perhaps  paradoxically,
granted him opportunity to make a success of rejuvenating monastic life.
24 `Patriarcat de Diarbekir [Josephite]' 35 priests and 1,061 families and `Patriarcat de
Babylone' 64 priests and 2,962 families – totalling 99 priests and 4,033 families. (Bello
OAOC 1939, 13)
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(Bello  OAOC  1939;  Gë’dan  1910,  423) Independent  organisation,  well
planned and with a professional ethos, was difficult to reconcile with the
nepotistic  control  maintained,  however  unofficially,  within  East  Syriac
communities. 
From 1808 Dembo’s efforts focused on a pedagogical system which
embraced a syllabus of Arabic, logic and liturgical studies. (Badger 1852a,
I:162) This was not remarkable per se as East Syriac monasteries had been
centres of higher learning during the church's missionary period (c. 400–
1300). (Brock 2009, 66–70; Teule 2002, passim) What was remarkable was
delivering this  quality  of  education into the East  Syriac heartland in  the
modern era. Despite the clerical formation offered by Latin missionaries and
some Chaldean  clergy  travelling  to  the  Papal  States  for  advanced  study
these influences  were  not  yet  sufficiently  diffused  for  the benefits  to  be
spread  throughout  the  community.  Thus,  Dembo  offered  an  alternative
means of advancement in education for many eager students.
Dembo was founding his congregation at the right time insofar as the
local  Latin  missionaries  were  in  fact  limited  in  activity  in  the  early
nineteenth century and not necessarily available to train new clergy:
`De 1800 à 1811 il n'y eut que deux PP. Dominicains en Chaldée et le dernier quitta
Mossoul en 1815; il n'y revinrent qu'en 1841. À Diarbékir la mission des Capuchins fut
abandonnée de 1803 à 1808; elle reprit ensuite pour deux ans, en 1828 pour quelques
mois,  enfin  elle  fut  reconstituée  à  Mardin  en 1841.  Même pénurie  de personnel  à
Bagdad que le dernier Père Carme quitta en 1825.' (Bello OAOC 1939, 25)
The possibility of influence in ecclesial affairs gaining ground outside of the
traditional  clerical  groups was an issue of  contention for Yohannan with
monks chosen as bishops and thus patriarchs in the East Syriac tradition.
(Bello OAOC 1939, 37) Therefore, Rabban Hormizd's re-development was
also a threat to maintaining the future premier status of the leading clerical
family – the monastery was a historic centre of East Syriac spiritual life and
had an aura of respectability to which others looked with interest.25 
25 The monastery had been established in the seventh century by the monk Hormizd an
influential religious figure among the Church of the East of that time renowned among
the community for holiness and also for success in opposing West Syriac expansion.
(Bello OAOC 1939, 62; Budge 1902, II:, part I:85–90, 117–118, 134–141)
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Dembo and Yohannan as opposition figures
Dembo's community expanded rapidly: in 1808 Dembo had two others with
him  by  1827  there  were  ninety-three.  (Wilmshurst  2000,  263–264)
However, these efforts were not free from the injudicious methods which
some  East  Syriac  factions  were  prepared  to  utilise  for  political  gain:
accusations of corruption and misuse of position were made by Dembo's
supporters against Yohannan in 1812 which saw him suspended by the Holy
See as patriarchal administrator with Augustine Hindi placed in control over
both Chaldean patriarchal lines. (Bello OAOC 1939, 17–18) Yet in 1816 the
Latin Vicar Apostolic for Mesopotamia wrote to the Propaganda supporting
Yohannan which eventually resulted in a formal reconciliation between he
and Pope Leo XII (1823–1829) in 1826. (Habbi 1971, 140) Despite  the
conflict between Dembo and Yohannan the reinvigoration of monastic life at
Rabban  Hormzid  was  of  long  term  benefit  to  the  Chaldean  community
throughout the rest  of the nineteenth century with the level  of education
among the  monks of  a  high  standard  and saw them raised  up as  future
church leaders such as patriarch Joseph VI Audo (1847–1878). 
In  an  attempt  to  consolidate  his  position  Augustine  Hindi
consecrated  five  new  bishops,  receiving  the  pallium  in  1818,  however,
recognition from the Holy See as patriarch did not come. (Habbi 1971, 138)
It  has been suggested the pallium was instead given as a reward for his
administrative efforts during the discord among the Chaldean communities.
(Wilmshurst 2011, 333) Nevertheless, Hindi considered it as confirmation of
his  status  as  patriarch  and  from then  until  his  death  considered  himself
Patriarch Joseph V.
Three  of  Joseph  V's  newly  consecrated  bishops  attempted  the
creation of a new clerical group in opposition to Yohannan and it would
seem also against Joseph V a situation which continued from 1822–1827
and ended with the Holy See's intervention following the death of Joseph V
in 1827. (Badger 1852a, I:163) This the opportunity the Latin missionaries
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had sought and as Wilmshurst argues about Yohannan: `despite his many
faults,  [he]  was  a  good Catholic,  or  at  least  could  be  presented  as  one'
(Wilmshurst 2011, 338) Thus, the apparent patriarchal authority which the
see at Amid had been granted was definitively withdrawn and by 1830 and
through the intervention of the vicar apostolic in Mesopotamia Yohannan
was granted the title of Chaldean patriarch. Yohannan VIII must have had
extraordinary ambition to maintain his efforts over the half century which it
took him to gain patriarchal office given he was seventy-four at the time of
his acknowledgement by the Holy See. (Wilmshurst 2011, 339) It therefore
seems likely that his agitation was derived at least in part from a vocational
calling and a hope for union with the Holy See and not just a desire for
power and advancement within the East Syriac community.  Having been
named Natar Kursya at the age of sixteen this event surely made a lasting
impression on his early psychological and religious formation and as to why
he regarded his pursuit of the patriarchate as lawful.
2. Political change in Mesopotamia and the 
origins of the modern Chaldean Church 
(1830–1918)
Following the final Ottoman conquest of Mesopotamia in 1704 and until
1831 with the assertion of direct Ottoman rule the Mesopotamian provinces
were administered by a series of pseudo-independent Georgian mamluks.26
By 1749 the Georgians had so consolidated their power that the sultan was
obliged to accept their  effective autonomy. There was little to which the
Porte could be opposed as the Mamluks could be relied upon to secure the
region against  threats  from Persia  or  the  Russian  Empire.  Such was the
strength  of  their  leader,  Daud  Pasha  (1816–31),  that  he  refused  Sultan
Mahmud II's (1808–1839) request to leave his post when requested in 1830.
Direct  Ottoman  military  intervention  followed  in  an  attempt  to  prevent
complete  political  autonomy  for  Mesopotamia  as  Mohammed  Ali  had
26 Mamluks were freed slaves trained originally as a military force by Muslim rulers in
the Middle East. The most famous dynasty of which ruled Egypt and Syria during the
mid-thirteenth to early sixteenth centuries.
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pursued in Egypt. 
The  1830s  was  a  difficult  decade  for  northern  Mesopotamia.  A
plague of 1831 had severely affected the economy and the Kurds viewed the
disruption caused by the changing patterns of rule in Mesopotamia proper as
an opportunity to assert  their  independence via  a series of revolts  which
negatively impacted the surrounding populations including the East Syriac
communities. Alqosh was attacked, for example, and severely damaged in
1832. (Bazzi 2008, 11)
This period of political difficulty seguing with the modern Chaldean
community's emergence did not see Yohannan VIII usefully employed in
consolidating his flock. Nevertheless, Tfinkdji does write highly of him: `La
conversion de Jean VIII Hormez inaugurait une nouvelle phase de prospérité
et  de  bonheur  pour  l'Eglise  chaldeénne'  (Tfinkdji  1913,  15) Whereas,
Yohannan VIII sought to maintain the practice of hereditary succession and
to place his chosen candidate as the next patriarch and continue his feud
with Gabriel  Dembo.  A feud which ended after  Dembo's  death  during a
Kurdish raid of 1832. (Wilmshurst 2011, 383; Gë’dan 1910, 410; 1911, 355)
However,  Bishop Joseph Audo, the future patriarch,  Joseph VI, intrigued
with Rabban Hormizd's  monks to  gain their  tithes which perhaps should
have been paid directly to the patriarch rather than Audo as the local bishop.
The ensuing row was brought to the Holy See's attention which sent the
apostolic  vicar  of Aleppo to consider  the matter  directly.  Eventually,  the
vicar  found in favour  of  Yohannan VIII  but  by this  time,  1835,  he  was
increasingly  frail  and  resided  in  Baghdad  until  his  death  in  1838.
(Wilmshurst 2011, 383–385)
Ecclesiological discourse and developments
Any formal relationship between East Syriacs and Latins was complicated
by discussions over the juridical authority of the Petrine See and as to what
was  the  East  Syriac  Christological  paradigm  and  if  it  was,  in  fact,  an
expression of extreme dyophysitism akin to what was perceived to be the
heresy of Nestorianism. 
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If  we  accept,  following  Wilmshurst,  that  the  latest  and  most
authoritative Christological statements of the Church of the East come from
Abdisho, Metropolitan of Nisibis, in his work  The Pearl of 1298 we may
assume  that  this  remained  their  standard  Christological  outline  to  the
nineteenth  century  and  the  gradual  revivification  of  their  scholarly
undertakings  via  Latin,  Anglican,  protestant  and  Russian  missionary
influence.27
Abdisho's work confirmed the `formula of [Theodore of Mopsuestia]
two natures in two hypostases and one person'. (Wilmshurst 2011, 273–275,
281) It  is  not  clear,  however,  if  the  level  of  knowledge  among  the
community  extended  far  enough  to  debate  on  theological  disputes  apart
from the rudiments of their faith. Indeed, as Wilmshurst outlines throughout
his work The Ecclesiastical Organisation of the Church of the East 1318–
1913 (2000) at  least  from the  sixteenth  century  and until  the  nineteenth
scholarly output focused on copying manuscripts and not original works.
The protestant missionary Asahel Grant observed in the 1830s that in the
Sulaqite community only the patriarch had a complete text of the Bible and
this split into several volumes and loaned out to the clergy. (Grant 1841, 65)
From the Latin perspective it is not clear as to whether missionaries
acknowledged  the  variation  of  depth  in  theological  education  prevalent
among the East Syriacs or worked from the assumption that all expressed
Nestorian Christology – as they perceived it – and based their proselytising
efforts  from  this  premise.  I  suggest  that  owing  to  a  lack  of  ecclesial
distinctiveness  it  was  at  least  until  the  unification  of  the  claims  to  the
leadership of the Chaldean Church in 1830 a relatively informal procedure
to move between the East Syriac communities. 
It  appears  that  for  those  converts  of  who  had  received  a  more
advanced  education  there  was,  for  example,  acknowledgement  of  the
doctrine preached by the Latins of extra ecclesiam nulla salus.  (Smith and
Dwight 1833, II:252) However, where a rudimentary level of education was
relatively  widespread  then  to  approach  someone  to  discourse  on  papal
primacy,  ecclesial  jurisdiction  or  Christological  nuances  would have  had
27 Badger provides an English translation: (1852b, II:380–422)
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little  impact.  Although  the  increasingly  distinctive  liturgical  and  para-
liturgical practices which the Latin missionaries introduced whether through
praying the Holy Rosary or the celebration of feasts such as Corpus Christi
or the devotion to the Five Sacred Wounds of Christ would have contrasted
the differences between the communities. (Gë’dan 1910, 422)
It  appears  that  until  an  ecclesial  distinctiveness  became  readily
apparent  the  Holy  See  adopted  a  cautious  approach  to  conclusively
supporting the Chaldean community as indicated by the reluctance to grant
titles to Augustine Hindi and the intention to gain the legitimist patriarchal
line's allegiance. (Cf Labourt 1908b, 230) 
From the late  1830s confidence  appears  to  have  risen among the
Latins that the Chaldean project was on the right path with the Chaldean
episcopate increasingly free of the parochial culture which appeared to exist
among  the  community.  The  Latin  confidence  was  summarised  by  the
Protestant missionary Asahel Grant:
`The Papists in Mesopotamia have assured me that no effort will be spared to convert
the whole of the Nestorian Church to their faith; and this report is confirmed by letters
since received from Bagdad, one of which says that three bishops and priests, educated
at  the  Propaganda,  were  ``about  going  to  Mosul  to  hold  a  convention  to  devise
measures to bring over all the Nestorians to the Romish faith!'' [sic] '  (Grant 1841,
47–48) 
These attempts to gain the adherence of the entire East Syriac population
were complicated by the Latins' desire to do so in a manner which assumed
the  existing  limits  of  East  Syriac  dioceses.  A  potentially  complicated
procedure involving competition with the  de jure claims from the Sulaqite
patriarch with one diocese potentially professing loyalty to him and another
to the Holy See. This was never settled and in practice determined on a
village by village basis instead. (Badger 1852a, I:172–173) 
Nicholas I Zaya
Nicholas  I  Zaya  (1838–1847)  was  appointed  to  succeed  Yohannan  VIII
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directly by the Holy See. This intervention did not endear either him or the
papacy in the person of Gregory XVI to the hierarchy of the Chaldeans who
regarded this as a grave imposition.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 33; Badger 1852b,
II:165) Moreover, as Nicholas was a Persian subject there may have been
some  grumblings  as  to  his  suitability  to  lead  what  was  becoming  an
increasingly  Mesopotamian focused Chaldean community.  The monks of
Rabban Hormizd under the tutelage of the emerging leadership of Joseph
Audo were also antagonistic to Nicholas and he had to work extensively to
gain their  approval.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 33; Cf Badger 1852a, I:168–169)
Nicholas' difficulties were compounded in 1843 following his suggestion to
introduce  the  Gregorian  calendar  but  the  level  of  opposition  became so
strong that the plans were withdrawn. (Badger 1852a, I:170)
A success  arrived  in  1845 as  Nicholas  gained the  support  of  the
monks at  Rabban Hormizd and together they attempted to improve their
financial  arrangements  by  restoring  some  agricultural  properties  in  and
around Alqosh to their ownership. (Badger 1852a, I:171) However, this was
opposed  by  disaffected  parties  who  sought  Nicholas’  overthrow  via
accusations of corruption to the Holy See.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 34; Badger
1852a, I:170–172) The Holy See not in a position to have access to a full
account of events supported the accusers and sought to investigate Nicholas
who instead resigned from the patriarchate in 1847 and died in 1855. 
Changes among the Ottomans
From  October  1844  the  Chaldean-Ottoman  relationship  altered  on  an
administrative level. The Chaldeans were brought within the structure of the
millet  system under the aegis of the Armenian Catholic millet  with their
patriarch working on the Chaldeans' behalf at the Porte.  (Gaunt 2006, 13;
Maggiolini  2012,  271) Legitimising  the  Chaldean  position  came  in  the
context  of  Ottoman  social  and  legal  reform  introduced  by  Sultan
Abdulmecid I (1839–1861) referred to as the  Tanzimat. The changes were
implemented to bring the Empire in line with contemporary military, social,
economic and political trends prevalent among the European powers whose
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dominance in the Mediterranean was increasing at a rate the Ottomans were
nearly  unable  to  match.  The  most  significant  trend  came  in  the
standardisation in bureaucracy and administrative structures over and above
arbitrary use of power in patronage networks. (Ceylan 2010, 69–71) 
The  greatest  benefits  to  the  Empire's  Christians  came  in  the
pronouncement of the Hatti Serif (1839) and Hatti Humayun (1856) which
gave explicit  equality in law to all  Christian communities with the latter
effectively ending the use of  sharia and the millet system. However, legal
equality brought with it the Muslim populations' ire. The change in social
status for Christians threatened Muslim led judicial and statutory paradigms
from which most existing Ottoman laws derived. (Movsesian 2010, 2) The
reforms  saw,  amongst  other  aspects,  the  prohibition  of  the  slave  trade,
universal conscription including of non-Muslims, the introduction of a post
office  system and the  establishment  of  secular  law courts.  All  of  which
required  significant  financial  backing  to  follow  through,  complete  and
maintain  against  the  recalcitrance  of  the  established  power  groups.  The
reforms altered the strength of the ulema and Janissaries who dominated the
legal and coercive structures in Ottoman society and led to their disaffection
regarding the Empire's overall direction: whether as less determined by a
particular religious paradigm and essentially westernised or Islamicised and
maintaining the traditional order. The latter which would return Christians to
their position of diminution.
The reforms' implementation slowed due to the internal opposition
and with the effects of the 1873 international Great Panic financial crisis the
Ottomans  were  unable  to  sustain  the  Tanzimat  due  to  insufficient  tax
revenue. From 1878 Sultan Abd al-Hamed II (1876–1909) re-consolidated
the  sultanate's  powers  and  re-instituted  an  explicitly  Sunni  cultural  and
social paradigm throughout the Empire. 
From the 1870s the Chaldeans were increasingly dependent on how
the Ottomans conceived Christian status within the Empire in general. The
changing  social  circumstances  moving  towards  and  away  from  greater
social  mobility  saw Christians throughout the Middle East expedite their
efforts  to  self-improvement  in  recognition  that  education,  vocational
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training and commercial development were vital to ensure they could retain
a position of something approaching the higher social status of the Muslim
population. 
Concurrent  with  Mespotamian  Christian  advancement  was  the
consolidation of the Mesopotamian Shia population which had undergone a
revival from the late 1700s following widespread conversions among the
southern tribes. (Ceylan 2010, 35; Nakash 2003, 28–29) Such a situation did
not  necessarily  imply  a  volatile  or  sectarian  situation  but  as  religious
affiliation defined community paradigms it also led to reconsideration of the
social order and as to who ought to control political affairs. The question of
political control was brought to the fore with the Young Turks' accession to
power  in  Constantinople  from 1908.  Mesopotamia's  ethnic  and religious
plurality did not concur with the views of the Young Turks who fomented a
zeal for a supposed Turkish ideal of ethnicity and culture and as the supreme
race in opposition to any other within the Empire.  Christian engagement
with western political ideals through their education or mercantile activities
saw them increasingly involved in Arab nationalist groups and in opposition
to these  Turkish efforts  with  the foundations  of  modern  Arab nationalist
thought constructed by a significant proportion of Christian intelligentsia.
This related to opposing the political  dominance of Sunni Islam but also
through a genuine belief in nationalism's vitality as an ideal to overcome the
boundaries of religious communities and Turkish domination of the Arab
Middle East.
Eastern Catholic consolidation, the Chaldeans 
and the First Vatican Council
The  Chaldean  Church's  strength  from  the  1850s  onward  relied  on  the
ecclesiology  which  Nicholas  I's  successor,  Joseph  VI  Audo,  developed.
Audo  asserted  a  vision  of  effective  church  governance  through
strengthening the apostolic zeal and level of religious education among the
Chaldean clergy and laity. (Cf Wilmshurst 2011, 386) Audo was convinced
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of  a  close  Chaldean relationship with the Holy  See and Christologically
distinct from the Church of the East but this did not prevent his desiring
ecclesial  autonomy  and  attempting  to  justify  this  whenever  possible.
Valognes  appraises  Audo’s  position  thus:  `Une  personnalité incontestée,
sincèrement attachée au catholicisme, mais qui ne fait pas mystère de sa
fidélité à la tradition orientale' (Valognes 1994, 434)
Audo's pursuit of autonomy was brought into focus when in apparent
contravention of papal authority he consecrated bishops for the East Syriac
congregations in India in 1860 and later also in 1874 and 1875.  (Pius IX
1872, passim) Those East Syriac rite Indian Catholic communities came to
be known as the Syro-Malabarese which reflected their religious, linguistic
and geographic origins. 
The Indian East Syriacs had a consistently challenging relationship
with Latin missionaries who entered the sub-continent from the sixteenth
century  under  the  auspices  of  the  Portuguese  Empire.  Traditionally  the
Indians  had been under  the Patriarch of Seleucia-Ctesiphon's  jurisdiction
and reliant upon him for episcopal consecrations. Following the Chaldean
community's  foundation  the  Indians  looked  to  Yohannan  Sulaqa  and  his
successors  for  episcopal  replacements.  The  Holy  See  opposed  this
arrangement primarily due to the papacy having reserved the right to choose
bishops  for  India  since  the  sixteenth  century  and,  secondly,  due  to  the
increasing strength of the Portuguese Padroado28 in India and the assertion
of Latin jurisdiction over all the Christians of the region regardless of pre-
existing  ecclesiastical  organisation.  (Habbi  1980,  86) The  situation  was
further complicated by the Indians asserting a more independent character
than their continuing relationship with the Mesopotamian based East Syriacs
would suggest with a strong desire expressed to retain Malabarese cultural
distinctiveness. (See, for example, Podipara 1970; Cf Habbi 1980, 84)
By  the  eighteenth  century  and  despite  the  long  term  Portuguese
28 The Padroado was an arrangement formed between the Portuguese Empire and the
Holy See.  It  granted the Empire  de facto control  over Latin religious communities
within its territories. Numerous conflicts of interest  arose but it  had the advantage,
from the perspective of the Holy See, of ensuring the consolidation of Catholicism
among one of the largest and most influential Empires of its time. (Cf Teles e Cunha
2011, 53–54)
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imperial  presence  and  Latin  jurisdiction  the  significance  of  receiving
bishops from Mesopotamia was not lost on the Malabarese and despite the
last  Mesopotamian  appointed  bishop  dying  at  the  end  of  the  sixteenth
century  communal  memory  remained  strong  of  traditional  practices  and
supportive of their continued implementation. The Malabarese sought the
Chaldean hierarchy's assistance in 1796 with a delegation visiting Mosul but
the responsibility of the Chaldeans for the provision of clergy – as opposed
to their appointment by the Holy See – was not conclusively resolved at that
juncture most likely due to the contemporary factionalism prevalent among
the Chaldeans.  (Habbi 1971, 131–132) Joseph VI when called upon from
1860, however, considered episcopal consecrations for India were within his
remit. The Holy See opposed this regarding it as an attempt to impugn the
powers of the Indian based and Latin influenced hierarchy.
The  right  to  consecrate  bishops  may  at  first  appear  a  somewhat
insignificant  issue both in  relation to  Joseph VI and to  the status  of  the
Malabarese East Syriac Christians. However, the situation is indicative of
the following:
• The  contemporary  significance  of  traditional  procedures  for
appointing  bishops  and  relevance  to  day-to-day  ecclesiastical
administration.
• Another aspect of the legacy which the Chaldeans assumed from the
Church of the East.
• The  role  of  Latin  missionaries  in  defining  eastern  Catholic
ecclesiology as opposed to the desire of eastern Catholics to retain
existing customs.
• The identity of the East Syriac tradition could not be confined to the
culture  and  customs  of  Mesopotamia  alone  but  retained  an
international aspect.
The Holy See's concern for the situation in India related to the extent to
which  an  eastern  Catholic  patriarch  could  unilaterally  provide  episcopal
consecrations for a group operating within an environment dominated by the
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Latin clergy. I suggest as the Chaldean situation developed vicariously from
the  1550s  the  implications  of  the  Holy  See's  rôle  in  Malabarese  and
Mesopotamian affairs was likely little considered. Furthermore, in asserting
his jurisdiction over the Indian territories Audo perhaps did not realise the
extent to which the Holy See considered the appointment of bishops as its
own prerogative. 
In  view  of  attempting  some  standardisation  of  practices  among
eastern Catholics Pope Pius IX (1846–1878) had implemented changes in
ecclesiastical  administration.  The  Chaldeans  were  affected  by  the
implementation of the ecclesiastical  constitution `Reversurus'  through the
bull of 1869 `Cum ecclesiastical disciplina'. The latter permitted the Holy
See to confirm who was and who was not to be appointed as bishop in every
diocese  and  confirmed  to  the  Chaldeans  their  position  as  a  community
directly reliant on the Holy See in these matters. (Baumer 2006, 252)
 In the 1830s with the unified Chaldean community's establishment it is not
clear whether this was an issue of discussion and due to satisfaction with the
co-operation  of  the  Chaldeans  the  issue  was overlooked.  Alternatively  it
may have been discussed and accepted at the time with less thought given to
its future implications.
Audo's relationship with the Holy See came to a head at the First
Vatican Council (1869–1870) regarding the extent of papal authority over
all  other  bishops  and  as  to  the  influence  which  the  dogma  of  papal
infallibility  might have over local  traditional practices.  (Bury 1930, 100)
Audo considered it impossible for patriarchal rights to be withdrawn by the
Holy See and further argued that the position of the eastern Catholics was in
such disarray that any Latin intervention to alter  this could cause further
difficulties in gaining eastern Christians' allegiance. (Frazee 1983, 235)
On the question of papal infallibility Audo chose not to vote at the
Council and instead temporarily departed.  (Frazee 1983, 235–236) Pius IX
was  reportedly  extremely  angered  by this,  however,  as  Audo was  of  an
advanced age – by this time in his eighth decade – we may suppose that Pius
was  slightly  more  well  disposed  to  his  attitudes  than  if  opposed  by  a
younger and potentially longer living rival. Nevertheless, Audo's reluctance
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to conform to the padraodo's conditions and preference for dealing with the
situation himself along with his concerns over the status of eastern Catholic
rites and the nature of papal infallibility resulted in the publication of the
1872  papal  encyclical  `Quae  in  Patriarchatu'  directed  at  him  and  the
Chaldeans. 
The encyclical gave an outline of historical relations between the
Holy See and Chaldeans and emphasised the most important factors for Pius
IX  as  to  `what  remain[ed]  to  be  done  to  drive  away  those  dangers
threatening Catholic faith and unity'.  (Pius IX 1872, para. 1) The pope, in
this  instance,  concerned  that  despite  finally  achieving  unity  among  the
Chaldeans the patriarch still did not meet with the expected eastern Catholic
ecclesiological  position.  Indeed,  the  core  issues  of  contention  were
hereditary succession referred to as `the disgrace' and the widespread nature
of  Nestorianism perceived  by  the  Holy  See  as  still  present  among  East
Syriac communities and which could influence the Chaldean faithful. (Pius
IX 1872, para. 2) Pius IX's aim was to assert that he as pope was the final
arbiter in Chaldean ecclesial life and eventually Audo was reconciled with
papal policy.  (Wilmshurst 2011, 387–388 ff; Pius IX 1872, para. 11) Pius'
actions whilst perhaps appearing overly authoritarian especially concerning
whether Audo could lawfully appoint his own candidates for bishops were
meant to ensure the lasting stability and security of the community which
had been so fragile until the early nineteenth century.
Despite Audo's eventual submission to the Holy See in all matters
the relationship  with the  papacy was never  essentially  resolved until  the
emergence of the independent Syro-Malabarese hierarchy from 1887. (Pius
IX 1872, para. 4–6; Wilmshurst 2011, 388–389) Audo whilst a very able
leader was never of one mind with Pius IX. Indeed, shortly before his death
Audo was nearly excommunicated, yet, his activities were carried out with a
concern  for  those  who  came  to  him  seeking  assistance  and  to  maintain
eastern Catholic rites and customs after the Vatican Council.
Audo's final statement on the matter came at the end of his life:
`Je veux mourir obéissant fils de la Sainte Eglise catholique, soumis au Saint-Siege. Ce
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que j'ai fait contre le n'a pas été par Siège St. esprit de rébellion, mais que j'ai cru c'était
pour le bien de la nation.  J'ai  été condamné, je  me demande pardon j'en soumets.'
(Martina SJ 1990, 107)
Consolidation prior to the First World War
The  missionary  zeal  which  Audo  had  affirmed  was  supported  by  his
successor  Elias  XII  Peter  Abulyonan  (1879–1894)  who  sought  the
adherence  of  the  Sulaqite  East  Syriac  communities  in  competition  with
Anglican and Protestant missions.  (Wilmshurst 2011, 391) The Sulaqites it
appears were well aware of the variety and nature of the missionaries with
Shemon  XVIII  Rubil  (1861–1903)  affirming  it  would  be  far  better  to
become a  member  of  the  Chaldean community  than  any other  Christian
group. (Coakley 1992, 172)
Abulyonan after the colourful lives of Joseph VI Audo and several of
his  predecessors  can  comparatively  be  regarded  as  a  more  conservative
patriarch.  He  is  notable  for  having  been  one  of  the  youngest  Chaldean
patriarchs at the time of his election in 1879 – at most in his late thirties
having been born c. 1840. Indicative that he was a talented man especially
considering he had only been consecrated a bishop in 1874. I suggest he was
selected at the recommendation of the Apostolic delegate for Mesopotamia,
Eugène-Louis-Marie Lion (1874–1883), who likely sought a complete break
with the influence of a traditionalist East Syriac  milieu as exemplified by
figures such as Audo. 
After  his  premature  death  from  typhoid  fever  Abulyonan  was
succeeded by Georges Ebedjesu V Khayyath. Despite leading the Chaldeans
for only five years he made several contributions along with his clergy to an
increase in studies of Chaldean history and literary culture. (Tisserant 1931,
247) Khayyath had previously written a defence of papal primacy whilst
still  archbishop of  Amadiya  a  work which  we may suppose was largely
formulated as a result of his studies at the Propaganda. (Oussani 1901, 84–
85; Khayyath 1870; Tisserant 1931, col. 247) For the Holy See there could
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have been little more satisfaction than that found in the rise of an erudite
leader supportive of a central pillar of Tridentine ecclesiology. This in the
context of having had to contend with Chaldean leaders who were opposed
to  such  ideals  and  Khayyath's  short  but  significant  rule  marked  the
consolidation of a new era of co-operation with the Holy See.
Khayyath's  rule  was  also  marked  by  the  start  of  widespread
massacres of the Christian communities in and around eastern Asia Minor
and northern Mesopotamia from 1894. These massacres were presaged by a
minor Armenian revolt against the levying of a double rate of tax on their
community. This was repressed by Kurdish militia and affected nearly the
whole  of  the  Armenian  community  in  eastern  Asia  Minor  and  northern
Mesopotamia. The East Syriacs may not have been affected directly but the
situation laid the foundations of an atmosphere of insecurity surrounding
non-Muslims' status in the Ottoman socio-political order.
Chaldean missions to the Church of the East
In the  early  twentieth  century  the  Chaldean hierarchy's  support  for  their
communities  and  continued  missionary  efforts  were  extensive.  Ratel
provides  an  example  of  a  significant  body  of  converts  to  the  Chaldean
community in 1903 resulting from missionary activities begun in late 1899.
The group consisted of:
`Mgr Ichoïale,  évêque de Douré,  du mélik Nemroud,  neveu de Mar-Schémoun,  de
l'archidiacre Joseph et de quatre autres, tous de la famille patriarcale; et, en outre, de
quatre  prêtres  et  de trente  cheïks,  représentants  des principales tribus nestoriennes.'
(Ratel 1904, 290)
Indicating that  as  success  builds  on success  so the Chaldeans  were in  a
position  to  increase  their  numbers  from influential  members  of  the  East
Syriac population.
As Chaldean identity strengthened from the nineteenth century we
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can note that to return to the Church of the East if one had become Chaldean
was considered a grievous incident. One monk of the monastery of Rabban
Hormizd who did so is  referred to as: `Henànisô est  mort au milieu des
païens après être devenu nestorien' (Gë’dan 1910, 420) An indication of the
level of reaction against those who returned to what was perceived as error
and that such devotion to the Chaldean cause was likely popularly held and
outwardly demonstrated by the use of easily identifiable Catholic customs
such  as  devotion  to  the  Holy  Rosary  to  which  was  ascribed miraculous
deliverance in times of danger. (Gë’dan 1910, 421)
A study of the Chaldeans highlighting the extent of conversions was
providentially undertaken in 1913 by Fr Joseph Tfinkdji and built on the
previous work of Khayyath. (Tfinkdji 1913; Khayyath 1896b) An awareness
of Chaldean identity was present in Tfinkdji's mind and he speaks highly of
those in leadership positions in the Chaldean community in expressing links
with  the  Holy  See.  Quite  apart  from  the  remarkably  comprehensive
documentary project which he produced what is particularly notable is his
choice of words for the book's title:  L'Eglise Chaldéenne. The purposeful
use of the term Church to describe the Chaldeans indicates there was some
concept of the semi-autonomous nature of the community set apart from the
Catholic Church even if not formally acknowledged as such by the Holy See
and as would later be officially adopted at the Second Vatican Council.
As of 1913 the Chaldean community consisted of twelve dioceses in
Mesopotamia  as  well  as  thirteen  patriarchal  vicariates  serving  outlying
Chaldean communities without regular access to the sacraments.  (Tfinkdji
1913, 34–37) The estimates of total population around that time vary but in
considering  the  figures  collected  on the  Chaldeans  we should  note  from
Ceylan that the Christian populations were often the most under accounted
for in Ottoman census records. (Ceylan 2010, 36) Such a state of affairs not
necessarily  shared  among  the  Latin  and  Chaldean  clergy  who  it  seems
documented their communities in some detail and an overall picture does
begin to emerge.
Oussani  affirms the Chaldean population  as  100,000 strong as  of
1901 but later increased this estimate to 150,000.(Oussani 1901, 81; Oussani
1921, xxiv–xxv)  Whereas, Paulin Martin in 1867 and Khayyath and Chabot
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in 1896 put the figures nearer to 70,000–80,000.  (Wilmshurst 2011, 400;
Khayyath 1896b, 453; Martin 1867, 205–210) With the discrepancy in the
figures it seems likely the aforementioned difficulties of accessing reliable
information did have an effect.
The largest areas of Chaldean population were in Mosul and Salmas,
with  the  vast  majority  based  in  and  around  Mosul  with  approximately
30,000  Chaldeans.  (Khayyath  1896b,  436;  Wilmshurst  2000,  199) The
future of the Chaldean community appeared before the First World War to
be assured especially as of 199 ``Chaldean'' villages approximately 180 had
their own priest according to data collated by Wilmshurst: the Church of the
East had one priest for every 400 laity, the Chaldeans approximately one
priest for every 300 laity. (Wilmshurst 2011, 401)
Massacre without remorse: 1915–1918
Ottoman  entry  to  the  First  World  War  was  a  turning  point  in  Chaldean
history  during  which  the  community  experienced  a  period  of  extreme
persecution under the cover of the conflict and were forced to adjust their
ecclesiology  to  take  account  of  the  destruction  of  dioceses  whilst  also
attempting to forge for the first time a position as the dominant Christian
community  in  Mesopotamia-Iraq.  The  massacres  qualitatively  and
quantitatively altered the Chaldean  status quo yet  their experience of the
massacres has only of late begun to be assessed.
Infrequent  but  brutal  attacks  against  the  East  Syriacs  took  place
increasingly from the mid-nineteenth century. These events could have been
ascribed to inter-communal rivalries resolved through extreme methods of
coercion especially as they derived much of their intensity from living in
close proximity to the Kurds. In contrast the massacres during and after the
First World War were characterised by anti-Christian rhetoric expressing the
need to remove their presence and as a threat to Ottoman Imperial security.
This basis for attacks also receiving justification from fears of their potential
rôle as fifth columnists supporting the Entente powers.
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Prior to 1915 the status of the Christian population and their status in
the eyes of the Muslim residents of Mesopotamia varied. In areas such as
Basra  or  Kirkuk  seemingly  amicable  relations  were  built  around  shared
mercantile interests. Contrasting this was the reception received from their
Muslim neighbours in Mosul or Amid which were often far more hostile.
The British Vice-Consul, Wilkie Young, writing on the Mosul environs in
1909 stated:
`The attitude of the Moslems towards the Christians and Jews, to whom...they are in a
majority of ten to one, is that of a master towards slaves whom he treats with a certain
lordly tolerance so long as they keep their place. Any sign of pretension to equality is
promptly  repressed.  It  is  often  noticed  in  the  street  that  almost  any  Christian
submissively makes way even for a Moslem child.' (Wilkie Young 1971, 232)
Young was writing in reference to an area outside of the direct reach of the
subsequent massacres yet the treatment even there was extremely harsh and
memories  among  the  local  population  were  still  strong  regarding  the
persecutions of the nineteenth century. (G. Bell 1909)
The Chaldeans' treatment by the Kurdish and Arab populations were
complicated  by  the  commitment  among  the  modernising  Young  Turk
movement  towards  an  exclusive  ethnic  vision  for  the  Ottoman  Empire.
Originally  the  movement  had  favoured  a  pan-ethnic  notion  of  Turkish
identity. Following a 1913 coup in Constantinople the Committee for Union
and  Progress  (CUP)  which  became the  strongest  political  faction  in  the
Empire  altered  the  position  to  focusing  on  Turkification  of  the  entire
population and the reduction of the social status of Ottoman subjects of non-
Turkish ethnicity. The influence of minorities was to be dispersed through
ethnic  cleansing.  (Gaunt  2006,  40–41) These  policies  served  only  to
increase more fractious relations between the Kurds and the Christians as
both were on the edges of the new political vision.
First World War and start of massacres
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A jihad was declared in conjunction with the Ottoman declaration of war
against the Entente. The purpose of the former was to advance the cause of
the latter and also based on the pragmatic need to garner support from those
subjects  of  the  Sultan  increasingly  disillusioned  by  the  apparent
modernisation and secularisation of the Empire under the direction of the
CUP and the potential support of the substantial Muslim populations under
British Imperial governance. (Cf Allawi 2014, 48) In northern Mesopotamia
the  jihad gave impetus to the ethnic cleansing of the Christian population
and the realisation of Kurdish efforts to expand their autonomy. The creation
of an independent Kurdistan,  without any alien members,  was something
which  became  more  realistic  the  longer  the  war  proceeded  due  to  the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Violence did not begin en masse with
the declaration of jihad in November 1914 but from this time onwards and
until to the conclusion of the wars in the region in 1923 consistent intense
attempts were made by the Turks and the Kurds to destroy or deport the
Christian  populations  in  northern  Mesopotamia  and  eastern  Asia  Minor.
(Baumer 2006, 261)
East Syriac-Russian relations
A prelude to the attacks included the increasingly cordial relations between
the Church of the East and the Russian Empire and Church. The willingness
of the leaders of the Church of the East to engage with the Russians was not
unsurprising  given  the  gradual  decline  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  at  the
expense of Russia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century following
Russian  victories  in  the  wars  of  1877–1878.  Contacts  with  the  Russian
church and state had been established officially at patriarchal level since a
letter of Shemon XVIII Rubil was sent to Tsar Alexander II in 1868 seeking
succour if possible. (Joseph 1961, 99) Nothing was formally achieved other
than  the  establishment  of  a  precedent  for  seeking  Russian  material  and
spiritual assistance. The apparent conversion of about 20,000 members of
the Church of the East to the Russian church in 1898 after the creation of
their  mission  in  Urmia  the  previous  year  was  the  first  demonstration  of
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political and religious loyalty to the Russian Empire and its occupation of
the  surrounding area  in  1909 appeared  to  create  a  secure  region for  the
Church of the East. (Baumer 2006, 259–260) However, in the long term this
level of co-operation with the Russians gave credence to the Turkish and
Kurdish fear of Armenian and other Christian communities seceding entirely
from the Ottoman Empire and as a direct threat to the success of the war
effort. 
We may sympathise with the leaders of the Church of the East at this
time if they desired to militarily support their only ally but Russian imperial
intentions towards the East Syriacs were never defined. Notwithstanding the
apparent conversion of patriarch Shemon XIX Benjamin (1903–1918) and a
significant number of the community in 1914 the number of converts to the
Russian church was immaterial to the Russian military as to whether they
would or would not defend the East Syriacs in the context of war with the
Ottomans. The Urmia region immediately bordering Mesopotamia was of
relatively low strategic importance to the Russians in contrast with the rest
of the Caucasus. (Baumer 2006, 261)
Start of the Massacres
Massacres against the East Syriacs began in January 1915 but were effected
more strongly following a formal declaration of war by the Church of the
East against the Ottoman Empire. (Baumer 2006, 262) The declaration came
as a result of overconfidence on the part of the leadership of the Church of
the East who concluded that they could expect Russian military support in
the near future. 
The  massacres  proceeded  from west  to  east  as  the  Turks  gained
ground against the Russians during 1915. Even those Christians who were
able to escape from the immediate areas of attack fared no better  in the
mountains into which they were hunted by the Kurds. (Baumer 2006, 261) It
must be emphasised the uniform nature of the attacks of the Turks and the
Kurds against the Christian populations in eastern Asia Minor. There was no
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respite and no alternative but to flee, starve to death, be killed outright or be
enslaved. (Bazzi 2008, 12)
Following  the  withdrawal  of  Russian  protection  in  1915  the
opportunity  to  enter  Russian  territory  was taken by many thousands  but
resulted in the deaths of up 15,000 East Syriac Christians during extremely
arduous winter conditions. (Baumer 2006, 261, 261 n. 46) Perhaps the two
most badly affected Chaldean groups were in Amid and Seert. In these areas
every Chaldean village was destroyed and the Archbishop of Seert, Addai
Scher, was beheaded in June 1915. He was a noted scholar and his loss was
a great blow to the Chaldeans.  (Scher 1910; Brock and Kiraz 2011) The
extent of destruction for other dioceses was no less significant and Mardin,
Gazarta,29 Van, Salmas and Urmia30 were essentially destroyed as ecclesial
entities before the end of the massacres. (Wilmshurst 2011, 423; 2000, 83)
Ottoman  leaders  in  permitting  the  massacres  and  forced
displacements appear to have regarded these actions as a strategic necessity
to remove those actively or sympathetically opposed to Turkish hegemony.
This was a conventional strategy by the standards of late nineteenth and
early twentieth century warfare which viewed forced displacements from
areas of operations as a normative procedure – the Russians also conducting
a similar process in the Caucasus. However, the Turkish efforts to remove
sections of the Christian populations eventually consisted of death squads
targeting whole Christian communities  and not relocations.  (Gaunt 2006,
65) Also  as  Gaunt  highlights,  for  example,  in  Amid  1,600  people  were
offered  life  were  they  to  convert  to  Islam  indicating  there  was  in  this
especially badly affected area a specific anti-Christian motive. (Gaunt 2006,
162) Wilmshurst outlines another example from the village of Dilman: 
`[this]  predominantly Chaldean community...about 800 strong, was massacred when
the town fell  to  the Turks.  Some of the Chaldeans were offered their  lives if  they
converted  to  Islam,  and  were  killed  when  they  refused.  Eyewitnesses  noted  that
29 Phillippe-Jacques  Abraham OAOC,  Bishop  of  Gazarta  was  martyred  in  August
1915.
30 Of which only Salmas and Urmia were to  return to  a state  of  normal ecclesial
functioning  later  in  the  twentieth  century.  Amid  remains  a  titular  diocese  with
jurisdiction of all Chaldeans now resident in the borders of the Republic of Turkey.
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Muslim villagers joined in the looting, and that while most of the killing was done by
the  Kurdish  irregulars,  regular  Turkish  officers  made  no  effort  to  stop  them'
(Wilmshurst 2011, 416)
The  Holy  See  was  not  inactive  in  attempts  to  provide  some succour  to
Ottoman  Christians.  Pope  Benedict  XV  attempted  to  influence  Sultan
Mehmed V (1909–1918) during 1915. The response and policy of Mehmed
and his government was to continue to favour collective punishment due to
the apparent difficulty of distinguishing between supposed Armenian rebels
and those either ambivalent  to the agenda of each side or those actively
involved in fighting the Sultan's enemies. (Cf Gaunt 2006, 151)
Attempts to defend the East Syriac population via military means
were focused around the Syriac leader Agha Petros who had been granted
Russian support in Urmia. It appears Petros was well acquainted with the
different powers in the region having been educated at a European school
and later working for the Ottomans as a civil servant. However, he was a
controversial figure accused of permitting violent excesses by the soldiers
under his command and despite his military successes was unpopular among
East Syriacs as he desired to lead their community instead of the patriarch.
(Wilmshurst 2011, 420–421) Efforts to defend the East Syriacs were largely
welcomed  but  Petros'  activities  further  incited  the  Ottomans  and  gave
expression  to  their  fears  of  the  Church  of  the  East  operating  as  an
independent  power  within  the  region  with  members  of  the  East  Syriac
communities  considered  to  be  politically  motivated  rebels.  (Gaunt  2006,
123, 128)
From 1917 the Russian Empire was increasingly internally divided
and the Ottomans succumbing to British military victories in the Arabian
peninsula and Mesopotamia. It was unclear for the Christians whether they
could  hope  for  direct  support  the  Entente.  The  Church  of  the  East  was
forced into a partnership of convenience in March 1917 with the Kurds of
Agha Simko. This partnership was encouraged by the Russians in the region
who sought any means to secure their position from the still active Turkish
forces.  Once  the  Russian  Empire  had  fallen  in  the  winter  of  1917  the
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provincial areas of the Empire were left to attend as best they could to their
own security. In this case the Kurds saw an opportunity to remove their East
Syriac enemies and murdered Patriarch Shemon XIX in March 1918.
Impact on the Chaldeans
This period for the Chaldean Church and communities was perhaps the most
trying encountered in their history.31 The Chaldean situation was particularly
tragic as they had avoided political agitation prior to the war. The distinctive
nature of each Syriac community was not clear to outside observers and the
assumption of a collective guilt of all Christians regardless of involvement
in any anti-Ottoman activity was transferred into the actions undertaken by
the Ottoman and Kurdish forces.
If  we  accept  that  attacks  by  Turks  and  Kurds  against  Syriacs
(Chaldeans, Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic and Church of the East) and
Armenians led to either death or emigration for fifty to sixty percent of these
populations overall  one might have assumed as a contemporary observer
that the churches would have had little if any ability to recover with Oussani
and Naayem suggesting a total Syriac Christian population pre-1914 of up
to 700,000 and affirm up to 250,000 killed.  (Baumer 2006, 252; Oussani
1921, xxiv–xxv; Naayem 1921, xxx)32 Fortunately for the Chaldeans some
of their  population were quite  far removed from the immediate  areas of
massacre.  South  of  Mosul  life  was  far  less  affected  notwithstanding  the
ongoing military  campaign in  Mesopotamia  between  the  British  and the
Ottomans. As the British Imperial forces firmly established themselves in
Basra the Chaldeans were there particularly protected from the depredations
of the Ottomans, whilst Suleyman Nazif, Ottoman wali of Baghdad, forbade
killing of Christians in his wilayet. (Gaunt 2006, 305)
Wilmshurst  who has  collated available  Chaldean data  for  this  era
suggests that approximately ten to fifteen percent of the pre-war Chaldean
population were killed (c.10,000–15,000  of 100,000).  (Wilmshurst 2011,
31 Although, as of 2015, and the rise of Da'esh this is debatable.
32 Even if these figures are overestimates they intimate the proportion of the Syriac
community killed.
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436–437, 446) After the massacres according to the Holy See's statistics –
which Wilmshurst presents – there were approximately 44,000 Chaldeans in
1928.  This  figure  is  contrasted  with  that  of  Stephen  Kajo  in  1937  who
suggested 140,000. Between the lower figure suggested by the Holy See and
the higher figure of Kajo it can be suggested that there were approximately
80,000 Chaldeans present in Iraq just before the start of the Second World
War. (Wilmshurst 2011, 444)
It  seems  unlikely  that  the  figure  of  44,000  Chaldeans  can  be
considered authoritative and perhaps can be accounted for by the relative
lack of infrastructure in many areas of Iraq and the difficulty of conducting
a census.33
Thus,  even  despite  the  death  of  a  significant  proportion  of  the
community the Chaldeans appear to have begun to recover to pre-massacre
levels by the 1930s. Nevertheless, this growth may not have been organic
per se – through births – but derived from the necessary readjustments many
East  Syriacs  made  after  the  war  to  access  pastoral  care  from Chaldean
clergy in the absence of those of the Church of the East.34 In 1920 there
remained six bishops in the Church of the East including the patriarch. Of
the laity perhaps as many as a third were killed during the war. 
In  making  an  assessment  of  this  era  the  variable  quality  of
information which is extant to determine the exact number of Chaldeans
affected should be noted. Whilst there is a range of academic and popular
literature these works often refer to non-Armenian Christians as Assyrians.
(Petrosian 2006, 114, 117) There is no conventional manner to distinguish
between Chaldeans or the so-called Assyrian members of the Church of the
East.  This  is  largely  due  to  the  wide  variety  of  writers,  the  lack  of  a
definition as to the specific nature of each title and as to whether they are
mutually exclusive.  Thus,  sources  from this  period can be confused and
ignore  further  the  distinction  between  the  Syriac  Catholics  and  Syrian
33 Indeed, this is an issue which continued to affect the Chaldeans into the twenty-first
century with the Holy See presenting figures with substantial variations and apparent
discrepancies:  tens of  thousands of  persons ``appearing''  and ``disappearing''  over a
period of twenty years. See, for example, the Chaldean population statistics of 1990,
2000 and 2010 in Roberson CSP (2010).
34 In 1920 there remained six bishops in the Church of the East including the patriarch.
Of the laity perhaps as many as a third were killed during the war. (Wilmshurst 2011,
423, 440–441)
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Orthodox.
The notion that a comprehensive report should be conducted after
the massacres by or on behalf of the Chaldeans may have been an issue.
Whilst considered worthy, it was inhibited by the lack of stability in the new
Iraqi  state  –  a  nationwide  uprising  occurring  in  the  context  of  British
attempts  to  assert  their  rule  in  1920  –  and  the  sense  of  exhaustion
experienced  by  the  Chaldeans  in  the  aftermath  of  the  massacres:  a
perception instead that rebuilding the community and creating a new status
quo should come before assessment of the immediate past.
3. Re-discovering the Chaldean narrative in 
modern Iraq (1918–2003)
In attempting to outline Chaldean history following Iraq's establishment in
1921 we should  recall  the  novelty of  such a  study and the lack of  pre-
existing methodology in the Iraqi case for considering the Chaldeans in the
full light of their eastern Catholic status and the relationship between the
office of patriarch and the state. This, further, combined with the lack of
reflection  from  Chaldean  authors  from  the  perspective  of  ecclesiastical
history offers an emerging scholarly field for original contributions. We may
be justifiably  surprised  at  the  lack  of  ecclesiastical  history  written  since
1921  given  reflection  on  relationships  with  the  temporal  power  and
chronicles of church affairs were so strongly engaged with by East Syriac
authors in Late Antique and Medieval periods.  (See Wood 2013;  Becker
2008, 40–45; Brock 1979)
There was perhaps a  trend towards  a  lack of  willingness to  have
pursued ecclesiastical history outside of few authors. The account of Israel
Audo, Chaldean Bishop of Mardin, on the massacres and as they affected
his  diocese  and  Chaldeans  more  widely  one  of  the  few  produced,  for
example, on this topic.35 An absence of self-reflection in this context perhaps
unsurprising given the strength and pain of memories and wounds existing
35  An English translation of which is currently being prepared by Andrew Palmer,
Radboud University, Nijmegen.
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so  close  chronologically.  The  Chaldean  community  at  the  time  (1930s–
1960s) were in an era which focused on integration into a new Iraqi society
with an emphasis on looking forward instead of retrospective glances into
painful events of which many by the 1960s would have had no experience
or recollection.36 In what arena would ecclesiology and ecclesiastical history
be discussed outside of community members with a particular interest and
for  the  instruction  of  some  students  and  seminarians?  Population
displacement,  urbanisation  and  engagement  with  modern  political
ideologies  all  provided  distraction  from  a  need  or  desire  to  consider
Chaldean identity and to pursue a metaphysical understanding of being a
Chaldean.
Ecclesiastical  history  and  ecclesiological  discussions  altered
somewhat  with  the  establishment  of  the  Syriac  Corporation  of  the  Iraqi
Academy and the production of ecclesial journals such as  Fikr al-Masihi
and that of the Syriac Corporation itself. Nonetheless, these developments
were  reliant  upon  the  driving  interests  of  Iraqi  and  non-Iraqi  Christian
intelligentsia (e.g. A Abouna; S P Brock; L Cheikho SJ; J-M Fiey OP; Y
Habbi; P Youssif etc) and was largely not popularly led. Moreover, there
was  and  still  does  exist  a  lack  of  widespread  interest  in  the  historical
experience of the Chaldeans in the era 1921–2003 among the community.37
A  contiguous  Chaldean  culture  so  deeply  rooted  in  northern
Mesopotamia and eastern Asia Minor could not easily be reconciled to the
new  Iraq  and  its  different  cultural  and  geographical  environments.  The
incarnation of Chaldean life having to be re-affirmed, re-constructed and
structured  so  as  to  meet  the  needs  of  a  community  whose  position  was
irrevocably altered from an ecclesiological identity as central to their lives
to  multiple  and  in  some  instances  competing  levels  of  attachments  and
identities whether to the state, their perceived ethnicity or economic foci.
36 As of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) Thomas Reis, Chaldean bishop of
Zakho (1957–1965) noting the religious indifference of the youth and the detrimental
affects of Communism and Freemasonry upon the retention of religious practice and
identity. (Cherubini 1995a, 46–47)
37  Observed among conversations with a range of Chaldeans – laity, clergy, young and
old  –  during  fieldwork  in  northern  Iraq  (October  2013),  London (2012–2014)  and
Jordan  (May–June  2013).  Only  very  few  of  the  community  wanting  to  or  being
cognizant of the importance of discoursing on Chaldean history.
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This is a wider historiographical issue raised, for example, by Borrut
and Cobb in their  work on the  Umayyad dynasty.  They note:  `Sensitive
students inevitably confront the question...how do we know what we think
we know about  the  Umayyads?'  (Borrut  and  Cobb  2010,  2) A question
which  may  just  as  easily  be  applied  to  the  Chaldeans  and  as  to  our
comprehension of  their  history  leaving us  with the answer  that  in  many
instances  either  we just  do not  know or  we will  for  the  present  remain
uncertain.
Building on current scholarship
The modern religious history of Iraqi Christianity especially from the 1930s
onwards is a developing genre in scholarship. A lacuna, for example, in the
historiography  is  the  lack  of  studies  on  Patriarch  Emmanuel  II  Thomas
(1900–1947). A surprising gap given the continuance of government which
he enjoyed for forty-seven years in one of the longest periods of leadership
since the establishment of the Chaldean community. By way of comparison
the first  European language biography of King Feisel I (1921–1933), the
first Iraqi monarch, was only published in 2014. (Allawi 2014)
If  Thomas'  rule  lacks  scrutiny  this  could  reflect  the  church's
distressed nature during the second decade of his patriarchal career and the
political neutrality which he encouraged among the Chaldeans. Engaging in
this  apparent  quietism  with  the  intention  of  maintaining  the  community
more securely from accusations of treachery and thus persecution. Such a
quietist  approach to  patriarchal  leadership similar  to  that  associated with
Iraqi Shiite clerics seen, for example, in the life of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. (Petrosian 2006,
125;  Rahimi 2004,  12–14) The retention of a  low profile  resulting from
Thomas' awareness of the tragedy which had befallen the Church of the East
during the 1915–1918 massacres as a result  of acquiescing to a  political
narrative which set their community apart from surrounding Ottoman and
Kurdish society. Such a path was rejected by Thomas and I suggest his entry
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into  Iraqi  political  life  through  membership  of  the  Iraqi  senate  was
perceived as a more efficacious means to retain Christian influence at the
élite  level  of the state and mirrored the example of East  Syriac-lay  élite
interaction under the Abbasids.
In historiography generally a large body of literature considers Iraqi
Christianity  from  different  perspectives  of  scholarly,  personal  and
professional interests but less discussion on the history of Christian political
relationships with the governments of the republican and especially Baath
administrations. Most recently Wilmshurst (2011), Valognes (1994), Yacoub
(1996) and Rassam (2010) have re-dressed this balance but their works in
the former two instances lack a specificity to the Chaldeans or Iraq in one
volume whilst the latter two come from quite a partisan perspective towards
the East Syriac communities. O'Mahony  (2009; 2004a; 2004b) and Audo
(2012;  2008;  2005) have made several  contributions  whilst  Teule  (2015;
2012; 2008) and Hunter (2014a; 2014b) probably come closest to beginning
an assessment  of  the socio-political  involvements  of  Iraqi  Christians  but
their works in these instances tend to focus on the situation post-2003.
Difficulties  have  existed  in  general  in  pursuing  a  comprehensive
approach to Iraqi historical studies which encompass all religious, political
and ethnic communities. A major edited volume to emerge since 2003 which
seeks  to  revivify  modern  Iraqi  historical  studies  despite  being  over  500
pages in length with thirty-three articles in total does not provide one piece
which focuses on the challenges of writing the history of the non-Muslim
inhabitants or that of non-Arabs or non-Kurds. The work is to be greatly
welcomed  for  considering  a  range  of  methodological  issues  but  fails  to
recognise  the  normative  plurality  of  Iraq  and  to  attempt  to  encourage  a
history of Iraq that is a more purely historical account and not conveyed
through  the  lens  of  political  science,  political  history,  sociology  or
anthropology.  This  absence  is  somewhat  surprising  given  that  the
introduction, co-authored by two of the editors, notes:
`With Iraq facing the danger of implosion, which groups – or even segments of the
population  with  their  own  sub-Iraqi  and  trans-border  references  –  will  be  able  to
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impose  their  visions  of  history?  Is  Iraq  facing  an  unavoidable  ``fragmentation  of
collective memory"?' (Bocco and Tejel 2012, xiii)
More widely we can note,  in one of the standard texts on Iraqi political
history, Tripp in his otherwise useful A History of Iraq, refers to Christians
on nine occasions – as per the index – with only the briefest explanations of
their  roles  and  mainly  in  relation  to  the  political  aims  of  those  who
associated with an Assyrian identity. (2007) Whilst Simons, who also offers
a very useful broad introductory history of Iraq lacks consideration of more
than a passing nature of the Christian segments of the population.  (2004)
These  works  are  contrasted  with  the  concise  but  excellent  outline  of
Christian contributions to Iraq in TAJ Abdullah's work which provides an
indication  of  how a  history  of  Iraq  can  account  for  its  plural  character.
(2003) Gareth Stansfield also has a  good if  brief  assessment  of how the
Christian communities were affected by Iraqi political discourse.  (2007)38
This  trend  to  avoid  mentioning  the  Christian  population  is
disappointing  given  the  available  scholarship  on  the  Christians  and  the
emphasis in recent and contemporary academic studies for considering the
place  of  minorities  (so-called)  in  Middle  Eastern  societies.39 By  way  of
comparison  there  has  been  a  growing  interest  in  the  former  Jewish
populations  of  Mesopotamia-Iraq  in  the  last  fifteen  years  which  raise
awareness of Iraq's former plurality and ensure that a bipolar Sunni-Shia
discourse  does  not  solely  dominate.  (Masters  2001;  Rejwan  2004;  Snir
2006; Gavish 2010; Somekh 2012)
Among the  churches  of  the  western  tradition  there  appears  to  be
uncertainty as to how to treat the scholarship produced by Christians of the
East  Syriac  tradition.  This  is  perhaps  due  to  concomitant  difficulties  in
38 Stansfield has made more effort than most non-specialists to include observations
on the Christian communities in Iraq which is also seen in his co-authored monograph
(with Liam Anderson) on the modern history of Kirkuk (2009).
39 This section and following will refer to religious minorities in Iraq. It should not be
thought that because the Christians, Yazidis, Mandeans etc are numerical minorities
that they are in any sense less legitimately or intimately involved in the development of
modern Iraq. Their historical contributions to the Mesopotamian region preclude them
being considered as a minor influence. The Shia despite their overwhelming majority
in the Iraqi population were a de facto minority given their limited political and social
roles in modern Iraq.
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comprehending what process of theological or ecclesiological engagement
should be taken towards the East Syriac churches due to the relative lack of
expertise  which  the  dominant  Latin  and  Protestant  discourses  have
concerning  them.  Nevertheless,  through  the  growth  of  the  modern
ecumenical movement,  the increasing importance of Iraq to  regional  and
international politics and the growth of diaspora groups in the west practical
and  theological  engagement  has  increased  and  saw  a  boom  in  studies
especially from the 1960s with Brock  (1982; 1996; 2004; 2009) and Fiey
(1959;  1970;  1993;  1994) leading  scholarship  in  this  area.  Thus,  the
Christians of Iraq have come to be well served in general but lacking has
been  an  assessment  of  their  relations  with  the  Baath  party  and  Saddam
Husain. It appears from present scholarship there are hints at and awareness
of aspects of this relationship but a lack of concentrated discussion. (White
2007, 5–8) There is little if any discussion, for example, on the rôle of Tariq
Aziz,  his  religious  identity  and  the  effects  of  this  on  Baath  policy.  The
extended interview with Aziz conducted by Bouvet and Denaud contains
only a few pages concerning his religious identity and no discussion of how
this  affected  his  position  in  government.  (2000) The  churches  and  their
relationship to  international  communities is  also lacking.  The Holy See's
place  within  Iraqi  history  having  had  limited  assessment  which  is
remarkable especially in considering the strong interest with which popes
John Paul II and Benedict XVI have had in the Middle East.  (Filoni 2008;
Toulat 1992)
In considering the Chaldeans in and of themselves we do well to
recall  how  they  have  been  viewed  by  the  Muslim  populations.  This  is
important  as  Christians  were  often  and  still  are  considered  as  a
homogeneous group by the government and many non-Christian Iraqis. The
churches largely dealt with via the Chaldean patriarch with his position as
primus inter pares among the church leaders resident in the country granting
him this rôle. Indicating the Muslim precept that ``unbelief constitutes one
nation'' has had a lasting influence even among more secularised rulers in
the Arab Middle East. (Masters 2001, 81) 
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A new political order: 1918–1947
In the new Middle Eastern order established after the First World War the
Chaldeans experienced a period of initial uncertainty but saw a growth of
hope for  a  secure place  in  Iraq.  Uncertainty derived from fears  of  what
future status they would have in an Arab Sunni dominated state and as to
how  to  consolidate  their  church  structures  and  communities  after  the
massacres. Chaldean hopes for the future also centred on British Imperial
influence  in  Iraq.  Iraq's  legal  system  and  constitution  formulated  with
British oversight were intended to ensure that in the fullness of time Iraqis
would be accepting of pluralism in public life and equal social status in law
for all citizens. (Natarajan 2011, 806)
The state of Iraq was formed officially for the first time as a result of
the  Sykes-Picot  agreement  and  the  subsequent  distribution  of  the
possessions of the Ottoman Empire outside of Asia Minor nearly entirely by
France and Britain. Following the end of the First World War through the
Treaty of Sèvres Britain was granted the Mesopotamian region as Iraq and
maintained effective control over the state via a League of Nations mandate
granted  until  1932.  The  mandate  was  given  legitimacy  through  the
establishment of a constitutional monarchy which was led by Feisel I from
1921 (d 1933), the son of the Sheriff of Mecca, and his successors Ghazi
(1933–1939) and Feisal II (1939–1958).
The plebiscite which formally established Feisel as monarch had a
return of over  ninety percent  causing some doubt as to its  validity.  This
doubt  unsurprising  when  we  consider  Feisel  had  no  geographical  or
personal ties with Mesopotamia and as he was Sunni would likely bring
with him an élite of similar background to secure his rule over a population
of which large sections since the late eighteenth century had increasingly
converted  to  Shia  Islam  and  were  the  numerical  majority  by  the  early
twentieth century. (Nakash 2003, 13)
The British thinking behind suggesting Feisel for the monarchy was
astute,  however, and based on the popularity he attained during the First
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World  War  and  his  family's  alleged  line  of  descent  from  Mohammed.
Initially the Christians appear to have opposed Feisel's introduction given
his Hijazi origins with Dawisha asserting that `the thriving Christian and
Jewish communities of Iraq [did not] find palatable their incorporation into
a  Muslim-dominated  Kingdom  ruled  from  Mecca'.  (Dawisha  2005,  39)
However,  as  the realities  of  his  character  and rule  became apparent  and
following his loss of Mecca and his territories in the Hijaz to the Saudis
fears of an overtly Muslim state faded.
Thoughts of Iraqi independence were largely quashed by the 1922
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which saw the creation of a British shadow state for the
native  government  with  several  areas  of  administration  given  British
advisers to maintain the economy in line with the financial imperatives of
the Empire.  (HMSO 1925, 4, 9) The treaty impacted upon the conduct of
religious life with Article 12 affirming that the operation of missionary work
must be permitted without let or hindrance. (HMSO 1925, 6) A new version
of  the  treaty  was  made  in  1930  which  again  favoured  the  British  with
military facilities made available to their forces for a twenty-five year period
and safeguarded their access to Iraq's oil fields. Thus, when considering Iraq
from 1918–1930 we should see it as an economic vassal state to the British
Empire as opposed to a novel independent Arab constitutional monarchy.
(Cf  Tripp  2007,  51) The  conflicting  dynamic  between  the  British
imperatives for the Empire’s economy in the free flow of oil and the Iraqi
élites  was  only  to  be  effectively  resolved  following  the  withdrawal  of
British military forces in the 1950s. Support for a continued British presence
varied  with,  for  example,  the  population  of  Basra  strongly  in  favour.
(Nakash 2003, 63) However, given the extended British military presence
there from 1914 and the benefits which accrued to the local Shia, Jewish
and Christian merchants through a ready and secure market to India and
British colonies in the Far East this was unsurprising.
Chaldean state and inter-communal relations
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The new state had been artificially created so it was some time before there
began a coagulation of interests to sustain it. Feelings of disconnect from
British imperial influence and direction of Iraqi affairs by a monarch from
the  Hijaz  were  first  manifested  during  the  1920  rebellion.  As  the  Arab
Revolt  had  been  influential  to  overthrowing  Ottoman  rule  so  such  a
rebellion fuelled the imaginations of Mesopotamian residents who perceived
a  similar  effort  could  be  made  to  remove  the  British  presence.  Despite
British  military  dominance  in  the  southern  Levant,  Egypt  and  peninsula
Arabia their hold on Mesopotamia appeared tenuous by comparison where
their victory against the Ottomans had been extremely costly. 
The rebellion  which  generally  focused in  mid-  and southern  Iraq
derived  justification  from  Islamic  jurisprudence  and  the  question  as  to
whether Muslims – Sunni or Shia – could be justifiably ruled by an infidel
power such as the British. (Nakash 2003, 67) Such a state of affairs had long
existed for  Muslims in  other  regions  whether  in  the Caucasus under  the
Russian Empire or French north Africa. That such a state of affairs began to
exist in what many Muslims considered the heart lands of their religion was,
however, a direct threat to their social dominance in the central Middle East
and could be religiously interpreted as an indication of a fatal decline and/or
punishment. Therefore, rebellion brought together for a short time the Sunni
and Shia Arab populations of Mesopotamia-Iraq. The renewed call to jihad
considered a very dangerous threat by the non-Muslim populations. Even if
such rhetoric was not directed at them it ensured that from the foundation of
Iraq in 1921 that Christians, Jews, Mandeans and Yazidis were sensitive to
the necessity of a stable Iraqi social order. 
Eventual British victory did not rely solely on military intervention
but also upon the conservative nature of a sufficient proportion of the native
population – there being every hope among tribal and landowning élites to
see the restoration of order so as to to begin to rebuild their economic and
social dominance regardless of who laid claim as the ruling élite. There also
existed a proportion of the population largely disinterested in the coercive
attempts by any one faction to establish themselves as dominant. With many
residents of Basra and Baghdad having had extended interactions with the
British during the mid- to late nineteenth century an awareness existed of
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the likely inevitability of British Imperial success in the power vacuum left
following the defeat of the Ottomans. No one of the Iraqi factions having
sufficient capabilities to emerge victorious with the new Iraq appearing to
require  –  however  reluctantly  –  an  authoritative  leadership  figure  and
institutions  around  which  the  new  ideal  of  Iraqi  patriotism  could  be
anchored.
As for the Chaldeans they were not opposed in principle to a co-
opted monarchy under British supervision and remained acquiescent to this
stabilisation  of  the  social  order.  (Rutledge  2014,  185) The  British
recognition of the Chaldean patriarch's influence bolstering this support with
Emmanuel II Thomas' position on an advisory council of ministers under
British supervision in 1920 and from the formation of the state in 1921 as a
member of the Iraqi Senate.  (Tripp 2007, 44) The early drafts of the first
Iraqi Constitution had also provided for set numbers of minority members in
the Chamber of Deputies as an attempt to support their position within a
unitary Iraqi state. (Joseph 1983, 115) These proposals were rejected by the
Chaldeans, however, for fear of appearing to set themselves apart from the
rest of society.
The military élite and the Assyrians
Although the monarch was the head of state Iraq's governance – outside of
British  intervention  –  was  largely  determined by the  prime minister,  his
cabinet and the competing factions who held sway among the contemporary
ministerial appointments. The cabinet became dominated by the military but
their political affiliations were further divided by strength of adherence to
nationalism, socialism and Islam. As the military élites came to consolidate
control  over  Iraqi  politics  from the 1930s the army became the primary
means of coercion utilised by Sunnis to maintain their privileged status. The
military  saw  the  maintenance  of  Iraq's  borders  as  established  from  the
Treaty  of  Sèvres  as  a  foundational  principle  of  the  state  and would  not
countenance  opposition  by  any  group  who  attempted  to  undermine  this
status quo. Thus during times of perceived or actual threat decisive action
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was  taken and the  Kurds,  Yezidis  and Shias  were  all  repressed  between
1933–1936 and 1936–1941. (Nakash 2003, 123) The acts of force the armed
forces' leadership used to maintain their position derived from the lack of
economic or religious influence they could otherwise exert to influence or
coerce the population. 
In such circumstances the creation of a more secure socio-religious
situation for Christians was not aided by British reliance on levies recruited
among members  of  the Church of  the East  and other  numerically  minor
communities  who were  used  to  quell  uprisings  against  British  influence
especially in northern Iraq. (Petrosian 2006, 120; Bet Shlimon 2012, 95) As
some East Syriacs had begun to assert  an ethnic and cultural  link to the
ancient Assyrian empire from the nineteenth century these assertions were
transformed into political action in the twentieth century as they agitated for
an  autonomous  Assyrian  region.  The  Levies  perceived  by  Assyrian
nationalists as a potential means for assisting this end. It appeared to many
Iraqis that the Assyrians acted in cahoots with the British and were favoured
through  links  established  between  the  British  High  Commissioner  and
Patriarch Mar Shimun XXIII. (Husry 1974, 166)
Plans  for  secession  culminated  in  the  publication  of  an  Assyrian
Officer Manifesto in 1932 outlining the formation of an autonomous region
in the Nineveh plain.  (Husry 1974, 167) In pursuing such an agenda the
Assyrians were in opposition to the the king,  the British and Iraq's Arab
population  who  had  little  desire  to  see  any  form  of  devolution  or  the
potential loss of a buffer zone with Turkey and Syria. The millitary  élite
were  particularly  concerned  given  the  Assyrian  independence  movement
coalesced concurrent  with  campaigns  against  Kurdish separatists.  (Husry
1974, 168)
The mutual antagonism between the army and the Levies increased
and in 1933 the Simele tragedy occurred which led to the deaths of a large
number  of  Assyrians.  The circumstances  of  the  incident  became heavily
politicised over time and according to authors' biases have led to either one
or other side being blamed for the outcome of events.  (Husry 1974, 175;
Main 1933, 664)
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The essential event leading up to Simele was the release of levies
from British service in 1933. The armed Assyrian population totalled nearly
10,000. When we consider the Iraqi army was only 30,000 men in total at
this time we can note a potentially serious strategic threat. (Main 1933, 667)
Each levy following his demobilisation was permitted to retain a rifle and
ammunition and thus a highly trained independent military was established.
For many levies returning to their homes in northern Iraq independence in
some form was seen as a realistic option. The Iraqi Army sought initially to
disarm the ex-levies and following confusion as to how and whether this
could take place and Assyrian fears of physical danger it appears plans were
made  on  both  sides  to  intervene  militarily  against  the  other.  The  main
incident focused on the village of Simele and involved only the soldiers of
each  side.  However,  violence  soon  extended  to  surrounding  Christian
villages which saw the civilian massacres. Estimates as to the total number
killed vary but a figure of approximately 1,000 casualties appears to be the
most likely. (Main 1933, 672) 
Regardless of the extent of the attacks and whatever actually led to
and took place during the incident the outcome for Assyrian nationalists and
for the Church of the East was deleterious and ecclesiologically decisive.
Mar Shimun XXIII was exiled from Iraq in 1933 initially to Cyprus and he
later settled in Chicago from 1940.  (Baumer 2006, 269) This marked the
first time since the consolidation of the Church of the East at the Synod of
Dadisho in 424 that its patriarch was not officially resident in or around
south-west Asia. The events reinforced the Chaldean position as the senior
Christian community in Iraq but gave credence to a popular assumption of
the  potential  disloyalty  of  Christians.  It  would  be  an  exaggeration  to
characterise  the  nationalist  cause  of  the  Assyrians  as  one  inherently
unsettling  for  the  majority  of  Christians  and  other  numerically  minor
religious  groups  in  their  relationship  with  the  Muslim  majorities  and
government of the day. However, through aggrandisement for secession the
Assyrians  influenced  the  general  perception  of  and  beliefs  about  what
Christians appeared to  desire  politically:  an autonomous region and with
limitations on Muslim led political hegemony.
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Emmanuel II Thomas (1900–1947)
From the foundation of Iraq Thomas recognised that the future security of
the Chaldeans and the Christian population more widely was linked to:
1. Accepting the government of the day – so far as its activities did not
interfere with Chaldean religious practices
2. Supporting modernist  political  ideals  of  the separation of religion
from the state
3. A commitment to an Arab national identity
These three points became the cornerstone of the Chaldean interaction with
the contemporary political  élite.  A type of interaction which only altered
following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This position was in contrast to that of
the  Church  of  the  East  which  lost  its  patriarch  to  exile  and  lacked  the
intellectual  and material  resources  to  formulate  a  coherent  plan  for  their
position in the new state. Hindered particularly by the lack of engagement
with Arabic culture with even the patriarch lacking more than a rudimentary
grasp of the language. (Husry 1974, 166)
Thomas' efforts were not particular to the Chaldeans as for all Iraqi
religious  leaders  during  the  1920s–1930s  their  leadership  rôle  related  to
assessing and engineering a secure position in the new political and social
environment.  (Lukitz 1995, 108) However, Thomas was fortunate to make
his mark on political culture through his membership of the Iraqi senate and
in  his  personal  relationship  with  Feisel  I.  Thomas'  privileged  position
supported  the  integration  of  Chaldeans  into  Iraqi  society  in  general.
Integration  which  was  popularly  based  in  the  educational  and  economic
advancement which many attained and which the patriarch and hierarchy
strongly encouraged. Admiration for Catholic forms of education and the
religious  communities  which  maintained  schools  should  not  be
underestimated given that until the First World War literacy extended to only
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five percent of the Mesopotamian population. (Abdullah 2003, 123) Whilst
such  could  change  and  did  in  a  relatively  short  space  of  time  the
repercussions  for  the  majority  of  the  population  in  responding  to  the
urbanisation and industrialisation attendant with the discovery of oil were
significant  and  limited  their  ability  to  initially  respond  to  economic
development. A European observer writing in 1927 noted:
`How backward the conditions still  are...is shown by the fact  that one Government
secondary school in Baghdad, with a boarding section, is sufficient to meet the demand
for secondary education for boys in the capital, and that the total attendance at the five
Government secondary schools in the whole of Iraq is 562 pupils.' (Conway 1927, 334)
However, the Christian advantage gradually began to decline as Muslims
grew  to  compete  economically  and  socially  in  the  professions  with
significant investment in all levels of state education.  (Lukitz 1995, 109–
110) Nevertheless, the quality of Chaldean life from 1921–1947 generally
improved which related to Thomas' willingness to work within a society in
which Sunni and Shia law and custom were cultural and societal norms and
to  act  as  a  subtle  differentiating  influence.  As  a  graduate  of  the  Jesuit
University of St Joseph in Beirut he had received formative training in a
region  which  had  a  long  standing  religious  plurality  and  permitted
engagement with the eastern Catholic and Arab literary and cultural revival
from  the  late  nineteenth  century.  The  transfer  of  Thomas'  Levantine
experiences to Iraq serving to reinforce his commitment to maintaining an
Iraqi plural  socio-religious  status quo united with an openness to Arabic
culture. 
Thomas' success demonstrated most clearly by the overall expansion
of  the  Christian  population  which  between  1932  and  1957  more  than
doubled in Baghdad, Basra and Kirkuk. (Betts 1979, 105) The rapid change
in  demography  for  the  southern  cities  and  especially  Baghdad  was
remarkable  with  new  churches  constructed  to  accommodate  the  new
arrivals. The concentration of Chaldeans in Baghdad changing the focus of a
community  whose  traditions  had  largely  been  sustained  in  and  around
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Mosul for the previous 600 years.
Movement  to  Baghdad  entailed  some  change  in  identity  for
Chaldeans.  Through participation in urban life in the capital  engagement
increased with the Iraqi Baath and Communist  parties.  There was also a
shift  away  from  agricultural  based  employment  and  towards  artisanal,
technical or professional rôles. There had long existed a core of Christian
urban intelligentsia but the population shift from Mosul and the Nineveh
plains was the first time since the Abbasid era that East Syriac life had been
so far advanced in Baghdad.
The Chaldean position in Baghdad was further reinforced through
the departure of the Jewish population during the 1940s and early 1950s.
The  displacement  of  the  Iraqi  Jewish  population  in  the  context  of  the
foundation of the state of Israel  in 1948 with many Muslims pursuing a
coercive approach to their removal. This was a significant departure from
the  views  which  Feisel  I  had  espoused  during  his  rule  concerning  the
Semitic root of life in Mesopotamia as a common bond between the Jews,
Muslims and Christians of Iraq.  (Snir  2006, 382) Indeed, given the anti-
Zionist  and  pro-Iraqi  discourse  pursued  by  many  Jewish  Iraqis  their
departure  is  even  more  remarkable.  (Snir  2006,  383–384;  Ben-Yaacob,
Kazzaz, et al. 2007)
With the Chaldeans entering the social gap which the Jews left it was
for  many  Muslim  Iraqis  a  first  opportunity  to  come  into  contact  with
Christians on a regular basis and to note how their interventions in public
discourse came not in an ostentatious manner but relied on being a humble
(but  not  silent)  presence  by  maintaining  a  living  Christian  witness  in  a
challenging majority Muslim environment. Also influencing the Chaldean
experience of Iraqi  soceity  was the connection with the Shia population.
Formerly the Chaldeans had interacted mainly with the Sunni whether Arab
or Kurdish who predominated in northern Mesopotamia. As demographic
change  and  geographical  foci  altered  there  grew  to  be  a  mass  new
relationship  with  the  Shia  and also  for  those in  Baghdad with  the  large
Jewish population until  the 1940s. In general terms the relationship with
both communities was more amenable than with the Sunni. Though this was
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far  from uniform with Sunni  awareness  of  the  Chaldeans'  importance  to
Iraq's socio-economic development.
A significant feature of Thomas' rule during the inter-war era was the
start  of  Chaldean  emigration  outside  the  Middle  East.  Economic
opportunities in urban areas of North America, for example, could not be
ignored  by  those  eager  to  improve  their  conditions  during  the  Ottoman
Empire's decline. Iraqi society did give freedom for Christian communities
to expand in areas of public life especially in the professions and skilled
labour but some areas of work were limited still  by an unofficial  bar on
Christians  entering  them  such  as  administrative  managerial  positions.
(Rassam 2010, 140) The draw of emigration also due to the opportunity to
reside in what were apparently Christian countries in which religious life
would be far less affected by societal pressures.
Eastern Catholics were far from forgotten by the Holy See during
Thomas'  leadership.  Pius XI (1922–1939) re-affirmed the commitment to
supporting the eastern Catholics through the Pontifical Oriental Institute and
that at every level of the Latin church the facilitation of greater knowledge
of the eastern churches should be put in place. (Pius XI 1928, 434–435) The
interaction with the Holy See by the Chaldeans was more of a general nature
during  the  1920s  to  1940s  than  specific  interventions  regarding  the
operation of the Chaldean community which had dominated their history in
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.
At Thomas' death the Chaldeans were in a comfortable situation as
the latter years of his leadership segued with the consolidation of the Iraqi
petroleum industry. The subsequent growth in the economy reached to such
a level that Coptic,  Armenian and other Christian migrants were keen to
move  to  Iraq  to  take  advantage  of  the  situation  where  their  skills  in
engineering and medicine were very well received.  (Hambye SJ 1968, 84;
Cf Rassam 2010, 134–135)
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Iraq as a nation and Chaldean involvement in 
political activity
Regardless  of  the  Chaldean  population's  involvement  in  forming  a  new
plural Arab led society the majority of other religious or ethnic communities
could not be found to be as strong supporters to the ideal of the new state. It
would be hard to describe Iraq as a stable country prior to the late-1920s and
in 1932 Feisel I voiced his concerns:
` ``the inhabitants of Iraq have not sufficient national cohesion to admit of Government
agreeing to any differentiation between sects or classes, and that the policy must first
be for all classes to realize they are Iraqis''.' (Quoted in Husry 1974, 169)
 Such a status quo exacerbated by internal and external powers' actions. The
finalisation of Iraq's border with Turkey came only in 1932 with the Turkish
state  seeking to  annex Mosul  and its  environs  from the end of the First
World  War.  These  ambitions  only  prevented  through  British  military
intervention and the commitment of the League of Nations to favour Iraqi
ownership from 1924. Whilst in Basra the religiously mixed merchant class
were unified in their attempts to develop the city as the main port hub in the
Persian Gulf in competition with Kuwait.  (Visser 2007, 25; Nakash 2003,
63)
A key point  of contention was what  constituted an Iraqi  patriotic
identity. Patriotic concepts were split between those who supported an Iraqi
particularist paradigm, which was also supported by the British, and those
who sought a more pan-Arabist emphasis on union with other Arab peoples
in the surrounding region. Thus, the distinction of who could be considered
within the state was radically different as for the pan-Arabists the Kurds, for
example,  could  not  be  fully  considered  to  fit  within  the  future  Arab
collective.  As  Ottoman  rule  had  been  relatively  benign  until  the  mid-
nineteenth  century  and  had limited  social  impact  outside  urban areas  in
central  and  southern  Mesopotamia  a  unifying  Mesopotamian  identity  in
opposition  to  their  rule  had  not  developed.  (Marr  2010,  18–20)
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Implementing  a  national  identity  relied  on  the  acceptance  of  the  new
political and geographic boundaries and sufficient coagulation of sectional
interests to ensure an identity was widely held. Without the enforcement of
the Arab monarchy on the state and their  support for an Iraqi patriotism
however abstract or ill defined the pluralism of the Iraqi milieu would likely
have retreated into more regionally based political  groupings because no
other overarching body existed around which to form a point of unity in the
new state.
The  Chaldeans'  situation  was  complicated  by  their  location  –
whether rural or urban – and as to their ability to cope within what became a
predominantly linguistically Arab state: rural dwellers were generally Syriac
speakers  and urban residents  Arabic  speakers.  (Masters  2001,  45) Those
who  remained  resident  in  more  rural  northern  Iraq  were,  for  example,
generally more affected by the challenges of adjusting to the use of Arabic
as the state's official language. 
Chaldean political involvement
Until  the  1950s  Chaldeans  largely  avoided  political  activism  and
concentrated on economic and social contributions to Iraq. This reluctance
and/or lack of interest to engage directly in politics shaped by the dominant
role which the clergy had held in determining the relationship of the entire
community with the state. I suggest there was substantial reluctance to cede
political influence to the laity as the hierarchy had controlled East Syriac
relations with the state for nearly 1,500 years and which was strongly re-
emphasised by the Ottoman millet system. (Betts 1979, 142)
Thomas'  position  as  a  member  of  the  Iraqi  senate  from  1921
reinforced  the  dominance  of  the  patriarchal  office  in  determining  the
community's relationship with the state. Thomas' position in the senate was
perhaps not initially conceptualised as that of an essentially political rôle but
instead  as  an  advisor  with  some  oversight  into  the  application  of  new
statutes on the Chaldean population. Thus reflecting both the intermediary
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rôle of the patriarch between the state and community and efforts by East
Syriac  patriarchs  under  the  Sasanid  Empire  and  Abbasid  dynasty  who
sought to ensure their community's security by regular engagements with
the contemporary emperor or caliph and his court.
The clergy's dominance did not preclude lay Christian involvement
in the state with Yusif Ghanima40 and Rafael Buti as ministers of Finance
and State respectively.  (Betts 1979, 183) Christian integration into senior
positions  of  state  followed  a  pragmatic  approach  from  successive
governments as Christians were in fact appointed to positions where their
often more cosmopolitan upbringings could be put to good use with,  for
example, Najib Sa'igh made Iraqi ambassador to Lebanon. (Betts 1979, 184)
Joseph VII Ghanima (1947–1958) and the end 
of the monarchy
Joseph VII Ghanima having lived through the massacres era was well aware
of the necessity of securing the community's position in Iraqi society via a
co-operative  relationship  with  the  government.  Moreover,  he  had  been
present  with  the  League  of  Nations  delegation  who  were  to  determine
whether Turkey had a right to annex Mosul in the 1920s and was used to the
political  difficulties  consonant  with  the  independent  Iraqi  state.  It  was
unfortunate that such a well qualified candidate to lead the Chaldeans died
in 1958 the same year as the monarchy was overthrown.
Joseph VII's desire to ensure the Chaldeans were not dismissed from
political  and social  life  in  Iraq  influenced the  transfer  of  the  patriarchal
headquarters to Baghdad from Mosul in 1950, a significant change but one
which was not without precedent.  (Petrosian 2006, 125; Seferta 2008, 14)
The  Abbasid  dynasty's  capital  of  Baghdad  was  host  to  the  East  Syriac
patriarchs on a consistent basis and under Ottoman rule Baghdad had been
the  de  facto centre  of  administration  in  Mesopotamia.  The  Chaldeans
returned as the successors to the Church of the East in the Iraqi centre of
40 Not to be confused with Chaldean patriarch Yusif VII Ghanima (1947–1958).
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political  power  and  strengthened  their  claim  to  the  heritage  of  the
patriarchate  of  Seleucia-Ctesiphon.  Joseph  VII  was  fortunate  to  lead  the
Chaldeans  during  a  period  of  relative  political  stability  in  Iraq  and  to
consolidate  a neutral  and,  to  a certain extent,  privileged position for  the
community  which  effectively  emerged  as  the  national  church  of  Iraq.
(Valognes 1994, 753) Albeit a national church in an Islamicised culture, of a
minority  of  the  population  and  with  limited  direct  influence  on  the
government's political thought. 
Joseph VII was also able to further the work of the Chaldeans more
widely: he consecrated a new Cathedral in Tehran in July 1950 and a church
in Egypt in 1951.  (The Catholic Herald 1950;  The Catholic Herald 1951)
He also took further steps to formalise the priests' education who were, from
at least 1952, obliged to finish a formal seminary education. (The Catholic
Herald 1952) Ghanima was completing much of the prodigious work which
Thomas had instigated.
Thomas had seen the need for further improving the standards of
Christian education and with the Iraqi government's and Holy See's support
a Jesuit school – Baghdad College – was established in 1932. (MacDonnell
SJ 1994, passim) This institution was open to all Iraqis regardless of religion
and welcomed for its modern pedagogical style of formation. In starting the
school at an early stage in Iraqi history it ensured Christian education if not
overt  Christianity  could  be  found  supporting  the  new  élites.  Baghdad
College's  success  permitted  the  establishment  of  the  Jesuit  led  al-Hikma
University  in  1955.  Both  institutions  provided  a  very  high  standard  of
education for many future Iraqi leaders and were a means for Iraqi Catholics
to  demonstrate  their  loyalty  to  the  state,  that  Christianity  was  not  a
detrimental  influence  on  Iraqi  society  and  that  Christian  methods  of
education could dramatically improve the quality of the professional classes.
The naming of the university indicated the traditions which the Jesuits and
government wished to pursue with the title chosen for the mutual Christian
and Muslim association with King Solomon and that of the ninth century
discussions between patriarch Timothy I and Caliph al-Mahdi in the context
of  the  centre  of  scientific  and philosophical  research  known as  Bayt  al-
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Hikma in Abbasid Baghdad. (D’Ancona 2013) The opportunity for regular
debate  coming  freely  with  a  mixed  student  body  of  approximately  fifty
percent Christian and Muslim from 1956–1968. (MacDonnell SJ 1994, 175)
In  1968 following the  Baath  government's  establishment  all  non-
state schools were closed.  In the case of Baghdad College and al-Hikma
concerns  were  expressed  in  terms  of  the  threat  they  posed  to  the
maintenance of pan-Arabist  ideals in the student formation and the more
catholic paradigm which they endeavoured to provide for their education.
Not because they were Christian but through accusations of participation in
Anglo-American Imperialism led as they were by mostly American Jesuits.
(MacDonnell  SJ  1994,  251  and  235–237) Until  1968  I  suggest  the
educational contribution which the Jesuits and Catholics more widely made
may have offset an emerging politicisation of Iraqi schools dominated by a
strong Sunni influence; equipping particularly non-Arabs and non-Muslims
to work as political and economic actors with as great legitimacy as Sunni
Arabs. (Cf Lukitz 1995, 113)
Revolt against the monarchy
As a result of Anglo-German rivalry to take strategic control of south-west
Asia  the  British re-introduced direct  rule  to  Iraq  for  the  duration  of  the
Second World War due to the pro-Axis  leanings of Iraqi  Prime Minister
Rashid Ali. At this time Iraqis were not greatly desirous of supporting either
one or other European power but many Arab nationalists  believed that a
German  victory  over  the  British  Empire  would  see  Iraq  prosper  more
abundantly  and gain  independence  sooner  and worked to popularise  this
view.
Until the re-affirmation of ties with Britain in foreign and defence
policy  under  the  1948  Portsmouth  Treaty  there  was  relatively  limited
interest in Iraq for agitating towards a change in the method of government
from  constitutional  monarchy  to  a  republic.  However,  the  Treaty's
ratification saw the consolidation and popularisation of the views of Iraqi
nationalist and socialist factions who regarded the monarchy as little more
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than  a  means  to  maintain  British  strategic  hegemony  in  the  region  and
secure access to Iraqi natural resources.  (HMSO 1948) By the late 1940s
Chaldean involvement in Iraqi political parties had become more common
place and the interest in seeing the maintenance of monarchical means of
government declined among the politically active groupings. In the 1920s
Chaldean social life had been eased by the monarchy's open attitude to the
maintenance of their presence, whereas the underlying political instability of
the 1930s and 1940s, in the short term, led to vacuums of power with the
armed forces acting as guarantors of law and order in periods of change
between  governments.  I  suggest  the  lack  of  legitimacy  with  which  the
monarchy had been regarded – as a Sunni imposition on majority Shia state
and as created by the British – left the Chaldean hierarchy in an uncertain
position as  how to claim the community's  legitimate place in  public  life
given their  reliance on the support  of the King so to  do.  The monarchy
represented stability and authority and provided the basic unifying point for
Iraqi national life. To suggest removing this institution implied a generalised
loss of societal stability with it far from certain that an alternative means of
government would be as open to the Chaldean patriarch's public rôle. 
I  suggest  in  this  context  the  Chaldean  hierarchy  tended  more
strongly  towards  favouring  retention  of  the  monarchy  whilst  the  laity
desired  more  radical  changes  which  they  perceived  could  come  about
through involvement with political movements. Nonetheless, the hierarchy's
support for the monarchy could not be considered unassailable and did come
at some cost as, for example, per an Iraqi law of 1947 the Minister of Justice
had the right to oversee the religious courts of Christians and Jews. (Joseph
1961, 216) Furthermore the head of these communities was required to be
an Iraqi citizen of good standing. As the Church of the East's patriarch had
been exiled in 1933 he was barred from ruling his own church at least in
Iraq.  (Joseph 1961,  216–217) Such a  level  of  control  indicative  that  the
shadow of the Ottoman millet system was not yet removed from Iraqi life. 
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1958 rebellion against the monarchy and the 
Chaldean response
Yusif  VII  Ghanima's  death  marked the  start  of  a  qualitative  shift  in  the
Chaldean hierarchy's relations with the government and it is possible that
had  he  encouraged  and  pursued  a  more  distinctive  policy  towards  the
government  the  Chaldean  community  could  have  emerged  in  a  stronger
position in Iraqi society and their relationship with the state from 1958. He
perhaps neglected societal issues related to the popular desire for a more
equitable economic order which were pertinent to Iraqis as a whole and if he
had been vocal in annunciating the Chaldean contributions to Iraqi society
could have garnered more widespread societal support for the intermediary
role of the patriarchal office in political and social affairs and the Chaldean
community in general. Nevertheless, his position is understandable when we
consider that Ghanima had lived much of his life in Thomas' shadow as his
secretary and as a result it was difficult to develop a distinctive pro-active
approach as patriarch.
With  British  imperial  influence  in  Iraq  re-impressed  through  the
1948  Portsmouth  Treaty  and  the  1955  Baghdad  Pact  the  end  of
constitutional monarchy moved closer. The burgeoning nationalist identity
of many Iraqis by the mid-1950s perceiving these agreements as contrary to
their interests especially in the context of Nasser's rise in Egypt. (Marr 2010,
24) That the treaties obliged the Iraqi government to maintain their national
defence policy in line with British imperatives and to maintain their military
infrastructure through links with British industry until 1973 widely regarded
as  deeply  patronising.  However,  the  British  failure  at  Suez  in  1956
precluded any further strategic dominance in the region without the USA's
support.  Moreover,  Iran  became  another  focus  for  Anglo-American
intervention with Mossadeq's overthrow in 1953 and Iraq appeared for a
time to have an opportunity to attempt independent domestic and foreign
policies. The monarchy's downfall could not be prevented, however, as the
rise of nationalism, limited efforts to reform land tenure and the economy
were not sufficient to sway the army from permitting a republican coup and
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the execution of the royal family.
Ghanima died just six days before the murder of King Feisel II and
his family in July 1958. It will likely never be known as to the physical and
psychological  impact  the  disintegration  of  the  political  order  had  on
Ghanima prior to his death but I suggest he was cognisant of substantial
changes  afoot  and  likely  feared  for  the  future  of  his  community.  The
monarchy during its existence offering a veneer of legitimacy to the idea of
a  stable  Iraqi  social  order  and  which  in  reality  was  far  more  heavily
stratified  and  weaker  than  realised.  The  monarch's  rôle  a  figurehead  for
authority even if the monarchy wielded little real power and had become
used  by  competing  factions  for  their  own  personal  aggrandisement  and
advancement. This position of the office of the monarch as somewhat set
apart from the real power interactions of the day contrasting with that of the
Chaldean patriarch who in real terms could directly influence a segment of
the Iraqi population through his office something which the monarch in Iraq
other than as a point of union struggled to achieve.
Paul II Cheikho, the Iraqi state and the new 
Catholic ecclesiology of the Second Vatican 
Council
Ghanima was succeeded by Paul II Cheikho (1958–1989) whose rule was
contiguous with much of Baath party rule. As Emmanuel II Thomas had set
the tone for the consolidation of the Chaldean community in the 1920s and
the creation of a modern bureaucratic state so Cheikho had to contend with
the re-creation of political, economic and social life as Iraq was transformed
into an authoritarian  police state  giving  expression  to  the  outworking of
Saddam  Husain's  will.  Valognes  also  rightly  emphasises  the  significant
regional  and  international  events  which  were  to  affect  Iraq  during  his
leadership:
• The petrol boom of the 1970s
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• The Kurdish revolts from the 1960s onwards
• The Iran-Iraq War from 1981–1988 (Valognes 1994, 436)
To which should be added the effects of the Second Vatican Council upon
Chaldean ecclesial character as a sui juris church and the development of a
new form of relations with the Holy See.
The new ecclesiology for the universal Catholic church from 1965
was to be a communion of churches in union with the Holy See.  (Green
2002, 244) It was an attempt to move toward a model in which the Holy See
acts as primus inter pares with the pope as chief bishop ``presiding in love''
over the others. 
The  change  in  universal  Catholic  ecclesiology  facilitating  a  new
form  of  eastern  Catholic  union  with  the  Holy  See  with  all  particular
Catholic ecclesial communities becoming sui juris churches: self-governing
and  with  the  responsibility  to  determine  their  ecclesiology  insofar  as  it
remained in accordance with existing tradition and in union with the Holy
See. Galadza characterises sui juris ecclesial identity as:
`distinguished  not  only  by  their  worship,  but  also  by  indigenous  theologies,
spiritualities  and  canonical  traditions.  Each  of  them is  also  to  incarnate  in  unique
fashion the unity, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity of the one Church, with the
Bishop of Rome serving as the touchstone of this unity and continuity.'  (Galadza 2007,
291)
This  new  form  of  overarching  ecclesiology  an  attempt  to  grant  the
devolution  of  ecclesial  power  and  the  restoration  of  latent  jurisdictional
powers essential  to  the authority  of the bishop who heads each  sui  juris
church. A model perceived to be more in keeping with that which existed
prior to the Council of Trent and as perceived to exist in the early centuries
of the Christian oikumene.
It appears a new ecclesiological identity took time to develop and
many years before all church members grasped the implications of the new
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model. The use of the vernacular in the liturgy which some eastern Catholic
churches  introduced  after  the  Second  Vatican  Council  –  including  the
Chaldeans – having far greater impact in terms of an indication of change to
community members in the way in which the church operated and expressed
its identity than more abstract ecclesiological theories.
For  the  Chaldeans  the  other  major  change  to  take  place  in  the
aftermath of the Council was the creation of the dioceses of Ahvaz (in Iran),
Erbil and Sulaymaniya between 1966–1968. It is unlikely the impetus to do
so derived from the Council, however, taking place in the context of general
ecclesiastical  re-organisation  given  between  1957–1960  the  dioceses  of
Aleppo, Beirut and Alqosh had also been established.
Christian involvement with revolutionary movements
The establishment of republican government did not impact directly on the
conduct of religious affairs. Nevertheless, a setback to the Christian position
in national affairs was the Chaldean patriarch's removal from the senate and
thus  a  decline  in  influence  over  the  legislature.  Although from 1958 all
religious  leaders  were  barred  from involvement  in  legislative  affairs  the
effect on the Chaldeans and by extension all Christians was greater than the
Muslim populations. This due to the Christian community's size compared
to the Sunni and Shia and the lack of Christian communal cohesion outside
of  a  religious  framework –  they  could  not  like  the  Kurds,  for  example,
express unity through ethnic identity. For Christians to retain their voice at
the highest level of the state in the Iraqi context obliged them to have one
authoritative  point  of  contact  with  the  contemporary  political  élite.  A
divergence of opinions expressed via political parties whilst attractive for
those Christians interested in pursuing a modern western style parliamentary
democracy detracted from the recognition of Christians as an essential part
of Iraqi society because they lacked a figure who represented their interests
in  a  comprehensive  manner.  Whether  such  a  position  was  desirable  the
traditional paradigm of Mesopotamian-Iraqi society as divided by religious
affiliation which had existed in some form since the Sasanid era and with
one figure or a small dedicated group to represent each religious community
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was  perhaps  the  most  efficacious  way in  which  to  ensure  the  continued
presence of the Chaldean difference in Iraqi society and popular recognition
of such.
In some respects, and due to the republicans' desire to establish a
more secularist paradigm for the Iraqi state, the seizure of power by General
Abd  al-Karim  Qasim  and  Colonel  Abdul  Salam  Arif  benefited  the
Chaldeans.  Legal  reform,  for  example,  limited  the  rôle  of  the  sharia.  It
seemed also for a time there might be an end to the dominance of the Sunni
minority.  (Baram,  Rohde,  and  Zeidel  2010,  6) Qasim's  ethno-religious
heritage mix of Sunni Arab and Shia Kurd it was initially thought might
endear him to a greater cross section of the population and could have acted
as  a  point  of  unity these were not  sufficient  to  deter  his  deposition and
execution in 1963 in a Baathist supported coup led by his former ally Arif.
(Kirmanj 2010, 49)
Qasim's death was not especially to the detriment of the Chaldeans
but at times of internal upheaval in the republican era they were often on
dangerous  ground  as  political  scapegoats  due  to  substantial  Christian
involvement  with  the  Communist  Party.  This  was  exemplified  during
Qasim's tenure when Christians were implicated in a communist rising in
1959 in Mosul and from 1959–1960 in attacks against  conservative pan-
Arabist Muslims. Despite the Chaldean Patriarchate's transferral to Baghdad
in 1950 and some Chaldean migration to  the city  a  significant  Christian
population remained in Mosul of which 30,000 were displaced following
violent traditionalist Muslim reaction to the rising and Qasim's attempts to
introduce  socialist  socio-economic  policies.  (Betts  1979,  185) The  upset
caused at a national and regional level by Christian involvement was strong
with  many  families  avoiding  attacks  by  confining  themselves  to  their
homes.  Rivalries and perceived threats  between socio-religious  groups in
northern Iraq were often more intense than those in central and southern
Iraq with a greater number of groups competing for dominance in the social
sphere a challenge to stable political order. (Betts 1979, 106)
A  significant  minority  of  East  Syriac  Christians  saw  the  Iraqi
Communist Party (ICP) as an avenue for radical change in a society which
                                                              110
they viewed as continuing in the traditions of power for the very few and
assumed  that  a  Marxist  inspired  political  system  would  resolve  these
differences. That those involved in the instigation and maintenance of the
party were often middle class urban intellectuals (a group which coalesced
with many Christians) was a trend found throughout the Arab Middle East.
The first ICP general secretary was Yusuf Salman Yusuf41 of East Syriac
heritage who had become involved with Soviet Russian activists during the
1920s and helped form the ICP's first iteration in 1935 but was executed in
1949 as a result of his involvement in anti-government activity. (Betts 1979,
148, 184) 
Despite  Christian  membership  of  the  ICP being  as  much  as  ten
percent of the total the hierarchy considered involvement highly dangerous.
Joseph Gogue, Chaldean archbishop of Basra, and Cheikho all but formally
prohibited  participation  in  ICP  activities.  (Betts  1979,  185) Such
condemnations were necessary to disavow Muslim Iraqis of the notion that
Christians favoured an anti-religious party gaining influence in government.
This  was  a  difficulty  shared  with  the  Shia  religious  leadership  as
communism  appealed  to  many  as  a  means  to  alleviate  their  political
minority status.  (Nakash 2003, 132–134) Conversely, from the late 1950s,
some Shia gravitated towards a rejuvenation of their religious identity as the
means  to  affect  change  through  an  Islamic  Revolution  and,  given  their
proportionate size in the population, this seemed likely to succeed. (Nakash
2003, 135) For the Chaldeans a popular militant religious identity which
could aid  in  affecting such change was not  a  realistic  path  given that  it
lacked historical precedent in the East Syriac tradition and support from a
sufficiently large section of the Chaldean population.
Republican governments and the rise of the IBP
The party which was to dominate Iraq from 1968–2003 had its origins in
Syria in 1943. The Baath was established under the tutelage of a religiously
41 Leading Chaldean communists also included George Telou and Elias Hanna.
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mixed group of intelligentsia one of whom the Antiochian Orthodox, Michel
Aflaq, was to remain a key Baathist theorist. With its message of Arab unity,
freedom from Western influence and a more equitable socio-economic order
under a socialist system the party proved very popular and had a captive
audience especially among students, young professionals and eventually the
armed forces in Iraq. Saddam Husain became involved in the party from the
early  1950s  and  emerged  as  a  militant  leader:  in  1959  attempting  to
assassinate Qasim. Spending the next four years in exile he developed the
IBP as the chief vehicle of the ``Arab Revolution" in Iraq and ensured that
mistakes made in pursuing this agenda by other revolutionary parties were
overcome and created a hardened cadre of activists to facilitate IBP success.
(Sassoon 2011, 19–29 ff)
The  Baathists  came  to  predominance  initially  in  the  1963  coup
which overthrew Qasim. This ended in failure due to a lack of sufficient
military and popular support to maintain their momentum. By contrast their
success in 1968 relied on the consolidation of the party membership and a
rise in popularity: the Baath viewed as the only party capable of upholding
an  independent  Iraq  and  which  could  form  an  effective  counter  to  the
perceived threat of Israel, Iran and the USA to the Arab states. It was also
perceived  that  the  IBP  would  more  efficaciously  utilise  the  national
petroleum revenues. Despite a rapid increase in the standard of living from
1958–1968 there was continued hope for a more equitable and meritocratic
economic settlement especially among the new and growing urban middle
class.
After  consolidating  their  initial  political  success  the  1958  coup
leaders had sought to remove perceived injustices in Iraq by weakening the
influence of socio-economic élites principally through land redistribution.
However, as the republicans were unable to break the entrenched patronage
networks which the land owners and tribal leaders controlled so were they
unable to meet the demands of a rising middle class caught up in a wave of
economic development which transformed Iraqi infrastructure and the hope
among the peasantry for land re-distribution. (Mansfield 1982, 70)
It should be noted that Baathist control of the government and state
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was  not  conclusively  completed  on  taking  power  in  1968.  IBP control
extended gradually and the period to 1979 was reliant on building a broader
base of support which involved the Kurdish Democratic Party (PDK) and
ICP in government under the grouping titled the National Progressive Front.
Efforts were also made to deal with the Kurdish question but a 1974 law
granting  autonomy  was  viewed  as  insufficient  to  assuage  the  PDK's
aspirations  and  they  began  to  agitate  for  separation  by  military  means.
Whilst  the  ICP,  as  of  1976,  was  repressed  along  with  a  purge  of
independently  minded  military  officers.  (Luizard  2002,  84,  90–91) All
served  as  means  to  advance  IBP status  with  the  purge  in  the  military
particularly indicative of the substantial power which the IBP wielded: the
army had been the key faction determining the contemporary government
since the establishment of the modern state of Iraq. Baathist capability to
alter the existing political  status quo without alienating the general public
determined  by  the  use  of  petroleum  revenues  to  make  good  on  their
ideological  promises  to  create  a  more  equitable  socio-economic  order.
(Luizard 2002, 94–95)
Political change impacts on the Chaldeans
The affects of political changes during the 1960s on the Chaldeans varied by
geographic  location  and socio-economic  position.  However,  I  suggest  an
overarching trend was a loss of confidence in the ability of traditionally
influential institutions such as the military to restore stability to the state.
This  was  exemplified  when,  with  the  loss  of  authoritative  political
leadership and societal stability, the Chaldean hierarchy organised for the
migration of those in their communities who so desired via Turkey to the
West.  (Interview,  Chaldean  community  member,  Amman,  May  2013)
Nevertheless, the Chaldean commitment to the ideal of Iraq as a nation state
did not disappear and Sengstock indicates the opportune circumstances for
the Chaldean community's integration in a national cause facilitated by the
IBP. (Sengstock 1974, 201, 202) Until Mesopotamia became Iraq Christians
tended  towards  regionalism  with  trans-regional  identities  tied  to  church
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membership.  Following the creation of an independent state in which all
were expected to contribute to the nation state and its development even if
only through the payment of taxes this changed. Chaldean urbanisation and
closer interaction with modernist Muslims who shared an outlook of a lay
state and a desire for social development were commonly held aspirations.
The  Baath  offered  this  and  the  party  avoided  the  potentially  dangerous
affects of overtly anti-religious socialism favoured by the ICP. However, the
overall  development  for  the  poorer  urban  and  rural  classes  which  the
Christian  intelligentsia  favoured  could  still  be  acted  upon.  As Mansfield
notes: 
`The socialist content in Ba'thism is not very specific. It is less a set of socio-economic
principles than a rather vague means of national improvement. Saddam says that only
certain broad basic conditions need to be fulfilled for a system to be called socialist.'
(Mansfield 1982, 69)
I  suggest  Chaldean participation in  the IBP brought  with it  an increased
respectability for the party and the appearance of a wider base of support.
Christian  involvement  only  declining  after  the  increasing  prevalence  of
Baathist  identity  and ideology  to  the  exclusion  of  any  other  in  national
politics,  the  militarisation  of  Iraqi  life  and  the  implementation  of
authoritarian security structures.
Regardless  of  the  new  government's  secularising  and  social-
nationalist intentions the new 1970 Iraqi constitution established Islam as
the state's religion but guaranteed religious freedom. (Yacoub 1996, 28) At
the core of Baathist ideology was to accept the advent of Islam as one of the
most  important  events  in  Arab history.  However,  it  was  accepted  for  its
spiritual foundations – the political structures which grew up around Islam
were to be ignored. Instead the political order was to be based on modern
ideals of nationalism and a self-reliant industrial economic order. (Dawisha
1983,  115) Different  religious  identities  were  permitted  but  were  to  be
derogated  for  the  progression  of  the  greater  Arab  cause.  This  Arabist
discourse had been influenced and formed by Christian leaders within and
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outside Iraq. Michel Aflaq, for example, was an Arab first and a Christian
second. (Kelidar 1974, 22)
Religion was not hidden under IBP rule for it was acceptable insofar
as it was not  political which was suppressed. The state as directed by the
party was the only arena in which political development of national policies
and national identity was to take place. External to this arena activity could
occur  as  long as  ideology derived from alternative  religious,  political  or
cultural sources did not attempt to affect change on a national level or which
weakened  the  IBP hold  on  the  means  of  coercion  in  the  state.  Such  a
separation of the overall  direction of Iraqi  society going deeper  than the
English  term  secularism implies  which  emphasises  more  attempts  to
suppress overt displays of religion in public life. The French term laïcité is
perhaps more appropriate in the context of the IBP's attempts to separate
political direction of society from influence by non-party institutions and to
reduce  the  influence  of  religious  movements  determined  to  affect
widespread political change. Moreover, it marks the distinction between the
lay element  of  society  and the  party élite  who assumed the direction  of
society from all other organisations who previously would have had a voice
and influence in the direction of national affairs. The desire to advance such
a  paradigm  of  laïcité linked  not  just  to  fulfilling  Baathist  ideological
imperatives but also due to the need to present a societal mentality which
could unite  the Iraqi  population to  oppose the rise of revolutionary Shia
groups. (Luizard 2002, 99–103)
The  suppression  of  overt  displays  of  religious  identity  was
challenging to enforce given religion formed a chief distinguishing marker
of communities in Iraq. Public and private Chaldean displays of religious
practice were  discounted as  a  threat  by the government  as  they were in
general disinclined to be involved in political agitation. A point emphasised
by  Sengstock  who  notes  that  the  `Chaldeans  have  lived  politically  as
``marginal men'' '. (Sengstock 1974, 202; Pacini 1998, 15) 
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Mesopotamian identity
The Christian rôle in twentieth century Iraqi politics held precedent from
earlier periods in Mesopotamia during the rule of the Sassanids, Abbasids or
Mongols  who  permitted  Christians  to  act  as  integral  contributors  to
developing  Arab  and  Mesopotamian  societies.  Such  pluralistic  concerns
were supported by Saddam Husain to an extent who was enamoured by pre-
Islamic Mesopotamian history. He attempted to consolidate the history of
the ancient Akkadian, Assyrian and Babylonian Empires under the aegis of a
unique Arab Iraqi-Mesopotamian discourse.  (Baram 1983, 435–437) This
was  brought  into  public  life  through  cultural  events  such  as  the  Mosul
Spring Festivals: 
`The Festivals were meant to get across to the dwellers of the Mosul district – Arabs,
Kurds and Turkomans, Muslims, Christians – and to all Iraqis, essentially three ideas.
First,  that each part of  Iraq,  north, centre,  and south,  had a history to be proud of
somehow connected to the dwellers of those regions in present-day Iraq. Second, that
all these histories should be regarded as an Iraqi heritage and third, that the recognition
of  this  heritage  should  encourage  everyone  ``to  strengthen  internal  Iraqi  unity".'
(Baram 1983, 429)
Husain,  however,  only  supporting  a  plural  society  in  the  context  of
attempting  to  make  Iraq  unique  among  Arab  countries,  the  legitimate
successor  to  the  Semitic  empires  of  ancient  history  and  to  emphasise
internally and to the world the superiority of Iraq as the best suited country
to lead the Arab peoples. The emphasis on an Arab national identity was
implicitly  supported  by  the  Chaldeans  with  those  who  supported  an
Assyrian identity setting themselves apart and were exposed to accusations
of treachery by the state.
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Cheikho, the Baath and Saddam Husain
Cheikho was born in Alqosh in 1906 and ordained priest for the diocese of
Mosul in 1930. Like Thomas and Ghanima his background introduced him
to the challenge of accommodating refugees from northern Iraq after the
Ottoman massacres and the demands for political autonomy raised by the
Assyrian nationalists  in  the  1920s and 1930s.  Cheikho received a  sound
formation for future patriarchal office as Bishop of Akra from 1947–1957
and  was  a  graduate  of  the  Pontifical  Oriental  Institute.  Cheikho  also
oversaw the establishment of twenty-five new Baghdadi Chaldean parishes
and the construction of a new seminary in Dora in 1962 – the region of the
capital  which  would  go  on to  become known as  the  ``Vatican  Quarter''.
(O’Mahony 2005, 29; The Catholic Herald 1962) The continuing growth in
the city a remarkable rise given that until the First World War only three
Chaldean  churches  existed  there  and  demonstrating  again  the  rapid
ecclesiological and demographic changes with which successive patriarchs
had to contend.
Cheikho was also responsible for interpreting and implementing the
new sui juris ecclesiological identity and having been named a member of
the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Churches in 1963 he was at the
forefront  of  the  future  direction  of  the  development  of  eastern  Catholic
identity.  (The Catholic Herald 1963) It is possible that maintaining a close
relationship with the Holy See was a reason for his pastoral work being
largely  unhindered  during  Husain's  rule.  To  too  heavily  damage  this
relationship potentially limited the Holy See's voice of mediation in regional
and international affairs with which Iraq became entangled.
Saddam Husain became President of Iraq in July 1979 following the
resignation of his predecessor Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr. Husain had prepared
for his ultimate accession to power since the 1968 coup through extending
IBP  influence  into  nearly  all  Iraqi  institutions.  Chaldean  religious  life
perhaps  one  of  the  least  impacted  but  even  in  this  arena  informers  and
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security service agents were prevalent. Nonetheless, a greater modicum of
free action was permitted perhaps due to the Church being perceived as a
non-state institution which could be more effectively influenced by the state
and partly because the Chaldean patriarch was resident in Iraq unlike the
patriarchs of the Syrian Orthodox (Syria), Syrian Catholics (Lebanon) and
Church of the East (USA). 
The position of Chaldeans in relation to the Baath whilst formally
directed by Cheikho was heterogeneous and affected by three main factors:
location, social position and strength of adherence to the nationalist ideal of
a  separate  Assyrian  region  in  the  north  of  Iraq.  (Rassam  2012b) For
Chaldean  residents  of  central  and  southern  Iraq  there  was  a  general
acceptance of the Baathist  status quo especially due to its restrictions on
Islamic jurisprudence and customs in public life. 
Due to the ongoing conflict between the state and the Kurds those
Chaldeans resident in northern Iraq were faced with the need to agitate for
their  communities'  defence.  A scenario  which  was  combined  with  those
Christian political exiles who gained relative freedom of operation among
the Kurds of northern Iraq and who viewed Christian political autonomy as
necessary for their security. Chaldean residents and political exiles brought
together  under  the  aegis  of  the  Assyrian  Democratic  Movement  (ADM)
which  emerged  as  the  leading  proponent  of  an  independent  Christian
political and ethnic identity in Iraq. Such Assyrian and Kurdish separatist
movements  affected  the  Baathist  view  of  northern  Iraq  which  came  to
regard the region as the abode of political enemies. Such a state of affairs of
great sorrow to Cheikho whose regard for northern Iraq stemmed from his
own  origins  there  and  tenure  as  bishop  of  Akra.  Cheikho  had  to  be
pragmatic  in  his  leadership  as  he  dealt  with  radical  alterations  to  Iraqi
culture  and  society.  I  suggest  reluctance  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  the
northern Chaldeans during times of Iraqi military incursion was perceived
as necessary to ensure stability for the majority who resided in central and
southern Iraq but was ultimately detrimental to Chaldean ecclesial identity
which was so strongly associated with the north.
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The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988
From the mid-1970s Iraqi foreign policy focused on the traditional rivalry
between Arabs and Iranians in the competition between the Baath state and
the Pahlavi monarchy to become the leading power in south-west Asia. It is
a  remarkable  coincidence  that  1979 saw Husain's  rise  to  power  and the
success  of  Ruholla  Khomeini's  Islamic  revolution  in  Iran.  The  Iranian
Chaldean  community  was  challenged  by the  introduction  of  a  dominant
Shiite  influence  as  the  formal  ideology  of  the  state  and  society.  The
Chaldeans lost a large proportion of their support as all foreign Latin clergy
were obliged to leave Iran in 1979 and in the space of one month after their
departure only six members of their previous 150 Latin clergy and religious
remained.  (Baumer 2006, 276) Chaldeans in Iraq and Iran had a genuine
fear which an expressly Shia political revolutionary ideology could have on
their societies were Iran to invade. Youhannan Issayi, Chaldean Archbishop
of Tehran (1970–1999), noting in 1983: ` ``Christians began to feel the need
for a religious revision of their lives and a return to God'' '  (Hebblethwaite
1983, 1042) Perhaps indicative of detachment from a traditional Chaldean
identity  which  modernity,  urbanisation  and  engagement  with  political
parties  and the  state  had  inhibited  away  from rural  village  or  town life
centred on the parish and ecclesial institutions.
In this context those united by religion were divided by geography
and  nationality  with  Chaldeans  serving  in  both  Iranian  and  Iraqi  armed
forces during the Iran-Iraq War.42 Iraqi Chaldeans were found as committed
supporters of the War as any other Iraqi community and their subsequent
military service largely reflected that of the general population. (O’Mahony
2004b, 443) The war saw high casualties among the Christian communities
which  some accord  to  the  purposeful  placement  of  Christian  soldiers  in
exposed positions at  the front,  however,  this could have been a result of
Christian  attempts  to  prove  their  worth  to  their  fellow  soldiers  than  a
politically motivated military order.  (Petrosian 2006, 128) In general terms
42 An issue affecting Iranian and Iraqi Armenians, Shia and members of the Church of
the East.
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the War served as a means to improve the Chaldeans' social status as until
the  1980s  unofficial  barriers  to  Christian  progression  in  state  apparatus
continued to exist partly as a result of the continued stereotype of Christian
desire for separatism and the Sunni reluctance to cede power to any other
community. As a result of Christian participation the highest ranks in the
military  were  opened  to  them which  positively  affected  how they  were
perceived in other arenas. (O’Mahony 2003, 6)
It is difficult to assess Chaldean beliefs and perceptions about the
war as no survey of Christian Iraqi military veterans has taken place. If we
are to  take the opinions  of  the highest  ranking Chaldean in  the political
order as popularly held we can note that Tariq Aziz referred to the Iranians
as ``savages'' and stated he would have used nuclear weapons to defeat them
if they were available. (Takeyh 2010, 376) Such language indicative of the
intense and personal nature of the conflict in Iraqi society and the persistent
Christian  fear  of  revolutionary  Shia  Islam.  Such  rhetoric  and  the
dehumanisation of the Iranians was a theme pursued under the Baath with
Husain's  uncle  writing in  a  propaganda leaflet  entitled ``Three Creatures
God never created – Persians, Jews and flies": `The Persians are animals
given  human  form  by  God.  Their  morals  are  bad,  they  have  a  mean
nature...Brother Arabs, the Persians are the number one enemy!' (Quoted in
Luizard  2002,  100) In  Aziz's  case  his  views  of  the  Islamic  Republic
coloured by its attempted assassination of him in 1980.
Tariq Aziz
It has been suggested that those Chaldeans who accepted membership of the
IBP were  in  some way collaborators  with  the  state  –  viewing Chaldean
commitments to the party in an entirely pejorative manner and through the
prism of all the actions of the state as directed by Husain.  (Cf Wilmshurst
2011,  438) In  actuality  membership  was  no  more  or  less  a  marker  of
collaboration than party membership of any other authoritarian government
such as the Communist in the USSR or the NSDAP in Germany during the
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1930s and 1940s, as if one wished to work in the civil service or the military
membership was mandatory.
Tariq Aziz rose to prominence during the first Baath coup in 1963
but he along with many other IBP members were forced into exile until their
ultimate  triumph  in  1968.43 Aziz  had  been  a  strong  influence  on  party
thought and activity since working as editor of the party newspaper, later
rising to become Minister of Information in the 1970s before attaining the
position of deputy prime minister and foreign minister and becoming one of
the most powerful men in Iraq. 
His initial interest in the IBP had come from a desire to reform Iraqi
society and to ensure complete independence from the British Empire. This
inspiration was later transformed into fulfilling the political aims of Husain
and developing Iraq into a modern industrial state. Aziz's Christian origins
were never denied during his political career yet paradoxically despite being
baptised  Mikhael  Yohannan  he  utilised  a  nom  de  plume to  escape  the
explicit connotations of his name in order to support his political success.
(Spencer  2010) Aziz's  subsequent  career  was  an  unusual  but  not  an
impossible trajectory for a Chaldean. Yet it  is  not clear to what level he
associated  himself  with  a  Christian  faith  or  a  Chaldean  identity  beyond
formalities having stated in 2000 that he does not practice religion but his
wife does and that all his children were baptised. (Bouvet and Denaud 2000,
80) Aziz's  religious  background  was  not  detrimental  to  Saddam and the
IBP's popular support but if  on occasion there was criticism towards the
government or a failing in Aziz's area of responsibility this could be referred
to  as  the  damaging  influence  of  his  Christianity.44 (Interview,  Chaldean
community leader, Erbil, October 2013)
Prior to Aziz Christians had assumed high office: Dr Hanna Khayat
was the first Iraqi health minister and Rafael Butti was propaganda minister
in  1953.  Chaldeans  also  still  maintained  a  substantial  influence  in  the
43 He  was  born  in  1936 in  the  northern  Iraqi  town  of  Telkef  –  one  of  the  most
culturally Chaldean towns of Iraq.
44 There is a remarkable lack of information in general or academic literature available
on Aziz and studies on his religious identity and influence on Saddam Husain and the
Baath government would be a very useful contribution to scholarship.
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professions from the 1970s onwards and their contributions reinforced the
notion  of  the  Christian  community's  value  to  Iraqi  society.  It  would  be
incorrect to consider Chaldeans as enjoying any special place in Baathist
Iraq  as  all  Christian  groups  were  considered  with  the  same  treatment
regardless  of  size  as  long  as  they  remained  politically  neutral.  (Rassam
2012b) Aziz did intervene for Christians on occasion but this was never over
issues that would alter their social status. In June 1992 the Missionaries of
Charity were in difficulty with Iraqi bureaucracy over whether they had a
right  to  continue  working  in  the  country.  Patriarch  Raphael  I  Bidawid,
appealed to Aziz to resolve this issue favourably and the religious sisters
were permitted to remain. (Catholic News Service 2010) That he did consent
to  act  following  appeals  from  a  church  leader  indicates  he  must  have
retained some sympathy for Christians in general, however far he may have
moved away from the Chaldean  milieu and likely considered them as his
natural constituency within Iraqi society. The Christian communities since
2003 would perhaps not have made such efforts to highlight Aziz's position
during trial,  sentencing and subsequent imprisonment on death row to an
international audience if he had not been in a position to ameliorate their
situation  during  Baathist  rule.  Georges  Casmoussa,  the  Syrian  Catholic
Archbishop of Mosul, noted in 2010: ` ``Tariq Aziz was not in security, he
was a civil minister. Of course he was part of the regime of Saddam, but that
does not mean he was responsible for everything that happened.'' ' (Catholic
News Service 2010) That until the 2003 invasion of Iraq Aziz maintained his
position as a high profile figure in Husain's immediate coterie due, partly, to
the  political  expediency  of  a  high  ranking  non-Muslim  presence  in
government  to  present  an  image  of  plurality  to  the  wider  world.  Aziz's
Chaldean  identity  also  facilitated  the  consolidation  of  the  Iraqi  state's
relationship with the Holy See and Vatican diplomatic corps under Husain.
A relationship  which  from the  1980s  became  a  means  to  develop  Iraqi
interests in a broader context and to consolidate Holy See-Iraqi relations.45
45 Aziz died whilst still imprisoned in June 2015.
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The Kurdish rebellions and Christian involvement
If as one contemporary author suggested `it is in Iraq that the Kurds have
the fairest treatment [by comparison with other states in which they reside]'
(Edmonds 1958, 147) Iraq also presented the most opportune circumstances
for a Kurdish rebellion to succeed given the disintegration of the political
status quo from 1958–1968. Instability at the executive level inhibited the
construction of a sustained policy for dealing with Kurdish aspirations and
the  Iraqi  army  was  relied  upon  to  contain  them.  Such  a  turn  of  events
associating  Iraqi  policy  on  Kurdish  autonomy  to  a  primarily  military
solution for most of the next four decades with the formulation of a political
resolution  for  meeting  Kurdish  demands  perceived  as  a  denial  of  Iraqi
territorial sovereignty and nationhood.
Regardless of the Chaldean influx to southern Iraq as a result of the
massacres in the First World War and later Kurdish rebellions substantial
communities remained in the northern towns of Akra, Alqosh, Erbil, Duhok,
Kirkuk,  Mosul,  Sulaymaniya  and  Zakho.  All  key  centres  of  Chaldean
presence and from the 1960s and the return of the Kurdish leader Mustapha
Barazani from exile in the USSR increasing foci of Kurdish attempts to gain
independence. 
Some  Christians  resident  in  the  northern  provinces  supported
Kurdish  military  and  political  activities  with,  it  appears,  the  majority  of
activists drawn from the Church of the East and a significant minority of
Syrian Orthodox. (Donabed and Mako 2009, 75) Betts and Adams Schmidt
indicate that at the final dissolution of the Assyrian Levies in 1955 many of
the  highly  trained  fighters  turned  their  loyalties  from the  British  to  the
Kurdish separatists with Schmidt describing one Kurdish military unit he
came across:  `of 200 Kurds there were,  as I  recall,  about 30 Christians'.
(Betts 1979, 186; Schmidt 1964, 71) The Kurds were viewed as a suitable
body upon which to attach themselves to advance the cause of Assyrian
nationalism with both seeking to aggregate their power under a government
which had no interest in their political independence.  (Hazen 1979, 49) It
                                                              123
was paradoxical, however, to see the ethnic ideal of ``Assyrianism'' pursued
through support from a group which had previously massacred Christians
during  the  First  World  War  –  reflecting  the  rapidly  changing  pragmatic
alliances which existed in the region. (Joseph 1961, 37; Donabed and Mako
2009, 75)
Nevertheless, I suggest through becoming part of Kurdish political
discourse  Assyrian  nationalists  detrimentally  affected  their  relations  with
other Christians. The nationalist approach of the Assyrians contradicted the
universalism  of  the  Christian  faith  with  the  limits  imposed  on  it  by  a
particular  ethnic  identity.  (Cf  Hastings  1997,  185) Furthermore,  the
Assyrians  sought  to  control  the  discourse  on  nomenclature  among  the
Christian  communities  utilising  ``Assyrian''  as  a  suitable  title  for  all
Christians so that the supposed link to the Assyrian people of the Ancient
World  could  be  maintained  and  give  credence  to  their  agitation  for  an
independent state. (Teule 2011e, 313–314)
Nature of combat and effects on Chaldeans
During the Iraqi army pacification campaigns no discrimination was made
between  the  intended  target  –  the  Kurds  –  and  other  Iraqi  minority
populations with Chaldeans, members of the Church of the East and Yezidis
all affected by attacks. With the Chaldeans suffering particular persecution
during  military  operations  in  1963  in  Amadiya  and  during  the  Anfal
campaign  of  the  1980s.  (Wilmshurst  2011,  438) Chaldean  difficulties
continued with the Arabisation policy pursued by the IBP which involved
the movement of Sunni Arabs from southern and central Iraq to the villages
of Kurdistan. This policy combined with the continuing affects of military
activity saw further numbers migrate from the north to central and southern
Iraq.
The experience of day-to-day Christian life across northern Iraq was
not  uniform.  The  geographic  and  social  variations  across  the  region
precluded  a  consistent  narrative  developing.  Nevertheless,  during  the
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Kurdish rebellions nearly all the Christians of the region were affected in
some way. The Chaldean village of Inishke provides a useful example and is
indicative of the population's changing fortunes and the long term effects of
the  clash  of  Kurdish  demands  for  independence  with  Arab  nationalist
ideology on regions ethnic and religious make up.46
The village is presently a small settlement in Duhok province under
the  administration  of  the  Kurdish  Regional  Government  and  is
ecclesiastically  part  of  the  Chaldean  Diocese  of  Zakho-Amadiya.  In  the
1950s a stable Chaldean presence was based around the parish church of
Mart Shimuni and Her Holy Sons. From the 1958 revolution the situation
deteriorated and as military action against the Kurds began the Chaldeans
started to migrate. This period was also contiguous with an increase in the
number of Kurdish nomads settling and turning to agriculture which appears
to  have  led  to  competition  for  the  use  of  land  suitable  for  agriculture.
(Edmonds 1958, 149) The Chaldeans becoming so pressurised as a result of
residing in the conflict zone that in 1961 a Mosul based priest sent buses to
bring the women and children from Inishke to the city. Nearly all Christian
villages in the Duhok area faced similar difficulties and it was only in late
1973 that former villagers began to return as re-development began in the
area.
What  was  most  striking  from  the  information  gained  during  the
interview was the Chaldean community's resilience and attachment to their
village. Despite a departure of over ten years for many of the residents every
effort was expended at the earliest safe opportunity to return. The sense of
stewardship over  the  village  regardless  of  ongoing political  and military
conflict  emphasising  that  geographical  ties  to  the  land  are  integral  to
Chaldean identity. 
From  the  late-1970s  onwards  the  restoration  of  political  order
encouraged more families to return and with the Church's support were able
to return to the norms of daily life. Indeed, the area became popular with
Arab tourists especially from the Gulf states to take advantage of the cooler
46 The following information gathered in an extended interview with the parish priest
of Inishke in October 2013.
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summer climate which the higher altitudes permitted. The area's reputation
grew to the extent that Husain visited in 1979 and built several vacation
palaces  for  his  close  associates.  Husain's  favour  for  the  village  did  not
benefit the Chaldeans as it greatly increased the security forces present in
the area and complicated the livelihoods of local farmers. Some of the most
fertile land being appropriated for Husain's own purposes and other tracts
given  for  use  to  Arab  migrants  from  central  and  southern  Iraq  as  the
Arabisation  policies  of  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  were  vigorously
implemented. 47
Although  Arabisation  of  Iraq  had been  ongoing  since  the  British
mandate  the  Baathist  implementation  of  the  policy  was  the  first  time in
which population movement had been encouraged so comprehensively to
the  detriment  of  the  population  of  northern  Iraq.  (Marr  2010,  20) The
intentions of the policy were through social and economic activities to re-
engineer northern Iraqi society which led to three main outcomes:
• the nationalisation of arable/pastoral land
• non-Arabs had no right to their previously owned property
• re-settlement of northern Iraq with Sunni Arabs from the al-Jazira
desert (All points from Muscati and Bouckaert 2009, 19)
The difficulties for Christians who lived in and around the areas of Kurdish
autonomy were further exacerbated by the violence used during the Anfal
campaign from 1987–1988:
`By the end of August [1988], all organised resistance was at an end the Iraqi armed
forces were in control of the whole of the Kurdish autonomous region, roughly 80% of
all  the  villages  had  been  destroyed,  much  of  the  agricultural  land  was  declared
``prohibited territory'' and possibly 100,000 people had lost their lives.'  (Tripp 2007,
236)
47 We cannot underestimate the effects of displacement as a result of the Iraqi-Kurdish
conflict on the residents of northern Iraq with some estimates of up to 1,000,000 people
having been forcibly displaced or departing as refugees. (Cf Joseph 2000, 215)
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Christians became the ``collateral damage'' in a campaign prosecuted with
extreme  violence  for  defeating  a  threat  to  the  maintenance  of  central
government power. That many Christians and also Yazidis identified at least
officially  as  Arabs  and were  at  worst  politically  ambivalent  towards  the
Baath state was ignored. Approximately 150 Christian and Yazidi villages
were  destroyed  along  with  twenty-four  churches,  monasteries  and  an
orphanage  whilst  clergy  were  not  exempt  from attack  and  several  were
alleged to have been killed either among the civilians in the conflict area or
targeted directly by the Baath security services. (FIDH and AIJ 2003, 40–42,
55) A particular  concern  for  the  continuation  of  ecclesial  life  was  the
destruction  of  active  monastic  property  which  saw  the  transferral  of
personnel to the Chaldean monastery of St Anthony's in Baghdad.  (Seferta
2008, 23)
The effects of forced displacement were not just in the immediate
aftermath of events. In 1991 up to two million Kurds left northern Iraq and
even where this was temporary it created an irruption in the social order.
(Luizard  2002,  108) Where  were Chaldeans  to  place themselves  as  they
became  more  exposed  as  wider  Kurdish  society  withdrew?  Later  when
Kurds returned and especially after 2003 with the rejuvenation of Kurdish
identity  how could Chaldeans continue to  maintain a  place in the social
order without being reduced to a group holding to a paradigm of dhimmi
status?  The  Kurdish  rise  to  determine  political  affairs  in  northern  Iraq
preventing another outcome for in advancing their own cause as a minority
in Iraq other minorities were reduced in significance and came to exist in
Kurdish  society  as  Kurdish  subjects  and  reliant  upon  their  goodwill  to
maintain an active presence in the region. 
The difficulties faced in northern Iraq during the 1970s–1980s were
not shared by those Chaldeans resident in central  and southern Iraq with
those in Baghdad often inclined to discount military attacks and government
policies as exaggerated or only affecting those Christians directly involved
in  anti-government  activity.  This  may  seem surprising  given  the  uniting
bond  of  church  membership  and  familial  connections  with  the  northern
populations.  However,  these  were  tempered  by the  relief  for  the  overall
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security situation and the belief that involvement in anti-government activity
was a direct threat to the  status quo. A mentality prevailed that Husain in
particular  had  been  `good  for  us  Christians'  implying  that  criticism  of
government  actions  or  anti-Christian  persecutions  should  be  limited  if
voiced at all. (This paragraph from discussions with Chaldean community
members, London, 2012–2014)
The Kurdish situation came to a denouement only after the 1990/91
Gulf War and the Coalition efforts to shackle Iraq's economy and inhibit
Iraqi armed forces from continued punitive actions in the north. As a result
the Kurds established their de facto autonomy and a parliament was formed
in 1992. Five of the 105 members were Christians with four seats won by
the ADM and the other to the Union of Christians of Kurdistan. (O’Mahony
2003, 7; Teule 2012, 181–182) The Kurdish parliament in 1996 remarkably
recognised  7th  August  (date  of  the  massacres  at  Simele  in  1933)  as  a
national holiday in the region which granted the Assyrian nationalists hope
that  they were recognised as an accepted community within the Kurdish
milieu.  (Teule  2011e,  315) This  success  for  Christian  representation  and
their social stability was complicated, however, by the continuing political
and tribal inspired violence between the PUK and KDP who did not reach a
truce until 1998. 
Raphael I Bidawid (1989–2003)
Cheiko's time as patriarch can be characterised initially by the difficulty of
establishing  a  new  paradigm  for  Chaldean-state  relations  under  the
republican  governments  of  1958–1968.  The  political  shocks  which  Iraq
experienced until  the stabilisation in central  government under the Baath
from 1968 weakening the patriarch's  capability  to  formulate  an effective
narrative  for  church-state  relations.  Cheikho's  rule  also  marked  by  his
practical inability to comprehensively shield Chaldean residents of northern
Iraq  from  the  depredations  which  they  experienced  during  the  Kurdish
rebellions. I suggest it was perceived that openly expressing opposition to
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Arabisation and the Iraqi army activities and their effects on the Chaldeans
would have marked the entire church as a threat to the Baath. A situation
which  led  to  the  the  Church's  leadership  neglecting  the  northern
communities and instead focusing their concerns on Chaldeans resident in
central and southern Iraq and reinforcing the successes of their integration
into Iraqi society especially in Baghdad. 
Cheikho was succeeded by Raphael I Bidawid. Bidawid was born in
Mosul in 1922 and was marked out from a young age for advancement to a
leadership position. He entered the Dominican run minor seminary in 1933
and then was sent for further formation at the Vatican for ten years from
1936–1946.  Receiving  such  a  thorough  formation  by  1956  that  he  had
completed  two  doctorates  in  theology  and  philosophy.48 His  further
ecclesiastical development derived from experience as the Vice-Rector of
the Chaldean seminary in Mosul and six years as chaplain to the Chaldean
workers of the Iraqi Petroleum Company before consecration as Bishop of
Amadiya in 1957 aged only 35. The extended formation in the Vatican led to
accusations later in life of being a partisan of Latin theological and liturgical
trends. Yet, this formation also ensured that Bidawid was better able to gain
influence within the Holy See and its associated institutions once he had
assumed office as patriarch in 1989. 
Bidawid spent a long period of his life as Chaldean Bishop of Beirut
(1966–1989). His experiences in the Lebanon leaving him with an insight as
to how to consolidate the Chaldean status quo within the confines of long
term conflicts  –  an issue with which  his  time as  patriarch was affected.
Bidawid's time as patriarch saw the Chaldeans' status begin to radically alter
within the Iraqi socio-economic climate. By 1989 Iraq had been at war or on
a  total  war  footing  for  nearly  a  decade  and  faced  significant  economic
difficulties having exhausted most of the foreign currency reserves which
had been built up from petroleum production in the 1970s. Further, despite
extensive  and often  successful  state  propaganda persuading Iraqis  of  the
war's necessity the long term effects of the conflict were telling and caused
deep social trauma: 
48 Respectively on East Syriac patriarch Timothy I and Sunni philosopher Al-Ghazali
(b. 1058 d 1111)
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`Iraq suffered over 400,000 dead and wounded...By the time of the cease-fire, [in 1988]
more  than  50  percent  of  Iraq's  males  between the  ages  of  18  and  45  were  in  the
military...Many young men, those who did not qualify for special exemption,  spent
eight of their most productive years in armed service.' (Mylroie 1989, 61)
A normal sense of inter-personal relations which was not reliant on shared
experience of the military life, conflict or socio-economic deprivation was
very difficult to restore. An especially problematic issue was the passing on
of such disturbed communal experiences to the next generation of Iraqis.
Collective  communal  memory  of  eight  years  of  war  and  its  effects  not
limited just to those who died or returned physically or mentally scarred but
also their  families  and children.  An issue which  owing to Iraq's  relative
inaccessibility for research can only be estimated but seems likely under
assessed.
The Chaldean experience during this period mirrored that of other
Iraqis but was tempered by the existence of the wider Middle Eastern and
Western  diaspora  which  opened  opportunities  for  migration.  Bidawid
encouraged Chaldeans to remain even despite difficulties with his working
relationship with the government and Husain playing a substantial part in
this  –  aided  by  his  reputedly  more  charismatic  personality  than  his
predecessor.  (Seferta 2008, 18) A relationship which the patriarch had to
navigate  carefully  and in  the context  of another  major  war  from August
1990.
Second Gulf War 1990–1991 and migration
Bidawid was strong in his condemnation of the Coalition invasion and at
least  officially  supported Iraq's  annexation of  Kuwait.  A Christian  Peace
Conference modelled after one held by Iraqi Muslim leaders earlier that year
was staged in December 1990. As the title of the conference suggested the
Iraqi  churches  were  present  to  pursue  a  peaceful  resolution  and support
Husain's plan for a negotiated settlement to the crisis which was couched in
terms of defeating foreign threats  to  the Arab nationalist  struggle.  (Long
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2004, 131) Husain also drew upon religious rhetoric to support resistance to
the Coalition forces: contrasting the righteousness of Iraq's cause with the
blasphemous betrayal of Christian values which American President George
H. W. Bush pursued by attempting to intervene militarily in the situation.
(Long 2004, 132)
During and after the war on occasions Bidawid's choice of words
may seem to have been injudicious; stating in January 1991 that chemical
weapons might be used by Iraq as a last resort if invaded or, for example,
calling Husain a ` ``real gentleman" '. (The Tablet 1991, 110; Corley 2003)
Whilst in other instances unequivocally referring to Coalition preparations
for entering Kuwait as a crime and that the Baathist annexation of Kuwait
was justified in view of the economic warfare (viz. the manipulation of oil
prices) by which Iraq was affected in the preceding two years.  (The Tablet
1991, 110) Yet he was also realistic about the effects another conflict could
have  upon  Iraqi  society  with  the  potential  of  widespread  anti-Christian
feeling developing through accusations of proximity to western interests. I
suggest Bidawid considered such statements and expressing devotion to Iraq
the  most  utilitarian  means  to  secure  and  even  advance  the  Chaldeans'
position post-conflict. Indeed, it should be recalled that the outcome of the
American led war against Iraq was considered to be far from a foregone
conclusion at the time with Iraq's military one of the largest in the Middle
East with substantial combat experience over the previous decade. 
Post-war Iraq
Whilst  the  immediate  effects  of  the  January–February  1991  Coalition
invasion were restricted to Iraqi soldiers and the populations of Baghdad
and Iraq south of the capital; the entire population of Iraq suffered from the
subsequent effects of infrastructure destruction and the state's inability to
rebuild following the implementation of comprehensive punitive sanctions.
In  this  context  migration  external  to  Iraq  was  a  popular  option  for  the
Chaldeans. The professional classes were in the best position to leave the
country or, if they remained, escape from the effects of inflation and limited
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material resources due to higher salaries. The most severely affected were
those Chaldeans too poor to afford the costs of migration or alleviate their
position in the face of rising inflation. 
It seems likely the loss of a critical mass of Chaldeans in Iraq to the
community's long term maintenance was not apparent until after the end of
the 1991 Gulf War. Prior to the War the construction of a new Chaldean
cathedral in Baghdad had been planned with the capacity for 5,000 persons
whilst  a  new Christian  higher  education  institute,  Babylon  College,  had
opened in 1990.(Yacoub 1996, 32–33; Rassam 2010, 175) Thus, despite the
Iran-Iraq War the Chaldean presence was regarded as likely to continue and,
in  general,  Iraq was perceived to  have sufficient  resources  to  re-develop
from 1988. The destruction to infrastructure in 1991 and the status accorded
to Iraq as a pariah state in the aftermath radically changed this situation.
Quality of Christian life in Iraq declined further and rapidly from the
mid-1990s with four major catalysts: the implementation of a more hard-
line state security policy; the decline in quality of healthcare; the bombing
of Iraq by Coalition forces during Operation Desert Fox in 1998; and the
end of the state's  neutrality  policy in  religious affairs  which saw Husain
seeking the support of Islamist groups to shore up his loss in support from
other sections of Iraqi society.
In  response  to  the  new  Iraqi  reality  and  the  difficulties  which
Christians  throughout  the  Middle  East  were  facing  from  economic
difficulties Bidawid pushed for greater co-ordination between the churches.
He assisted with the foundation of the Council of Catholic Patriarchs and
Bishops (in the Middle East) and a Council with a similar purpose for the
clergy in Iraq.  (Rassam 2010, 172) To continue the Chaldean tradition of
contributing to wider society Bidawid established Caritas Iraq a charitable
organisation  to  alleviate  difficulties  Iraqis  experienced  as  a  result  of
sanctions. (Rassam 2010, 172) It seems likely Bidawid's vision for shoring
up the Chaldean position can be credited to his time ministering to Lebanese
Chaldeans: the awareness he gained of the realities of social and military
conflicts  in  a  quasi-functional  and multi-confessional  state  equipped him
well to deal with the difficulties which Iraq experienced.
                                                              132
One immediate aspect of the war's aftermath was the defeat of an
anti-government  rebellion  by  the  Iraqi  armed  forces.  The  rebellion's
suppression intended as a marker of Husain's re-affirmation of control over
the state. It appears Chaldeans were not widely involved in the rebellion but
there had existed a widespread assumption that the government would be
overthrown  and  it  appears  that  political  forces  outside  of  Iraq  and  in
Kurdistan  attempted  to  influence  Chaldeans  to  become  more  closely
involved with the rebellion in order to gain an advantageous position in a
post-Baathist Iraq. (O’Mahony 2003, 7)
Bidawid, to avoid any implications of collusion with foreign powers,
the Kurdish nationalist aspirations, an association with a political party or an
association  with  a  proposed  Assyrian  state  was  opposed  to  asserting  a
particular ethnic identity for the Chaldeans. Far rather he proposed that one
can have a national affiliation apart from Iraqi Arab – if so desired – and one
can also be a Chaldean. (Petrosian 2006, 115–117) This view was based on
two factors;  political  and social  difficulties  as  indicated  but  also from a
recognition of the limits placed on church's ecclesiology by so doing. The
Chaldeans could not affirm to belong to a missionary orientated institution if
the limits  of the community relied on an ethnic connection – something
which  was  alien  to  the  church's  missionary  history.  Moreover,  as  the
Chaldeans  grew in  size  in  the  diaspora  and expanded  their  work  in  the
modern ecumenical movement a paradigm of mutual aid between the Syriac
churches and more widely among the eastern churches began to form which
was antithetical to those who asserted a particular ethnic nature of religious
identity.
However, Bidawid had to manage the expectations, status and safety
of  the  Chaldeans  in  what  were  becoming  two  distinct  state  entities  the
Kurdish administered region and Iraq proper. Joseph relates how during a
visit to northern Iraq in 1998 Bidawid stated: ` ``[Christians and Kurds] are
the sons of this land; we have a joint history. I can even say, more than this:
We have common blood.'' ' (Joseph 2000, 221) Such a view seems unlikely
to  have  been  endorsed  by  Husain  but  I  suggest  there  was  perhaps
recognition within the Baath administration that the patriarch was not just
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the President's ``man'' but a leader of an international community to which
he had diverse responsibilities.
Chaldean migration 1991–2003
The Melkite priest Jean Corbon identified a process of delocalisation during
the twentieth century whereby a church has origins or long-term residence
in one place but subsequently the community migrates in whole or in part to
one  or  more  locations  often  some  distance  from  their  place  of  origin.
(Corbon 1998, 98) The Melkites are a prime example of this: with a global
population of 1.6 million nearly half of all Melkites live in South America.
Causes of population displacement inherent to delocalisation vary – from
economic decline to persecution – and such a process can even be placed in
the context of the normative Christian missionary impulse resulting from
geographical  displacement.  The  process  permitting  the  revivification  of
ecclesial life in new environments and the development of an ecclesiological
vision which more effectively meets the needs of an international church. 
There are strong precedents for the delocalisation of the Chaldeans
from  their  heritage  as  part  of  the  undivided  Church  of  the  East.  The
missionary impulse which saw the propagation of the East Syriac tradition
throughout  Asia  from  the  Late  Antique  to  Late  Medieval  periods  and
continued  in  the  nineteenth  century  with  Joseph  VI  Audo's  attempts  to
maintain  jurisdiction  over  the  East  Syriac  communities  in  India.  The
difference  of  conception  between  delocalisation  and  that  of  missionary
activity  should  be  one  more  of  terminology  than  of  nature  given  that
migration can provoke interest in the religious identity and practices of a
migrant community among native residents much as active missionary work
does. 
The chief  barrier  to delocalisation becoming an active missionary
process  during  the  internationalisation  of  the  Chaldeans  in  the  twentieth
century due to the negative connotations attached to the causes of migration
from  a  context  of  persecution,  extended  conflict  and  socio-political
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disenfranchisement  in  Iraq.  By  contrast,  the  spread  of  East  Syriac
Christianity in the period fifth to thirteenth centuries came during an era of
particularly  active  propagation  of  the  faith  from  a  community
proportionately larger in size and with greater resources during a sustained
era of the expansion of socio-economic development throughout Asia. The
level  of  hardening  of  religious  communal  boundaries  in  the  twentieth
century;  the  militant  Muslim opposition  to  the  spread  of  Christianity  in
Central Asia and the Middle East and the ambivalence of populations in the
West  to  Christianity  causing active missionary work perhaps to  be more
challenging than any time since the Apostolic era. 
The  greatest  Chaldean  concentrations  outside  of  the  Middle  East
came to reside in the USA with Detroit, Michigan becoming one of the first
and subsequently most long lasting diaspora hubs.  (Bacall  2014,  passim)
Detroit was a focus for manufacturing industries for skilled and unskilled
labour and appealed to a variety of Catholic migrants from Chaldeans and
Maronites to Ukrainians and Irish. The Chaldeans were supported by the
Maronites from the outset of their arrival attending their Liturgy before the
arrival of their first permanent priest in 1947. (Seferta 2004) The lack of a
priest and dedicated religious institutions from the first arrival of Chaldeans
to Detroit in 1889 was far from unusual among early Arab migrants to the
USA who were reluctant to establish churches and mosques as they had
considered their stay to be a temporary one.  (Seferta 2004; Kayyali 2006,
87) The possibility of a return to the Middle East not then being far from
their minds with perhaps a perception that western social and technological
changes would soon have their effect in their homelands. This viewpoint
altered as the attachments to the Middle East declined and stronger ties to
the West developed in recognition that their position in the West allowed for
an explicitly Christian culture to develop more abundantly. (Swan and Saba
1974, 89)
Migration  from  1991  continued  to  favour  the  USA  as  a  final
destination but increased in geographical spread with new concentrations in
Scandinavia,  Germany,  France,  the  Netherlands,  Jordan,  Syria,  Greece,
Britain, Georgia and Australasia. 
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In the European diaspora and the Middle East (outside of Iraq) the
emphasis  in  ecclesial  life  has  been for  shared  activity  with  other  Syriac
churches (especially the Syrian Catholics and Church of the East)  and/or
attendance at the Latin liturgy. The Syriac Orthodox Church, Church of the
East and Ancient Church of the East all have one or more European dioceses
by comparison the Syrian Catholic and Chaldean Catholic churches have
only  at  most  patriarchal  vicariates.  Whereas  in  North  America  and
Australasia Chaldean jurisdictions have been present since 1982 and 2006
respectively  with  it  is  perhaps  being  easier  to  establish  dioceses  in
contiguous  states  –  in  Europe the  Chaldeans  are  spread widely  across  a
variety of jurisdictional boundaries both ecclesial and national.
Nevertheless, the lack of European Chaldean dioceses is surprising
and where Chaldeans are not granted sufficient ecclesial support encourages
engagements with other Syriac churches. Across the whole of Britain, for
example, there has only ever been one Chaldean priest available to work on
a variety of projects to support the community and to form and maintain a
sense of Chaldean ecclesiological identity quite apart from the necessity to
provide the sacraments.49
Until the 1990s motivation to migrate largely derived from hope for
short to medium term social stability and economic advantage and a desire
to live within a more Christian cultural  environment (if  migrating to  the
West). From the 1990s with Kurdish  de facto independence northern Iraq
with  its  many  resources  and  traditional  East  Syriac  ties  also  proved
increasingly popular as a destination for families from Baghdad, Basra and
Kirkuk. Migration into Kurdistan was not universally viewed as necessary
or desirable by Chaldeans but substantial changes were taking place with
Baghdad losing perhaps up to half of its Chaldean population between 1990
and 2000. (Roberson CSP 2014) The ecclesiological and social implications
of  this  cannot  be  underestimated  as  for  those  who  remain  life  becomes
harder as the social space left by the departed Chaldeans is filled by other
49 Fr Habib Jajou (from 2014 bishop of the Archdiocese of Basra) had as of 2012
approximately 500 families to minister to, many of whom do not reside near to the
main community in London but across Britain. Of those outside his immediate remit
many attend the Latin liturgy to fulfil  their Sunday obligation.  (Interview, London,
November 2012)
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influences  and  factions.  Whilst  ecclesiological  attachment  to  Baghdad
which had formed the centre of Chaldean life since the 1950s was reduced
and  the  status  of  the  patriarch  weakened  –  without  a  sufficiently  large
community to refer to, the patriarch's ability to represent Christian affairs to
the Baath élites as integral and essential to Iraqi society was reduced.
Meeting the varied needs of the Chaldeans
Tensions existed between clergy and laity over delocalisation in a strategic
context and as to how they should contribute to the Church in the long-term.
The hierarchy emphasised from 1991 the need for the community to remain
in the regions from where their ecclesiastical culture developed to ensure its
character and contributions to Iraqi society was sustained which had been
emphasised  since  the  Second  Vatican  Council.  (Cherubini  1995a,  46;
Asianews.it 2013) There continues to exist an underlying fear, which is not
widely acknowledged, of the switch between ecclesial identities by migrants
whether in the West or the Middle East. This is not necessarily a process
migrants enter into willingly but does suggest that the Chaldean clergy in
the  diaspora  are  unprepared  to  maintain  a  Chaldean  ecclesial  identity
because of the context of rapid changes in population which have occurred
since  1991.  An example  of  such  a  challenge  is  found in  the  Hashemite
Kingdom  of  Jordan  where  perhaps  up  to  30,000  Iraqi  Chaldeans  have
resided prior to further onward migration from 2003 to 2013 yet there has
only  ever  been  one  Chaldean  chaplain  in  Jordan  at  any  one  time.
(Conversations  with  Latin  and  Chaldean  community  members,  Amman,
May 2013)
The Latin community in Jordan is considered by Iraqi migrants and
refugees  to  have  a  particularly  welcoming  atmosphere  where  to  be  a
Christian  is  the  main  aspect  of  identity.  (Conversations  with  Latin  and
Chaldean  community  members,  Amman,  May  2013)  Thus,  explicitly
Chaldean identity is diluted through taking part in religious life in such a
milieu. The number of  de facto conversions to the Latin church by other
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eastern Christians appears also to have been and continues to be quite high
as a result of the economic and charitable support available but also due to
Latin  social  and educational  institutions.  However,  no  statistics  are  kept
even  of  de  jure conversions  due  to  the  controversial  nature  of  such
conversions in the current environment of modern ecumenism and attempts
to maintain the survival of churches which are much smaller numerically
and financially than the Latin patriarchate in Jordan. Chaldean clergy are
right to speak up on migration yet if measures are not put in place to secure
an identity more heavily influenced by the East Syriac tradition the number
of these Latin-Chaldeans will almost certainly continue to increase.
This  is  a  broader  issue  than  just  a  religious  concern  with  the
Christians becoming lost among the refugee populations in the Levant with
those  who would  normatively  be  most  active  in  sustaining  Iraqi  society
denied opportunity to commit to the societies in which they came to reside
due to difficulties attaining visas or residence status. At the time of their
departure migrants are often of a younger age and better qualified (but not
necessarily all the young are better qualified and vice versa) thus increasing
the average age of the community in Iraq with fewer persons able to replace
the rôles of adults who travel abroad for work. (Cf Sabella 1998, 152) The
Chaldean refugee population in Jordan appears oversupplied with talented
and well qualified workers reflected in the variety of professions among the
people  encountered  during  research  in  May  and  June  2013  including
engineers,  university  lecturers,  self  made  business  men  and  women,
architects,  and  NGO  workers.  Their  available  skills  being  not  always
possible to put to good use in Jordan where many work as restaurant serving
staff, for example, for a minimal salary as low as eighty Jordanian dinars a
week.50 
The  particular  difficulties  which  Christian  Iraqis  experienced  are
seen in the disparity between their size in Iraq by contrast with the entire
Middle East. As of 1998 3.2 percent of Iraqis were Christian whereas for the
whole of the Middle East the Christian population was 6.3 percent. (Pacini
1998, 15, 22) The larger Christian proportion of the populations of Lebanon,
Syria and Egypt notwithstanding and leading to a higher average this was
50  Roughly equivalent to £70 as of 2013.
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still  a  significant  demographic difference affected by the outcome of the
1991 war and subsequent sanctions. This was reflected in refugee statistics
collated  prior  to  the  invasion  in  2003  which  showed  in  2001  of  those
officially  registered  refugees  Iraqis  were  the  third  greatest  population
globally  and  in  2000  the  second  largest  group  seeking  asylum  in
economically developed countries. (Chatelard 2002, 1)
Final years of Husain and Bidawid
The  Chaldean  situation  in  Iraq  and  abroad  was  complicated  during
Bidawid's last five years in office (1998–2003) due to ill health. In and of
itself  the  Chaldean patriarchal  rôle  was  difficult  but  when  coupled  with
attempting  to  restore  its  status  in  a  declining  economic  atmosphere  and
faced with antipathy by major powers in and outside the Middle East this
factor became significant. Bidawid absented himself from Iraq and sought
treatment in the Lebanon which whilst necessary given the parlous state of
healthcare in Iraq was criticised by many in the Iraqi Chaldean community.51
Nevertheless,  Bidawid  continued  his  work  as  far  as  he  was  able
which included acting as an intermediary – either himself or another senior
cleric – between the Iraqi government and the Holy See. This relationship in
turn formed a channel to opening Chaldean relations with western political
leadership  and  demonstrated  plurality  which  still  existed  in  Iraq  and
evidence that not all Iraqi life was determined by Husain which became a
popularised  point  of  view in  Western  media  in  the  lead  up  to  the  2003
invasion.
The strength of goodwill which Husain built up with the Holy See
saw plans laid for a visit by John Paul II to Iraq in 2000. (Mostyn 1999) The
visit was eventually cancelled due to fears over ensuring the pope's security
and the  potential  for  Baathist  embarrassment  were anything untoward to
occur or John Paul to make any statements which could be detrimental to
the USA as the force behind the sanctions or critiquing Baathist policies.
(O’Mahony  2005,  37) Nevertheless,  meetings  continued  between  senior
51 Such a situation following him to the grave with his 2003 funeral held in Beirut.
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members  of  the  Congregation  of  the  Oriental  Churches  and  Baathist
leadership typically Tariq Aziz. The presence of Cardinals in Iraq reflected
the  Holy  See's  continued  interest  in  the  well  being  of  the  Christian
population and reinforced to the international Catholic community that Iraqi
Catholics were an integral part of the universal church. Their long standing
relationship with the Holy See also assisting the Chaldeans  in  justifying
their  presence  in  a  western  environment  when  they  are  so  little
acknowledged  by  the  western  churches  in  general.  The  presence  of  St
Thérèse  of  Lisieux's  relics  in  2002  in  Iraq  a  sign  of  the  Iraqi  Catholic
population's  continued  commitment  to  the  universal  and  multi-faceted
international Catholic community. (ZENIT News Agency 2002b) Given that
St Thérèse is also one of the patrons of Catholic missions I suggest this also
marked a point of reflection on the challenging environment for the Catholic
community's growth in Iraq.
Modern ecumenism
Bidawid's engagement with political powers was reflected in his efforts to
advance  modern  ecumenism  with  other  churches  as  supported  by  the
decrees  of  the  Second  Vatican  Council  `Unitatis  Redintegratio'  and
`Orientalium Ecclesiarum'.  Bidawid had been an early  supporter  of  such
modern ecumenical sentiments stating at the Council:
`  ``Omnes  Christifideles  in  mea  Eparchia,  precibus  petunt  et  vota  faciunt  ut  hoc
Concilium  Oecumenicum  unitati  Ecclesiae  praesto  sit,  ut  sint  unum  ovile  et  unus
pastor." ' (Cherubini 1995b, 14)
Modern ecumenical discourse affirmed the necessity of developing relations
with eastern Christians not  in union with the Holy See and in particular
recognising their historic mission and witness.  (Paul VI 1964, sec. 5, 24)
The purpose of engaging with other Christians changed from one of direct
attempts at conversion to the Catholic Faith and submission to the Holy See
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to  a  focus  on  re-considering  theological  disagreements  with  a  hope  for
reconciliation. (Girling 2012, 38–40)
The Chaldeans  have  pursued  ecumenism especially  vigorously  as
their  situation  in  Iraq  is  unmatched  in  the  Arab  Middle  East  since  the
Second World War for the rate of decline of a Christian population perhaps
with  the  exception  of  the  churches  in  occupied  Palestine.  The
encouragement for engagement with other eastern Christians had been, prior
to the 1960s,  supported in Baghdad at  the Carmelite ``Centre''  under the
direction  of  Frs  Robert  Beulay  and  Raymond  Charbonnier  from  1956.
(Hansbury 2007) The appeal of ecumenism was to give Iraqi Christians an
apparent means to forge a united front to inform the rest of Iraqi society of
their contribution to the country, to consolidate available resources between
communities  and  to  act  as  a  mediating  influence,  however  unofficially,
between Sunni and Shia.
Regional discussions were formalised from 1974 taking place within
the context of the Middle East Council of Churches (MECC) the chief inter-
Christian ecumenical  body in the region.  MECC had been formed as an
extension of the World Council of Churches to pursue debate specifically
resonant with the local churches especially regarding the issue of relations
with Muslims on a temporal and religious level.52 The other main arena for
dialogue is within the Syriac tradition at the Pro Oriente forum. The forum
was  founded  in  1964  with  a  view  to  implementing  the  principles  of
ecumenical  reconciliation  of  `Unitatis  Redintegratio'  among  the  eastern
Christian communities in particular. From 1993 the Church of the East was
invited  to  take  part  in  dialogue with  the  Chaldeans  and further  to  share
Catholic academic and pastoral resources which resulted in the Holy See
granting Church of the East clergy the opportunity to  study in Chaldean
institutions in Baghdad and Vatican universities.  (See,  for example,  Soro
2004; Youssef 1996)
As a result of these engagements significant changes were brought
about in the East Syriac communities' relationship through the completion
52 The Church of the East has yet to join the MECC with accusations of heresy related
to a perceived Nestorian Christology still raised.
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of agreements in 1997 and 2001. The former for the establishment of co-
operation at an official level between the two in pastoral areas and the latter
for granting permission for inter-communion at the Divine Liturgy between
the churches. (Mar Raphael I Bidawid and Mar Dinkha IV 1998, 185–188)
The  growth  in  diaspora  communities'  size  suggests  that  co-operation
between the churches may become a more frequent activity as resources are
dissipated so widely in North America, Australia and Europe. The diaspora
outside of the Middle East had, as of 2000, become the new homeland for
approximately twenty-five percent  of  Chaldeans and during the 1990s at
least one third of all Christians had left Iraq and the numbers only increased
following  the  approach  to  the  Second  Gulf  War.  (Roberson  CSP 2010;
Petrosian 2006, 114)
Prelude to the invasion of 2003
On reflection  over  a  decade  after  the  2003 invasion  it  appears  war  was
inevitable  once the Coalition powers had determined the need to  expand
their strategic positions in the Middle East. The strength of anti-war feeling
exhibited by the populations of the invading countries ignored: the largest
world  wide  public  demonstrations  for  decades  having  no  impact  on  the
resolve of the Coalition governments to invade Iraq. With such a scenario
Bidawid's efforts to shore up the Chaldean population and Iraqi society in
the face of war may now appear to have been futile. Yet at the time they
were underpinned by belief in Divine Hope that war could be averted and
reinforced by the awareness that the removal of Husain presaged not just a
change of political order but also a loss of Iraq as a national entity.
Reflections  by Christians  since  the  invasion  of  March 2003 have
considered the relative quality of life under Saddam Husain to their present
situation as refugees unable for the most part to sustain livelihoods in their
own country. One Christian interviewed in 2007 argued that Husain was: `a
secular leader especially good for Christians, as long as they stayed out of
the  way...``When  Saddam was  in  power  there  was  no  fighting.  Saddam
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loved the Christians'' ' (Sudilovsky 2007) Whilst we may not go so far as to
support  the  interviewee's  understanding  of  Husain's  admiration  for
Christians – his personal Chaldean cook notwithstanding – the human cost
of the occupation of Iraq indicates the preference which they had for his rule
is  not  without  merit.  There  appears  to  have  been  an  understanding  that
religious and political instability leading to sectarian conflict would destroy
their  position  in  society.  Nevertheless,  Iraqi  Christian  life  during  the
twentieth century should not necessarily all  be viewed in the prism of a
decline in well-being, status or near permanent migration and as Betts notes
as of the 1970s: `The combined advantages of affluence, education, higher
health  standards,  and a  strong sense  of  community  worked to  create  an
enviable social image for Christians'  (Betts 1979, 136) Furthermore, large
proportions of Christians remained in Iraq regardless of internal political
changes  and  with  no  desire  to  leave.  We should  recall  that  in  the  Iraqi
Kurdistan region since the establishment of permanent semi-autonomy from
1992  that  the  Christians  were  regarded  as  net  contributors  to  society.
Nevertheless,  the  overall  mindset  of  Christians  and  the  psychological
burden altered sufficiently even in Kurdistan that a communal melancholia
developed – quite naturally and understandably – from March 2003.
4. The Chaldean Church in the new Iraq 
(2003–2013)
This section of the thesis provides a history of the Chaldean Church during
the ten years following the 2003 invasion of Iraq with analysis focusing on
the effects of conflict and socio-economic change on Chaldean ecclesiology
and ecclesiastical organisation. Source material having been collated largely
during  fieldwork  in  northern  Iraq  in  October  2013  which  consists  of
baptismal,  marriage  and  population  records  from  Chaldean  parish  and
diocesan archives.  Information  was also provided by Chaldean clergy in
central  and  southern  Iraq  –  regions  inaccessible  due  to  constraints  on
freedom of movement – and who have supplied information from their own
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records.  Discussions and interviews with Chaldeans were also conducted
ranging from political activists and historians to clergy and physicians.53 
As  this  is  a  growing  and  unexplored  area  of  study  much  work
remains to be done. However, the fieldwork for this study is fortunate to
have  been  completed  in  2013  prior  to  the  rise  of  Da'esh.  Further
accumulation  of  data  even  via  e-mail  correspondence  from  June  2014
proving very difficult  due to  the  direct  ethnic cleansing of  the  Christian
populations  in  northern  Iraq.  Whether  a  similar  study  can  be  conducted
again in the future remains to be seen but the research findings presented
here document the Chaldean Church at a crucial cross roads in its history.
Chaldean identity post-invasion
From  the  1990s  Iraqi  Christian  identity  became  more  fluid  and  less
denominationally bound with a more generic identity beginning to emerge
among the communities in Iraq expressed largely either as Iraqi Christian or
Assyrian Christian and confusion as to nomenclature can occur. This can
lead to ignorance of the ecclesial differences which do exist still and, in the
context of assertions of Assyrian nationalism, Iraqi Christian identity can
itself  be subsumed.  This  has  not  always  been consistently  recognised  in
existing secondary literature but it is important to recall as nearly all Iraqi
Christians encountered during fieldwork still  held a strong attachment  to
and identification with the church in which they were baptised but, since the
invasion,  in  tension  with  their  identity  as  Iraqi  citizens  and  as  to  their
perceived ethnic identity whether Arab, Assyrian or other.
I suggest Iraqi Christians in the post-invasion era were obliged to
provide  a  definition  of  communal  and  personal  identity  as  a  result  of
residing  in  a  society  with  competing  notions  of  what  constitutes
membership of the Iraqi nation. This further complicated by the confines of
the Islamic Arab milieu in which Shia and Sunni have varied opinions as to
how non-Muslim Iraqis  should  be  treated  in  law.  Views  which  required
53 Unless otherwise noted and referenced analysis and information presented below 
comes from the aforementioned research and fieldwork sources.
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creative Christian communal responses and to demonstrate identities which
in some way could meet the expectations of their own communities and the
external observers who queried their status as fully integrated members of
Iraqi society. Thus, in effect, attempting to re-justify the Christian presence
despite its heritage and to re-instil confidence in the church as a legitimate
influence upon Iraqi society.
Historical Overview (2003– 2008)
From March 2003–March 2013 Iraq saw an immediate socio-economic and
political  decline  with  a  gradual  growth  in  stability  of  a  sort  in  some
provinces.  This stabilisation especially notable for those,  including many
Chaldeans, resident in the northern Iraqi provinces of Duhok, Sulaymaniya
and Erbil administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). By
the mid-1990s, the three provinces had effectively become an independent
Kurdish  led  state  defended by the  Coalition  imposed  No-Fly  Zone over
northern  Iraq  and  backed  by  claims  to  the  oil  reserves  present  in  the
provinces or in close proximity to the border with Iraq proper. This  status
quo continued into the twenty-first century with the Kurdish armed forces
(Peshmerga) facilitating the 2003 Coalition invasion.54
The KRG is largely pro-Western in its foreign and economic policies
with commitments from the political élite to protect the numerical minority
groups' rights especially Christians. Unofficially these commitments vary by
location  but  the  general  level  of  freedom  from  violence  and  economic
opportunities which the KRG offered saw thousands of Chaldean families
move from central and southern provinces to northern Iraq.
54 The Peshmerga (literally translated as ``those willing to face death'') emerged in the
1940s under the leadership of Kurdish nationalist Mustafa Barzani. For much of the
rest  of  the  twentieth  century  they  formed  the  vanguard  of  the  Kurdish  nationalist
movement's armed forces in northern Iraq with branches from both the main Kurdish
movements:  the  Kurdistan  Democratic  Party  and  the  Patriotic  Union  of  Kurdistan.
Since 2003 the peshmerga have been gradually integrated into the armed forces of the
KRG becoming the largest native military force in Iraq with largely better morale and
esprit d'corps if not training and equipment than the reformed Iraqi armed forces under
Coalition direction. (Lortz 2005, 66–72)
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Radical alteration of life expectations
Through removing the rule and state apparatus of Saddam Husain and the
Baath  Party  the  Coalition  removed  those  elements  which  had  coerced,
regulated  and controlled  nearly  all  aspects  of  Iraqi  life.  Thus,  as  for  all
Iraqis, Chaldeans have seen a radical re-orientation of life expectations. The
change from a situation of relative security under Husain to one of apparent
freedom  in  the  new  republic  providing  few  tangible  benefits  to  the
Chaldeans  with  their  perceived  proximity  to  Western  ideas  and  political
agendas leading to persecution. A sustained atmosphere of security in which
all Iraqi citizens could exercise a normal life remained elusive with regular
sectarian violence between radical Shia and Sunni Islamist factions a threat
to even the most basic of day-to-day activities.
These  difficulties  were  exemplified  once  the  initial  stages  of
occupation  were  completed.  The  Coalition  Provisional  Authority  (CPA)
disbanded  the  Iraqi  army  and  police  on  23rd  May  2003.55 The  CPA
considered  it  a  political  imperative  to  remove  IBP  influence  from  the
coercive arms of the state but gave little consideration to the impact of such
changes.  The  lack  of  native  security  forces  was  disastrous  for  the
maintenance  of  law  and  order  and  exacerbated  the  situation  for  the
Christians. They rarely resorted to organising a community militia for self-
defence as was the case for many Muslim or even Yezidi groups.
Another difficulty for the Chaldeans at the time of the invasion was a
leadership crisis. Patriarch Bidawid died in July 2003 and his successor –
Emmanuel III Delly – was ultimately selected by the Holy See after the
Chaldean synod of bishops had failed to reach a decision. Antoine Audo SJ,
Bishop of Aleppo, emerged as a prominent candidate but was perceived to
suffer from a lack of direct contemporary experience of Chaldean life in
Iraq.  That  no  decision  was  reached  to  choose  such  a  well  qualified
candidate, I suggest, indicative of the loss of direction towards the end of
Bidawid's  life  and  the  limited  influence  he  had  in  the  choice  of  his
successor. The Holy See in being obliged to determine the successor and in
55 The CPA was the body which was to act as the Iraqi government in the time prior to
which elections could be held for the Iraqi parliament. (Bremer 2003)
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choosing Delly also reflected a somewhat surprising lack of forethought in
what  the Chaldeans  required for  their  leadership at  a  time of  qualitative
change in Iraq and the short-sightedness of selecting a leader who was not
well  integrated  with  extended  church  networks  in  the  Middle  East  with
strong understanding of the institutions of the contemporary Holy See. 
We should recognise the difficulty legacy which Delly assumed from
Bidawid and  his  own status  as  a  compromise  candidate  which  inhibited
developing an authoritative leadership position which a clear victory at the
patriarchal election could have granted. Delly was a fortunate choice insofar
as  he  had  an  excellent  knowledge  of  internal  Chaldean  affairs  and  the
ecclesiastical organisation of the Church in Iraq down to parish level. Yet he
lacked that sense of communal confidence which is derived from successful
transitions between leaders. I suggest this was the foundation for a sense of
long term disappointment among many Chaldeans in the patriarchal office
to outline a comprehensive approach to meeting the demands of the new
Iraq.  Perhaps  also  leading  to  a  consolidation  of  diocesan  identities  with
individual bishops being obliged to become de facto leaders of ``churches''.
It  is  possible  that  a  patriarch  with  a  stronger  personality  could  have
withstood better the competing demands of the Iraqi dioceses, the demands
of the increasingly autonomous Chaldean dioceses of the United States and
the overall  decline of Iraqi  socio-economic life.  This should be borne in
mind when considering the following assessment of recent Chaldean history.
The effects of the invasion by Coalition forces in 2003 on the 
Chaldean community and initial attempts to re-
construct civil society
In attempting  to  enforce democracy on Iraq  the CPA followed the same
essential processes as the British had attempted in the 1920s in establishing
Iraq  as  a  state  for  the  first  time  which  included  the  creation  of  new
executive,  legislative,  judicial  and  military  branches  of  the  state.  These
developments generally dictated by what was perceived to meet the needs of
the occupying power than changes which would have been best suited to the
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native population. This was seen in the composition of the Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC) established in July 2003 whose twenty-five members were to
advise the CPA. Whether this was more than a mere veneer of supposed
legitimisation of the occupation is open for question but it at least supposed
an attempt to better reflect the ethnic and religious groups who composed
the Iraqi nation.56 
The  major  differences  between  the  two  reformulations  of
Mesopotamia-Iraq  were  in  available  technology,  highly  increased
destructive  power  of  weaponry  and,  as  a  result  of  previous  Coalition
interventions, increased enmity. It would appear, therefore, the potential for
the successful establishment of a republican democracy under the United
States'  tutelage was far less likely than that of a constitutional monarchy
encouraged by the British. In the Chaldeans' case at least the British had
recognised the significance of including their patriarch within the legislature
from 1921.
In 2003 Chaldean cognisance of their vital role in the development
of Mesopotamia-Iraq extended to a formal letter of the hierarchy addressed
to the CPA's head, Paul Bremer, requesting acknowledgement of this and
further,  to permit them a formal rôle in re-developing Iraqi national life.
(Emmanuel III Delly et al.  2003) This appears to have been ignored and
Christians were to be frozen out of making a meaningful contribution to
nation formation. It appears the CPA were at a loss as how to engage with
the  non-Muslim populations  and were  pursuing a  policy  of  ameliorating
communal divisions in Iraq focused on the Sunni-Shia religious and Arab-
Kurdish ethnic dichotomies with little awareness of Iraq's plurality.
It may appear in retrospect that the Iraqi situation was without any
likely  resolution  and  consider  the  Chaldean  attempts  to  re-affirm  their
presence  and  commitment  as  futile  at  this  juncture.  It  was,  however,
considered even worse were they to do nothing entirely. The bishops' letter
was submitted at a time when it was thought that development of a positive
nature could still occur prior to the start of intensified Shia-Sunni conflicts,
the rise of Al-Qaeda in  Iraq and the terminal  migration of the Chaldean
56 (13 Shia, 5 Kurds, 5 Sunni, 1 Turkmen, 1 ``Assyrian". Tripp 2007, 284)
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community. (Emmanuel III Delly et al. 2003)
Christians speaking with one voice?
The Chaldeans faced the challenge of protecting their own community and
maintaining their leadership rôle among the Iraqi churches and as the largest
non-Muslim community.  However,  as  we have  noted  in  earlier  chapters,
political and denominational divisions among the churches existed for much
of the twentieth century and only with the start of ecumenical engagements
was unity of action recognised as a means to consolidate the security of
Iraqi Christians into the future. (Lamani 2009, 11)
An attempted consensus among Christians emerged in 2003 when
the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) discussed the descriptive term
``Chaldo-Assyrian''  for  use  in  the  new  state's  constitutional  and  legal
framework  when  referring  to  the  Christian  population.  Unified
nomenclature  was  complicated  by  the  requirement  to  cover  so  many
competing  interests  and involved conflicting  views as  to  the  appropriate
future rôle of the churches and Christian political organisations. The ADM's
efforts were initially supported by many churches including the Chaldeans.
However, the Chaldean hierarchy later withdrew support largely due to fears
that the ADM and their preferred aggregate term would be used as part of a
push  for  the  establishment  of  an  autonomous  Christian  region  in  Iraq
something  to  which  the  Chaldean  hierarchy  remained  opposed.  (Teule
2011e, 315–316) The situation in Iraq by mid-2003 was such that unity of
any kind may have been preferable in order to be better engaged in the state
re-formation process. Yet in the context of Bidawid's death and subsequent
patriarchal  election  it  was  very  difficult  for  the  Chaldeans  to  provide  a
definitive commitment to such inter-Christian initiatives. 
I  suggest  the  churches  were  reluctant  to  engage  with  ostensibly
Christian political parties owing to continuing dispute over as to who could
better  represent  the  community  on  a  national  level  and  as  to  whether
religiously or politically directed identity was a better means for securing
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the Chaldean community in Iraq. The former emphasising Iraqi citizenship
and  a  plural  society  the  latter  often  emphasising  the  imperative  of  an
autonomous Christian region and a withdrawal from engagement with wider
Iraqi society. Nevertheless Chaldean leaders were obliged to retain working
relationships  with  Christian  politicians  and  their  positions  within  Iraqi
representative  bodies  as  they  were  able  to  directly  assist  the  Christians
through facilitating the provision of housing, the resolution of legal disputes
– especially with the KRG – and the granting of government funding. (Teule
2012, 187)
The rise of violence against Christians
Intimidation  of  Christians  began with  videos  of  be-headings  left  outside
homes in Mosul in Spring 2003 whilst  Patriarch Delly received,  in June
2003, a letter accusing him of collaboration and demanding he leave Iraq.
(Rassam 2012a, 13; Gunn 2009, 10) Such a focus on the patriarch three
months after the invasion indicating a developed awareness of the Chaldean
presence.
The first most comprehensive attack against the Christian population
took place on 1 August 2004 when five churches were bombed in Baghdad
and Mosul with eleven people killed and fifty injured.  (Glatz 2004; Hirst
2004b) The focus of these attacks on Catholic churches (Armenian, Syrian
and  Chaldean)  was  justified  by  blaming  `the  Pope  for  leading  an  anti-
Muslim crusade'. (Hirst 2004a, 25) The spurious reasoning provided by the
Islamist group an attempted justification for ongoing criminal and terrorist
behaviour manifested as religiously motivated violence against Christians in
general.  Bombing  attacks  against  churches  continued  in  October  and
December in Baghdad with, it appeared, increasingly co-ordinated if short
and intense campaigns aimed at removing the Christian presence.
From a regional perspective attacks on the Chaldeans were largely
confined to Baghdad, Kirkuk, in and around Mosul and nearby Christian
villages of the Nineveh plain. Basra had a significant Chaldean presence but
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saw less anti-Christian attacks which can perhaps be accounted for by the
lack  of  an  intensified  Sunni-Shia  conflict  due  to  the  Shia  dominance  in
southern  Iraq.  Regardless  of  their  geographical  location  the  Chaldeans
maintained the  status quo of  their  religious  life  even as it  became more
dangerous so to do and the growth of migration levels from central  Iraq
rapidly expanded.
It is notable that anti-Christian actions were undertaken long before
Benedict XVI made comments which were perceived to criticise Islam in
2006  and  indicates  the  reasoning  for  violence  was  established  among
Muslim attackers and marks out the papacy and the connected churches in
Iraq as a particular target. (Benedict XVI 2006) Moreover, that the Holy See
had been one of the leading voices most ardent in opposing the invasion
seems to have gone unheeded. (ZENIT News Agency 2002a)
Social and psychological affects after the end of Baath party 
rule
Despite Iraq's socio-economic decline during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars
the state's security apparatus and general stability remained largely the same
and ensured that existential threats to Husain's rule were removed. This was
demonstrated most strongly in the defeat of the 1991 popular rebellion and a
widespread belief  in  the longevity and necessity  of  Husain's  rule  among
many  Iraqis  existed.  Therefore,  to  go  from  such  a  situation  to  the
consistently disturbed society from March 2003 required of Chaldeans a re-
assessment of personal, ecclesiological and political paradigms to determine
one's place within the new order. Except that the new order brought with it
only new competing social tensions with which to contend.
The  psychological  shock  among  the  Chaldean  population  was
immediate and to an extent paralysing, affecting the Church's ability to cope
with the change inflicted and to contend with the ferocity of persecution. In
the longer term it imprinted a fear of other Iraqis and a destructive pattern of
self-doubt and disassociation of their patriotic attachment to the Iraqi nation.
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This psychological development resulting from cultural and social change
was highlighted by the Latin Archbishop of Baghdad, Jean Sleiman OCD
(2001–  ).  Speaking  in  London  in  September  2008  he  referred  to  the
intensification  of  the  outlook  of  Dhimmitude among  the  Christian
population whereby they have been considered less than full members of
society regardless of Muslim affirmations to the contrary since the seventh
century.  Such  an  outlook  which,  Sleiman  stated,  is  `not  [necessarily]
reflected in the laws of the land but it is very present in the culture and
psychology of  the  people.'  (Sleiman OCD 2008)Bosworth noting  from a
longer term historical context:
`It is surprising that, in the face of legal and financial disabilities...and of a relentless
social and cultural Muslim pressure, if not of sustained persecution, that the dhimmī
communities survived as well as they did' (Bosworth 2012, 161)
Similar effects and stipulations which began to be implemented in all but
name  against  Iraqi  Christians  and  seeing  the  emergence  of  a  popular
awareness  not  just  of  martyrdom of  individual  Christians  or  of  different
churches but  a martyrdom of the Christian narrative and presence in
Iraq and  a  denial  of  non-Muslim  contributions  to  Mesopotamian-Iraqi
history.
Physical and legal persecution has been a consistent threat faced by
East Syriac Christians throughout their history. However, aside from events
after 2003 martyrdom as a theme in the Chaldean Church had not been so
resolutely impressed upon the entirety of the Chaldean communal memory
other  than  during  the  Ottoman  massacres  of  1915–1918.  For  the  period
1921–2003 the martyrdom narrative appears to have been suppressed and
attempts  made to  play down the anti-Christian connotations  which  some
events  appeared  to  have.  Whether  through  more  senior  members  of  the
Church recommending to those affected that issues of contention in business
dealings  be dropped or  that  the motivations  in  the murder  of  Chaldeans
could be ascribed to non-religious reasons. The intention to downplay these
events as specifically anti-Christian to ensure that the secure social position
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which  Iraqi  Christians  had  attained  in  general  terms  could  be  extended
indefinitely.  Furthermore,  Chaldean  desire  to  suppress  the  martyrdom
concept  on  a  level  of  communal  memory  among  older  generations  also
derived from a desire to forget the traumas experienced during the 1915--
1918 massacres and subsequent forced displacement and the severe loss of
ecclesiastical, cultural and material heritage. 57
The re-awakening of the presence of the martyrdom theme came in
the context of the post-2003 scenario of societal collapse and eventual civil
war. A fixed narrative of marginalisation of Christians emerged which could
not be challenged by the churches:  at a society wide level the decline of
the Christian presence was ignored, considered acceptable or inevitable.
The  lack  of  concern  for  the  Christians  by  other  Iraqis  so  prevalent  it
destroyed societal plurality and became indicative of the reinforcement of a
sectarian milieu in which the lived reality of Christian life was of consistent
social  and  material  deprivation.  A means  of  attempting  to  redeem  this
experience was through emphasising the nature of the process as one of
martyrdom.  In  theory  providing  some  comfort  with  the  notion  of  the
Chaldeans  experiencing  the  lived  reality  of  the  Christian  notion  of  long
suffering in times of extreme trial. Yet for a population which had been in a
state of sustained decline since the 1990s and now faced a final push out of
wider  Iraqi  societal  consciousness  theological  reflection  offered  little
practical  comfort  and  deeply  affected  the  psychology  of  Chaldeans  at
communal and individual levels – rejection on a nationwide level in Iraq
never having been experienced.
Changes in Christians'  psychological outlook increased in damage
through the lack of resources available to deal with trauma to which the
invasion  and  subsequent  persecution  were  witness.  Due to  the  extent  of
these difficulties the Chaldean hierarchy looked to support their community
as far as they were able and introduced training for seminarians and priests
as to  how to recognise and engage with community members who were
suffering  from  Post-Traumatic  Stress  Disorder  and  other  mental  health
57 One older Chaldean man relating how having visited eastern Asia Minor to see
areas once populated by members of the East Syriac churches he could weep for the
pitiful  status  in  Iraq  to  which  the  Christians  of  the  region  had  been  reduced.
(Conversation, Erbil, October 2013)
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difficulties. This training becoming vital to deal with the growth in mental
health problems among the communities as it is approximated that P-TSD
arising  from conflict  situations  often  emerges  five  to  ten  years  after  the
event which causes symptoms to develop.
A new constitutional order and Chaldean 
involvement?
Regardless  of  the  unstable  social  situation  the  implementation  of  a  new
constitution,  it  was  hoped,  might  bring  about  some normalisation  of  the
irregular  status  of  Iraqi  social  interactions.  Christians  were  wary  of
accepting the new constitution due to the limited opportunity which they
had  to  influence  the  drafting  of  the  document:  Christians  had  only  one
meeting  in  August  2005  to  air  their  concerns.  (Yacoub  2010,  179)
Nonetheless, the new fundamental law of Iraq received approval from the
CPA and IGC on 28th August 2005 with a popular referendum later ratifying
it in October.
The constitution granted some hope for the historical precedents of
non-Islamic  contributions  to  Mesopotamia-Iraq  to  be  remembered.
Referring  to  both  the  temporal  and  religious  pre-Arab  heritage  in  the
Preamble  which  noted  the  production  of  the  first  law  code  under  the
Babylonian  king,  Hammurabi.  (Yacoub  2010,  174,  175  n.  4) Such
sentiments  are  in  contrast  with  the  rest  of  the  document  which  ignore
mention of non-Islamic contributors. Overall it is paradoxical, as from the
outset, the constitution indicates support for democracy, rights of minorities
and freedom of worship but is framed by the assertion that no new law can
contradict  the  sharia and that the Federal  Supreme Court  is  to be based
around  Islamic  jurisprudence,  a  knowledge  of  which  is  required  for  all
judges. (Yacoub 2010, 176)
By comparison, the preferences of the Chaldeans from March 2003
were  for  a  lay  state,  emphasising  the  importance  of  citizenship  and not
submission to the new government; the rights of women and the disabled
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and opposition to a state in any way based on ethnic divisions.  (Yacoub
2010, 179–180) Themes which struggled to meet the demands of those who
sought  to  create  a  state  which  embodied  Islamic jurisprudence and gave
basis  to  the  interests  of  many  Iraqi  Muslims  who  were  partisans  of  a
religious revival in reaction to the lay state and secular culture which Husain
had enforced until the last few years of his rule. The Islamic revival in the
Middle  East  and south-west  Asia  from the  1970s  often  emphasising  the
implementation  of  sharia norms  in  tension  with  `matters  of  women,
religious freedom, and co-existence with non-Muslims'. (Hefner 2014, 642)
The Chaldean preferences  reflecting  the  precedents  set  at  least  officially
under the rule of the IBP and by comparison similar to the paradigm still
then experienced in Syria under the leadership of another Baathist president
Bashar al-Assad. Audo outlines the situation thus:
`Accustomed to a single and comfortable discourse at every level of the institutions of
the state, especially the army, education and the single party, the Syrian people, despite
their ethnic, religious and geographical differences, enjoyed a certain stability, with the
comfort  and  progress  which  that  brought.  The  country's  Christians...found  in  this
regime considerable security and a reining in of all religious extremism. We might even
say that Christians prospered: in universities, manufacturing, business, etc.'  (Audo SJ
2012, 13) 
In  principle  the  new  Iraqi  constitution  provided  the  opportunity  for
Christians to exist with a  comfortable discourse with the government, its
infrastructure and supposed they could remain contributors in Iraqi society
with the opportunity to practice their faith. Constitutional articles which are
particularly relevant to the Chaldean population include:
• 2 Freedom of worship
• 10 Freedom to worship at places of religious significance 
• 35c State guarantee against religious coercion
• 36a Freedom of expression
• 40 Freedom of belief
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• 41 State forbidden to interfere in administration of religious groups
• 41b `protection of places of worship' (‘Final Draft Iraqi Constitution’
2005)
These  concepts  are  further  supported  throughout  the  document  with
guarantees  of  rights  for  different  ethnic  and  religious  groups  to  self-
administration and cultural  and educational  independence.  (Yacoub 2010,
175) In practice these guarantees have been extremely difficult to maintain
because of widely held and ingrained Muslim religious and cultural views
on the lower worth attached to Christianity and other non-Muslim religions
not  just  on  a  spiritual  level  but  on  the  necessity  of  their  legal  status  as
subordinate to Muslims.  (Taneja 2007, 26; ‘Final Draft Iraqi Constitution’
2005, sec. 1, art. 2) The increasingly assertive Islamic groups which came to
dominate Iraqi political and social life reinforced views and actions which
had, to a large degree, been kept in check by Saddam Husain's government
and were instead freely able to attempt to establish an idealised new Iraq in
which  significant  minorities  of  the  population  would  be  repressed.  The
revivification  of  the  distinct  legal  status  of  Christians  in  a  Muslim
dominated country a product of the long term Dhimmi conditioning which
they had experienced over centuries and as was derived from Koranic and
sharia based  stipulations  as  to  their  treatment.  (Hefner  2014,
639)Stipulations  which  however  loosely  enjoined  upon  the  Christians
throughout the history of Mesopotamia were never removed from Muslim
Iraqi legal discourse into the twenty-first century. (Mallat 1988, 700)
Other  difficulties  associated  with  the  formal  wording  of  the
constitution have also arisen for the Chaldeans. We can note, for example,
the greater status in law which groups who have a cohesive and explicitly
expressed  ethnic  identity  are  granted.  (Yacoub  2010,  175–176) As  the
Chaldean  hierarchy  did  not  consistently  support  the  idea  that  their
community was an ethnic group it was not evident how their position as a
separate religious group would be protected. This distinction is important
for it purports a secondary tier to which the Chaldeans are ascribed – as
merely a minority religious group – within the hierarchy of the nation and
forms a precedent for future considerations of Iraqi society as delineated by
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a sectarian milieu. Whereas, if they asserted a particular Aramaic, Syriac or
Assyrian ethnicity they would appear in law to have a stronger claim to the
resources of the state and a more ``genuine'' position in a social order which
grew accustomed to a paradigm which suggested an explicit ethnic identity
was necessary to achieve this.
A veneer of democracy, rights for numerical minorities and national
unity as exists in the new Iraq is dangerous for it presupposes that there is
some commitment among the state bureaucracy and government towards the
manifestation  and  maintenance  of  these  political  ideals.  As  the  Iraqi
situation in 2015 was less unified and more fragmented politically we can
share  Byman's  view  that  a  democracy  can  exist  in  theory  but  often  in
practice exists with values determined by the faction which has the strongest
control over the means of coercion which in practice leads to the exclusion
of certain parties.  (Byman 2003, 54) Moreover, the decisive influence of
leaders  who  support  the  implementation  of  Islamic  legal  and  cultural
practices  would  appear  to  prevent  the  development  of  a  lay  state  type
paradigm  which  had  been  perceived  as  a  goal  in  the  introduction  of
representative democracy to Iraq. As noted above the Preamble of the new
constitution states that Islamic values cannot be contradicted by any law yet
commits  Iraq  to  a  republican,  federal,  democratic,  pluralistic  system.
(Seferta 2005, 10; ‘Final Draft Iraqi Constitution’ 2005, Preamble) Given
the  multiplicity  of  interpretations  of  Islam  within  Iraq  and  the  further
multiplicity within these interpretations of what constitutes the best means
of government it seems very difficult for pluralism to be effected in the long
term. 
The Iraqi civil war (2006–2007) and effects on the 
Chaldeans
At the end of 2005 Chaldean communities had declined in size due to 
migration in the face of socio-economic decline but were not yet at a 
precipitous level appearing to retain a critical mass sufficient to sustain their
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presence indefinitely. However, demographic change increased and was 
brought into perhaps its most destructive phase from 2006–2007 where 
areas of Christian residence in Mosul and Baghdad were left significantly 
depleted following specific anti-Christian campaigns. This is particularly 
evident from the Chaldean parish registers in Baghdad which saw on 
average a just under fifty percent drop in the number of baptisms between 
2005 and 2008. A selection of four parishes from across the city providing 
indication of this in Table 1. 
Anti-Christian persecution in this period operated in the context of a
Sunni-Shia  civil  war  which  saw  unprecedented  levels  of  violence.  A
situation in which Chaldeans were open to the predations of those inclined
to view violence as the only means for societal change. The civil war of
2006–2007 should be distinguished from previous and successive periods of
intense intra-societal conflict but as can be noted from Haddad's work the
situation for Christians in general was as bit  part  actors in the unfolding
sectarian narrative. (Haddad 2013, passim) These two years saw Sunni and
Shia groups for the first  time since 2003 seek to remove the other  on a
country wide scale from posing a threat to the other's implementation of a
religiously based social order. The period led to a greater change in mindset
of the Chaldeans than any since the invasion period in 2003 with it being
widely asserted that not only would they seek security by migrating but that
they had no intention of ever returning.  (Conversations  and observations
among  the  Chaldean  communities  in  northern  Iraq,  October  2013)  This
change of mindset is notable for whereas previously migration could occur
on a temporary basis this period of violence marked the end of hope for a
return to normality in their homeland.
The  Chaldean  position  was  compounded  by  a  perceived  lack  of
interest with which the wider Iraqi community held their plight and the lack
of  interest  which  the  Western  mainstream media  regarded their  situation
outside of one-off special reports. A lack of interest which appears to have
extended among those  NGOs whose role  was to  alleviate  conditions  for
internally  displaced persons and refugees  in  the  Kurdistan region and in
Jordan  and  Syria.  In  speaking  with  Chaldean  refugees,  for  example,  in
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Amman it was strongly emphasised the lack of support which they received
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
the limited awareness which they had of the specific difficulties faced by the
Christian communities by comparison with Muslim Iraqis which possibly
stemmed from the UNHCR's  refusal  to record the religion of  refugees.58
This  in  turn limited the collection of  data  by NGOs on the proportional
effects of the war between the Christian and Muslim Iraqi populations.
Notably  in  this  period  quotations  from an  earlier  era  of  Muslim
antagonism  towards  Christian  communities  were  remarked  upon  by
Benedict  XVI  during  the  Regensberg  lecture.  Remarks  which  saw  an
intensification of attacks against Christians over a short period.59 However,
attacks  at  the  time  did  not  appear  to  distinguish  among  the  different
Christian  groups  as  an  Iraqi  Presbyterian  minister  was  murdered  in
November  2006.  The  reasoning  behind  this  event  as  `revenge'  for  what
Benedict XVI had said. (Hanish 2009, 7) This disconnect between the group
who supposedly caused the offence and the actual person affected revealing
the ignorance of those attacking them. It is unlikely that an average member
of  an  Islamist  militia  would  have  a  measured  perspective  on  Benedict's
remarks.  By  the  time  they  had  been  popularised  and  drawn  out  of  all
proportion as to their context they became a convenient means of criticism
and advanced the notion that the Crusades and the native Iraqi Christian
presence were linked and were, in fact, an excuse to continue to engage in
generic anti-Christian violence. 
A direct attack to inhibit  the future development of the Chaldean
Church was launched in September and December 2006 with the kidnap of
the rector and vice-rector respectively of St Peter's seminary in Baghdad.
(Asianews.it 2006c) These  events  led  to  the  decision  to  relocate  the
58 It was also suggested that there was a deliberate policy by UN refugee agencies of
delaying the bureaucratic processes for asylum or supporting their residence in Jordan
once it  was  known that  refugees  were Christians.  This  is  practically  impossible  to
verify but several separate incidences were reported at length during a research visit in
May and June 2013 to Amman.
59 The words which appear to have led to a strong Muslim reaction being that of the
Byzantine emperor Manuel Paleologus (1391–1425): `Show me just what Mohammed
brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his
command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.' (Benedict XVI 2006)
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institution to the Christian suburb of Erbil, Ankawa, where it re-opened in
January 2007. The movement of the seminary though forced due to threat of
violence  was  also  pragmatic  given  the  increasing  Chaldean  population
resident in and around Ankawa which grew year on year in the period 2000–
2007 from 2,100 to 6,450 families as can be seen in Table 2.
The  growing  pace  of  communal  change  hung  heavily  over  the
hierarchy and laity as they increased their  efforts to support those in the
internal  Iraqi  diaspora  with  new  churches  constructed  along  with
accommodation, medical facilities and schools. There continued to exist a
resolution to adapt and prosper as far as the situation permitted and at the
establishment of a new church foundation in Erbil, Patriarch Emmanuel III
Delly stated: 
`And as our fathers have shed their blood for the prosperity of this country and its
progress in faith and holiness, we should follow their foot steps. Do not be afraid, O
small  flock,  for  the  Lord  is  with  us  until  the  end  of  the  world  despite  all  the
persecutions that we face whether inside or outside. The interior persecution comes at
the time when we are working hard for the good of this country believing that we have
all the rights as we have all the duties.' (Emmanuel III Delly 2007)
Delly's  remarks  reflect  the  concerns  which  the  hierarchy  had  for  the
Chaldean presence in some form to remain in Iraq not just as a token group
but as integral to the formation of Iraqi political, social and cultural life. His
words,  however,  failed  to  resonate  with  the  experiences  of  Chaldeans
outside of the Kurdistan region and the rapidly changing circumstances in
which Chaldean families  lived.  Even those areas  of  traditional  Chaldean
concentration were becoming irreversibly weakened. June 2007 was most
terribly marked by the murders of Fr Ragheed Aziz Ganni and Sub-Deacons
Basman  Yousef  Daoud,  Wadid  Hanna  and  Ghasan  Bidawid  outside  the
church of the Holy Ghost  in Mosul.  These murders were explicitly anti-
Christian with demands to the men that they convert to Islam immediately
prior to the attacks along with demands for the closure of the church. The
ripple effect of the attacks for months afterwards was for many to lead to a
re-awakening and strengthening of their faith but also a questioning of the
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practicalities of remaining resident in Mosul. The number of baptisms at Fr
Ragheed's  church  had  held  strong  during  his  ministry  but  dropped  off
exponentially following his death and 2008–2013 saw only five baptisms
celebrated  in  the  church:  2006  had  seen  49  and  2007  15  baptisms.
(Baptismal  register  Holy  Ghost  parish,  Mosul,  facsimile  copy  accessed
October  2013)  The  psychological  effects  were  lasting  and  changed  the
Chaldean mindset from one in which it was possible to consider oneself as
still part of the Iraqi populace to an alien resident. The new reality appeared
to be that as a Christian one could no longer act freely without dissimulation
or leading an extremely sheltered life.
The death  of  Fr  Ragheed  struck at  the  heart  of  Chaldean life  in
Mosul as he represented the archetype of Christian in Iraq committed and
loyal  to  a unified Iraqi  state with a  pluralistic social  basis.  He was well
qualified  as  an  engineer  and  on  the  way  to  completing  a  doctorate  in
theology in Rome but instead requested to return to Iraq after the invasion to
assist in the re-building of the country. A very influential priest within the
diocese  of  Mosul  he  eventually  came  to  work  as  secretary  to  the  then
bishop, Polos Faraj Raho. Speaking in May 2005 at a Eucharistic Congress
in Bari, Fr Ragheed had said: 
` ``The terrorists might think they can kill our bodies or our spirit by frightening us,
but,  on  Sundays,  churches  are  always  full.  They may try  to  take  our  life,  but  the
Eucharist gives it back'' ' (The Catholic Herald 2007a)
It appears that such faith expressed by the parochial clergy was one of the
main means by which the Chaldean hierarchy could be certain of shoring up
and keeping the laity strong in resolve to remain resident in Iraq.
Kidnapping as well as physical attacks remained an issue effecting
the Chaldean community both among clergy and laity. In many instances
kidnap was for purely monetary gain by criminals as opposed to terrorists
with  recognition  of  the  relative  wealth  of  Iraqi  Christians.  For  those
motivated by their religion kidnap was a convenient means to weaken the
confidence  of  the  Chaldean  community  in  general  and  in  particular  to
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weaken the Church's leadership. In the case of Fr Hani Abd al-Ahad who
was  abducted  and  tortured  for  two  weeks  in  July  2007  in  Baghdad  the
central focus appears to have been to attempt to force him to convert  to
Islam and to weaken the resolve of his congregation to reside in Iraq. Fr
Hani  when  interviewed  in  January  2008  related  the  particularly  anti-
Christian nature of the kidnappers:
`They constantly told me that we Christians were infidels. I got a real lesson on how far
their hatred for Christians goes, how it motivates their action. They would not kill me
because  my  Christian  blood  would  have  fouled  the  house  preventing  them  from
praying there anymore. [sic] When they talked to me they always referred to me as
``piece of filth.''' (Rahema 2008)
The kidnappers' remarks evidence that the Iraq conflict was influenced not
just  by  those  who  desired  an  explicitly  Muslim  society  but  one  which
excluded all non-Muslim communities especially Christians. 
Regional effects of the war and the Chaldean 
response
If the years 2006 and 2007 marked the start of the intensification of attacks
against Christians the period also saw the start of large scale national and
international responses to the problems encountered with increasing support
from the Holy See and Catholic  charities.  Patriarch Emmanuel  III  Delly
attempted to bring to the fore his requests for the Coalition forces to take on
their  responsibility  of  restoring  Iraqi  society  to  a  more  peaceful  status
insofar as the Coalition having broken Iraqi society were beholden to a very
large extent to restore it. (Yacoub 2010, 189)
The  Holy  See  to  raise  awareness  of  the  Chaldeans'  particular
difficulties  and to  recognise  the  significant  role  which  Christians  had in
Iraqi life elevated Delly to the rank of Cardinal on 24th November 2007.
Perhaps comparison can be drawn here with St John Fisher  in  sixteenth
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century  England  who  was  made  a  cardinal  in  an  attempt  to  offer  some
protection from the attacks against the Catholic Church in England by King
Henry VIII. Benedict XVI emphasised that: 
`he  was  honouring  not  just  the  Patriarch  of  the  Chaldean  church,  but  all  Iraqi
Christians, and wished to show their plight to the world...``They are experiencing in
their own flesh the dramatic consequences of an enduring conflict and now live in a
fragile and delicate political situation'' (The Catholic Herald 2007b)
The level and intensity of faith and devotion to their religion could not be
disputed and the direction of devotion led to some level of rejuvenation in
the community with their resolve transformed into restoring or establishing
essential  social  and  educational  services.  The  town  of  Qaraqosh  (near
Mosul)  is  a  useful  example  with  which  to  illustrate  the  situation  as  it
developed from 2003. Whilst the town had historically been and retained a
predominantly  Syrian  Catholic  population  since  the  invasion  it  received
1,372  migrant  families  of  which  approximately  seventy  percent  were
Chaldean. As of October 2013 485 Chaldean families were still living in the
town when previously only a handful of Chaldeans were resident. (Statistics
provided by the Centre for Christian Affairs, Qaraqosh, October 2013)
Newly  arrived  migrants  were  provided  with  accommodation  in  a
complex  of  flats  offering  basic  but  adequate  facilities  with  320 families
resident. A municipal building was also purchased which served as a multi
use hall for weddings and baptismal celebrations, community meetings etc.
As of October 2013 a dispensary was also constructed along with ongoing
renovation work on a medical and dental surgery. Another practical activity
indicative of the difficulties for higher education was the opening of part of
the University of Mosul in Qaraqosh for security reasons with the safety of
the Christian students who travelled to Mosul being difficult to ensure.
The administrative hub – the Centre for Christian Affairs – recorded
the changing demographics. The Centre, whilst particularly well organised
in Qaraqosh, was found throughout other towns and villages in some form
with several key personnel working there with a detailed understanding of
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the requirements of the local community. The staff often consist of one of
the senior community members from a leading family, the sacristan of the
local church and secretarial staff in some form. (Conversations, Qaraqosh,
October 2013 and general observations, Kurdistan region, October 2013) In
speaking with the staff it was clear that Qaraqosh was a preferred place to
stay  due  to  it  being  well  served  by  the  churches  (Syrian  Catholic  and
Chaldean  Catholic)  and  maintaining  a  very  strong  sense  of  Christian
communal security and identity. The popularity of the town was especially
demonstrated by the low number of persons who having moved to the town
then decided to move abroad standing at only three percent. 
The  situation  in  Qaraqosh  can  be  contrasted  with  that  of  Telkef
which  is  on  the  border  between  ICG  and  KRG  control.  The  area  is
significant for its traditional East Syriac presence with several monasteries,
convents  and  theological  centres  in  the  surrounding  area  along  with,  at
times, the patriarchal headquarters based in or around the town. Until the
mid-twentieth century it was home to a large Chaldean population of over
5,000 families. 
The first large scale migration from the town took place not as a
result  of  persecution  but  due  to  the  greater  opportunities  for  economic
development in Baghdad and Basra and also in the USA especially during
the 1960s.60 Life for the Telkefi Chaldeans was complicated by the Sunni
Islamicisation  of  the  area  from  the  1990s  and  since  2003  the  growing
influence  of  a  Wahabi  mosque.  The  presence  of  the  mosque  is  a  factor
leading to greater discontent in their relations with the Sunni Telkefis as for
all intents and purposes the Chaldeans became second class citizens unable
to openly practice their religion beyond the confines of their own church.
The growth in persecution of the Christian population from 2006–
2008 nearby in Mosul saw the maintenance of population levels through
refugees replacing those who departed but as of October 2013 the number of
families had shrunk to 365 consisting of only thirty percent of the town's
total  population.  Ten  families  left  during  summer  2013  with  a  further
twenty-five asserting their intention to depart by the end of that year. It was
60 There was a year on year decline between 1960 and 1971 with, in those respective 
years, 356 and 176 baptisms, (Telkef parish baptismal register, facsimile copy accessed
October 2013)
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predicted that if conditions remained the same in ten years no Chaldeans
would remain in the town. Nevertheless, religious practice remained strong
with  attendance  at  daily  morning  and  evening  Masses  at  350  and  200
persons respectively as of October 2013. 
The response of the parish priest, Fr Hadil Louis, was to recognise
the particular difficulties with which he was faced and to `take things as
they are, this is his reality' with the intention to remain regardless of the
situation and to lead those parishioners who remained in the town. He was
committed also to helping those who remained to develop a business project
of some kind to ensure income can be generated. The town was fortunate to
be supported by Dominican Nuns who ran a school and orphanage which
aided  in  the  practical  unification  of  the  Chaldeans  who  were  dispersed
among the Muslim inhabitants. (Conversation, Telkef, October 2013)
The  church  structures  had  been  looked  to  as  foci  of  social
organisation in twentieth century northern Iraq. Some break in reliance on
the churches was affected under IBP rule with the deference for the state to
be relied upon in times of difficulty. However, as the state broke down and
its  ability  to  extend  influence  during  the  Kurdish  uprisings  weakened,
reliance  on  the  church  increased  and  proved  increasingly  prevalent  in
successive crises and, as civil relations broke down from 2003, a similar
intensified pattern began to emerge throughout areas of Chaldean residence
in Iraq. Necessitating the clergy to resolve economic as well as social and
religious difficulties.
Historical overview (2008–2013)
In response to the civil war the Coalition forces pursued a surge of troops
policy: the intention was to flood areas of intense levels of conflict – such as
Baghdad and Anbar provinces – with sufficient soldiers to inhibit escalation
of further incidents and to defeat elements committed to undermining the
new order. The ``surge''  began in January 2007 and was perceived as the
only  immediate  effective  means  for  inhibiting  insurgent  and  terrorist
activities.  However,  there  was  little  hope  for  the  impact  being  retained
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following  the  Coalition  forces'  departure  demonstrating  that  American
directed plans for post-war Iraq had lost initiative and a clear method for the
long  term resolution  of  Iraqi  affairs.  Nevertheless,  the  surge  followed  a
nuanced  approach  to  counter-insurgency  operations  which  focused  on  a
``hearts  and  minds''  approach  to  ensure  the  restoration  of  basic  regular
services.  Such activity  going some way to restoring  stability  with fewer
violent  incidents  by  the  end  of  2007.  Yet  this  derived  from  effectively
holding large swathes of the population at gun point and providing Iraqis
with few non-coercive incentives to avoid violence. (Cockburn 2008) 
The trend for American policies towards Iraq as of 2008, however,
also reflected a pragmatic approach to rebuilding the structures of the state
such as permitting former IBP members employment in the government or
armed forces. Moreover, with stabilisation of security foreign investment in
the  oil  economy was  encouraged  leading  to  some level  of  optimism.  A
stumbling block was found in the level of corruption which affected the oil
economy.  In and of  itself  not  an  unusual  issue  and propensity  for  fiscal
irregularities is far from unheard of in countries producing hard and soft
commodities.  However,  in  the  Iraqi  case  with  little  notion  or  desire  to
support a unifying sense of nationhood among political élites corruption was
effectively unrestricted and divested among far too wide a group to permit
some form of control.
With  the  tendency  towards  sectarianism and  the  desire  to  please
one's own constituents ministerial portfolios became foci of consolidating
power and accumulating wealth at the expense of those outside one's own
faction.  This  was  particularly  problematic  in  the  level  of  control  which
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gained through his appointments as minister
of interior; defence; and national security from 2005. That a Shia political
leader  held  these  offices  on  top  of  the  premiership  led  to  Sunni
disenfranchisement  with  concerns  raised  over  the  security  forces'
impartiality in their duties and ability to meet the needs of the entirety of the
population.  These  circumstances  combined  with  an  increasingly  strong
Shia-Kurdish  political  alliance  at  national  parliamentary  level  were
concerning to Sunni Arab Iraqis and perceived as a threat to their  social
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status in Iraq. 
Chaldean responses to a new Iraqi society
As of 2008 the restoration of Chaldean life to a recognisable standard such
as  the  pre-2003  status  quo was  impossible.  Political,  social  and
psychological changes were too substantial to overcome outside of Divine
intervention.  The patriarchate  might  remain in  Baghdad but  the focus  of
Chaldean life  in Iraq switched to the Kurdish governed provinces of the
north, the city of Kirkuk and the Nineveh plain region with responsibilities
derogated to the local bishops to oversee this consolidation.
Chaldean political and social disenfranchisement was most clearly
evidenced in the lack of concern expressed by non-Christians following the
March 2008 martyrdom of Polos Faraj Raho, Archbishop of Mosul.  The
Archbishop's murder followed a series of threats of violence towards him
and his communities and his refusal to any longer pay the jizya to a Sunni
group  for  the  prevention  of  violence  against  his  congregation.  His
determination  to  end  the  protection  racket  costing  him  his  life  and
foreshadowing the strict application of Sunni legal and cultural practices in
Mosul. 
The  1915–1918  massacres  had  seen  the  death  of  several  senior
clergy such as Archbishop Addai Scher but Archbishop Raho's death took
place  in  the  context  of  the  Iraqi  not  Ottoman  environment.  The  former
having appeared to strongly integrate the Chaldeans as an essential part of
society and, as a result, for persecution to take place in this context all the
more shocking that the respect they thought they held among other Iraqis no
longer  existed.  I  suggest,  moreover,  the muted response to  the murder  a
defining indication of the loss of society wide interest to see Iraq remain a
plural social mix.61
61 A similar context also affecting the Yazidis: on 14th August 2007 796 Yazidis were
killed  and  1,562  wounded  in  the  north-western  Iraqi  town  of  Khataniya  during
successive suicide bombings. This was the second deadliest terrorist attack in modern
history  –  after  the  11th  September  2001  attacks  in  the  USA –  but  little  if  any
recognition of this was or has been made in or outside Iraq.
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However, Iraq overall was in a state of greater security or at least
appeared to be so. The civil war's end in 2007 also saw a move away from
ephemeral hopes for ``freedom''  and ``democracy''  and instead focus was
placed on the basic requirements of medical care, reliable access to potable
water  and  electricity.  Whilst  January  and  March  2009  saw  the  lowest
number  of  civilian  and  US  military  casualties  respectively  since  March
2003.  (Iraq Coalition Casualty Count 2015; ‘Documented Civilian Deaths
from Violence’ 2015) This reduction in violence contemporaneous with al-
Maliki's  consolidation  of  position  with his  political  coalition  gaining the
largest single percentage of the vote in provincial elections and thus in turn
126 of 440 seats in the provincial councils. Such were the continued hopes
for relative stability in Iraq that May saw the formal withdrawal of British
forces.  However,  in  the  second half  of  2009 direct  threats  to  the  state's
integrity  re-emerged in  the  form of  large,  well  planned bomb attacks  in
Baghdad with terrorist incidents across the country – a pattern of violence
which continued into 2010. 
Iraqi electoral process and government formation
The  transitional  Iraqi  government  was  created  and  held  administrative
power until  the first  general election in 2006. From which time and into
2013 political  life  focused on the leadership of  the Arab Shia secretary-
general of the Islamic Dawa Party, Nouri al-Maliki.
al-Maliki was born in the Iraqi Shia heartland near Karbala in 1950
but  had  been  exiled  from  Iraq  for  the  period  1979–2003  owing  to
involvement in seditious activities against the IBP. al-Maliki's position in the
spotlight  of  post-invasion  Iraqi  politics  derived  from  his  links  with  the
governments of the USA and the Islamic Republic of Iran during his time
abroad.  He became Prime Minister  after  the 2006 parliamentary election
with his success related to political alliances with other Shia parties and the
Kurds. However, in consolidating his power base it appears he undermined
mechanisms  of  constraint  on  the  prime  ministerial  office  and  actively
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pursued a militant approach against opponents via the security services. It is
possible these actions took place in the context of removing genuine threats
to  the  Iraqi  government  but  his  opponents  regarded  him  as  a  self-
aggrandising authoritarian determined only to support the Shia community.
The  perceived  Sunni  exclusion  was  vocally  criticised  and,  as  with  the
Chaldeans, became a source of disenfranchisement from the ideal of the new
Iraq.  However,  the  Sunni  population's  size  and  militia  organisations
permitted direct attempts to challenge Shia hegemony.
In comparison the Chaldean hierarchy regularly met with Muslim
political and religious élites for the purpose of representing the community's
concerns.  These  engagements  were  multifaceted  but  focused  on  gaining
acknowledgement  of  their  legitimate  historical  presence  to  Iraq.  Clear
supportive public  statements for Chaldeans'  continued presence and their
importance to Iraq were made by Sunni and Shia yet the collective response
of  the  Muslim  communities  to  supporting  their  presence  was  minimal.
(Asianews.it 2009a) Nonetheless, the Chaldean leadership was obliged to
make this  effort  as  to  do nothing would  signal  their  acceptance  of  their
removal  from Iraqi  society  and  the  end  of  the  ``difference''  which  they
introduced.62
Christian political representation
From 2003 Chaldean political engagement was diversified more widely than
ever  before  with  the  presence  of  Christian  political  parties  spreading
throughout Iraq.63 Precedent for Christian participation in the national Iraqi
electoral  process  derives  from successes  in  the  KRG with  a  seat  in  the
Kurdish  assembly  won  in  1992  by  Sarkis  Aghajan  Mamendo  as  a
representative  of  the Christian Union of  Kurdistan and latterly  Yonadem
Yousif Kanna was granted the post of Minister of Public Works, Housing
62 In  much  the  same  way  as  the  field  of  Islamic  Studies  is  incomplete  without
reference to the relationship of Islam to Christianity so Iraq is not truly Iraq if it is not
plural and acknowledged as such.
63  Generally  all  of  these  parties  support  the  Assyrianist  ethnic  identity  and  an
autonomous Christian region. For an outline of the post-2003 Iraqi electoral system and
political structures see Appendix B.
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and Environment. (Teule 2012, 181–182)
With the new republic's establishment from 2003 the most prominent
national party to represent Christians – the ADM – moved its headquarters
to Baghdad. (Teule 2012, 182) The move stressing the ADM's recognition of
the necessity to be active in the centre of Iraqi national political life were
they  to  affect  change  for  their  supporters.  This  mirrored  the  Chaldean
patriarchate's move to Baghdad in 1950 yet the ADM's placement in the city
did not carry with it the same significance. The ADM's lack of a support
base to the same degree which the Chaldeans held from 1950–2003 in the
city inhibiting their ability to extend their influence given the majority of
their supporters were in northern Iraq. I suggest the patriarch's status as it
had existed to 2003 carried with it some political influence and was broadly
recognised across Iraqi society even if it was not widely understood as to his
rôle and purpose. Inserting an ostensibly Christian party which agitated for
an autonomous region, which was perceived to represent explicitly western
values and an uncertain relationship with the KRG and ICG were not factors
favouring its facilitating Christian interests in the capital. Nor could it be
said the ADM represented Christians in the same way as the patriarch given
the  normative  focus  of  political  parties  is  to  gain  political  ends  through
political means representing only parts of the entire Christian community –
the attempt to act as a universal influence in Iraqi society incomparable with
that of the patriarch.
As modern Chaldean ecclesiology is tied to the notion of Iraq and its
borders  the  new  structures  of  government  and  the  electoral  processes
influenced Chaldean activity with the community's preference for a political
balance of  parties which ensured the least  explicitly  Islamic grouping in
parliament and at a micro level Christian politicians retaining a voice on
provincial councils to engage with local Muslim leaders. This differed to
varying  levels  across  Iraq.  Under  the  KRG greater  openness  to  western
political ideologies and notions of human rights and equality in law were in
accord with Chaldean concerns as to securing a place as a known minority
integral to Kurdish society.
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Chaldean identity in post-war Iraq
For  many  Chaldeans  as  of  2013  in  Iraqi  Kurdistan  their  primary  and
national  identity  was Iraqi  and that  to  be a  Chaldean Christian was that
which they would next affirm. This was qualified by the remark that the two
–  Chaldean  and  Iraqi  –  were  closely  linked  and  could  in  no  way  be
separated.  (Conversations  with  Chaldean  community  members,  Erbil,
October  2013)  It  seemed  attachment  to  Iraq  was  the  slightly  stronger,
however,  and  this,  I  suggest,  likely  caused  by  the  influence  of  Arab
nationalism pursued under  the  rule  of  the  Baath.  The Arab national  and
ethnic identity permitting Chaldeans to remain a part of an Iraqi plurality as
all that made them distinctive was a religious identity. However, this varied
among those who favoured Assyrianism as an ethnic and national identity
and those who affirmed that they were of Aramaic identity. Being Aramaic a
means by which to maintain a specific ethnic origin but which did not lead
to agitation for any form of separatism or the pursuit  of an autonomous
region. Instead asserting a paradigm which fit within the plural social make-
up to which Iraq was heir from the earliest development of civilisation in
Mesopotamia. 
There  is  a  further  division of  identity  for  Chaldeans  – who have
grown up within the Kurdistan region or spent their formative years there –
which is an assertion of Christian ethnicity. Indicative of development apart
from being Arab or  Assyrian and due to  their  circumstances creating an
identity which was considered to more accurately reflect the character of
their  communities  and  which  is  acceptable  to  Kurdish  society.  By
coagulating their religious and ethnic sense of self they can create a group
identity of which the Kurds are already cognisant – popularly viewing the
Christians as one homogeneous group – and which avoids the connotations
of an Iraqi identity which could be perceived as antagonistic towards an
autonomous Kurdish state.
Language also could be a defining factor influencing which identity
was asserted. Those urban residents who had migrated to the KRG from
central and southern Iraq were predominantly Arab speakers for whom to
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return  to  using  Sureth  as  a  vernacular  was  sometimes  viewed  as  a
retrogressive step towards lower socio-economic status. These differences
actualised in religious life by the celebration of the liturgy in either Sureth
or Arabic or with a mix of both with priests being in a situation of having to
ensure the pastoral needs of the entire community are met. That the use of
two languages  within  the  liturgy  was  further  complicated  by  the  use  of
liturgical Sureth does make for some difficulty for priests and seminarians
not  all  of  whom necessarily  know Sureth  well  if,  for  example,  they  are
raised outside of northern Iraq.
The  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  specific  identity  is  useful  to
legitimise  and  define  status  in  Iraq  and  through  presenting  a  communal
presence on a national level (via the patriarchal office) inhibits the pursuit of
mono-cultural narratives and exclusive claims of one faction to determine
the  future  of  Iraq.  Moreover,  the  Christians  whether  intentionally  or  not
inhibit  a  dichotomy  of  Sunni-Shia  conflict  as  the  political  and  social
discourses  of  these  groups  are  obliged  to  take  their  contributions  into
account. This concept of remaining at the heart of Iraqi society one factor in
the  Chaldean  patriarch's  continued  determination  to  remain  officially
resident in Baghdad. The option for leaving the city has been open since
2003 but the patriarchate has been maintained because of the access to the
political  system and the capital  status of Baghdad.  To depart  would pre-
suppose  admitting  defeat  in  the  face  of  those  who  use  coercion  to
manipulate  Iraqi  society  and  undermine  Chaldean  ability  to  act  as  a
mediating influence on national events.
Situating the Chaldean narrative in Iraq and within the 
wider Catholic community (2010–2013)
The consolidation of the Chaldeans into northern Iraq saw a concomitant
decline  to  their  presence  to  Iraqi  society  more  widely.  Public  Chaldean
representation derived substantially from the efforts of leading clergy such
as  the  Archbishop of  Kirkuk,  Louis  Sako (2002–2013).  At  a  time when
Patriarch Delly's influence was waning through age and ill health Sako was
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able to exert a strong influence upon the Chaldean community.
Sako's efforts were focused in four areas:
• Maintaining relations with Muslim leaders in Kirkuk and nationally
regardless of the level or type of response
• Maintaining the norms of communal life insofar as was possible
• Emphasising  the  significance  of  continued  links  with  the
international Catholic community
• Ensuring a wider perspective on events: situating the contemporary
Chaldean narrative  in  the  full  sweep of  East  Syriac  ecclesiastical
history.
The  last  point  significant  for  vitiating  the  Chaldean  decline  and  was  a
reminder  to  the  community  that  previous  experiences  of  martyrdom and
social change had been met stoically and in time were overcome – key to
preventing the development of a victim mentality and tied in with the notion
of the lived reality of martyrdom. (Cf Col I:24; 2 Tim I:8) Such themes can
be lost if we do not take into account the spiritual and theological aspects of
Chaldean identity as a Christian church experiencing extended persecution.
The Chaldeans  from an ecclesiological  perspective were not just  another
sectional  interest  in  Iraqi  society  or  another  organization  facing  violent
attacks  –  merely  relating,  for  example,  the  number  of  people  killed  or
church  property  destroyed  insufficient  to  provide  a  theological
understanding of their situation.
The Holy See was far from ignorant of the realities of the suffering
of Iraqi Christians but did not take overt action in Chaldean affairs between
2003 and 2013.64 The trend in Petrine activity was towards recognising the
declining state of affairs for the eastern Catholics in the Middle East with
such activity  exemplified  by the  Synods for  the  Catholic  bishops  of  the
Middle East in 2010 and 2012.
Antoine Audo SJ provides an account of the 2012 Synod and the
publication of the apostolic exhortation Ecclesia in Medio Oriente which the
64 Other than as noted above confirming Delly as a compromise candidate to the 
patriarchate.
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2010 Synod had engendered but this covered rather general concerns such
as ecumenism, Christian-Jewish and Christian-Muslim communal relations
and liturgical theology.(Audo SJ 2012, 3–7) Neither  during  his  visit  to
Lebanon in  2012 did  Pope Benedict  make particular  efforts  to  highlight
conflicts  affecting  Christians  outside  the  Levant  and Egypt  even despite
these being discussed during the 2010 Synod.  (Bouwen M. Afr. 2012, 20–
21)65 
I  suggest  there  may  have  been  frustration  at  the  pope's  focus  to
Lebanese  and  Palestinian  affairs  and  with  the  lack  of  awareness  raised
regarding Syria and Iraq when we consider the spotlight of media attention
was focused on the pope's travels. Indicative of a wider context in which the
Holy See's concerns for Middle Eastern Christians are genuine but lack a
wider plan for their implementation beyond charitable efforts which, whilst
vital, do not resolve the long term need to maintain a Christian vision within
Middle Eastern societies. The work of the Apostolic Nuncio to the Republic
of Iraq, Abp Giorgio Lingua, is, for example, split with his time spent as
Nuncio to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This is unfortunate given the
level of work required to sustain diplomatic engagements in both countries
and is to the detriment of pursuing policies for two states and variegated
Catholic  communities  which  whilst  similar  in  many  respects  also  face
different socio-economic and political challenges. Looking retrospectively
from 2015 it is remarkable to consider why the Iraqi situation was not better
comprehended for its  volatility and the need for greater and more direct
engagement  by  the  Holy  See.  This,  however,  fitted  with  the  pattern  of
activity which many states and NGOs observed with the start of widespread
terrorist activity in Syria and concern shifting in focus from Iraq. As will be
seen below 2010–2013 was largely a period of consolidation in northern
Iraq or migration abroad for the Chaldeans and the situation – aside from
serious incidents which greatly influenced the community in general such as
the attack on Our Lady of Salvation Syrian Catholic Cathedral, Baghdad in
2010 – was not then perceived to be worse than the previous seven years
and was a time of coming to terms with a new and relatively stable if very
65 For a detailed assessment of the impact of the Synod for Christians in Iraq see Teule
(2011d)
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difficult status quo.
5. Chaldean ecclesiology and ecclesial 
organisation in Mesopotamia-Iraq
The main  aim of  fieldwork undertaken  in  northern  Iraq  in  2013 was  to
document  the  Chaldean  Church's  contemporary  status.  Assessment  is
provided  below  of  the  contemporary  Iraqi  Chaldean  dioceses  with  an
historical  account  of  their  origins  to  October  2013.  This  builds  on  the
research completed by Khayyath (1896b), Tfinkdji (1913), Tisserant (1931),
Fiey  (1959;  1965a;  1993) and  Wilmshurst  (2000) particularly  and  also
evident in the works which researchers associated with my home institution
have undertaken such as Whooley  (2004), Flannery  (2008) and O'Mahony
(2008).  This  in  recognition that  scholarly work does not  take place in  a
vacuum and  is  necessarily  influenced  by  the  works  of  others  and,  it  is
hoped,  building  on  these  platforms  for  the  future  for  others  in  turn  to
contribute  to  Chaldean,  eastern  Catholic  and  East  Syriac  ecclesiological
studies.
What is and how has ecclesiology altered?
Ecclesiology can be defined as the study of the relationships between the
organisation, theology, liturgy and pastoral practices of a church and as to
how these aspects of the church when considered as a whole express the
church's identity to the world and its members. At the heart of a church's
ecclesiology is its self-awareness of what it means to be a member of that
community, individual and communal identities and the implications of this
for  interactions  with  other  groups.  Thus,  ecclesiological  study  seeks  to
reveal  the  essence  of  church  life  and  what  it  means  on  a  practical  and
metaphysical basis to ``live'' as a member of a particular church.66
66 During fieldwork effort was made to record notes on ecclesiastical organisation,
social  interaction,  theological  discussions,  liturgical  and  pastoral  practices.  The
necessity to observe and later recall for writing up the research was essential in trying
to ``get under the skin'' of the Chaldeans and ensure their community is accurately but
not uncritically described.
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Ecclesiology  and its  study  has  since  the  Second  Vatican  Council
become  a  key  focus  of  academic  and  general  literature  on  and  about
Catholicism. This interest derived from attempts to alter the nature of the
Church's  borders  and  organisation.  The  Church  no  longer  held  to  be  a
unified monarchical institution with distinct juridical boundaries but a type
of communion in which  the Church of Christ  subsists.  Such changes no
more greatly impacted than upon the eastern Catholic communities which
since 1965 have been held as churches self-governing and  sui juris. Their
position  in  the  universal  Catholic  communion  now  affirmed  through
asserting union with the pope as primus inter pares than direct submission
to his jurisdiction and authority. For the eastern Catholics this was a push
towards virtual autonomy with one of the few limits on independent action
being the  requirement  to  defer  to  the  Holy  See  in  the  final  approval  of
bishops.
Chaldean ecclesiological change has not taken place in a vacuum
and has  been determined by the dictates  of  co-operating  in  the  Catholic
communion  but  also  professing  commitment  to  achieving  full  ecclesial
union with the Church of the East which, however, may not necessarily be
supported by the papacy or understood by non-East Syriac Catholics. The
Chaldeans encountering a tension between emphasising their membership of
the  Catholic  communion  and  pursuing  autonomy  on  a  greater  scale
emphasising their East Syriac ecclesial identity which draws on the heritage
of the community throughout Asia. (Cf Sako 2014) There are few examples
of  such  a  scenario  in  ecclesiological  studies  with  other  expressions  of
eastern Christianity having remained largely limited to those areas in which
they originated and only since the nineteenth century spreading in a truly
international manner or beyond the confines of the nations and territories
which they purport  to  represent.  For  in  attempting  to  theorise  a  modern
eastern  Catholic  ecclesiology  which  is  satisfactory  and  acceptable  to
Catholics and non-Catholics one can fall into difficulties from the context of
discord  between  Orthodox  and  Catholic  antagonistic  narratives.  As  the
Chaldeans'  East  Syriac  heritage  falls  outside  of  this  dichotomy they  are
apparently able to seek a different path of eastern Christian ecclesiology of
novel status and type. Such a model greatly influenced by the relative lack
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of  contemporary  rancour  with  its  progenitor  community;  by  the  shared
experience of persecution and their relatively small size by comparison with
other communities such as the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholics. 
Nevertheless,  the  development  of  a  closer  ecclesiological  bond
between the East Syriac churches requires a greater theoretical basis than
merely a perception that it  could be a good or necessary thing given the
difficult  circumstances  with  which  the  churches  are  faced.  Moreover,  in
outlining such ideals the Chaldean hierarchy have lacked the opportunity to
comprehensively  engage  with  these  ecclesiological  speculations  on  a
theoretical  basis  at  least  since  2003.  Nevertheless,  and  despite  the  war,
theoretical underpinnings of the Chaldean-Church of the East relationship
have been continued within the successor events to the Pro Oriente fora: the
Colloquium Syriacum conferences since 2009. 
Such meetings  also  vital  to  ensure  the  affects  of  migration  upon
ecclesiology are taken into account. Ecclesiological studies largely did not
assess  migration  from  a  theoretical  perspective  until  the  late  twentieth
century.67 As Chaldean ecclesiology was closely linked with their presence
within the borders of the Iraqi state and association with the state was a key
aspect of Chaldean identity the idea of developing an ecclesiology which
reflected the international spread of the Chaldeans was challenging to fit
within this paradigm. As to those abroad questions remain open as to how
properly to engage with them and as to the best means to retain them as
members of the Church as increasing numbers became  de facto Latins if
arrangements were not provided for by a local hierarchy.
It should also be noted that Chaldean ecclesiology has always been
impacted  by  the  necessity  to  take  part  in  some  form of  exchange  with
Muslims whether in Iraq or the diaspora. This process particularly increased
in importance following the invasion in 2003 with the church's ecclesiology
and ecclesial organisation having to account for Sunni and Shia factions'
behaviour as much as the Chaldeans own aspirations for the Church's future.
67 An  example  has  been  research  conducted  on  the  Carpatho-Rusyn  (Ruthenian)
migrations  from eastern  Europe  and  Ukraine  to  the  USA and  the  affects  on  their
ecclesiology. See Simon (1993) and Marti (2009).
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Chaldean status quo in northern Iraq
As of 2013 northern Iraqi Chaldean communities are found in the provinces
of  Erbil,  Duhok  and  Sulaymaniya  administered  by  the  KRG.  Those
Chaldean towns and villages on the edge of Nineveh province near to Mosul
were also considered a part of the northern Iraqi Chaldean presence such as
Telkef and Karamles. The status of these rural villages were complicated by
border  disputes  between the  KRG and ICG from 2003 until  June  2014.
Disputes  which  in  turn  led  to  questions  over  rightful  governmental
jurisdiction  and  Chaldean  unease  due  to  residing  in  areas  of  particular
political  tension.  Chaldean  residents  in  urban  areas  were  better  able  to
protect  themselves  and receive support  from the  hierarchy following the
2003 invasion. Communities of tens of families are far easier to displace
than towns in which hundreds or thousands of Christians are resident and
often part of a wider multi-religious milieu. 
Another point of context to the northern Iraqi region is its geography
which affects the relationship between the clergy and the local residents and
as to the ways in which the church is governed. The mountainous terrain in
which  many  Chaldean  villages  in  the  Diocese  of  Amadiya-Zakho  are
located can, for example, inhibit the presence of the bishop during inclement
weather conditions in winter. By comparison the Archbishop of Erbil can far
more  easily  engage  with  his  community  largely  centred  in  a  flat  and
compact  city  suburb.  The  former  scenario  necessitates  a  more  self-
supporting  mindset  among  the  community  and  its  parish  priest  and  a
different atmosphere in internal diocesan life.
Although I consider the history of dioceses in the light of events in
the twenty-first century it should be recalled these territories were once part
of a network of ecclesiastical organisation in the Late Antique and medieval
periods which covered much of the geographical area of modern Iraq. Thus,
in  discussing  the  history  of  the  dioceses  we  should  not  see  them  as
appearing  ex nihilo or as foreign to their surroundings. Areas of Iraq now
empty  of  Christians  particularly the  central  and southern  provinces  were
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once  contiguous  with  populous  East  Syriac  dioceses  and  monastic
foundations.
Given  the  total  diocesan  populations  and  relative  ease  of  access
fieldwork focused on Erbil, Zakho-Amadiya and Alqosh. Mosul diocese (as
opposed to just Mosul city) retained a substantial Chaldean presence whilst
Sulaymaniya and Akra had only a few hundred Chaldean residents and in
most other instances would exist as single parishes. I was fortunate to meet
with several senior clerics and Christian community leaders in the dioceses
of  Alqosh,  Erbil  and  Zakho-Amadiya  who  aided  in  understanding  their
status  and  plans  for  the  future.  The  context  at  that  time  being  that  the
development of the Chaldean Church and other churches was for the long
term to Iraq even despite any difficulties in the execution of their activities.
Such  qualitative  data  collected  being  vital  to  provide  nuance  to  the
quantitative information.
Diocesan study overview
This study builds a survey profile of the Chaldean Church in  Iraq as of
October 2013.68 The profile with the time and resources available to conduct
fieldwork  cannot  purport  to  be  an  authoritative  study  of  Chaldean
ecclesiastical  organisation  similar  to  that  which  Wilmshurst  (2000)
attempted in his work. However, the study provides indication of the effects
of the 2003 war and subsequent conflict upon Chaldean ecclesiology and as
to how, once again, northern Iraq has become the heartland of the Chaldean
Church in  the  Middle  East.  There  is  a  general  awareness  in  studies  and
popularly of the general Chaldean numerical and material decline but the
quantitative data collected illustrates, however, the rate of this decline.
The  data  collected  ``on  the  ground''  during  direct  fieldwork  via
interviews,  conversations,  general  observations  and access  to  archives  is
supplemented  from  information  solicited  among  the  wider  Chaldean
community via e-mail,  telephone or in person. Data sent via e-mail from
68 See Table 3 for a list  of principle towns and villages which were visited during
fieldwork.
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Baghdad,  Basra  and  Mosul  gives  a  welcome breadth  to  a  survey which
seeks where possible to illustrate Chaldean history within the context of the
history of the modern state of Iraq. However, gaps exist in the study and this
is due to four factors:
1. Data lost or not collected in the first instance and never recorded.
This was not an issue encountered on a regular basis with Chaldeans
cognisant  of  the  importance  of  maintaining  records  in  an  era  of
substantial change. Nevertheless, in practice this varied due to the
inclination of individual priests and bishops to pay close attention to
record  keeping  in  their  jurisdiction.  For  some  parishes
geographically distant from episcopal oversight there was perhaps an
inclination to only reluctantly provide data. Data provided was also
split in some instances by diocesan and parish level with all baptisms
for an entire diocese recorded but not specified as from which parish
they originated. Whilst at times of direct difficulty in parish life such
as periods of persecution or population displacement records were
disrupted.
2. Data not collected due to inability to access a location or a location
not visited due to human/time constraints.69 As research took place
over a four week period gaining a deep insight to the lived reality of
every  extant  village  and  town  with  a  Chaldean  population  was
impossible.  Other  areas  such  as  Kirkuk,  a  key  contemporary
Chaldean centre,  were  not  sufficiently  secure  to  visit  and from a
practical perspective the visa granted to British nationals on arrival
in the Kurdistan region permitted travel only to those areas under de
jure Kurdish  control  and  influence.  Security  measures  at  the
numerous checkpoints in the Kurdish administered regions were also
stringent  during  the  visit  in  October  2013  owing  to  a  terrorist
69 There was also the question of the reliability and provenance of data which I have
utilised from the  Annuario Pontifico to  supplement  my own data.  As  will  be seen
below I have used the AP's data to provide an indication of population size. This is not
without caveats and these are discussed below. This data was gained from the online
database  Catholic  Hierarchy <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/rite/ch.html>  and
Ronald  G.  Roberson  CSP,  ‘The  Eastern  Catholic  Churches  2014’.
<http://www.cnewa.org/source-images/Roberson-eastcath-statistics/eastcatholic-
stat14.pdf> 
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bombing taking place in late September in Erbil. Queues at vehicle
checkpoints, for example, could last several hours. 
3. Unwillingness of persons to take part/assist with the study. In being
hosted  during  fieldwork  by  the  Chaldean  Archdiocese  of  Erbil
introduction  to  the  Chaldean  communities  in  northern  Iraq  was
greatly facilitated along with the provision of a driver/fixer/translator
for  transport,  meetings  and  interviews.  Nevertheless,  this  did  not
mean all difficulties were removed or that research questions were
freely answered. Some, for example,  who were at  first  somewhat
suspicious of the research project and would only on second or third
meeting or after sustained correspondence be willing to participate.
All  issues  which  quite  naturally  were  expected  in  newly  formed
inter-personal  relations.  The Iraqi  context,  the  researcher's  British
nationality  and  the  study's  novelty  all  producing  barriers  to  an
openness to engage in some instances.
4. Questions  to  which  no  one  knows  the  answer.  During  an  era  in
which  population  displacement  and  the  interruption  of  regular
livelihoods  have  become  norms  it  was  a  challenge  to  find  an
interlocutor who could be drawn on some issues. There were, for
example,  limited  answers  given  in  discussions  to  questions  on
patriarchs Joseph VII Ghanima and Paul II Cheikho. The level of
questions  might  not  be  particularly  taxing  –  queries  about  the
political  views or social  origins of the patriarchs – but even here
there was limited awareness of  or some dispute as to  the correct
answer. Combined with the lack of awareness was the propensity for
opinions  in  many instances  to  be  given  about  a  question  and  its
subject as opposed to answering it directly with a definitive factual
answer. In due course this led to caution with regards to drawing out
answers from conversations and interviews and composite answers
outlined from a variety of sources were developed. 
5. Reluctance/unsuitability  to  ask  questions  or  collect  data  due  to
situation at the time. Given the violence which had marked Chaldean
consolidation to northern Iraq and the themes of conflict which had
so  strongly  affected  Iraqi  society  since  the  Iran-Iraq  War  it  was
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necessary to be sensitive to and aware of questions in general but
also when asking about events which had directly impacted on those
with whom I conversed. It might build a fuller historical record but
would  it  be  wise  to  press  a  former  resident  of  Mosul  on  their
experience of persecution prior to being forced to leave their home?
Some Chaldeans were very open and explicit about their experiences
and  opinions  and  were  very  eager  for  their  story  to  be  related.
However, it was made clear that we could end our discussions at any
time and without any obligation for the interviewee to explain why
they wished to do so.70 
Archdiocese of Erbil
The city of Erbil is one of the oldest sites of continuous human habitation in
the world dating to at least 6000BC and has long been a principal centre of
East Syriac Christianity in Mesopotamia.71 Christian expansion to the city
took place by the early second century and was expedited due to Erbil's
position on regional and trans-regional trade routes and by the presence of a
Jewish  community  from  the  first  century  following  the  local  rulers'
conversion about the time of the birth of Christ.  (Sellwood 2011; Harrak
2002, 52) At the Synod of Isaac in 410 Erbil was included in the ecclesial
province of Adiabene with the metropolitans of the province resident in the
city. By the seventh century Erbil had grown to be such a focus of ecclesial
activity that it was itself raised to metropolitanate status in the Church of the
East but with Mosul's growth as an East Syriac centre the cities were created
a joint see. (Wilmshurst 2000, 166–167) Erbil became infamous in Christian
memory for the massacre of an East Syriac community resident in 1310 by
the local Kurdish rulers and following the invasion of Tamerlane later that
70 It should be noted that this never occurred during fieldwork in Iraq or Jordan and
only in one discussion with a Chaldean community member in London was it evident
that  the  conversation  should  be  ended due  to  the  painful  memories  and emotional
response to which a question gave rise.
71 According to one tradition Mari – a follower of Addai, one of the seventy disciples –
miraculously healed the ruler of Erbil and delivered a child from demonic possession
after which the local élites were converted to Christianity. (Chaumont 1988, 17)
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century Erbil and its surrounds were reduced in non-Muslim activity. (Fiey
OP 1965a, I:88–91, 93)
Erbil's  East  Syriac  ecclesiastical  structure  still  technically  existed
into  the  seventeenth  century  but  from 1318–1607 only  four  bishops  are
known by name to have been associated with the town. (Wilmshurst 2000,
167) Whilst  legitimist  patriarch  Eliya  VIII  affirmed  Erbil  as  within  his
jurisdictional  purview  as  of  1610  the  city  itself  no  longer  retained  any
cachet of substantial ecclesial activity and it was only in the surrounding
villages, such as Ankawa, that East Syriac communities were maintained
with  these  entering  into  union  with  the  Holy  See  from 1779.  (Fiey  OP
1965a, I:95–96; Wilmshurst 2000, 166–168) During the nineteenth century
Erbil  and  surrounding  villages  were  included  in  the  jurisdiction  of  the
Chaldean  Archdiocese  of  Kirkuk  following  its  establishment  in  1789.
(Wilmshurst 2000, 169) From which time the East Syriacs were under the
close tutelage of Latin and Chaldean missionaries and foundations were laid
for the consolidation of the communities in the region. 
Erbil  was  re-established  as  an  ecclesial  body  in  1968  under  the
leadership  of  Archbishop  Stéphane  Babaca  at  which  time  the  Chaldean
population was c. 7,000 people. The diocese's re-creation should be seen in
the context of the successful Baath party coup of that year and the continued
and increasingly intense conflicts between the Kurds and the Iraqi military
in northern Iraq: events which indicated the need to provide greater pastoral
care to the Chaldeans. By the end of the twentieth century the Archdiocesan
population  stood  at  over  11,000  people  –  approximately  less  than  five
percent of the global Chaldean population as of 2000. If the bounds of the
Archdiocese were not perceived as the most desirable place of residence for
Chaldeans  it  nevertheless  retained  an  attraction  due  to  the  tradition  of
Christian presence and from 1991 its status as the  de facto  capital of the
increasingly autonomous and prosperous Kurdish administered provinces.
From 2005 the archdiocese lacked direct episcopal oversight until
the  installation  of  Archbishop  Bashar  Warda  CSsR  in  2010  having
experienced a period of  sede vacante with the death of the last occupant,
Yacoub Denha Scher, in 2005. In the intervening period it was administered
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by Rabban al-Qas who was simultaneously bishop of Amadiya. However,
Warda's influence in the archdiocese was consolidated from 2007 following
the  relocation  of  the  Chaldean  seminary  to  Ankawa  that  year  and  his
appointment as its rector. His subsequent appointment as Archbishop, as a
relatively  young  candidate  (aged  thirty-nine),  in  recognition  of  Iraqi
Kurdistan's  significance  to  the  Chaldeans  and  the  need  for  an  energetic
clerical presence in the Kurdish capital.
Chaldean ecclesiastical life in Ankawa
The  Chaldean  presence  has  coagulated  to  form  distinctive  functions  in
Ankawa which previously would have been the remit of activities in the
Archdiocese of Baghdad. This has elevated Erbil to a greater significance
within  the  diocesan  structure  and  the  enmeshing  of  the  future  of  the
Chaldean  presence  in  Iraq  with  the  KRG's  success  and  stability.  The
Chaldean  presence  to  Erbil  Archdiocese  becoming  unique  due  to  the
functions performed there and, I suggest, that the concentration of religious
formation and transfer of population means it has gained the status as  de
facto  premier ecclesial  body even over and above the patriarchate in the
Chaldean community's development.
The main Chaldean parishes in the city are Mar Eliya, Mar Gewargis
and Mar Qardagh which centre around the cathedral parish of Mar Yusif.
Mar Gewargis is the oldest extant church in Ankawa, some aspects of which
perhaps date  to  the tenth century.  (Fiey OP 1965a,  I:171–172) From the
archival material to which access was available it was evident that Ankawa
is  regarded  as  one  Chaldean  ecclesiastical  identity  with  the  different
parishes in each area as adjuncts of the cathedral. Population and baptismal
figures for Ankawa were not divided by parish for example. 
To confer a greater sense of unity among the Chaldeans especially
the younger members informal and formal education continues intensively
in the provision of youth clubs at the Cathedral to ensure mixing of new
migrants and the established population. These are often led by seminarians
which presents time for them to gain experience of leadership and engage
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with their future congregations. Similar activity is also conducted among the
seminarians and clergy with a regular football match taking place each week
–  a  means  to  maintain  and  build  bonds  given  the  severe  strain  on  the
community.
The seminary of St Peter, which is now located in the Archdiocese,
sits at the heart of the future of the Chaldean Church as only from 2008 has
there been a Chaldean seminary outside of Iraq – Mar Abba in San Diego,
USA. As high standards of education are regarded as vital to the Chaldean
future and to maintain Chaldean traditions and heritage it was considered
imperative to secure the free running of St Peter's following the kidnapping
of the rector and vice rector in 2006 in Baghdad. Their eventual safe return
notwithstanding it was perceived as more suitable to continue the work in
Ankawa.
The seminary's relocation has interfered with clerical formation and I
suggest will likely lead to the creation of a new outlook among the clergy
formed  in  an  environment  detached  from  the  political  and  cultural
surroundings and milieu of the Iraqi capital. This may limit priests' ability to
engage with Iraq as comprehensively having been pushed to the edges of
society geographically  and culturally.  The Chaldeans faced also with the
loss of the minor seminary in Baghdad which had been able to provide the
training of younger men in preparation for the priesthood. Nevertheless, the
major  seminary  has  become  a  well  established  part  of  ecclesial  life  in
Ankawa having seen several ordinations and the continuation of an altered
but  sustained  community  and  sense  of  discipleship  among  the  priests.
Vocations to the priesthood and religious life have suffered, however, with it
emphasised in conversation with clergy the difficulties which the Chaldeans
may have in the future if a larger number of candidates do not enter the
seminary. This it was noted was not solely derived from Iraqi cultural-social
problems but also experienced in the USA. A sign of the church's weakening
through violence but also the effects of modern irreligious attitudes in the
West and the apparent attractions which the world offers and the religious
life does not. A difficulty which is shared by Catholic churches worldwide
but in the Chaldean circumstances of especial concern.
The archdiocese appears to be well supplied in pastoral and spiritual
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support.  The  provision  of  training  in  counselling  to  deal  with  Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, for example, and the number of other Chaldeans
resident  in  Ankawa  creates  an  atmosphere  in  which  experiences  of
displacement and persecution can be shared and dealt with on a communal
level. The influx of migrants to the community and becoming the largest
proportion of residents has affected ecclesial identity in the Archdiocese for
it is no longer an ecclesiastical body of northern Iraq but encompasses a
multi-regional identity of persons from across the country.
From Graph 1 we can note that aside from the First World War era
and  until  1980  Ankawa  saw  a  trend  for  growth  in  real  terms  for  the
Chaldeans. The situation in Ankawa during 1914–1918 suggestive of there
being  little  hope  for  the  restoration  of  the  Chaldean  presence  to  the
surrounds of Erbil. From 1900–1913 inclusive the average annual number of
baptisms and weddings stood at 76.43 and 20.21 respectively. During the
War years this dropped to 14.2 and 8.2 but soon was restored and in 1921
saw a swift return to the pre-war levels in baptisms, 88, but with a drop in
the number of weddings of which until 1927 there were only 11 in total for
that period. This low level of marriages perhaps due to difficulties in coping
with the new system of British rule or the propensity for Chaldean men to
travel for work or to build up sufficient material support to provide for a
family. It is somewhat strange, however, as from 1919–1920 there were 44
weddings. Unless the Chaldeans found the imposition of British rule more
disruptive than the effects of the war in Mesopotamia it might be this was
due to the greater number of men killed during the massacres proportionate
to the number of women.
From the 1920s the Chaldean population grew strongly in Ankawa
with major drops in baptisms and weddings coming in the mid-1960s and
mid-1990s  in  reaction  to  political  change  and  military  activities  in  the
surrounding  region.  The  particular  spurt  in  size  from  1987–1991  as
baptismal figures peaked for the twentieth century at 261 in 1989 having
risen from the previous high of 193 in 1985. This difference indicative of
change in population growth and reflecting an influx from the northern Iraqi
villages as Kurdish-Iraqi army confrontations took place and as the Iran-Iraq
War  continued  to  affect  the  economies  and  security  of  Basra,  Kirkuk,
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Sulaymaniya  and  Baghdad.  It  would  be  useful  to  compare  population
statistics of the Archdiocese of Kirkuk and Diocese of Sulaymaniya for the
years 1980–1988 to see the extent of change given the proximity of those
cities to the border with Iran but unfortunately such information has not
been made available.
Ankawa in the twenty-first century
The total population of family figures which are available for 2000–October
2013 are provided in Graph 2 and Tables 2, 4 and 5. The population increase
from 2000–2002 only marginal when compared to later years but this seen
in the context of the sanctions'  increasing impact and population transfer
from  southern  and  central  Iraq  and  residents  of  northern  villages
economically  motivated to  move to Erbil.  The Kurds also experienced a
period of infighting with efforts to take control of Erbil by rival factions a
focal point of struggle during the mid-1990s. Such instability appears not to
have gravely interfered with the Chaldean population which from the above
baptismal records we can note remained steady during the entire decade. 
The  population  increases  from  2003–2007,  however,  were
significantly larger and pertained to the transfer of communal groups and
not just a few families. A terrorist incident in one area of Iraq, for example,
could be a cause for the transfer of population to an area perceived to offer
greater security. A nearly 3,000 family (c. 13,500–15,000 people) increase in
this period cannot be attributed to a drip-drip of population but entails an
entire change in communal make up in areas of central and southern Iraq.
From 2007 the rate of population change slowed but the overall growth in
the population increased steadily. This likely related to the gradual decrease
in the number of Chaldeans who transferred to the northern regions with a
residual  number  remaining  in  Iraq  proper.  I  suggest  that  those  who had
family or business connections to Syria (until 2011), Jordan or the Lebanon
may have travelled there directly rather than via Erbil. Whilst the city was
the ``go-to'' point for Chaldeans in the Nineveh plains and Mosul this did
not necessarily relate to the travel plans of those in Basra or Baghdad.
I suggest, further, that by 2008 of those resident in the Nineveh plain
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and Mosul those who were going to leave had left and it was only in the
context of specific events that population movement would again increase
such as the attacks on the Cathedral of Our Lady of Salvation in 2010 or the
murder of Archbishop Paulos Faraj Raho in Mosul in 2008. Indeed if the
present rate of change continued and Erbil remained an attractive destination
the population was only likely to increase with a subsequent decline in the
populations resident in Iraq proper in the long term. 
Parishes outside of Erbil
Outside  of  the  Erbil  urban  area  the  Archdiocese  consists  of  three  other
parishes: Shaqlawa the largest by population (c. 240 families), with Armota
and Qusenjaq significantly smaller (95 and 35 families respectively). Whilst
relatively small these towns are notable along with Ankawa as progenitor
Chaldean communities in the region. 
Shaqlawa is about thirty miles north-east of Erbil and had an East
Syriac presence at least since the fourteenth century and it is possible the
establishment  of  these  three  settlements  in  the  fourteenth  century  –
Qusenjaq, Armota and Shirawa – that this marked a period of population
displacement to more remote locations following the massacre of Christians
in Erbil in 1310. (Wilmshurst 2000, 168)
Shaqlawa's ecclesial affiliation shifted to become Chaldean in 1779
through the efforts of Yohannan Hormizd and as of 1913 the town had a
Chaldean  population  of  1,200  with  five  priests  serving  the  community.
(Wilmshurst 2000, 171, 176) As can be seen in Graph 3 the town saw spikes
in baptismal numbers from the mid-1950s, nevertheless, all throughout the
Kurdish rebellions and Iran-Iraq War there was relatively little change with
only 1974, 1982 and 1983 seeing the number of annual baptisms in the town
drop to below forty. Even more remarkable when we consider the relative
proximity of military operations in surrounding conflicts. The town appears
to have entered a period of decline from the mid-1990s only to be gradually
restored  from 2003 however  even  since  then  the  population  growth  has
fluctuated. 
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By comparison and as can be seen in Graph 3  such effects did not
necessarily translate to the situations in Armota and Qusenjaq which despite
drops have seen baptismal numbers largely remain the same regardless of
events with these times of conflict or political unrest the points of change.
The  baptismal  numbers  indicative  of  population  growth  supported  by
affirmation of local clergy that `replacements'  have filled the gaps in the
local population by those who moved to Ankawa or beyond. (Interview with
Shaqlawan parish priest, October 2013) Given the distance to Erbil from the
towns it is feasible for people to commute for work. Nevertheless, Shaqlawa
had a growing tourist industry and there was employment available even if
such service roles are not necessarily preferred by Chaldeans. 
Armota has a recent history complicated by strained relations with
the  local  Kurdish  population  and  historically  had  suffered  extensive
persecution from contemporary ruling powers whether Sassanid, Muslim or
Kurdish. I was informed Armota's English translation is ``land of death'' and
the formidable name reflects the local Chaldean populations dealings with
the  Kurds.  The  nineteenth  century  saw  extended  periods  of  persecution
which became so consistently strong that the local residents dug a series of
tunnels to remain safely hidden in times of difficulty. Nonetheless, by the
1920s  the  town  in  terms  of  its  Chaldean  population  was  considered
relatively  large  with  90  families  and  until  the  1960s  few difficulties  of
persecution or interference from the government were faced.72
The  local  Chaldean  relationship  with  the  Kurds  was,  however,
further  complicated  as  during  Iraqi  army  attacks  of  the  1960s–1970s
sympathies were expressed for the Kurdish attempts at  separatism which
appeared  to  segue  with  Assyrian  desires  for  political  autonomy.  This
sympathy extended in some cases to active support of the Kurds and as a
result during these decades twenty-three Chaldeans were executed for their
involvement in the rebellions.  From the parish records we can suggest a
decline in  the growth of  the Chaldean population – as  derived from the
number of baptisms – which was (relatively) substantial from 1978 with a
return to pre-1970s levels only coming by the mid-2000s. The area affected
72 As with Shaqlawa the village had an East Syriac presence in the fourteenth century
and was  brought  within  the  Chaldean  purview under  Yohannan  Hormizd  in  1779.
(Wilmshurst 2000, 168).
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by the successive wars and the difficulty of operating within the context of
Peshmerga-Iraqi army operations. That the population growth did not again
pick up after the imposition of the no-fly-zone on northern Iraq surprising
but  indicative  of  the  strength  of  the  pull  of  life  of  the  cities  of  Duhok,
Ankawa-Erbil  and  Sulaymaniya  for  Chaldeans  by  this  time.  During  the
1970s–1980s this also included moving to Baghdad or Kirkuk. 
A gradual return of the population took place after the 2003 invasion
but this was tempered by Armota not having been a particular focus for the
building  of  accommodation  and  instead  Qusanjaq  has  seen  more
development with apartment communes built for immigrants in 2004–2005.
Nevertheless,  there  was  some  feeling  of  distance  emotionally  from
Qusenjaq with those migrants who arrived in  fact  preferring to  move to
Armota. Indicating the link with the place in which one has familial links is
for  the  Chaldeans,  perhaps,  of  greater  import  than  being  provided  with
accommodation. As a result of forced displacement Armota has returned to a
level of population not seen since the 1920s what might be considered a
``traditional'' size of population with by 2013 95 families resident.
Qusenjaq has and had a somewhat smaller Chaldean population than
Armota with 60 families resident by the 1920s following their settlement in
the  nineteenth  century.73 The  population  appears  to  have  remained  at  a
similar  size  in  the  aftermath  of  the  massacres  as  300  Chaldeans  were
resident in 1912. (Chevalier 1985, 44; Wilmshurst 2000, 174) A population
shift  occurred  during  the  Kurdish  rebellions  with  half  the  population
estimated  to  have  moved  to  Mosul  during  the  1960s.  (Interview  with
Shaqlawan  parish  priest,  October  2013)  Such  a  proportional  change  in
population marking a turning point in the village's Chaldean presence with
only thirty-five families (c. 150 people) resident in 2013.
It is possible that population recovery to pre-1960s levels has still
not taken place due to the population's unwillingness to take advantage of
traditional local vocations around which life in the town was based in the
agricultural economy. The lure of a better material standard of living a great
draw to the cities and given the shift which the Kurdish wars had caused the
73 I am  unable to provide greater and more detailed context to the village as parish
records of baptisms and weddings were unavailable for years prior to 1938.
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under  development  of  the  rural  economy  became  a  lingering  problem
inhibiting a return to Qusenjaq and a loss of the skills necessary to be able to
return to working the land. 
It is quite common for northern Iraqi Christians to live and work in
agricultural  industries or related occupations in small towns and villages.
However, this is changing as they engage in areas of economic expansion
such as in IT and there remains a consistent effort to push for Chaldeans to
become members of the professions in accord with a view of what their
social status should be like. There having developed a view as a result of the
shift  of  the  population  to  southern  and  central  Iraqi  cities  during  the
twentieth century that this necessitated aspiring to a career as a physician,
engineer, dentist or academic.
This is a more general issue than that which just affects Qusenjaq.
That  many  achieved  such  positions  in  a  time  when  Iraq  was  relatively
flourishing (1940s–1970s) so it has been difficult to maintain expectations
of younger generations who desire to achieve the same. This has the knock
on effect of interrupting the Chaldean presence and leading to a decline in
Chaldean economic activity in Iraq as the choice for many is to leave the
country or at least move to Iraqi Kurdistan. I suggest that those who have
relocated from Baghdad can to an extent overwhelm the social make-up of
areas of Christian residence in northern Iraq. There being no quantitative
data to reflect this but from conversations and observations in and around
Ankawa,  for  example,  it  was  apparent  in  the  concentration  of  medical
surgeries  and the  offices  of  relevant  professions.  If  this  is  the  case  it  is
significant in the long term as it is unsustainable for all Chaldeans to attain
to professional status and/or an urban centred lifestyle when in reality the
majority  of  the  long-standing  Chaldean  population  in  northern  Iraq  has
always tended to come from lower social classes, residing in rural locations
and living agrarian lifestyles in  contrast.  It  would seem beholden on the
Chaldean  hierarchy  to  provide  further  encouragement  for  more  realistic
aspirations if they wish to ensure that Chaldean families can remain in Iraq
and  that  they  choose  to  do  so  because  there  are  sufficient  economic
prospects for their residency.
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Conclusion: Archdiocese of Erbil
The Archdiocese acts as a focal point of safety in the insulated world of
Iraqi  Kurdistan  set  apart  from  the  rest  of  Iraq  and  from  June  2014  a
particular  point  of  refuge  for  those  fleeing  attacks  by  Da'esh.  It  is
remarkable  that  one  archdiocese  has  been  faced  with  sustaining  the
Chaldeans as an ecclesial institution in some form in Iraq and has become
relied upon to secure the safety of a large proportion of those Chaldeans still
resident  in the country.  The advantages of being at  the heart  of Kurdish
political  and national  life  also providing a  greater  level  of  security  than
found  in  other  cities  with  it  implicitly  understood  among  Iraqi  and
international observers that Erbil's  security is  vital  to the maintenance of
stability in the region in the long term.
The protection which the Archdiocese offers is enmeshed with the
political stability of the KRG. However, this can detract from the particular
Iraqi  Chaldean  identity  which  developed  in  the  twentieth  century  and
around  which  the  Chaldean  Church  focused  its  ecclesiology  as  central
geographically and spiritually to the Iraqi state. Thus, with the distancing
from Iraq proper – in the Kurdish administered provinces – a new identity
expressed through desire for autonomy has in some instances grown among
the  laity  in  terms  of  Assyrian  nationalist  political  aspirations  and  a
disassociation from Iraqi national life.
Comparison can be drawn here with those Chaldean residents of the
Islamic Republic of Iran or the Syrian Arab Republic who whilst similar in
religion  and  ethnicity  have  become  separated  through  political  and
geographical constraints and aggregated their identity to the local regions in
which they have come to reside. In the instance of the Iraqi Chaldeans the
impermanence of the situation as of 2013 and awaiting the establishment of
full Kurdish independence undermining resilience to remain in the country.
The  Church's  ecclesiology  and  organisation  reflecting  the  new  political
order through reducing reliance on dioceses in Iraq proper and especially the
patriarchate.  Instead  Erbil  Archdiocese  meets  the  demands  of  the  local
Chaldean population whether through the construction of a new hospital,
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new accommodation for families and as noted above the consolidation of
the  Chaldean  seminary  to  the  city  and  outside  of  the  purview  of  the
patriarchal office and the patriarch's direction. The autonomy of the Kurds
in the structures of the Iraqi state mirrored to an extent in the autonomy of
the Erbil Archdiocese in the structure of the Chaldean Church.
Archdiocese of Kirkuk-Sulaymaniya
To July 2013 Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya were diocesan centres in their own
right with the joint archdiocese formed to consolidate available resources
given the Chaldean population's numerically minor size in Sulaymaniya.
Kirkuk's  Christian community can be dated earliest  to the second
century  following  the  arrival  of  a  bishop,  Theocritos,  who  was  fleeing
persecution at time when the city was still known as Bet Selok – a reference
to its use as a fortress by the Seleucid Empire – and constructed a church.
(Fiey OP 1968, III:20) As with Erbil the city was likely ripe for Christian
expansion as it was on a key east-west trade route and formed part of the
then Jewish led Kingdom of Adiabene. The ecclesial foundation in the city
eventually  grew  such  that  Kirkuk  was  the  metropolitan  see  of  the
ecclesiastical province of Bet Garmai74 from the early fifth century.
Kirkuk lost  its  ecclesial  prominence  from the  second half  of  the
ninth century. (Fiey OP 1968, III:42) The entire Church had from the third
decade of the ninth century been in a period of flux inhibiting attempts to
provide contiguous ecclesiastical administration: Timothy I had died in 823
after an over forty year period as patriarch – the following forty years would
see six patriarchs enthroned and two three year periods of sede vacante one
of which (850–853) saw the successive deaths of three of the patriarchs-
elect.  (Fiey  OP 1968,  III:38) Furthermore,  also  faced  with  the  Abbasid
caliph  al-Mutawakkil  (847–861) pursuing a  much more  restrictive  set  of
policies towards the non-Muslim residents of Mesopotamia whilst bands of
74 Bet Garmai was the fifth province in seniority of the five named ``Mesopotamian
provinces'' of the Church of the East affirmed at the 410 Synod of Isaac. The others in
order of seniority were Bet Huzaye, Nisibis, Perat d'Maisan and Adiabene (Wilmshurst
2011, 19–20)
                                                              193
marauders had pillaged much of the Mosul and Bet Garmai region in the
830s. The extent of the decline was such that Kirkuk lost its status as the
metropolitan see and was merged with the adjacent dioceses of Khanijar and
Shahrzur during the tenure of patriarch Sergius I (860–872). It appears that
Kirkuk continued to be at least a titular diocese into the fourteenth century
with it named jointly with the see of Daquq. (Fiey OP 1968, III:36–37 ff, 47,
62) Kirkuk returning to prominence, in a Chaldean context, from the 1550s
with  some  of  Yohannan  Sulaqa's  supporters  originating  from  the  city.
(Wilmshurst 2011, 163, 298)
It appears the first Chaldean ecclesiastical presence to Kirkuk was
established  in  1789  following  Yohanan  Hormizd's  successful  attempt  to
bring the majority of the town's East Syriac community into union with the
Holy See. (Fiey OP 1993, 64) However, a Chaldean see – if indeed one was
actually  established  at  this  juncture  –  was  not  physically  occupied  by  a
bishop  until  1826.  (Cf  Wilmshurst  2000,  175–176) The  years  between
creation and episcopal appointment being the period of intense political and
familial  rivalry  in  the  Chaldean  community  preceding  the  unification  of
Josephite and legitimist patriarchal lineages under Yohannan VIII Hormizd
in 1830. 
By  1913  the  archdiocesan  population  stood  at  5,840  Chaldeans
served  by  nine  parish  churches  with  the  geographical  remit  of  the
archdiocese extending north-westwards to Ankawa and incorporating those
towns  which  from  1968  were  part  of  Erbil  Archdiocese  i.e.  Shaqlawa,
Armota etc. (Wilmshurst 2011, 401; 2000, 175–176)
In  contrast  Sulaymaniya  is  a  modern  ecclesial  and geographical
creation. The city was established under the Kurdish Baban dynasty in 1784
who  dominated  north-eastern  Mesopotamia  from the  mid-seventeenth  to
mid-nineteenth centuries experiencing a great deal of autonomy from the
Ottoman and Safavid empires. (Behn 2011) This may have been a cause for
the development of the more independent spirit among the Sulaymaniyan
population set apart from Iraqi governing powers. Sulaymaniya is also one
of  the  least  Islamicised  of  all  Kurdish  cities.  The proximity  of  the  Shia
power in Persia-Iran possibly leading to the dilution of a militant expression
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of  Islam in  the  city  with  a  notably  plural  culture.  Until  the  1950s,  for
example, a significant minority of Jews were resident.  (Ben-Yaacob 2007,
304; Ben-Yaacob, Cohen, et al. 2007, 16) With the Jewish departure and the
creation of a social vacuum the Chaldeans take their place as the largest
non-Muslim population.  The primary Chaldean motivation for settling in
Sulaymaniya having been the expansion of the petroleum industry in close
proximity to the city from the 1940s–1970s and the diocese established in
1968 to response to  this.75 However,  the  diocese  only ever  received one
bishop until  its  merger with Kirkuk Archdiocese in 2013. Bishop Abdul-
Ahad Rabban OSH led the see 1982–1998 being preceded and succeeded by
priests who acted as apostolic administrators.76
Sulaymaniya's more recent history of the city has been challenging
for the population with the aftermath of the 1990/1991 Gulf War seeing the
city  besieged,  politically  independent,  occupied  and  eventually  granted
autonomous rule by Husain. This despite it being effectively separated from
the rest  of the Kurdish controlled Iraqi  territories through an Iraqi  army
blockade.  All  events  which  hampered  the  sustainability  of  the  urban
Chaldean population which could facilitate a far more amenable standard of
living either in Kirkuk (until 2003) and/or Erbil the next nearest large city
under  control  of  the  Kurds.  This  was  seen  in  the  subsistence  level  of
population which resided in the city in 1990 standing at 70 families which
dropped still further to 35 families by 2003. Nevertheless, as Sulaymaniya
recovered in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion and returned to a relative
level  of  economic  stability  the  Chaldean  population  stood  at  c.  1,200
persons (250 families) as of October 2013. However, the population still not
viewed  as  sufficiently  large  to  maintain  a  separate  diocese  and  giving
justification for merging it with the Archdiocese of Kirkuk in July of that
year. 
Unfortunately, baptismal, marriage and population figures were not
75 I have not been able to gain a clear awareness of the Chaldean population size for
that time. Anecdotal suggestions have put the total figure as c. 10,000 Chaldeans in and
around Sulaymaniya in 1968. However, AP figures are much lower – in the hundreds –
as can be seen in Table 6.
76 Fr Emmanuel Haddad (1976–1982); Abbot Yousif Ibrahim OAOC (1999–2006) and
Archimandrite Denha Hanna Toma OAOC (2006–2013)
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made available during fieldwork in Sulaymaniya and it was not made clear
as  to  the  wider  context  of  the  causes  of  this  situation  in  the  diocese.
However, several key figures were given during discussions with clergy – as
indicated above and below – which demonstrate the extended and intense
displacement of population.
Ecclesial organisation in Sulaymaniya
The Chaldean presence to Sulaymaniya grew only gradually and, it appears,
was not at the time of its foundation particularly attractive as a place of
residence with the first church – Mart Mariam – constructed in 1862 with by
1913 only 200 Chaldeans resident. (Wilmshurst 2000, 176) It is possible that
a draw of the city had been the relative security which the Baban dynasty
was able to provide and relative freedom from anti-Christian persecution
which was experienced by comparison with residents of the Nineveh plain
which in several instances in the latter half of the nineteenth century saw
direct attacks on the Christian residents. Mart Mariam continued in use until
2003 when it was damaged by fire. It is not known if any wider context can
be attached to this event but it seems unlikely given the lack of antagonism
towards Chaldeans from the Kurds in Sulaymaniya.  Subsequently,  a new
church – Mar Yusif – was used exclusively having been finished in 2001.
The ties to Mart Mariam remain strong, however, with it being used as a
shrine on a regular basis by the local residents.
The size of the new church – able to accommodate over 400 persons
comfortably – would appear to predispose its use by a far greater population
than that present in the city in the early 2000s. However, it has come into
more  active  use  with  the  consolidation  of  the  population  during  the
aftermath of the 2003 invasion. That being said the parish priest indicated
concern for the future of the Chaldean presence to the city specifically in
regard to the effects of secularist Western inspired culture upon the younger
members of his congregation. The draw of reducing religious identity and
expanding  a  more  laicised  outlook  permitting  greater  integration  into  a
milieu of  the  Kurds  and  wider  Middle  Eastern  society.  Also  for  those
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intending to migrate the desire to ``fit in'' to the new western societies in
which they often reside serves as impetus to avoid association with religion
in social contexts where religion has less and less role to play in public life.
It is notable that Chaldean identity is often more solidified within
areas which face greater threat of direct physical persecution and that the
safety net of a weaker Islamic  milieu lends itself to the infiltration of an
ambivalent attitude to the practice of religion. Notably, Sulaymaniya was the
only location in which such an attitude was evident during fieldwork. This
attitude difficult to counter in Sulaymaniya given only one priest is present
to minister to the entire Chaldean congregation. Even with the support of
nuns resident in the city who run an orphanage and encourage community
involvement it is a challenging apostolate. 
The unity of the Chaldean community in Sulaymaniya can neither be
taken for  granted which hinders further  the stability  which is  hoped for.
Over half the population are migrants who have either returned to the city of
their  family  origins  or  with  the  hope  of  taking  advantage  of  the  city's
political  stability.  This  has  led  to  some  friction  with  long  standing  city
residents  and  has  only  been  resolved  gradually  due  to  ten  ``mixed''
marriages. Showing the difficulties with which Chaldean migrants'  social
integration  is  faced.  Remembering  that  despite  religious  similarities
bringing  Chaldeans  together  that  human,  political,  social  and  economic
differences remain regardless of circumstances.
We  would  be  wrong  to  regard  Sulayamaniya's  Chaldeans  as  a
forgotten group but they appear to struggle for recognition of the particular
issues with which they are faced: relative geographical isolation to Kirkuk
in  the  south  and  Erbil  to  the  west;  the  growth  of  religious  indifference
among the community and the lack of formalised episcopal oversight. Issues
which are difficult to respond to in a creative manner or with the support of
former residents as the Sulaymaniyan Chaldeans and their culture have been
dispersed throughout  Iraq and the  diaspora abroad.  Indeed of  those who
travelled  to  the  city  having  previously  been  resident  in  key  centres  of
Chaldean  cultural  and  social  life  such  as  Baghdad  or  Mosul  and  its
surrounds  greater  onward  travel  has  been  registered  with  fifty  percent
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estimated to have left Sulaymaniya following their arrival.77 The dissipation
of the community has, however, slowed to some extent since 2003 and is
evidenced in the few families who left the city to go abroad during 2011–
2013  with  only  seven  to  eight  on  average  stated  as  having  departed.
(Interview, parish priest, Sulaymaniya, October 2013) 
Archdiocese of Kirkuk
The twentieth century  history  of  the Chaldean Archdiocese of  Kirkuk is
intrinsically  tied  to  the  development  of  the  city  as  one  of  the  major  oil
producing  hubs  of  Iraq.  The  city  also  a  key  focus  of  Kurdish  political
aspirations with hopes for its integration into a future Kurdish state and a
point of strategic focus during the Iran-Iraq War.
Chaldean  aggregation  to  the  city  came  as  part  of  the  communal
migration  to  Iraqi  cities  from  the  1930s  and  the  desire  to  utilise  those
vocational skills which they held in proportionately greater quantities than
many Arab Muslim and Kurds. Nevertheless, we should not overestimate
the Chaldean influence to Kirkuk but recognise it for what it was: a key part
of a multi-religious population in which all were seeking to assert the best
possible  position  for  their  community.  Such  a  process  of  integration
complicated by the Arabisation policies which were pursued by successive
Iraqi governments this  with a view to undermining Kurdish political and
economic claims to the city.
The Chaldean position in this context was to follow the path of least
resistance in terms of ethnic identity in order to ensure they could maintain
their  religious and social freedom in the city an issue which come to be
acute under Saddam Husain because Arab national identity for all Iraqis was
the basis of a political paradigm.78 During the Husain era Kirkuki Chaldeans
were  discouraged  from pursuing an  Assyrian  identity  or  any other  apart
from Arab. The level of adherence to this identity unclear on a person-by-
77 300 families migrated/moved from Mosul and Baghdad, only 150 remained.
78 We do well to note the third ``ethnic'' presence to Kirkuk – the Turcoman population
which ensured that until at least the mid-twentieth century Turkish dialects were 
common in the city.
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person basis but from 2003 Arab ethnic identity began to be discarded in
favour of Chaldo-Assyrian. It is not clear how widely supported this was in
Kirkuk but we may suggest it proved popular because of the re-emergence
of  attachment  to  particular  national/ethnic  groupings  which  had  been
forbidden  for  such  a  length  of  time  i.e.  Turkmen,  Kurdish  etc.  (This
paragraph  derived  from  discussions  with  Chaldean  Kirkuki  migrants  to
Ankawa, October 2013)
Kirkuki Chaldean population
Fiey noted the numerical decline of Kirkuki Chaldeans to the early twentieth
century and as to how the population was holding on to the heritage of the
East Syriac tradition: 
`Un maximum de mille Chaldéens survivra dans tout le B. Garmaï en 1914, petit reste
de la grande cinquième province de l'Église syrienne orientale, mais aussi levain pour
un avenir meilleur dont nous voyons déjà les commencements.' (Fiey OP 1968, III:145)
The  earliest  estimate  for  the  twentieth  century  is  for  1913  with  800
Chaldeans in Kirkuk at which time the city had the third largest Chaldean
population in the Archdiocese behind Ankawa (3,000) and Shaqlawa (1,200)
with a total  population of 5,840.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 176) The population
presumably  grew  in  Kirkuk  following  migration  post-massacres  and
assimilation to the Chaldean community by members of the Church of the
East with the next estimate for the entire  Archdiocese given as 7,620 in
1937.79 (Wilmshurst  2011,  445) Such  was  the  perceived  need  to  aid  in
consolidating the city's  Chaldean population over  the next  decade  that  a
substantial new church was built in 1949 – St Joseph's – which remained in
use until the 2003 invasion, was subsequently refurbished and reopened in
79 That Kirkuk and not Erbil had been named the chief city of the Archdiocese was
due to historical precedent in ecclesial organisation but also likely due to the Ottoman
administrative  organisation  in  north-eastern  Mesopotamia  in  which  Kirkuk was  the
administrative  centre  of  the  ayalet  of  Sulaymaniya  and  because  at  the  time  of  its
establishment  the Chaldean  population of  Erbil  was  relatively small.  (Kramers and
Bois 1986)
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2014. (Cf Fiey OP 1968, III:49)
According to  the  Iraqi  national  census  of  1957 1,509 persons  of
Syriac ethnicity were present in the city. (Anderson and Stansfield 2009, 43)
This should perhaps not be viewed as indicative of the Chaldean population
who by that time were asserting an Arabic linguistic and ethnic identity.
Furthermore, the number seems somewhat low given the development of the
petroleum industry in the area and that the  Annuario Pontificio  gives the
total  Chaldean  population  of  the  Archdiocese  as  9,000  in  1949.  If  the
proportion of the diocesan population resident in Kirkuk remained similar to
that  from  earlier  eras  it  seems  likely  the  Chaldean  population  almost
certainly rose in real terms. Nonetheless, we must note also the countrywide
migration of Chaldeans to Baghdad which had increased in the intervening
period and may have caused a drop in population.
Anecdotal estimates gained during fieldwork suggests an increase in
population to c. 10,000 Christians by the time of Husain's rise to power in
1979. This may have declined during the Iran-Iraq War as was suggested
above in the discussions of Erbil's change in population size. Nevertheless,
and  again  based  on  anecdotal  evidence  the  population  appears  to  have
rebounded to c. 10,000 Christians (of all denominations) after the end of the
war  and  remained  about  this  size  until  2003.  As  of  2013  the  Christian
population was broken down as:
• 1,500 Chaldean families
• 300 Church of the East families
• 100 Armenian families 80
A total Christian population of c. 7,500 people out of a total population of c.
750,000.
The  level  of  violence  which  Chaldeans  have  faced  in  Kirkuk  is
substantially lower than in Mosul or Baghdad but no less consistent in its
long term effects upon the population. It might be thought that the level of
80 These figures and from the preceding paragraph come from information provided
by Chaldean migrants from Kirkuk who, as of October 2013, were resident in Ankawa.
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sectarian  division  is  not  as  strong  in  Kirkuk  because  of  its  historical
plurality but  because of the loss of an overriding sense of Iraqi national
unity. Since 2003 the spread of more intense inter-communal relations has
become a  concern  given the  competing  claims of  Turkomen,  Kurds  and
Arabs for control of the city.
During the period 2003–2013 the Cathedral of the Sacred Heart was
the focus of Chaldean life in the city with five other active parishes. (‘Msgr
Yousif Mirkis, OP Speaks on the Chaldean Church’ 2014) The Cathedral
had faced a bomb attack in September 2012 but this did not cause major
damage, more it would seem in an attempt to reawaken an atmosphere of
fear in the city which despite a number of attacks since 2003 had seen signs
of consolidating the Chaldean presence with a new church dedicated to St
Paul  opened  in  2011  to  meet  the  needs  of  migrant  Chaldeans  who  had
moved to the city. (Al Arabiya News 2011)
The Chaldean presence to the city was strengthened through Louis
Sako's appointment as Archbishop of Kirkuk from 2002–2013.81 During his
Kirkuki apostolate Sako ensured that the Chaldean voice was represented in
local society and attempted to provide an ideal type of Chaldean presence in
a post-war Iraqi environment. Sako's efforts aided due to the greater societal
plurality of Kirkuk; his openness to engagement with Muslims and of the
need to link the current situation of the Chaldeans to the historic traditions
of the East Syriac community.
Sako was cognisant of the subtle differences which the Chaldeans
present  to  and  in  Iraq  society  and  as  to  why  these  differences  are  of
importance.  He  noted  in  a  2012  interview  that  the  Chaldean  Church
```which,  having  never  been  a  State  Church,  carries  a  rich  memory  of
interaction with Islam and openness towards the East, from Iran to China'' '
(Agenzia  Fides 2012) This  point  highlights  the  integral  nature  of  the
Chaldeans to Iraq and that the Chaldeans in principle retain no ideological
pretensions of prior associations with particular political systems and that
the  East  Syriac  tradition  should  be  a  normative  partner  with  Muslim
81 Sako born in Zakho in 1948 trained for the priesthood at the seminary of St John in
Mosul and was ordained priest for Mosul Archdiocese in 1974. Prior to his appointment to
Kirkuk he had been Rector of St Peter's Seminary, Baghdad for five years.
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residents  of  Iraq  having  incarnated  its  presence  in  Mesopotamia  in  the
context of predominantly Islamic societies since the seventh century. Such
annunciation of the East Syriac societal position can be lost in the context of
substantial civil conflict and the coercive power which violence grants to
whoever wields it. 
Sako's efforts to sustain engagements with the Muslim communities
a practical concession driven by the need to act as a persistent reminder of
the Chaldean presence – for if Chaldeans do not formulate publicly their
status in Iraq there is no other group which will be inclined to annunciate
their  integral  importance  to  the  country.  Sako's  most  practical
encouragement to incarnating a Chaldean engagement with the surrounding
Islamic  culture  came  with  an  invitation  to  Fr  Paolo  Dall'Oglio  SJ  to
establish a religious community in Sulaymaniya modelled on that of Deir
Mar Musa, near Nabk in Syria. Dall'Oglio had for many years encouraged
the  extension  of  Christian  pastoral  and  spiritual  hospitality  to  Syrian
Muslims. The extension of such a religious experiment to Iraq something
which perhaps other Chaldean bishops would have struggled to comprehend
or  cope  with  in  their  jurisdictions  especially  following  Dall'Oglio's
expulsion from Syria by the government owing to his perceived proximity
to  members  of  the  Syrian  opposition.  Nevertheless,  it  appears  Sako's
invitation  was  presupposed  by  the  necessity  of  radical  engagement  with
Islam and  the  desire  to  pursue  alternative  practical  means  for  resolving
societal  conflicts:  the  desire  to  put  into  practice  Christian  precepts  of
reconciliation even in extremely difficult situations.
Christian  culture  also  continued  to  be  exposed  to  the  wider
community of Kirkuk with for example the 1600th anniversary celebrations
in  2009  of  the  martyrs  in  Bet  Selok  in  409  under  the  Sasanians.  Sako
choosing to celebrate such an occasion an astute choice given the lack of
connotations of Islamic persecution from which other martyrdoms had been
caused. (Asianews.it 2009b) Yet at the same time bringing with it a sense of
the permanence of the Chaldean community to the city and a reminder to the
Muslim communities of the precedence for East Syriac Christian presence
and  their  capabilities  to  survive  in  spite  of  a  sustained  atmosphere  of
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cultural tension, legal and physical persecution.
Kirkuki ecclesial influence on the Chaldeans of Sulaymaniya
The extent of Chaldean Kirkuki control over Sulaymaniya was not clearly
evident at the time of fieldwork in Sulaymaniya in October 2013. This in
large  part  due  to  the  vacancy  of  the  see  for  just  under  a  year  between
January 2013–January 2014 until the appointment of Yousif Thomas Mirkis
OP as the new archbishop.82 The situation should take on more structure and
in harmony with the plans of the Chaldean community overall as a result
given the merging of the dioceses in July 2013 when the see was vacant.
Although this is dependant on the capability of the Chaldeans to recover
from  difficulties  arising  subsequent  to  the  de  facto destruction  of  the
dioceses of Alqosh and Mosul from June 2014. A longer and lasting trend
may  also  be  the  implications  for  the  Chaldeans  in  the  context  of
Sulaymaniya's  historical  irrelevance  to  the  development  of  Chaldean
ecclesiology or culture in general until the 1960s and subsequent difficulties
in  fully  incorporating  it  into  mainstream  Chaldean  ecclesial  life.  If  we
consider that it was only from 1982 that a bishop was actually installed in
the diocese we can comprehend why stagnation of the management of the
diocese may have occurred.
In the wider context of Chaldean influence in Iraqi Kurdish society
there is a key rôle to play in Sulaymaniyan life. The Chaldeans are the only
permanent  ecclesial  presence  in  the  city  and  as  such  whether  explicitly
welcomed or not are obliged to give example of Christian life well lived and
the bonus or onus of being the link with the local Kurdish governor for
Christian social and political concerns. An issue which may be complicated
by the merging of the diocese with that of Kirkuk. The Archdiocese head-
quartered in Kirkuk and thus beyond formal Kurdish political influence or
control.
82 Mirkis is a contemporary of Louis Sako: born a year after Sako in 1949 in Mosul,
studying at St John's seminary in Mosul and superior of the Dominican community in
Baghdad during Sako's time as rector of St Peter's seminary. These links likely causes
for Mirkis' appointment as Sako's successor in Kirkuk.
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Dioceses of Zakho-Amadiya and Akra
The  northern  and  north-western  regions  of  Mesopotamia  in  which  the
Zakho-Amadiya  and  Akra  dioceses  are  located  became  a  focus  of  very
active Chaldean life from the late-eighteenth century and battlegrounds for
control by the competing East Syriac patriarchates. These regions had been
long  associated  with  the  East  Syriac  tradition:  Akra,  for  example,  had
previously  been  part  of  the  Diocese  of  Marga  with  Thomas  of  Marga
recording the ecclesial life especially of the monasteries to the area as of the
ninth century in his work  The Book of the Governors.  (Wilmshurst 2000,
125) Nonetheless, there is little available assessment or written evidence of
activity during the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries and it is only with the
establishment  of  the Sulaqite  line of  patriarchs  and competing claims to
jurisdiction of East Syriac dioceses that we once again become definitively
aware  of  the  Christian  presence  across  these  far  northern  regions  of
Mesopotamia. (Wilmshurst 2000, 125, 128; Cf Budge 1893, II:296–297)
Diocese of Akra
The Chaldean see of Akra originated in the nineteenth century as a result of
attempts by Yohannan VIII Hormizd to consolidate his position as patriarch
and his family's prominence in the church hierarchy. Hormizd appointed one
of his nephews as the first Chaldean bishop of Akra in 1834 as part of an
attempt to assert his authority over a region in which the Christian residents
largely  supported  those  attached  to  the  traditionalist  Sulaqite  patriarchal
line.  (Wilmshurst  2000,  153) The  first  bishop  appointed  with  the
acquiescence of the Holy See and apart from accusations of nepotism was
Eliya Sefaro (1852–1854), subsequently,  the diocese became infamous as
being  led  by  Yohannan  Elias  Mellus  (1864–1889)  who  later  led  the
eponymous  schism  of  the  1870s  caused  by  the  development  of  an
independent line of clergy to serve the Malabarese East Syriacs.83 Despite
these circumstances the diocese had stabilised by the turn of the century and
83 Mellus was resident in India 1874–1882.
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was consolidated under the leadership of Bishop Yacoub Yohannan Sahhar
(1893–1909). (Wilmshurst 2000, 153)
The town of Akra, like Zakho and Amadiya, served as garrisons for
the  Ottomans  and  had  a  numerically  minor  Christian  population  of
Chaldeans and Syrian Orthodox totalling 250 of the 4,700 residents in the
late  nineteenth century.  In  1913 the entire  Chaldean diocesan population
was estimated at  2,390 people across nineteen villages served by sixteen
priests and ten churches. (Pétridès 1907; Wilmshurst 2011, 351) For a time
Akra was united with the diocese of Amadiya (1895–1909) but they were
later separated and from 1909–1947 Akra was administered by a patriarchal
vicar. Akra diocese presumably not retaining a Chaldean population which
would ordinarily  be suitable  for  episcopal  oversight.  More contemporary
data on population size emerges from 1958 in the Annuario Pontifico which
has figures available from 1958–2012.84
From 1947 the diocese had stable leadership until 1998 with one of
its bishops, the future patriarch Paul II Cheikho, leading the diocese (1947–
1957).85 Cheikho's previous experience of the diocese perhaps a reason for
his ordering the expansion of the cathedral in Akra in the 1960s and this
despite the relatively small number of Chaldeans then resident in the town:
only around 250 in 1961. (Fiey OP 1965a, I:265–266) In 1958 at the end of
Cheikho's episcopal tenure the diocesan population stood at 1,636 but by
1970  this  had  dropped  to  550.  Why  the  diocese  was  not  formally
amalgamated  with  another  bordering  it  is  unclear:  it  is  possible  the
continued political instability in the region prohibited considerations of re-
organising  ecclesial  structures  or  that  it  was  desirable  to  retain  an
appearance of ecclesial strength in the region. The lack of data for the period
1913–1958 inhibits our critiquing Cheikho's pastoral oversight but given the
cathedral's  re-construction  we  may  suppose  he  had  consolidated  the
Chaldean  community  with,  for  the  first  time  in  forty  years,  permanent
episcopal  direction.  The  population  decline  after  Cheikho  might  be
accounted for by the contemporaneous Iraqi army pacification of Kurdish
84  See Table 7 and <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/diocese/daqra.html> 
85 The other bishops were André Sana (1957–1977) and Abdul Ahad Rabban OAOC
(1980–1998).
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rebels  and  the  general  trend  for  Chaldean  urbanisation  in  Iraq.  Yet,  the
Annuario Pontifico figures for total  population of Akra diocese (Catholic
and non-Catholic)  show a nearly trebling of persons in the region (1958
32,723; 1970 85,000). The Chaldean departure for urban areas perhaps then
expedited by the effects of losing their stake in the local social order. The
Chaldean Akran population continued to decline from 1970–1990 – briefly
increasing during the Gulf War – and then again from 2000 onwards and as
of 2012 reached 1,190. In the ecclesiastical organisation as a whole and on a
purely numerical basis Akra has not in the modern era held importance but
its continued operation suggests it holds some ecclesiological significance to
and among the Chaldean community. 
As  of  2013 the  remaining centres  of  population  were  Akra  itself
(fifty  families)  with  the  rest  of  the  population  split  between  two  other
villages (c. 120 families). (Senior cleric of Erbil Archdiocese, October 2013)
One of these, Hezarjot, is a relatively new settlement established following
the displacement of the Church of the East population during the First World
War.  (Wilmshurst  2011, 437) As the total  population of the diocese thus
amounts  to  less than c.  1,000 persons it  is  a  diocese in  name only in  a
modern ecclesial context. Nonetheless, we should recall that this matches
the style of governance historically used in the East Syriac community with
a lack of communications infrastructure and a more insular focus of rural
life requiring sufficient local clergy to deal with matters arising with the
hierarchy doubling as the civil power on a de facto basis in such relatively
remote areas. 
It is possible that in the Iraqi context since 2003 and increased levels
of persecution that attempts to alter Chaldean ecclesial organisation may be
perceived as a sign of weakness whether by the persecutors, non-Christian
Iraqis in general or among the Chaldean community itself. Such perceptions
can lead to ecclesiological change because they can re-define the way in
which the community as a whole responds to physical threat. Nevertheless,
it  would  appear  to  be  from  the  point  of  view  of  ecclesial  organisation
sensible  for  the Akra diocese to  be formally subsumed into Erbil  whose
archbishop has current responsibility for the community.
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Zakho-Amadiya ecclesial history
The geographical region now largely covered by the Chaldean diocese of
Zakho-Amadiya and the East Syriac communities resident there had to the
late thirteenth century been within the jurisdiction of the dioceses of Bet
Nuhadra or Bet Dasen and Ture. Both dioceses had been named suffragan
sees of the Metropolitan of Adiabene at the 410 Synod of Isaac from which
time they were occupied to at least the mid-thirteenth century with the last
known Bishop of Bet Dasen, Mattai, present at the consecration of patriarch
Yahballah  III  in  1281.  (Wilmshurst  2000,  125;  Cf  Budge  1893,  II:296–
297)86
During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there were no known
bishops for either Bet Dasen or Bet Nuhadra. With the revivification of East
Syriac  life  especially  from the  sixteenth  century  we  find  the  Amadiyan
communities largely loyal to the legitimist patriarchal line with Yohannan
Sulaqa having been killed for his attempts to gain the affiliation of the East
Syriacs of Amadiya in 1555. Owing to the concentration of East Syriacs and
the ecclesial dependency of Amadiya on Alqosh the legitimist patriarchal
line  competed  with  the  Sulaqites  for  control  of  the  region  and  in  1784
legitimist  patriarch  Elias  XIII  Ishoyab  consecrated  one  his  nephews,
Hnanisho, as bishop of Amadiya. (Wilmshurst 2000, 128)
There had been some earlier  success for the Chaldeans with East
Syriac residents of Duhok persuaded of the benefits of union with the Holy
See  from the  seventeenth  century  but  it  was  only  from the  1780s  that
concerted efforts were made to gain East Syriac loyalty more widely in the
Amadiyan region with a Chaldean ecclesial structure established in 1785.
(Cf  Wilmshurst  2000,  125) The  town  of  Amadiya  and  the  village  of
Mangesh emerging as principle centres of Chaldean activity.  (Wilmshurst
2000, 134) The historical existence of a strong monastic presence to the area
presumably gave it an impression of significance to the Latin missionaries
and its relative proximity to Mosul where the Dominicans were based made
86 The Amadiyan region in ecclesiastical terms also included the diocese of Marga
which is largely contemporaneous with the present Chaldean diocese of Akra.
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it an attractive focus for expanding evangelisation.  (Cf Wilmshurst 2000,
125) There  was  perhaps  a  desire  for  the  reinvigoration  of  East  Syriac
monasticism – which appeared a very real  possibility  in light of Gabriel
Dembo's project at Rabban Hormizd from 1808. To the fourteenth century at
least five major monastic centres were active in the region but by the early
seventeenth century only one was still in operation. (Wilmshurst 2000, 132)
The  emerging  leadership  of  Yohannan  Hormizd  as  a  potential
patriarchal successor for the Chaldeans and competition with Hnanisho for
control of the Amadiya region formed a major aspect of local ecclesiastical
life to Hnanisho's death in 1813.87
The competition between East Syriac leaders Elias XIII; Hnanisho;
Yohannan Hormizd; Augustine Hindi – titularly Patriarch Joseph V – and
Gabriel Dembo from the 1780s–1820s seemingly a severe barrier to gaining
the sympathy of the Holy See and the Latin missionaries.88 With Amadiyan
residents caught in the middle of these events it seems likely there existed a
strong  awareness  of  the  instability  pertaining  to  the  leadership  of  the
community,  a  fluctuating sense of  Chaldean identity  and to  the sense of
purpose of the patriarchal office. With no one clear patriarchal leader of the
East Syriac communities from the death of Elias XIII in 1804 to Yohannan's
patriarchal appointment in 1830 to what would East Syriacs be converting
or switching their ecclesial affiliation? That the ecclesial functioning of the
communities continued testament to the subsidiarity of action among the
East Syriacs in the operation of their affairs and I suggest a lack of concern
as to jurisdictional boundaries as borders between Chaldean, legitimist or
87 Yohannan as Metropolitan of Mosul consecrated one of his own nephews as bishop
of Amadiya in 1790 as a rival to Hnanisho who was then still also the legitimist bishop
of Amadiya. It seems Yohannan's nephew was in a far more influential position than
that of Hnanisho with the support of the Latin missionaries a decisive factor in his
favour and led to his gaining the affiliation of the East Syriacs in the Sapna valley and
Zibar district (eastern Amadiya). (Wilmshurst 2000, 128)
88 The competing East Syriac patriarchal lines, the patronage from the Ottomans, the
Latin  missionaries  and  the  Holy  See  in  such  a  relatively  small  geographical  area
comparable with the factionalism present in the Ukrainian Orthodox community which
to  the  present  has  three  main  patriarchal  lines  claiming  the  heritage  of  the
Metropolitanate of Kiev established in the tenth century. The Latin influence of strong
missionary activity and the adherence of some residents in the Ukraine region to a
Russian led church and the historical influence of the Russian monarchy's patronage in
the  region  similar  to  the  role  of  Ottoman  and  non-native  religious  and  temporal
administrators facilitating the rise of one or other East Syriac factions.
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Sulaqite communities. An overarching sense of East Syriac identity broadly
prevailing among community members still at this time with loyalty to one
faction not  necessarily  implying an exclusive relationship with it  and its
clergy. 
Amadiya's  history,  then,  strongly linked to  the Chaldean Church's
foundation and its status and significance in the ecclesial order never higher
than during this era. The competition between the Church of the East and
the Chaldeans for control of the East Syriac populations in the area only saw
an  end in  the  aftermath  of  the  massacres  of  the  First  World  War  when
displaced members of the Church of the East from Asia Minor migrated to
northern  Mesopotamia  and  assumed  membership  of  the  Chaldean
community due to a shortage of their own church infrastructure and clergy.
An attraction  of  Amadiya  town itself  to  new residents  was its  historical
reputation and geographic location as a key point of economic exchange
between  the  Kurds  of  the  highland  regions  and  the  merchants  of
Mesopotamia-Iraq proper. (Streck 1913, 324)
A Chaldean episcopal presence to the Zakho region was established
in the 1830s and consolidated in 1851 through the aggregation of villages
which had been within the remit of the neighbouring dioceses of Gazarta
and Amadiya.  The creation of Zakho diocese likely with the intention to
limit the remaining influence of legitimist clergy opposed to the Chaldean
project. The appointment of new bishops to a region or the formation of new
dioceses was a traditional  means to  influence the local communities  and
practically  extend  administrative  control.  In  the  period  1569–1596,  for
example, the legitimist line had at least two bishops appointed for Gazarta
as the Sulaqite patriarchs had established their own see of Gazarta in 1554.
(Wilmshurst 2000, 102–103)
Gazarta had been an active see from at least the fourth century only
undergoing an apparently inactive era from the mid-fourteenth to the late
fifteenth century from which time it was extant to 1918. (Wilmshurst 2000,
101) The credibility of clerical claims to hold influence with the civil power
were to an extent reliant on a willingness to support structures which at least
gave an appearance of communal strength which was in part why Chaldean
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influence to Gazarta was titularly at least present from the formation of the
Sulaqite  Chaldean  hierarchy.(Wilmshurst  2000,  102) In  the  context  of
Ottoman  administration  the  need to  affirm a  reputation  as  the  true East
Syriac community was vital. However, Chaldean influence to the Gazarta
region was undermined by the traditionalist patriarchal line which promoted
a more active apostolate among its local clergy for much of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries.  Only the early nineteenth century resolution of
Chaldean  patriarchal  leadership  led  to  comprehensive  efforts  to  induce
conversions which proceeded very effectively and by the immediate pre-
First World War era remaining influence of the Church of the East (through
the  Sulaqite  line)  was  nearly  nil  with  the  newly  established  Chaldean
dioceses and attendant missionary led education programs proving attractive
to many East Syriacs. (Wilmshurst 2000, 102–106)
Following  its  initial  Chaldean  establishment  Zakho  diocese  was
combined with those of Akra and Amadiya until  the 1850s. Zakho again
became an independent diocese from 1851 but a bishop, Basil Asmar, was
only appointed from 1859.  (Fiey  OP 1993,  93) As with  Amadiya  in  the
aftermath of the massacres, the diocese held significance for bordering the
new state of Turkey and in close proximity to the former dioceses of Gazarta
and Seert became a point of entry into Iraq for East Syriac refugees. The
diocese declined in ecclesial significance over the course of the twentieth
century with the movement of Chaldeans southwards or abroad yet by way
of comparison since the establishment of the modern state of Iraq, the city
of Zakho has been a key strategic position being less than thirty kilometres
from both the Syrian and Turkish borders.  The diocese was in difficulty
from the 1960s–2000s due to incidents of persecution from the Kurds, Iraqi
republican governments and during the rule of Saddam Husain all of which
greatly interrupted religious life. 
Zakho was  an  occupied  see  from 1859–1987 with  no  gap in  the
episcopal  succession  longer  than  three  years.  However,  at  the  death  of
Stephen Kajo in  1987 Zakho did not  receive another  bishop until  2001.
Given  the  proximity  of  Amadiya  diocese  and  its  bishop,  Hanna  Kello
(1973–2001)  it  appears  that  he  took  on  responsibility  for  both  dioceses
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which is supported by the fact that on his death new bishops were appointed
for  both  Zakho  and  Amadiya:  Hanna  Issa  al-Harboli  (2001–2010)  and
Rabban al-Qas (2001– ) respectively. Further ecclesial reform taking place
in July 2013 when the dioceses were again united this time officially and
under al-Qas' leadership.
During the period 1987–2001 it is possible that the urbanisation of
Iraqi  life  and  Chaldean  migration  proved  an  inhibiting  factor  to  the
patriarchal focus for Chaldeans north of Mosul with – it seems – only events
from 2003 ensuring that a re-awakening of comprehensive concern for the
northern  dioceses  occurred.  Be  that  as  it  may  the  Chaldean  leadership's
response was difficult to formulate or implement given that Iraqi Kurdistan
was  faced  with  intermittent  conflict  and  the  disruption  of  normal  social
interactions for months at a time. The northern dioceses to an extent reliant
on self-sufficiency owing to this relative isolation. 
Perhaps it should be queried as to what extent the long term effects
of conflict and geographical distance from Mosul and Baghdad have had
upon each of the dioceses? It is notable, for example, that none of Zakho's
bishops  have  ever  gone  on  to  attain  senior  postings  in  the  Chaldean
hierarchy  –  such  as  Archbishop  of  Mosul  or  as  an  auxiliary  bishop  in
Baghdad – and yet this is in contrast to the bishops who were appointed to
Amadiya of which at some point three patriarchs had been the contemporary
bishop.89
Zakho's diocesan population has remained substantially larger than
Amadiya's at least since the 1950s and as table 8 from AP figures indicates
the Amadiyan population has been four or more times smaller than that in
Zakho. 
These figures provide some evidence of the dioceses' remarkably 
changing fortunes and the particularly strong effects of the Kurdish rebellion
in its geographical remit. I suggest the sharp decline from 1970–1980 only 
increasing as a result of the migrations post-Gulf War. These figures ought 
89 They were and their years in office in Amadiya: Joseph Audo (1833–1848); Georges
Ebed-Jesu Khayyath (1860–1879) and Raphael Bidawid (1957–1966). Bashar Warda
CSsR was briefly appointed apostolic administrator of Zakho (2012–2013), however,
he had already been consecrated Archbishop of Erbil by this time.
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also to be seen in context of our own research data of baptismal and 
marriage records for the Diocese of Amadiya. These support the latter trend 
in the AP figures for a restoration of growth from 1996. The earlier years 
1959–1970 according to the AP saw a growth in population whereas the 
lacuna in our data leaves us little conclusion to draw other than that it is 
possible that the 1960s saw overall population stability and that although 
violent incidents occurred they were not uniform to the area and that in fact 
the 1970s was a far more disruptive decade. The lacuna in the figures for 
1963–1969 should not be overstated for it could indicate merely the 
particular filing cabinet in which records were kept was in a fire or similar 
incident. Yet that every other year has been collected even during times of 
political and social turmoil suggests more than one incident prohibited the 
collection of data.90
Zakho-Amadiya ecclesial organisation
As with Kirkuk-Sulaymaniya the diocese of Zakho-Amadiya was formed as
a  merger  in  July  2013.  Despite  this  re-organisation  a  separate  diocesan
identity  was  still  apparent  in  the  two  zones  of  ecclesial  activity  during
fieldwork  with  it  presumably  taking  some  time  for  the  clergy  and
communities  of  Zakho to  be  reconciled  to  rule  from Amadiya.  Such an
identity  perhaps  related  to  the  extended  period  of  formal  ecclesial  self-
sufficiency which the Chaldeans of Zakho diocese have experienced.
Zakho  diocese  centres  around  the  city  of  the  same  name  whilst
Amadiya has its administrative centre in the city of Duhok an arrangement
retained under the Zakho-Amadiyan ecclesiastical structure. The diocesan
population  is  spread  across  twenty-seven  villages  in  this  north-western
region of Iraq with 400 Chaldean families resident in Zakho (city) as of
2013 and c. 500 in the city of Duhok as of 2012.91
The cities are far from Chaldean or Christian majority centres with
90 I do query the collection process of the  AP figures which appear to suggest often
estimations as opposed to an attempt at a census. Indeed, the appearance of just under
6,000 people between 2001–2002 and the disappearance of c. 13,000 between 2009–
2010 is questionable as to exactitude. Nonetheless, the figures do reflect the trend for
very large population movements which Chaldean residents of northern Iraq have faced
during the twentieth century and the proportional size of diocesan populations.
91 See tables 9 and 10. Wherever possible I have localised these villages in Map 5.
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residents mostly Sunni Kurds.92 Such a scenario akin to the situation for the
Chaldeans of Ankawa. However, the more explicitly Sunni cultural views of
the  local  Kurds  have  seen  cases  of  anti-Christian  activity  especially  in
Zakho. In 2011 following inflammatory sermons by local Muslim leaders
groups of young men attacked Christian businesses with the suggested basis
of the attacks being the widespread sale of alcohol by Christian merchants.
The  riots  lasted  for  four  days  with  attacks  spreading  throughout  Iraqi
Kurdistan  as  far  east  as  Sulaymaniya.  Whilst  the  KRG  took  a  strong
approach to restoring law and order and arrested the purported ring leaders
it seems that Islamic inspired violence can be easily stoked when desired by
unscrupulous leaders and adds a dimension to Chaldean life which is far less
commonly experienced in more secure settings such as Ankawa. 
Unlike most of the other Chaldean dioceses worldwide the current
bishop of Zakho-Amadiya does not reside in either of the towns related to
the name of the diocese. Nevertheless, the movement of the bishop from
Amadiya was not without precedent as he, when Amadiya, Zakho and Akra
were a united diocese in the nineteenth century, would alternate residence in
these  locations.  Residence  has  been  subsequently  transferred  to  Duhok
which, as with Erbil, is a centre of Kurdish political and economic power
with greater resources available supporting the running of a modern diocese
and  increased  opportunity  to  impress  the  Chaldean  presence  into  Iraqi
Kurdish society. This evidenced in the work of the contemporary bishop,
Rabban  al-Qas,  whose  primary  and  secondary  school  complex  is  highly
regarded by the local Kurdish population and seen as a marker for what can
be  achieved  by  the  Chaldeans  if  such  efforts  are  conducted  in  an
environment relatively open to public manifestations of Christian works. It
was notable during fieldwork that such an atmosphere to Duhok ensured
that  the  city  was  affirmed  along  with  Ankawa  as  a  preferred  place  of
residence in Iraqi Kurdistan by Chaldeans. Such level of Christian culture
further evidenced by the presence of a Syriac publishing house in the city
which offers support to the building up of a Christian culture. 
A senior  cleric in the diocese noted that the working relationship
92 Duhok's population is 300,000 and Zakho's 350,000.
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with  local  administrators  is  characterised  in  his  words  as  `they  always
respond positively'  when a request is made for assistance.  (Conversation,
Duhok, October 2013) Indeed, this was exemplified during a visit to one of
the  local  Chaldean  schools  which  displayed  KRG  symbols  and  posters
throughout  its  buildings.  The  support  of  and  from the  KRG  a  practical
concession and entirely in keeping with the historical experience of the East
Syriac tradition in making accommodation in  practical matters in order to
be able to sustain their community in its religious life.
KRG support  of  the Chaldean population in  the diocese in  direct
terms is limited with between ID40,000–60,000 (about £50) given to each
Christian family per month. This is only a fraction of what is realistically
required for the sustenance of the communities but understandable in the
Kurdish context where the government has had to attempt to accommodate
the migrant and existing populations. Nevertheless, the responsibility of the
KRG to the Chaldean migrants should technically be as comprehensive as
any other group given that they are also Iraqi citizens. 
Due to time constraints fieldwork visits could not be conducted to all
twenty-seven settlements with a Chaldean presence in the diocese and only
limited access was gained to archival material. However, as will be outlined
below  population  data  and  baptismal  records  were  collected  in  several
instances permitting some assessment of the situation to be made along with
comparison of earlier periods. Population figures as of 2012 for every town
and village in Zakho diocese; baptismal records for Amadiya diocese as a
whole 1950–2014 and baptismal  records for the parish of Mar Gewargis
church, Zakho.
Villages and towns of Zakho-Amadiya visited during 
fieldwork
The village of Araden is situated in the Sapna valley an area long associated
with  East  Syriac  Christianity.  Even  into  the  early  seventeenth  century
religious life was still active in the village despite two preceding centuries
of relative decline among the East Syriac communities. Perhaps part of this
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resilience was due to its connections with the wider East Syriac network
throughout the Middle East. Wilmshurst, for example, notes a local monk
donating a manuscript to the East Syriac community in Jerusalem in 1605.
(Wilmshurst  2000,  69) As  with  the  rest  of  the  Amadiyan  area  ecclesial
affairs were largely directed by the legitimist patriarchal line and such was
their strength that it was only in the 1830s that the Chaldean influence began
to be extended into Araden with Joseph Audo obtaining its allegiance and
the latter half of the nineteenth century saw the community grow strongly
from fifty Chaldeans in 1850 to 650 by 1913. (Wilmshurst 2000, 131, 134)
It further grew into the twentieth century and by the 1950s over 300 families
were resident.   (Interview with parish priest,  Araden, October 2013) The
status of Araden increased such that it was used as an alternate residence by
the Chaldean bishop of Amadiya.
It  is  unfortunate  that  data  is  not  available  for  Araden's  particular
population or baptisms which would serve to indicate the rate of change in
the  twentieth  century.  Nevertheless,  from the  overall  baptismal  marriage
records for the entire diocese of Amadiya we can see a rapid drop from the
high of seventy-four baptisms in 1955 down to five in 1961. This era and
the local area were the point of rapid dissolution of political power for the
Iraqi central government which struggled to contain the growing Kurdish
rebellion  with  a  coherent  counter-insurgency  strategy.  Local  residents  in
2013 ascribed Chaldean migration from the town during that period as a
result of this violence and in particular the overthrow of the monarchy and
not to urbanisation. It appears in the years preceding the Kurdish risings the
Chaldean population was in fact growing in Amadiya contrary to the general
trend for the passage of Chaldeans to urban areas. 
That the violence of the conflict was intense is further emphasised in
baptismal and marriage records in the archive recording that the data for
1963–1969  inclusive  was  `lost  due  to  events  in  the  north'.  The  data
suggesting that a return of stability and thus the population who had initially
departed coming from 1975 onwards. The spike in baptisms in 1974 seems
likely to have been caused by residents returning after the area's gradual
pacification and the desire for parents to have their children baptised in their
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parishes of origin.93 In Araden's case the Church with the acquiescence of
the  state  attempted  to  restore  the  Chaldeans'  position  with  houses
constructed  through  the  intervention  of  the  contemporary  bishop,  Hanna
Kello,  to support the return of some migrants in 1992–1993. This is not
reflected in the diocesan baptismal figures with the numbers declining year
on year 1991–1996. Though it is perhaps the case that a return of a more
normal life could only occur a few years after resettlement in the Amadiyan
region and this is seen from 1997. Nevertheless, it proved difficult to return
Araden to its former status or size and as of 2013 only forty-six families
were resident, a decline of about eighty percent from the 1950s.
A similar situation to that of Araden can be found in the village of
Inishke.  A village  which  also  used  to  be  associated  with  a  substantial
monastic presence again reflecting the vitality of the region in East Syriac
terms. The village's East Syriac community enjoying particular strength in
the tenth century with the  Life  of  Rabban Joseph Busnaya providing an
account of this. (Wilmshurst 2000, 132)
It is possible the textual sources for the later history of Inishke as
presented  by  Wilmshurst  (2000) may  be  at  odds  with  the  version  of
historical events which was stated in interview with the parish priest. The
priest asserted that a Chaldean foundation in the village dated from 1785
and was related to the entry of members of the Nwyia family into the local
area.94  By 1880 the village had grown in size to over forty families based
around the church of Mar Shimon and Sons. 
Wilmshurst  asserts,  following  Badger,  that  the  village  initially
entered into union with the Holy See in the 1850s but was not secured as a
Chaldean centre until the 1870s. (Badger 1852a, I:198–200, 283) Given that
the  Amadiya  region  was  a  focus  of,  if  not  always  successful,  Chaldean
missionary activity co-ordinated by resident Dominican missionaries from
the mid-eighteenth century we can suggest that the exact date of the entirety
of the population assenting wholeheartedly to a Chaldean led East Syriac
93  One reason why baptismal figures should not necessarily be taken to represent the
birth rate.
94 Whose descendants included the notable Chaldean scholar Fr Paul Nwiya SJ (b.
1925 d 1980). (Nwyia 1970)
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ecclesial affiliation was some time after their initial efforts. Moreover, when
we recall the absence of many previously strong Latin missionary presences
across Mesopotamia and eastern Asia Minor in the period 1800–1840 we
can recognise why conversion may have slowed at  this  time.95 This may
explain the wavering of East Syriac communities between their traditional
ecclesial  affiliations  and  that  of  the  Chaldeans  with  no  necessarily
confirmed  date  for  formal  conversions.  Indeed,  given  that  Amadiya  and
Mangesh had Chaldean communities from 1783 and 1791 respectively it is
far  from  inconceivable  that  Inishke  likewise  had  a  group  at  least
sympathetic  in  their  ecclesial  persuasions  towards  the  Chaldeans  from
around that time. (Cf Wilmshurst 2000, 134)
As we have  outlined  above Inishke's  fate  was closely tied  to  the
proximity of Kurdish rebel and Iraqi army engagements particularly from
the 1960s as well  as the aesthetically  pleasing nature of the surrounding
area.  The restoration  of  stability  in  the  region related  to  the  particularly
authoritarian attempts at restoring central Iraqi government control. These
efforts saw an amelioration of security in Inishke with direct support from
Saddam Husain for the reconstruction of homes and encouragement to re-
build the local tourist industry. This period of peace was interrupted again
by  the  wars  of  1991  and  2003  and  their  consequences:  the  former
particularly  complicating  the  lives  of  the  Chaldeans  as  they  gradually
exchanged  Arab  rulers  for  Kurds.  Fortunately  Inishke  was  at  least  far
removed  from  the  main  areas  of  operations  during  these  conflicts  and
proved an attraction for  refugees  and returning migrants  who more  than
doubled the pre-2003 war population of fifty families to 113 as of October
2013.
The success of the town in attracting a growing population has seen
the  construction  of  a  new school  with  the  local  residents  keen for  their
children to attain to as high a social status as possible. In this instance there
has  arisen  perhaps unrealistic  expectations  relative to  the  local  situation.
Aspirations to train in the professions or to start a business to be welcomed
95 The Dominicans were absent from Mosul 1815–1841; the Capuchins from Amid
(Diyarbakir) from 1803 only to re-establish in Mardin in 1841 whilst the Carmelites in
Baghdad departed in 1825. (Bello OAOC 1939, 25)
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but not fitting to the requirements or traditional agricultural vocations with
which the area's geography is suited. This if it continues likely leading to a
denuding of rural areas once considered Chaldean due to the willingness of
Kurds to utilise the land more productively. The issue is further complicated
by the competition with which all farmers in northern Iraq are faced from
Iranian and Turkish producers who can undercut their prices. It appears in
general  the clergy encourage Chaldeans to return to traditional vocations
with the overarching concern for retaining territorial influence in northern
Iraq  as  a  result  –  through  a  widespread  network  of  personal  claims  to
working the land. Resentment towards this attitude was not noted per se but
seen  as  another  instance  of  the  Church  not  being  sufficiently  aware  or
willing to accept the realities of life in ``the world''. It is, however, a wider
issue  more  generally  of  attempting  to  reconcile  aspirations  for  material
improvement with the ability to satisfy those desires in a way which can be
accommodated in the social order. For Chaldeans in rural Iraq this appears
to necessitate migration to or direct involvement in urban life.
Prior  to  the  twentieth  century  Zakho itself  had a  small  Chaldean
population with approximately ten to fifteen families resident from 1837–
1913.  (Wilmshurst  2000,  115) The  community  as  of  2012 stood  at  400
families  (1,725  people).  Without  our  own  population  data  for  the
intervening  period  (1913–2012)  we  can  only  infer  from  anecdotes,
baptismal numbers and the  Annuario Pontificio that this figure was likely
much higher at times especially during the 1920s–1970s with the population
moving southwards or emigrating from Iraq when the predations of internal
civil conflict undermined resilience to remain.
Data available for Zakho comes from one of the two parishes in the
city – Mar Gewargis.96 The overall decline from 1989–2013 even after 2003
is clear with only a brief rise in baptisms from 2006 to 2008 which was
contiguous with the Iraqi Civil War. As of 2012 the parish population stood
at 908 people (220 families), which will likely see that a population of this
size can be maintained in the long term with between 10–20 new baptised
96 Graph 5
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members of the community each year.97 
The Zakho bishopric retains its de facto use as the focus of ecclesial
administration in the local area with pastoral  work reliant largely on the
efforts of three priests who are responsible for twelve of the surrounding
Chaldean communities, with one serving six parishes. A state of affairs not
unusual in the Chaldean context where the relatively small size of villages
and their remoteness precludes the permanent residence of a priest. 
Aside from Zakho town a research visit the same day took place to
the villages of Deir Abon and Feshkhabur both located close to the Turkish
and Syrian borders. Feshkhabur is only separated from Syria by the river
Tigris with a shrine to Our Lady Protector of Crops built into the cliff at the
river's edge. 
An East Syriac presence to Feshkhabur likely dates from at least the
seventh  century  and  it  appears  the  local  region  –  the  Khabur  valley  –
became more densely populated by East Syriac communities in the sixteenth
century especially with available manuscripts mentioning settlements to the
area  from  this  time  period  onward.98 (Wilmshurst  2000,  120–121) The
village was notable as site of substantial Chaldean population growth in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In 1850 it was then part of the
Diocese of Gazarta and 60 people were resident99 but by 1913 had 1,300
Chaldean residents.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 107) This increase can perhaps be
put  down  to  the  attraction  of  the  village  as  a  centre  of  agricultural
production but also from the efforts of Latin and Chaldean missionaries to
gain the affiliation of members of the Church of the East in the region and
this would fit  with the pattern of general Chaldean expansion in this era
through the work of Joseph VI Audo.  As of  2012 the village retained a
population of 584 which was one of the larger Chaldean settlements in the
diocese.
During  the  visit  to  the  villages  it  was  related  that  relative  socio-
economic stability  had been experienced from the foundation  of  modern
97 The number of births lower, however, than the national Iraqi birth rate which was
26.85 births per 1,000 population in 2014. (‘Iraq’ 2014)
98 Including Deir Abon in 1671.
99 Yet despite this small size the village was the only one in the diocese to have two
churches.
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Iraq until the mid-1970s. Given the region's proximity to Turkey and Syria it
is possible the Iraqi army sought to avoid any internal conflicts spilling over
to cause disputes with neighbouring states and viewed a peaceful locale as
an absolute necessity to maintain stable borders. Particularly important as
the  Turkish  government  had historically  viewed the  region  as  within  its
purview. From the mid-1970s the Kurdish wars impacted more heavily on
Chaldean socio-economic life and a process of relocation and abandonment
of villages began which segued with Kurdish occupation of settlements. It is
unclear as to whether this had specifically religious and/or national-political
justification.  That the villages were Christian perhaps of little account to
Kurdish farmers who perceived fertile agricultural land was going to waste. 
Although the KRG and Kurdish political  élites have emphasised a
secular  and co-operative vision with other  residents  of  northern  Iraq  the
historical  memory  of  Kurdish  persecution  is  still  strong  and  Kurdish
Islamist  antagonism towards  Christianity  and  non-Kurdish  residents  still
exists. Therefore even if Kurdish occupation of villages was not perceived
as specifically anti-Christian by the Kurds it holds a very particular concern
for Christians who see it as a return to persecution and the de-legitimisation
of their presence to northern Iraq. Perhaps in recognition of Christian fears
from 2003 the rebuilding of long abandoned Chaldean villages has been
undertaken with the KRG's support and during the visits to the Zakho area it
was emphasised as to the co-operative nature of the KRG when attempting
to resolve issues  such as  property disputes  with  local  Kurdish residents.
Accommodating Chaldean interests has little material cost to the KRG given
the relative size of the Chaldean population but whether KRG  élites truly
wish for equanimity for the Chaldeans is unclear with Chaldeans cognisant
of all the advantages – political and economic – which the Kurds hold and
aware  of  the  broader  historical  context  of  Christian-Kurdish  relations  at
times relatively amicable but often violent. 
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Note on Amadiyan diocesan records100
Amadiyan diocesan baptismal and wedding records are entirely blank for
1964–1969 inclusive perhaps reflecting difficulties faced during the Kurdish
rebellion's  intensification  including  the  destruction  of  the  Amadiyan
bishopric in 1961.(Wilmshurst 2000, 12)  Such a shock to the administration
of the dioceses could not realistically have been predicted and as with events
from  2003  onwards  ecclesiastical  structures  have  been  destroyed  and
struggled to contend with changes. The effects of the attacks having reached
the level that it was only with population migration to the north from 2003
that baptismal numbers indicate that population growth returned to previous
levels. The knock-on effects of the conflicts perhaps also affecting the way
in which management of dioceses was conducted. For the 1960s as we have
noted, saw the restructuring and creation of Chaldean dioceses such as that
of  Sulaymaniya  and  Erbil.  It  must  also  have  been  difficult  to  restore
Amadiya when the then bishop, Raphael Bidawid, was transferred in 1966
to the Lebanon. His replacement Curiacos Moussess dying in 1973 at the
age of only 51. To what extent his death brought about by the stress of his
time in office in a very difficult situation unclear.
Conclusion: Dioceses of Zakho-Amadiya and Akra
The creation of these dioceses was a key point in the formation of what was
to become the normative Chaldean ecclesiastical structure for most of the
twentieth century. With the destruction of the Chaldean dioceses of Mardin,
Seert,  Amid and Gazarta during the massacres Zakho-Amadiya and Akra
became the  home for  an  influx  of  refugees  and  migrants.  The  dioceses
becoming also the representation of Chaldean presence to this region of Iraq
and were key to the securing the East Syriac tradition to a region which had
once been so heavily associated with the Church of the East, the monastic
100 See Graph 4
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life and an active Christian presence.
During fieldwork through conversations and observation one gained
a sense of the loss which was still felt by Chaldeans after the massacres. I
suggest for those in close proximity to the Turkish border there was also an
understanding that the border was not only a geographic expression but a
dividing  point  in  communal  memory and perception  between a sense of
completeness  of  the  Chaldean  Church  and  the  gap  in  the  Chaldean
community for what might have been had the community retained a more
diverse population through incarnating its presence in the Turkish state and
being a difference in that milieu as well as Iraqi society from 1918.
Diocese of Alqosh
Alqosh and the Nineveh plain region has been a traditional focus of East
Syriac life since the third century and a focus of Semitic religious activity
for at least 3,000 years. Whilst it is challenging to assert a comprehensive
account of East Syriac history in Alqosh itself prior to the sixteenth century
it appears that only during the mid-fourteenth to mid-fifteenth centuries was
there a period of substantial inertia and a qualitative deterioration in East
Syriac ecclesial and communal life.
As of  the  mid-sixth century  the  Mosul-Nineveh plain  region was
East Syriac in its religious character and formed part of the dioceses of Bet
Nuhadra and Nineveh.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 188) Although members of the
West Syriac community directed concerted and often successful efforts to
gain the adherence of Christian settlements in the Nineveh region Alqosh
remained an East Syriac stronghold. (Wilmshurst 2000, 189) The thirteenth
to fourteenth centuries saw a general decline of Christian presence with East
Syriac settlements altering their religious allegiance. With the social benefits
of converting to Islam or desire to reside in a more secure location likely
prominent reasons for this change and with other groups such as the Yazidis
emerging to  take  the place  of  East  Syriacs  in  local  society.  (Wilmshurst
2000, 189)
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The  sixteenth  to  early  seventeenth  centuries  largely  saw  the
crystallisation of the East Syriac Christian geography of the region to the
present with the main exception being the decline of the monastic presence
which was reported in 1610 to consist of five active sites with only one as of
2013 (and this effectively a new foundation in 1859) still continuing this
tradition of East Syriac monasticism.101 (Wilmshurst 2000) 
Alqosh and its immediate surrounds as a specific site for monastic
activity  dates  from  the  early  seventh  century  establishment  of  the
eponymous monastery of Rabban Hormizd. (See Budge 1902) What marked
out Rabban Hormizd during the formative years of the Chaldean community
was its position as the patriarchal headquarters of the legitimist line for the
period  c.  1600–1800  and its  status  and  that  of  Alqosh  as  a  centre  for
manuscript production. (Wilmshurst 2000, 241–243, 248)
Owing  to  Rabban  Hormizd's  heritage,  geographic  and  strategic
location to the patriarchal office its control was marked as an identifying
feature of the legitimacy of its holder. From the 1720s onwards Latin efforts
and interest among local East Syriacs in the Chaldean project increased the
Latin  presence  to  Mosul  with  the  See  of  Mosul  and  Rabban  Hormizd
becoming definite targets for by the Latin-Chaldean factions. Alqosh and
Rabban Hormzid's significance especially from the eighteenth century was
perhaps not as great in the era seventh–fourteenth centuries when both sites
formed a part of the wider network of East Syriac ecclesiastical organisation
and  monasticism  diffused  throughout  Asia.  By  the  sixteenth  century,
however,  much importance  can  be  ascribed to  Rabban Hormizd and the
Mosul region as centres of the greatest extant concentrations of East Syriac
activity in the Ottoman Empire. Northern Mesopotamia the area in which
the  East  Syriac  tradition  was  maintained  in  its  strongest  form  and
evidencing its heritage from its ``golden era". Nonetheless, association with
Rabban  Hormizd  as  a  means  for  justifying  legitimacy  to  the  patriarchal
office  gradually  disappeared  with  the  establishment  of  the  ``lower
101 Alqosh town is  currently served by Notre  Dame des  Semences monastery the
continuation of Rabban Hormizd as well as a Dominican convent which serves as a
girls orphanage. The latter of great importance but distinct from the male monasteries
and the pre-existing sites dedicated to the contemplative and scholarly life.
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monastery" of Notre Dame de Semences which became a new Chaldean site
of priestly formation; the emergence of the legitimist line as  the Chaldean
patriarchal successor and the limited influence of the Sulaqite patriarchs to
the area. 
The  monastery  site  –  of  Rabban  Hormizd  –  quite  apart  from its
present significance from an East Syriac cultural heritage perspective offers
some evidence as to the ecclesiological identity which the legitimist  line
advanced in the sixteenth to early nineteenth centuries and as the Chaldean
presence to the region strengthened. The monastery served as the burial site
for the majority of the legitimist patriarchs between 1497–1804. Harrak has
offered the most recent English translation of the funerary inscriptions of the
entombed  patriarchs  and  begun  to  develop  an  historical  analysis  of  the
inscriptions which are written in the first person and detail the patriarchs'
Christological beliefs. (2003)
The ecclesiology of the patriarchs develops in emphasis with those
who were buried there from 1497–1558102 noting their status as Catholicos
but otherwise only outlining their Christology. In 1591 with the burial of
Elias VII the patriarch notes his desire to see ` ``amen" ' said throughout `the
entire church'.  (Harrak 2003, 297). Elias VII entered office in 1558 three
years  after  Sulaqa's  death  and  six  after  the  start  of  the  first  Chaldean
patriarchal line. I suggest this desire for ``amen" was an indication of a hope
for unity in the East Syriac community which had become factionalised but
without  connotations  as  yet  to  Christological  or  theological  distinction
between the communities. With Elias IX (d 1660) the patriarchs from then
on preface their description of the `church' with `orthodox'.  (Harrak 2003,
298  f) This  change  presumably  with  a  desire  to  clearly  mark  out  their
position as apart from the Chaldean faction owing to increased awareness of
the distinctiveness of the Tridentine Christological views and ecclesiastical
boundaries  which  Latin  missionaries  pursued  and  encouraged.  The
inscriptions are thus notable for being a point from when the revivification
of  East  Syriac  Christological  awareness  began.  A Christology  which  for
some time prior to this, perhaps since the Christian revival in the twelfth to
102  Shemon IV Basidi; Shemon VI Denha and Shemon VII Ishoyab
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fourteenth  centuries  had  not  been  broadly  reflected  upon  within  the
community.  Moreover,  East  Syriac  Christology  or  ecclesiology  had  not
perceived  the  Church  of  the  East  as  set  apart  from  the  Latin  ecclesial
community.  The  engagement  with  the  Latins  in  a  post-Tridentine
environment creating opportunity for the creation of a more well defined
ecclesiological  and  Christological  position  and  one  which  the  legitimist
patriarchs perceived as necessary to defend. `orthodox' implying also that
outside of this frame of reference and community that there was something
lacking in the heterodox community. Such a notion framed and annunciated
by the patriarch and the hierarchy but would be increasingly diffused among
the community to  ensure the retention of  members  apart  from Chaldean
efforts.103
Although the monastery is now unoccupied except for a caretaker it
casts  a  metaphorical  shadow over  the  running of  Alqosh diocese  and is
linked  to  the  perceived  necessity  to  retain  a  strong  Chaldean  presence
regardless of events. As the spiritual and previously temporal home of the
East Syriac tradition in Mesopotamia and a remnant of the great network of
monastic centres throughout central and west Asia it is a tangible reminder
of past glories.104
Until  October  1960  and  the  growth  of  population  in  Mosul
archdiocese  overall  the  Chaldean  hierarchy  did  not  perceive  a  need  for
further  administrative  declension  in  the  region  with  Alqosh to  that  time
within the archdiocese.105 We may imagine that  the leadership of  Abdul-
Ahad Sana as bishop of Alqosh from its foundation until December 2001
left  a  particular  identity  upon  the  diocese.  Given  that  Sana  had  been
consecrated in  1961 with the purpose of  his  leading the diocese we can
103 It is interesting that such a definite ecclesiological position should evolve after the
irruption of Latin directed efforts to the region. Given the proximity of the West Syriac
communities  in  Mesopotamia and eastern Asia Minor one wonders as  to  why self-
definition of orthodoxy was not perceived as necessary. It is perhaps most likely the
case that differences were less fresh and real at that time with the disputes last having
been affirmed some generations previously.
104 As of 2015 Rabban Hormizd, like the Syrian Orthodox monastery of Mar Mattai
near Mosul, stands virtually on the front line of the war between Iraqi and Kurdish
forces against Da'esh. The monasteries existing as a living rebuke to the terrorists and
in Mar Mattai's case as a spiritual anchor in the unseen warfare which the remaining
monks conduct through their prayers. (Cf Ephesians 6:10–18)
105 For an overview of the region see Map 7.
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wonder  at  the  influence  which  he  had  in  implementing  ecclesiological
changes after the Second Vatican Council. The seguing of the Council with
Iraq's  rapid economic development a remarkable coincidence and for the
speed  with  which  it  necessitated  organisational  change  among  the
Chaldeans.  Ecclesial  modernism's influence upon eastern Catholic  life  in
Iraq  therefore  closely  tied  to  modern  political  and  economic  changes  in
general. Furthermore as Alqosh had been predominantly a town associated
with the Church of the East until the early nineteenth century a Chaldean
identity  had  to  be  consolidated.  Sana  was  succeeded  by  Mikha  Polo
Maqdassi  (2001– )who has  had to  contend with maintaining East  Syriac
heritage and also creating means to support and retain the character of the
modern  Chaldean  Church.  The  geographical  territory  is  a  challenging
environment  for  the  current  bishop  as  the  population  whilst  largely
Chaldean is heterogeneous with numerical minorities of Sunni Arabs and
Kurds as well as Yazidis resident.
Ecclesial Organisation
The main communities of the diocese consist  of Alqosh itself,  where the
bishop has his residence, and the towns of Teleskef, Baqofa, Batnaya and
Sheikhan.106
Residents  of  Alqosh  in  2013  strongly  affirmed  that  continued
residence in the town was preferred to migration. Although Alqosh has been
a point of departure for many it retains a proportion of population who will
likely never leave evidenced in the return of a few families from the USA
who had attempted to settle there – the cultural and social barriers being too
great to overcome. The strength of feeling about the local identity such that
Alqoshis are renowned locally for refusing to sell their properties to non-
Alqoshis with such a strength feeling also extending to other villages in the
diocese. 
The extent of patronage which the Kurdish governors provided to
106 See table 12. NB the town of Naseriya should not be confused with the town of
Nasiriya in southern Iraq.
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the bishop was not clear. However, Alqosh as a strategic location close to
Mosul and under KRG control presumably led to the cultivation of a strong
working relationship. Furthermore, the bishop for his part was attempting to
advance social bridges with the local non-Christian communities with the
construction of a new school which Yazidis and Kurds had indicated they
would be pleased to attend on completion. Although Alqosh has a mixed
community it was evident from observing the day-to-day life in the town
that the Christian presence was the strongest. Local Chaldean youths had
erected a large cross on the side of the most prominent hill in the north of
the town which is illuminated every night. It is unlikely this would have
been permitted without at least tacit permission of the local authorities.107
Teleskef
The  date  of  the  first  East  Syriac  presence  to  Teleskef  is  not  certain.  A
Christian presence of some kind possibly dates to around the sixth/seventh
centuries given the settlement's position between Alqosh and Mosul whose
own East Syriac communities were certainly present from at least that era.
Nonetheless,  and perhaps  more  likely,  Teleskef  could  have  been of  later
foundation,  Wilmshurst argues, with a confirmed textual reference for an
East  Syriac  community  coming  only  from  the  thirteenth  century  in  an
account  detailing  the  sacking  of  the  town by  the  Mongols.  (Wilmshurst
2000, 202, 234) The community was of sufficient – if unknown – size and
status by the late fifteenth century to warrant two churches: Mar Giwargis
and Mar Yacob the Recluse.(Wilmshurst 2000, 234)
With the trend for the patriarch to reside outside of Baghdad108 at
times of persecution or conflict – especially during the initial phases of the
Mongol occupation of Mesopotamia – it is realistic to suggest also a trend
107 The level of security at checkpoints into and out of the town appeared also to be
more substantial than other locations visited. This partly relates to Alqosh's relative
isolation from surrounding settlements but also its aforementioned strategic location in
any potential conflict scenario.
108  Denha I (1265–1281); Yahballah III (1281–1317); Timothy II (1318–1336) and
Denha II (1336– 1380) for whole or parts of their time in office resided in northern
Mesopotamia or north-western Persia.
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for East Syriac communal movement to areas perceived to be likely safer or
more remote such as the Mosul-Nineveh plain and Erbil regions. This would
correlate to the consolidation of the East Syriac presence between Alqosh
and Mosul in the period twelfth to fifteenth centuries and as to why Teleskef
and other nearby villages emerge in the written record. 
The  town gained  prominence  as  one  of  the  Christian  settlements
sacked during the raids of the Turkish leader Bar Yak in 1508 – Teleskef
along with Alqosh, Rabban Hormizd and Telkef all affected. Scribal activity
later became notable from the end of the seventeenth century and an interest
in the religious life appears to have been evident among the inhabitants with
vocations  to  the  monastic  life  sent  to  Rabban  Hormizd  during  Gabriel
Dambo's tenure, of whom one, Thomas Choa, became Chaldean Archbishop
of Kirkuk in 1853. (Wilmshurst 2000, 235–236) As of 1867 approximately
1,800 Chaldeans were resident; in 1913 the population had risen to c. 3,500
which  increased  further  to  5,705  in  1965.  (Fiey  OP  1965b,  II:381;
Wilmshurst 2000, 199) It seems very likely Teleskef was a beneficiary of
the migrants and refugees who after the First World War wished to resettle
in Iraq. The town proving an attractive site for those who wished to continue
their  work  in  agriculture  –  as  refugees  were  largely  previously  living
agrarian lifestyles – and benefited from the close proximity of the religious
and  economic  links  to  Mosul.  The  less  substantial  increase  in   total
population size between 1913 and 1965 compared with 1867 and 1913 can
be accounted for in Chaldean migration to central and southern Iraqi cities
from the 1930s. 
Bishop Maqdassi's 2013 figure of 1,450 families in Teleskef equates
to c. 6,525 people – at an average family size of 4.5 persons. The retention
of  population  despite  its  proximity  to  conflict  in  Iraq  proper  and  the
challenging economic  situation compared with  the population in  1965 is
notable. As with other towns in northern Iraq it is frustrating not to be able
to form a more comprehensive estimate and determine causes of population
change for intervening years from 1965–2013 when we are aware numerous
events of economic, political and social significance took place. As will be
seen below we can draw some conclusions from available data on baptisms
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and weddings.109
For those who look to depart Teleskef in 2013 the greatest evidence
of the desire to leave comes via the collection of baptismal and marriage
certificates which act as the onward ecclesial passport for entry into the next
diocese or parish location. Whilst the parish priest did not specify the total
numbers to have departed since 2003 he indicated very large numbers had
left.  This,  however,  balanced by his  assertion  that  those  who depart  are
replaced by migrants from southern and central Iraq.110 This is indicative
overall of the decline of the Chaldean population and with the concurrent
drop in the number of baptisms points to a long term inability to replace
those who make the final decision to leave Iraq. 
The rate of Chaldean departure from Teleskef, as of October 2013,
was stated as 1–2 families per week or an average of 78 families per year.
Whilst as of 2013 such a rate is not yet terminal such a consistent pattern of
decline  if  it  continues  means  that  were  no  other  families  to  settle  as
replacements that by 2018 twenty–thirty percent of the population will have
left. In numerical terms a substantial amount and, furthermore, ideologically
problematic for a town which was once so strongly Chaldean in culture.
Moreover,  a  thirty  percent  population  reduction  has  a  far  wider  impact
insofar as the community's bonds and its social cohesion are fundamentally
weakened. It  is also of concern due to the loss of skills  which the local
economy requires to survive. Despite the town centre being dominated by
shops and tradesmen the majority work in agriculture. Such a transfer out of
the population likely  to  result  in  a  concomitant  decline  which  is  largely
irreplaceable  in  the  short  term as  an  array  of  skills  are  lost  required  to
maintain farming. Such a scenario adding further strain on the community
which few external bodies are able to comprehend or assist in resolving. 
The community further strained because of the general insecurity of
their situation and an issue which was re-enforced during 2005 and 2007
when  there  were  bomb  attacks  in  the  town  and  as  a  result  a  spike  in
109 See Graph 6
110  The return of Chaldeans of Teleskefi origin from Basra, Baghdad and Mosul has
totalled 250 families (c. 1,200 people) after 2003. Such estimates are welcome as a
guide to the status quo but this type of record keeping completed to varying degrees of
formality and often not in writing. The ``knowledge'' of the local priest often being the
basis for accounting for statistics in his parish.
                                                              229
departures.  However,  this  appears  to  have been only temporary in  effect
with baptismal and marriage numbers for those years 130/64 and 161/66 at a
consistent level and in keeping with numbers in years both before and after.
The  Chaldeans  remain  resilient  despite  persecution  and  socio-economic
decline with the majority of the population choosing in the short term to
return  after  displacement  given  the  transitory  nature  of  so  much  of  the
violence in the years prior to 2014 and the emergence of Da'esh.
Available records from Teleskef consisted of baptismal and marriage
data from 1950–October 2013. Graph 6 suggesting the relative strength of
Teleskef as a place of Chaldean life maintained throughout political events
in modern Iraqi history.  Perhaps most notable is  the drop in baptisms in
1960 to nearly half of its level in the previous year. This may be an anomaly
or could be related to the intensity of conflict of the Kurdish rebellion that
year.  Given the number of marriages did not  decline at  a similar rate in
following years I am inclined to see this as an effect of the Kurdish war as
there  is  a  general  drop  in  baptisms  until  1973  from  which  time  the
population again grew. This in part likely due to the migration of population
during the  Iran-Iraq War  to  northern  towns and the gradual  cessation  of
violence after the Kurdish rebellions. In comparison the marriage numbers
have remained far more consistent. It may be the case that for women when
pregnant it is desirable to reside in an area more amenable to the difficulties
associated  with  such  events  and  that  in  contrast  weddings  continue
regardless  because  they  are  events  of  short  duration  and  traditionally
conducted in the home parish of the bride. Overall, however, if we follow
the  lines  of  the  graph  we  can  see  the  wedding  figures  largely  mirror
baptismal figures by a gap of c. 1–2 years as might be expected.
Conclusion: Diocese of Alqosh
I have noted the importance of Alqosh and the towns within the diocese to
the modern Chaldean Church. Da'esh's advance into the Nineveh plain poses
a severe threat to the Chaldean community's viability  at the regional level
for the diocese but also to Chaldean identity more widely. With the removal
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of the Chaldean presence to the Nineveh region the incarnation of the East
Syriac Christian tradition, its communities and ecclesiastical structures has
to begin again  elsewhere  and take  into  account  new social,  cultural  and
religious paradigms. The physical destruction of people as well as material
culture a set of circumstances which point to the removal of the Chaldeans
from the historical and living record. What is also severely detrimental to
the Chaldeans, however, is the loss of resilience and capability to remain in
the area – something which even despite persecution since 2003 has not
previously  been  encountered.  The  level  of  purposeful  and  systematic
removal  of  non-Sunni  culture  by  IS's  forces,  brutality  and  criminality
matched only by the massacres of the First World War. 
A psychological shift  has occurred among the Chaldeans whereby
even  in  Alqosh  they  are  alienated  from  the  land  in  which  they  have
incarnated  their  presence.  In  combination  with  the  ambivalence  of  non-
Christian Iraqis to their situation and the ineffectiveness of Coalition, Iraqi
and Kurdish military responses the Nineveh plain becomes very doubtful as
a place where even those who previously expressed sentiments  of  being
willing to stay or die in their lands can remain and when a fuller life can be
found abroad why should residents choose a life in Iraq? For a community
whose  preceding  generations  have  contended  with  persecution  under  a
variety of rulers from Sasanian to Baathist and survived, the intervention of
IS has an air of complete finality about its ability to alter the social make-up
of northern Iraq. Were Alqosh and Rabban Hormizd to be lost it could be
compared  to  the  loss  of  Kosovo for  the  Serbs  in  terms  of  the  spiritual,
religious and cultural heritage which the two regions have respectively for
the Chaldean and Serbian churches.
Archdiocese of Basra111
We turn now to an outline of the dioceses in Iraq which were beyond the
reach of direct fieldwork visits. Apart from two parishes in the Diocese of
111 For reference please see Map 6.
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Mosul I was unable to travel due to security constraints. That being the case
the following provides a discussion of the Chaldeans of the Archdioceses of
Baghdad, Basra and the Diocese of Mosul grounded in a somewhat  less
nuanced perspective than that which I was able to gain in regions where
fieldwork was conducted and where I was able to draw on more detailed
information.
The  Basra  region  is  one  of  the  oldest  and  was  one  of  the  most
prestigious  centres  of  East  Syriac  life  in  Mesopotamia-Iraq  with  an
episcopal presence in the area from the late third century.  (Hansman 2011)
The region was designated as the metropolitan province of Perat d'Maysan
at the Synod of Issac in 410 having been named after the local Sasanian
administrative district.  (Fiey OP 1968, III:263–264) Substantial missionary
activity  took  place  between  the  fourth  and  sixth  centuries  and
notwithstanding  periodic  Sasanian  persecution  a  secure  East  Syriac
foundation was attained in southern Mesopotamia. With the Arab invasion
of 637–638 to southern Mesopotamia the city of Maysan fell into disuse and
instead an army encampment was developed into the permanent settlement
of  Basra  on  the  site  of  the  Persian  town of  Vaheshtabad  Ardashir.  The
prominence of the burgeoning city due to its position on the route to Persia
and further Muslim invasions of south-west and central Asia and from an
ecclesial perspective as a maritime point of departure to the dioceses in the
Gulf:  Bet  Qatraye  (Qatar);  Rev  Ardashir  (Bushehr)  and  Bet  Mazunaye
(Oman) and further afield to East Syriac communities in India and China.
The East Syriac community of Basra faced the destruction of their
churches twice during the rule of the Abbasid Caliphs in the first and fourth
decades of the ninth century. Abbasid antagonism towards the Church of the
East varied, however, as in the intervening period the churches were rebuilt.
(Fiey  OP 1968,  III:269) The  weakening  of  centralised  rule  over  Basra
brought  with  it  instability  with  the  city  notably  being  sacked  by  the
Karmatians in 923 and the Mongols in 1258. (Donner 1988) Basra sustained
some  form  of  active  Christian  presence  and  intellectual  life  into  the
thirteenth century as is evidenced in the collation of literature by the then
metropolitan  of  Perat  d'Maysan,  Shlemon  of  Akhlat,  in  his  work  on
Christian  history  The  Book  of  the  Bee (c.1222).  (Budge  1886,  I/2:iii)
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Shlemon is the last known named metropolitan and it appears the province
entered into a period of substantial decline by the mid-fourteenth century at
the latest.  (Fiey OP 1968, III:265–266) The reduction of the East Syriac
presence  in  terms  of  ecclesiastical  structure  ties  in  with  the  overall
disruption  of  ecclesial  life  in  Mesopotamia  in  the  era  1300–1400 and a
northward geographical shift in activity.
The city's close proximity to the Persian border, Mesopotamia's only
sea port  and position on the Gulf all  saw it  maintain continued strategic
importance and the Ottomans with their expansion into the region were keen
to bring it into their sphere of influence doing so in 1534. It is likely the East
Syriac  community  was  largely  sustained  through  Basra's  economic
significance as a continued point of mercantile interest eastward to India,
south-east  Asia  and  China.  Encounters  with  western  traders  as  well  as
political and religious agents increasing from the seventeenth century when
the port was formally opened to European traffic. (Hartmann 1913, 673)
The Chaldean ecclesial presence was formally established in 1860 to
provide pastoral care for the Chaldean communities who were involved with
the  river  transport  businesses  which  grew  in  significance  as  Ottoman
administrative control was consolidated in Mesopotamia with a concurrent
desire to modernise its infrastructure. Wilmshurst notes Basra was created as
a diocese in his text but refers to it  as of 1913 as a patriarchal vicariate
which is practically what it was given there were c. 500 believers resident in
its jurisdiction at that time.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 361) The pastoral oversight
of the community varied, however, with patriarchal vicars named for only
fourteen years of the period 1860–1953 until a bishop was installed.  (Fiey
OP 1993, 60) We may suppose the parochial clergy had responsibility for
the  community  without  direct  episcopal  oversight  during  the  gaps  and,
moreover, given the relative security of Basra during the aforementioned era
and the independence of the Chaldeans owing to mercantile success it was
perhaps thought unnecessary to provide any further pastoral guidance.
From 1867 when baptismal records become available we can see the
Basrawi Chaldean population appears to have generally increased until the
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start  of  the  Iran-Iraq  War  in  1980.112 Nonetheless,  population  growth
especially from 1914–1970 was likely unsteady as is indicated by the spikes
then subsequent rapid declines in the number of baptisms. Some might be
ascribed  to  natural  trends  for  the  number  of  births  to  fluctuate  or  as
anomalies  but  it  appears  the  population  was  particularly  badly  affected
during  the  mid-1930s  with  Mar  Toma,  Mart  Mariam and  the  church  in
Amara  all  seeing  substantial  drops  in  baptisms.  This  is  particularly
surprising in the context of wider events. Basra had experienced a period in
the 1920s of hope for independence inspired by a Shia regional political
identity as well as sympathy towards the British Empire as a patron of such
a  new  arrangement.  Relations  to  be  secured  through  Imperial  access  to
southern Mesopotamia's oilfields. Such a scenario did not come to fruition
but  Basra  was  during  the  1930s  incorporated  socially,  economically  and
politically into Iraqi national life. It is possible that Chaldeans in the 1930s–
1940s saw Baghdad as a potentially better place for economic opportunity
and migrated. Alternatively, as Chaldeans had concentrated in Basra during
the First World War era to avoid the effects of conflict and persecution so
they now departed but even this does not seem to explain the average forty--
fifty  percent  drop in  baptisms during the 1930s by comparison with the
preceding decade. (Cf Visser 2005, 138–142 ff)
Aside from this era the growth and decline of the Archdiocese was
as might be expected tied to the vicissitudes of the Iraqi state in general. The
large drop in the late 1960s attached to the knock-on effects of the economy
due to political  instability  prior  to  the  assumption  of  the Baath  party  to
power. However, migration to Baghdad to take advantage of the increase in
opportunities in the city likely played a key role in the substantial change in
population in Basra. It cannot be underestimated as to the cultural, social
and economic attraction which Baghdad had over Chaldeans especially from
1950 and the transferral of the Patriarchate to the city from Mosul. To be
Chaldean  and  to  live  a  Christian  life  in  Baghdad  was  eased  by  the
concentration of population whereas it was far more challenging to do so in
a  strongly  Shia  cultural  environment  in  southern  Iraq  and  in  which  the
numerical size of the Chaldean population was proportionately smaller than
112 See Graph 7
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which developed in Baghdad in the second half of the twentieth century.
Migration from Basra was also expedited by the onset of the Iran-Iraq War
(1980--1988) and the desire to find relative safety in the capital which was
beyond  the  reach  of  the  vast  majority  of  military  operations  during  the
conflict. Whereas, Basra's strategic value and position placed it firmly as a
target for Iranian attacks and Iraqi defensive actions.
Chaldean life was further disrupted in 1990/1 and 2003 as Basra was
a main invasion corridor of the Coalition forces in these years and during
the First and Second World Wars for British imperial forces. However, this
has had the benefit of seeing the rapid re-development of Basra following
conflict because it is so vital to the stabilisation of Iraq's economy overall.
As  of  2013  the  Archdiocese  had  one  of  the  largest  geographical
territories in Iraq with the towns and cities of Kut, Amara, Diwaniyah and
Nasariya all included within its boundaries. 
The main churches serving the Basrawi Chaldeans were Mar Toma,
Mart Mariam and from the mid-1960s Mar Ephrem. We can note a very
substantial Chaldean presence in Basra in the 1960s with baptismal figures
peaking in Mar Thoma at 69 in 1962 and 183 in Mart Mariam in 163. A
rapid growth considering average annual baptisms in the 1950s had stood at
42.6 and 97 respectively for these churches. The latter years of the 1960s,
however, saw a decline in baptisms and population size. We should also note
that  between  1959–1969  the  total  population  within  the  archdiocesan
geographical  territory  –  including  all  the  non-Catholic  populations  –
increased  from 1,338,225  to  2,124,931.113 The  Chaldean  population  thus
decreasing as a proportion of the population from 6.1 to 0.4 percent and as
can be seen in table 13 also in real terms to roughly 10 percent of its former
size.
This change in size – if the  AP figures are correct – notably in the
context of overall population growth and with the increase in the number of
priests it would seem ecclesial intentions had been to support the population
and consolidate the Chaldean presence. However, due to the attraction of
moving to areas of even greater concentrations of Chaldeans in Baghdad,
113 Source AP
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for example, this choice was taken instead. The rate of population change
also  likely  impacted  due  to  the  consolidation  of  the  Shia  presence  and
identity  in  southern  Iraq  and  the  weakening  of  Chaldean  socio-cultural
affiliation  with  the  region.  Chaldean  population  change  perhaps  also
affected by the departure of the Jewish population in the 1940s and 1950s
which led to a lessening of the plurality of the country as a whole. Through
migrating to Baghdad where the concentration of Chaldeans was that much
greater it  was easier to retain one's cultural identity and to live in a less
sectarian  milieu than existed in other areas where the boundaries between
communities were more readily apparent.
The first Archbishop of Basra following its change of status from a
diocese in 1953 was Joseph Gogué  (1954–1971). He had been born in Seert
in  1886  and  had  seen  the  full  gamut  of  ecclesiological,  political  and
economic changes with which the Chaldeans had had to contend following
the end of the Ottoman hegemony and given his life experience appeared as
a reputable choice. Gogué's time in office saw the consolidation, if overall
numerical  decline,  of  the  Chaldeans  even  in  the  outlying  parts  of  his
Archdiocese. A consolidation for which he was not necessarily responsible
directly but a pastoral atmosphere conducive to good family life it seems
must have been noted for people to settle in the respective locations and to
start families.
Ecclesial organisation – churches in Basra city
Normal conduct  of  ecclesial  affairs  was challenging during the  Iran-Iraq
War. Chaldean life continued, however, as we can note from the data for the
Chaldean cathedral  (Mart  Mariam) records ended abruptly in  1980. This
lacuna is perhaps unsurprising when we consider the city was a particular
focus of Iranian military engagements during the war especially during the
battles of Operation Ramadan (1982) and Operation Karbala 5 (1987). The
latter which was the biggest military operation of the war perhaps involving
up to a million soldiers and led to very substantial population displacement
in the Basra region.
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The 2003 invasion of Iraq again interrupted the conduct of regular
religious and social life, nevertheless, if we speak in general terms the level
of religious persecution has been little evidenced by comparison post-2003
with those Chaldeans resident in central or northern Iraq. This should be
tempered somewhat as it appears the Chaldean presence faced some level of
opposition  with  the  then  apostolic  administrator,  Mgr  Iman  al-Banar,
requesting for his  communities to  celebrate  Christmas in  2009 in an un-
ostentatious  manner  citing  the  need  to  show  `  ``respect  for  Muslims,
especially Shi'as, on the occasion of Muharram.'' ' which coincided with the
Feast of Our Lord's Nativity that year. (Gisick 2009)
Various  figures  have  been  communicated  during  the  course  of
research related to the total population of Basra archdiocese which appear to
vary  in  accuracy  especially  from year  to  year  with  one  estimate  stating
5,000 in 2009 and another 1,000 in the same year. Through direct contact
with Chaldean community members,  however,  an estimate of 400 people
was given as of 2013. Assuming this to be accurate the loss of population
from even the lower end of 1,000 in 2009 is fatal to the continued Chaldean
presence and their ability to maintain sufficient communal cohesion for a
presence to remain.114
Conclusion: Archdiocese of Basra
As we will see below whilst the Chaldeans of Baghdad faced very intense
levels of persecution the community was able to retain a degree of cohesion
because of the mass concentration of Chaldeans in the city from the 1930s.
Conversely  Basra  is  sufficiently  tied  to  a  local  regionalist  identity  that
separation from the majority of the Chaldean population in this milieu is to
be expected. Subsequent to this loss of communal attachment, however, has
been the return of Basrawis to the north, many Chaldeans from Teleskef
having settled in Basra for example, which demonstrates the northern towns
retain the loyalty of the East Syriac population at heart. (Interview, Teleskefi
114 It is possible this figure may have risen since May 2014 given Basra's relative
security in the context of the rise of Da'esh in western and northern Iraq.
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parish  priest,  Teleskef,  October  2013)  Such  a  transfer  of  population  not
unusual  in  Basrawi  history  given  that  from  the  fourteenth  to  sixteenth
centuries the East Syriac community appears to have existed practically in
name only in the region which the archdiocese presently covers.
Archdiocese of Baghdad
Baghdad was the chief see and home of the East Syriac patriarchs for much
of  the  eighth–thirteenth  centuries.  The  city  was  founded  in  762  by  the
Abbasid Caliph al-Mansur as the dynasty's capital where the majority of his
successors resided until the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century. The
city's construction marked the Abbasid's attempted assumption of authority
over  the  Muslim  community  from  the  Ummayads  (661–750)  who  had
centred the caliphate's administration in Syria. 
Although  our  contemporary  views  of  the  East  Syriac  patriarchal
office  to  the  Mesopotamian  capital  may  relate  to  perceptions  of  Louis
Raphael  I  Sako's  status  in  Baghdadi  society  as  a  minority  influence  in
political affairs and Iraqi life generally, until the late-fourteenth century the
rôle of East Syriac patriarch in Mesopotamian society was of one among
many religious leaders under Sasanid, Ummayad, Abbasid and Mongol rule
with whom the shah, caliph or khan was obliged to productively engage.
Iraqi  society's  current  trend  for  the  denial  of  religious  plurality  only
developing in the late twentieth century.115
The  patriarch's  relationship  with  the  state  was  far  from  without
problems  as  the  persecutions  of  various  eras  attest  but  was  sufficiently
consistent to see the patriarch's inveiglement with the civil power to gain
position and influence for himself, his family and the Church. The onset of
dhimmi status from the Ummayad period setting the relationship as one of
qualitative disadvantage for the Christians but in which by virtue of their
size,  the  wider  plurality  of  south-west  Asia,  their  involvement  in  civil
administration and commitment to scholarship in a very broad sense ensured
115 Perhaps up to a third of Baghdad's population was Jewish prior to the First World
War, for example.
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they retained a significance to the civil power. East Syriac status altering
substantially as they became a numerically minor community and lacking
the weight  of  numbers  which obliged the  lay élite  to  acknowledge their
significance.  Instead  becoming  a  sectional  group  who  had  a  reduced
importance to the conduct of rule and state administration. Indeed from the
Ottoman era they were to an extent outside of the concerns of the general
administration  because  of  the  self-governance  by  communal  laws  and
customs which the millet system encouraged.
Prior to Baghdad's foundation East Syriac patriarchs had resided in
Veh  Ardashir  (Seleucia)  a  suburb  of  the  Sasanid  capital  Ctesiphon.
Following  the  move  to  Baghdad,  Veh  Ardashir  was  retained  as  the
traditional  site  for  patriarchal  enthronements  and is  from where  the  title
associated with the patriarch ``of Seleucia-Ctesiphon'' is derived. Given that
Ctesiphon  was  also  the  site  of  Sasanid  coronations  the  patriarch  likely
sought  to  emulate  and associate  himself  with  themes  of  sacred  kingship
which were personified by the Shah and to ensure that his manifestation of
Christian authority and jurisdiction aligned with that of the temporal power.
(Cf Kröger 2011)
A noted period of especially high status for the Church of the East in
the city and recognition from the Muslim communities of its significance
came  during  the  life  of  patriarch  Timothy  I  who  was  known  for  his
theological engagements with caliph Al-Mahdi (775–785). (Fiey 1980, 38–
39)
The Mongol invasion of western Asia saw a new dynamic of church-
state relations set for the Church of the East but which varied over time and
by  locality  in  Mesopotamia.  In  Baghdad,  at  least,  the  initial  Mongol
occupation of the city in 1258 saw no adverse effects upon the East Syriac
residents or Christians more widely. The intervention of Mongol élites well
disposed to their new Christian subjects or of Christian belief themselves
saw  the  Baghdadi  Christian  population  spared  from  the  widespread
massacres and looting in the city with tens of thousands of people estimated
to have been killed.  (Fiey OP 1975, 22) During the 1260s Muslim ire was
raised  against  the  Christians  who  temporarily  in  the  ascendant  and
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appearing  to  break  from  the  strictures  and  cultural  boundaries  of  their
dhimmi  social  status  through  Mongol  patronage  were  perceived  to  be  a
threat  to  maintenance  of  Muslim  dominance.  The  East  Syriac  position
became so difficult that the then patriarch Denha I (1265–1281) left the city
for Erbil – returning later in his reign and dying in Baghdad in 1281. (Fiey
OP 1975, 35; Wilmshurst 2000, 184)
Further  Christian persecution took place  in  1295 in Mesopotamia
and Persia following the conversion to Islam of the Il-Khanate Mongol ruler
Gazan  Khan  who  was  initially  zealous  in  advancing  his  new  religion
through active persecution of his Jewish, Buddhist and Christian subjects.116
(Amitai-Preiss  2012) Despite  Patriarch  Yahballah  III's  previously  close
relationship  with  some  Mongol  rulers  and  extensive  knowledge  of  their
culture  he  departed  from  his  residence  in  Baghdad,  following  the
confiscation of church property and appears not to have returned to the city
and at his death in 1317 was buried in the Il-Khanate capital Maragha in
north-western  Persia.  (Wilmshurst  2000,  184) Islam  had  become
increasingly popular among the non-Muslim lower classes under Mongol
rule (both Mongols and natives) in the second half of the thirteenth century
although  a  substantial  minority  of  the  élites  retained  their  Christian,
Buddhist or Shamanist religious affiliation.  (Fiey OP 1975, 54, 63–65) As
Yahballah's successor, Timothy II, was consecrated in Baghdad in 1318 and
moved to reside near Erbil  so his successor Denha II (c.1336–1380) had
limited connections with the city and it is not known if he was enthroned in
Baghdad. (Wilmshurst 2000, 185)
The Christian emir Haggi Togai had some influence in preserving
what  East  Syriac  community  remained  in  Baghdad  in  the  1330s,  for
example, ensuring that previously occupied churches were returned to East
Syriac  ownership.  (Wilmshurst  2000,  184) However,  the  East  Syriac
presence other than a token community likely did not continue beyond 1401
following the widespread destruction which Tamerlane caused in Baghdad.
(Wilmshurst 2000, 185)
116 Shamanism  as  the  traditional  Mongol  religion  was  for  pragmatic  reasons  not
directly attacked.
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The accession of Mongol dominance in south-west Asia presented a
challenge to how church-state relations should proceed. The relief  which
Mongol protection offered an indication of the possibilities which the East
Syriac patriarch and hierarchy could pursue at societal level and to increase
their influence in Mesopotamian society. Christian actions did not take into
account  the  resilience  of  Islam which  was embraced by Gazan Khan in
1290. I suggest this marked a turning point also and the aftermath of Gazan
Khan's conversion clarified that Islam was set for the indefinite future as the
religion of choice for the temporal rulers of societies in which the Church of
the East was present. The Mongols appeared as the final potential hope for
the elevation of East Syriac Christianity to the level of at least a if not the
state religion – with their turn towards Islam the Church of the East resigned
itself  to  dhimmi  status  indefinitely.  Ecclesiologically  significant  also  for
dislodging the patriarch's position to Baghdad and creating a situation which
increased  difficulties  in  cultivating  a  client-patron  relationship  with  the
ruling power. 
The status of the Church at the macro level reliant on forging some
form of  relationship  which  enabled  the  legitimisation  of  the  East  Syriac
community in  Mesopotamia.  Since its  foundation the ``state''  had been a
presence to the conduct of ecclesiastical affairs and from the Synod of Isaac
(410)  held in  Seleucia-Ctesiphon the ``capital''  had been linked with the
headship  of  the  Church of  the  East  and the  contemporary  ruling  power.
Therefore, how should the patriarch navigate the position of disconnection
even  temporarily  from  a  link  with  the  temporal  élite  and  the  loss  of
legitimation  in  Mesopotamian society  which  this  entailed?  In  the  longer
term into the fifteenth century leading to the geographical retreat to northern
Mesopotamia and disintegration of the East Syriac presence south of Mosul.
In the shorter  term weakening the  ability  of  church  leaders  to  present  a
broader vision of scope for the East Syriac community's involvement and a
de facto renunciation of their position in the ostensibly plural societies of
west  Asia.  The  loss  of  Christian  presence  to  Baghdad  then  perhaps  not
necessarily  viewed  as  or  leading  to  the  likely  end  of  the  East  Syriac
relationship with the state in this era but an inhibiting factor to the continued
status  of  the  Christians  as  viewed as  an essential  part  of  Mesopotamian
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society and lowering the confidence of the community in its leadership to
provide  a  sense  of  security  and  protection  to  the  population  which  it
represented.  The community outside of the level of societal  stability and
security  which  the  temporal  power  could  provide  largely  reliant  on  the
protection  offered  by  the  ecclesiastical  organisation  and  its  patronage
networks. If these networks were disrupted or suspended self-reliance on a
communal  wide scale  became of  key significance  for  the functioning of
ordinary  life.  With  the  Church of  the  East  largely  unable  to  call  on  the
support of the coercive or restricting power of the state following the end of
the Mongol empires from the 1330s and until the Ottomans their position
was  precarious.  The  movement  of  the  patriarchs  away  from  Baghdad
perhaps also a policy of following their communities into an exile from the
temporal order. Without a sustainable and active participation at the level of
headship there was less need or benefit of retaining their presence to the
city. Also signalling a loss of a cosmopolitanism to the Church of the East
and for the future a challenge to the re-integration and re-creation of intra-
societal networks: day-to-day interactions and successful engagements with
the authorities taking time to form.
The establishment of a Latin diocese for Baghdad in 1632 probably
aided  the  East  Syriac  restoration  to  the  city  and  from  contemporary
observers  it  appears  there  was  an  East  Syriac  community  of  about  500
people in the early seventeenth century.  (Wilmshurst 2000, 185–186) The
Latin  presence  in  Baghdad  drew  in  interested  parties  from  northern
Mesopotamia  and  a  consolidated  East  Syriac  community  sympathetic  to
union  with  the  Holy  See  seems  likely  to  have  appeared  by  the  late
seventeenth century given the Amidite line patriarch Joseph III (b. ? d 1757)
was from Baghdad. (Wilmshurst 2000, 186)
The Archdiocese of Baghdad is  of great  heritage in the Chaldean
ecclesial structure. It appears the archdiocese was founded with the creation
of the Chaldean community in union with the Holy See under Yohannan
Sulaqa  in  1553 as  the  titular  see  named Babylon.  The formation  of  the
Archdiocese of Baghdad took place simultaneously and was united with the
patriarch's jurisdiction despite his residence in the Mosul region. Suggestive
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of the continued memory of Baghdad's former status as one of the centres of
East Syriac religious life and as one of the centres of Islamic rule in Asia
throughout  the  Medieval  era  and  a  nexus  of  church-state  relations.
Nonetheless,  the  see  of  Baghdad  only  began  to  be  permanently  and
physically occupied when it was given over to an auxiliary bishop in 1938,
Souleyman Kutchouck Ousta (1938–1939), from which time one or more
auxiliaries have been associated with the city due to the concentration of
Chaldeans from the mid-twentieth to early-twenty-first centuries.
From  the  1950s  onwards  Baghdad's  position  as  the  centre  of
Chaldean life in Iraq was strengthened by the sharp rise in the construction
of churches to cope with the demands of the community. When we consider
that until the First World War there were only two churches in the city for c.
7,000 Chaldeans we can note the radical transformation of ecclesial life as
by the end of the twentieth century there were twenty-one parishes serving a
population of possibly as many as 300,000 Chaldeans.  (Khayyath 1896b,
433;  Wilmshurst  2000,  186;  Roberson  CSP  2010) This  movement  of
population tied into the context of Iraqi urbanisation during the twentieth
century and the enmeshing of Chaldeans in this  milieu. This a significant
change when we recall for much of the era fifteenth to nineteenth centuries
Chaldean ecclesiology and organisation had been built around rural village
and  small  town  life  in  northern  Iraq.117 This  change  in  the  dynamic  of
relationship with the bishop whose world was geographically  reduced in
size but responsible for a far greater number of community members within
their jurisdictional remit. Whereas during the Ottoman period the divisions
in  the  East  Syriac  community  by  factions  –  Sulaqite,  legitimist  and
Josephite – saw a proliferation of bishops to a particular region in an effort
to  wield  greater  influence  among  the  community  and  an  aura  of
respectability  and legitimacy  which  could  facilitate  greater  support  from
within the confines of the Ottoman administrative order.
With the re-construction of churches on a large scale for the first
time in  nearly  1,000 years  the  Chaldeans  came particularly  to  coagulate
around the area of Dora but there were churches spread across the centre of
117 Notwithstanding the communities in Kirkuk and Mosul.
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the city. Combined with St Peter's Seminary, various religious foundations,
schools  and  St  Raphael's  hospital,  the  Chaldeans  were  integrated  in  all
levels of Iraqi cultural and social life and were by far the strongest in terms
of influence on Iraqi life among the non-Christian populations especially
following the departure of Iraqi Jews in the 1940s. 
The work of the clergy in this context aided by Chaldean cultural
engagement throughout Baghdadi society which led to a very strong sense
of attachment  to  the city  and the expansion of  publications  in  literature,
poetry, ecclesial magazines and journals with much of this led by the laity.
Thus, when the Chaldean situation began to decline from the mid-1980s the
sense of loss  was significant  to  the ecclesiological  identity  of the whole
church which had come to rely on the success or failure of the Chaldean
presence in Baghdad to produce, lead and maintain the Church throughout
the world. Indeed, at the time which Chaldean cultural and social influence
in Iraq was reaching its highest level since the Abbasid era the population in
Iraq began to dissipate becoming once again and for the first time since the
fourteenth  century  an  international  presence  beyond  the  borders  of  the
Middle East and south-west Asia.
Despite the intensity of fighting which was manifested during the
Iran-Iraq  War  the  capital  was little  directly  affected  even during  the  so-
called ``War of the Cities'' aerial bombing campaign. Nonetheless, the era
was one in which the intensification of identity also took place with the
popular fear of Iran among many Iraqis and especially the implications of its
Islamic Revolutionary government upon the non-Muslim population were it
to  win the war.  Despite  the departure of  some Chaldeans  from Baghdad
during the 1980s to avoid conscription or the general effects of the war the
overwhelming  majority  remained  with  the  final  decline  of  the  Baghdadi
population only beginning as a result of sanctions post-1991. To deal with
these circumstances the clergy of the Archdiocese were in great difficulty
with limited practical means with which to strengthen the coherence of the
Chaldean population beyond their attachment to Iraq and the gradual growth
of hope for a better future. It was only from 2003 that churches began to
close in the face of violence. In the context of the persecution which swiftly
followed  the  invasion  of  March  2003  we  can  note  the  population's
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dissipation  and  the  inability  due  to  violence  and  loss  of  economic
opportunity to remain in the city.  Most strikingly brought to light in the
decline of the number of baptisms as can be see in graphs 8 and 9.118
As we have noted in our remarks on Erbil the effects of an event in
one place  can  lead  to  knock-on effects  in  others  which  was seen  in  the
relationship between the Chaldeans of Baghdad with those of Mosul and the
Nineveh plain. As of 2013, however, the level of decline appeared to have
plateaued at least for a time with those who remained the very determined,
the  poor  or  the  disabled.  In  speaking  with  clergy  in  2014  who  were
previously resident in Baghdad the sense of attachment to the city remained
extremely  strong  even  despite  their  difficult  situation.  Desiring  if  at  all
possible to return and this in part related to the twentieth century Chaldean
association with the city but also the awareness of an East Syriac presence
in  the  city  from  its  foundation  under  the  Abbasids.  This  it  is  felt  is
something which cannot be lost as it is so integral to the sense of East Syriac
and Chaldean identity. Quite apart from the persecutions which Chaldeans
have faced there is a sense of injustice extending to the contributions which
Iraqi  Christians  have  made  to  the  development  of  Baghdad  and  their
subsequent rejection by the wider population. A sense that Chaldeans should
have earned their  right to live in the capital  and have fulfilled a debt to
society and/or completed obligations which even the most biased of Islamist
should see as granting them leave to remain in the city.
In  terms  of  comparative  examples  for  the  twenty-first  century
situation and the levels of ethnic cleansing of the Chaldean population we
might look back to Tamerlane's invasion of 1401 to see similar levels of
destruction.  If  in  the  twenty-first  century  this  is  not  affected  in  such  a
directly destructive manner more recent events still have had the same long
term impact  upon  the  Christians  of  the  East  Syriac  tradition:  departure.
Possibly a better comparison is the situation for the East Syriac communities
in China from the eleventh century where under the Song, Yuan and Ming
dynasties  anti-Christian  campaigns  of  some  violence  along  with  legal
repression and the ambivalence of the population at large contributed to the
118 I was informed the vast majority of the twenty-three Baghdadi Chaldean churches
remain open, however, I was only able to access baptismal data from thirteen parishes.
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gradual decline of the East Syriac community. (Yuanyan 2013, 292)
Ecclesial organisation in Baghdad
As of October 2013 the vast majority of parishes remained open in Baghdad
with only the church of St Joseph the Worker having closed. We can note the
records of baptisms for the communities largely follow the wider trends of
Chaldean  life  and,  as  the  northern  dioceses  declined  in  population,  so
Baghdad  expanded  particularly  from  the  1950s–1970s.  Without  having
visited the city it is difficult to provide as good a ``feel'' for the diocese as
others  discussed  above.  Thus,  this  attempt  at  assessing  the  growth  and
decline of the Archdiocese must be seen in this light. Concurrent with this is
the knowledge of the Chaldean position in Baghdad as distinct from that
anywhere else in the world. We note, for example, the patriarchal residence;
the  unique  status  which  the  city  held  as  a  hub  of  connection  with  the
western political  and religious worlds and a level of social,  material  and
cultural advancement and cohesion for Chaldeans found in few other cities
of Iraq in the twentieth century. 
As reflected in table 15 and graphs 8 and 9 the patriarchal cathedral
of Our Lady of Sorrows enjoyed pre-eminence in the city prior to the 1960s.
From which time there was a gradual movement to other parishes as they
were  established  and  the  population  dispersed  to  those  churches  nearest
their  homes.  Nevertheless,  Mar  Yusif  in  the  Karrada  area  retained  a
substantial  level  of  support  and,  even as  of  2013,  a  large  proportion  of
baptisms still took place in the Cathedral. 
If we compare data of those churches in use prior to 1958 (in table
15)  for  which we have data  we can see although Our Lady of  Sorrows
exceeded all other churches by far Mar Yusif, Karrada saw an increase in
baptisms at a proportionately greater rate in the 1950s.119 Such a change of
focus far from being unprecedented and with the influx of Chaldeans in this
era  an  understandable  spread  of  population.  The  number  of  churches
permitting  choice  not  just  in  favoured  architectural  style  and  liturgical
119 NB data was not available in this instance on a per year basis.
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expression  but  in  preference  of  priest  and  associated  social  and cultural
activities.
That  data  for  the  most  part  is  unavailable  prior  to  1958  is  not
especially concerning given the population was largely based around the
three aforementioned parishes. The only church for which we do not have
data prior to 1958 and which was in use was St John the Baptist. As we
might expect the pattern of baptisms largely follows events in Iraqi society:
• The trend for significant growth at least from 1958 with an equally
significant decline coming from the 1990s. 
• The concentration of the Chaldean population to the capital during
the  Iran-Iraq  War  and  in  most  parishes  either  a  relatively  stable
population or which appears to have grown during the conflict.
• Perhaps most  surprising or  anomalous baptismal  record is  that  of
Mar  Yusif  (Karrada)  which  saw a  rapid  drop  in  the  1970s  from
which it never really recovered. As it was one of the older churches
in  Baghdad  by  the  1970s  it  is  possible  it  either  underwent
renovations during the decade or there was an appeal to becoming a
member of one of the newer churches.
• The decline of parish life especially since 2003 strongly indicative of
Chaldean migration. Also suggestive of the practical difficulties in
sustaining a community which has lost so many members and the
feasibility of the Chaldeans' continued presence to Baghdad. Much
like  Baghdadi  Jews their  fate  perhaps  to  be slowly ground down
socially, culturally and physically until there is no longer any room
for them to manoeuvre in Iraqi society or to manifest the East Syriac
tradition and popularly incarnate Christ's presence in Baghdad.
Baghdad and East Syriac ecclesiology
The consolidation of the patriarchal see in Baghdad in the eighth century
with the foundation of the new Abbasid capital was an attempt by patriarch
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Timothy I to deliberately link the two institutions – Caliph and Patriarch –
and to emphasise a  paradigm of  the normative  nature of  an  East  Syriac
presence to the centre of temporal power.120 Through the knowledge of the
former  ``golden''  era  of  the  East  Syriac  presence  to  Baghdad  under
Timothy's  direction  it  seems  likely  that  this  model  of  proximity  to  the
temporal  élite was present in the mind of Joseph VII Ghanima when he
confirmed the transfer of the Chaldean patriarchate from Mosul to Baghdad
in 1950.
Such a consolidation close to political power in both instances under
Timothy and Joseph influenced by four main factors:
• The patriarch had an understanding that he was leading a significant
community integral to the future development of Mesopotamia-Iraq
and to most effectively represent its interests required maintaining a
substantial if not leading official presence to the city.
• Having lost or been uncertain of a place in new societies – whether
Ummayad, Abbasid, Mongol or under the Iraqi monarchy – to enter
the centre of political  power in Iraq offered an opportunity to re-
create or develop patronage networks and influence with the ruling
élites. This combined with the aggregation of Christians to the city
necessitated  that  to  have  influence  over  the  majority  of  the
community also required them to be resident in close proximity to
the majority.
• The notion of utilising a connection with the state to ensure that the
church  hierarchy  in  the  person  of  the  patriarch  can  consolidate
control over the community. This was perhaps of greater import in
the post-Sasanian era as with the East Syriac community forming
such a relatively large proportion of Mesopotamian society that it
was  necessary  to  re-legitimate  the  patriarch's  ecclesial  authority
through  the  Abbasid  caliphs  as  the  Shah  ratified  ecclesiastical
decisions during Sasanian rule. It likely still played a rôle in the Iraqi
120 Patriarch Henanisho II (773–780) transferred the see to Baghdad in 775 and along
with this movement it is quite possible that Timothy assumed the credit for some other
aspects of Henanisho's work such as the codification of East Syriac canon law and the
missionary efforts in central Asia and China. (Wilmshurst 2011, 115)
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monarchist era as the Chaldean patriarch emerged as the  de facto
leader of all Iraqi Christians – especially with the departure of the
Church of the East's patriarch, Mar Shimun XXIII in 1933 – through
cultivating a relationship with the kings of Iraq expediting requests
for  Christian  advancement  could  take  place  the  church  building
programme which occurred  in  the  city  under  Ghanima being one
example.
• Moving the patriarchate to Baghdad permitted the patriarch to shape
the ecclesiological model and provide a vision for the future of the
church through being in close proximity to a large proportion of his
community. This was significant for influencing how the East Syriac
community over six decades (1950s–2010s) and six hundred years
(eighth–fourteenth  centuries)  would  view  the  significance  of
Baghdad and as to why East Syriac communities chose to remain in
the city even throughout persecution.121
To conclude I can further suggest that the entry into Baghdad for
Ghanima was an attempt at a deliberate break with a pre-existing vision of
Chaldean  ecclesiology  as  necessarily  related  to  northern  Iraq.  Through
situating the church geographically and in its ecclesiastical organisation in
central Iraq Ghanima was reacting to the political changes in the state and
wider Middle East which necessitated that Christians become increasingly
urbanised and in proximity to the political power of the day to ensure the
safeguarding of the community. Were there any doubts to the wisdom of
such a policy Ghanima was in a position to defer to the precedent which
Timothy had established and was practically supported by the majority of
Chaldeans in Iraq becoming resident to the city.
Conclusion: Archdiocese of Baghdad
The displacement of the Chaldeans from Baghdad since 2003 has historical
precedent in the East Syriac context and that on more than one occasion the
121 On the last three points cf Wood (2013, 226–227).
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community  has  been  revivified  to  the  centre  of  temporal  power  in
Mesopotamia-Iraq should not necessarily  imply events of the last  twelve
years have been fatal to the long term recovery of the community to the city.
Nevertheless, the recovery previously having taken nearly 600 years to be
fulfilled indicating a contemporary recovery is it would appear but a hope at
this  time.  How  the  break  between  the  main  body  of  the  community,
dispersed internationally, and the patriarch still resident in Baghdad can be
reconciled could follow the precedent for the substantial distance between
those who were resident in China during the Middle Ages. Yet, with the near
destruction of the community to Baghdad and the persistent undermining of
those who remain what can be done? Ecclesiological imperatives to retain
the Baghdadi Chaldean presence may seem of little import when the safety
of the community as a whole people is threatened by violence. Nonetheless,
the  physical  environment  in  which  a  church  incarnates  its  presence,
community and culture does matter and for however long a recognisable
East Syriac community has been in Mesopotamia it has been substantially
linked  with  the  sites  of  Seleucia-Cteisphon  and  Baghdad.  The  core  of
Chaldean ecclesiological identity would seem to be unsustainable in the face
of such a loss. Without a sufficient critical mass of community members to
represent the church in the city the Chaldeans are no longer able to act as
the Christian difference in Baghdad and the de facto national church of Iraq.
Whereas, for the period 1921–2013, proximity to the leadership of the Iraqi
state permitted the development and maintenance of patronage relationships
with  the  political  élite  and  popular  representation  of  the  Chaldean
community to Baghdadi society.
The decline of a Baghdadi Chaldean presence from 2003 and since
June 2014 lost from Mosul denuding the Chaldeans of essential aspects of
their identity and causing a necessary readjustment of expectation to what
the church means to Iraqi society and as to how the Chaldean patriarch can,
though still resident in Baghdad, administer the community and retain its
ecclesial  unity  in  an  international  and  globalised  context.  By  way  of
comparison for Timothy I his leadership of the East Syriac community was
at  least  over  contiguous  territories  –  one  could  theoretically  walk  from
Baghdad to Khan Balik – and this entailed also a varied if contiguous spread
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of shared ecclesial culture. 
For  Louis  Sako  the  geographical  spread  of  the  contemporary
Chaldean community and its socio-economic diversity inhibit annunciating
a unified and easily shared ecclesial culture. Sako is obliged to  maintain a
Chaldean ecclesiology which meets the distinctive needs and expectations
of  Chaldeans  from San  Diego  to  Aleppo  whilst  also  sustaining  an  East
Syriac  ecclesial  identity  which  draws  on  its  origins  and  continued
incarnation in the Mesopotamian-Iraqi environment.
Archdiocese of Mosul
Mosul's significance and that of the Nineveh plains region to the East Syriac
community can hardly be overstated. For much of the period 1553–1950 the
Nineveh  plain  was  the  focus  of  Chaldean  life  and  even  following  the
patriarchate's  transferral  to  Baghdad  in  1950  it  retained  its  place  as  a
heartland of religious life with Mosul home to the Chaldean seminary of St
Peter122 and the joint Chaldean-Syrian Catholic seminary of St John. Yet
Mosul was not always a site of fixed allegiance to the East Syriac tradition
with  the  West  Syriac  community  making  inroads  to  popular  religious
commitment to the modern era and until the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the city
retained substantial communities of Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholics.
(Wilmshurst 2000, 189; Fiey OP 1959, 18, 25)
As we have noted above regarding Alqosh and Rabban Hormizd we
should  be  careful  not  to  retroactively  apply  importance  to  the  Mosul-
Nineveh region when its status in the late antique and early medieval era to
the East Syriac church was not necessarily then as high as it was to become.
The spread of East Syriac Christian culture,  monasticism and intellectual
life  was  not  confined  to  Nineveh  and  was  one  among  many  normative
aspects of Mesopotamian Christian society. 
Certainly we can speak of a concentrated and long established East
Syriac  community  to  the  Mosul  region  from the  middle  of  the  seventh
122 Until the institution's transfer to Baghdad.
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century when the noted theologian and spiritual writer Isaac was appointed
bishop of Nineveh.123 It appears the diocese continued in to the ninth century
with Mosul itself gaining importance as the residence of the metropolitans
of  the  ecclesiastical  province  of  Adiabene  from  the  ninth  to  twelth
centuries.124 (Wilmshurst 2000, 191) 
From the twelfth century East Syriac bishops continued to reside in
Mosul to the contemporary period with only the invasion by Da'esh bringing
to  an  end  an  uninterrupted  East  Syriac  presence.125 The  Moslawi
ecclesiastical  structures  became  a  focus  of  competition  from  the  mid-
fifteenth century as a result of being closely linked with the institution of the
patriarchate as the diocese became the responsibility of the Natar Kursya.
This  arrangement  continued  from  the  late  fifteenth  to  late  eighteenth
centuries and as such appointment to the diocese was a sign of high favour
and  which  granted  influence  over  local  ecclesial  affairs  and  within  the
Church more widely. (Cf Wilmshurst 2000, 193–196)126 The office of bishop
of  Mosul  becoming  of  even  greater  significance  during  the  competing
claims  between  East  Syriac  factions  in  the  three  centuries  between  the
formation of the Chaldean East Syriac faction under Yohannan Sulaqa in the
1550s to the unification of East Syriac factions around Yohannan Hormizd
as Chaldean patriarch in the 1830s. Occupation of the see and the affiliation
of its inhabitants becoming a marker of the legitimate patriarchal successor's
status in the East Syriac community. In the eyes of the Latin missionaries
Mosul was also significant for its being considered the chief ``prize" in the
123  Latterly known as Isaac ``of Nineveh''.  For further biographical  detail  see the
introductory chapter in Brock (2014).
124 With regards to the nomenclature of ecclesiastical structures in and around Mosul
it is possible that the Church of the East's diocese of Mosul was never formally created.
Instead with the loss in size of the Church's jurisdiction and population the diocese of
``Nineveh" changed in status and name to that of ``Mosul" reflecting the new reality
and the  relative  extent  of  jurisdictional  claims of  the  church  in  the  region.  In  the
context of the decline of Mesopotamian East Syriac ecclesiastical organisation in the
fourteenth century we can perceive as to why de facto changes were incorporated into
diocesan structures.
125 The presence of East Syriac bishops to the city cannot be directly confirmed in the
fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries  but  given  surrounding  activity  such  as  Patriarch
Denha II's  residence  in  Karamles in  the  mid-fourteenth century  and known scribal
activity in manuscript production it is quite possible a bishop was present to the city.
(Wilmshurst 2000, 207–208)
126 Mosul  retained  such  a  status  into  the  twenty-first  century  with  the  Chaldean
Archbishop of Mosul considered the second most important figure in the Church after
the patriarch.
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East Syriac ecclesiastical organisation.
Even from the presence of Latin missionaries to the city from the
1630s  it  took some time before  the  city  itself  was brought  entirely  into
affiliation with the Chaldean East Syriac faction. The start of the Chaldean
movement in the city came via the interest of one `Heder, son of Maqdassi
Hormizd' who likely started along the path of union with the Holy See as
result  of  Capuchin  missionary  influence  and whose  order  had  a  mission
station in the city from 1636–1724.  (Fiey OP 1959, 56) Notably the East
Syriac communities external to the city were all in union with the Holy See
by the end of the eighteenth century but it was only with the resolution of
the  competition  for  patriarchal  leadership  between  the  legitimist  and
Josephite  factions  in  the  nineteenth  century  that  the  Chaldeans  began to
make inroads among the East Syriacs of Mosul itself.  (Wilmshurst 2000,
190) The long term consolidation of the Chaldean project becoming tied to
the city with it retaining one of the final communities of the non-Chaldean
East Syriac faction in the region.
In a move which appears to have been intended to consolidate the
Chaldean presence in central  Mesopotamia Baghdad's  ecclesial  structures
were absorbed into that of Mosul from 1863. (Wilmshurst 2000, 199) Given
the relatively small size of the Baghdadi Chaldean community at the time
this was a pragmatic change and brought Chaldeans in the city into a more
normal ecclesial arrangement as the diocese of Baghdad had had limited use
to that time in the Chaldean context.  On a practical basis  the two zones
within the ``patriarchal archdiocese'' were administered separately. 
There  was  perhaps  a  difference  in  leadership  style  between
successive  patriarchs  as  to  how  they  viewed  their  responsibilities  in
diocesan and ecclesial  administration.  There was a  twenty-four  year  gap
between  the  first  and  second  patriarchal  vicars'  appointments  for  Mosul
from 1870–1894. Joseph VI Audo being involved in controversy with the
Holy See in the 1870s perhaps in reaction asserting a more direct style of
control  over  his  communities  in  Mesopotamia.  His  successor  Eliya  XIV
Abulyonan only appointing a patriarchal vicar four years prior to his death
suggesting that regardless of Audo's concerns the communities may have
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been comfortably able to govern themselves without the need for external
oversight  or  that  administering  his  archdiocese  was  well  within  his
capabilities.127
Moslawi  Christian  life  was  complicated  by  the  often  less  than
hospitable nature of local Sunni administrators, the relative independence of
local governors from Ottoman central rule at times and the more modern
controversies as to the lawful governing power: whether Turkey or Iraq after
the First World War. Such a set of circumstances further complicated by the
strength of the Kurds and the Iraqi army campaigns in opposition to their
presence. Further complicated by the 1990s and the Kurdish capability to
project influence over the territory in and around Mosul. The parishes of the
contemporary diocese being no stranger to this with churches in Telkef and
Karamles  under  KRG authority,  for  example,  whereas  the  other  parishes
remained under ICG control.
Modern Chaldean identity and connections to Mosul whilst crucial
even after 1950 were gradually weakened. The élite factions of the modern
state of Iraq and the Chaldean Church came to fruition in general through
their  presence in  Baghdad with Mosul  missing out on the flourishing of
Chaldean life which was so strongly developed in the capital.
Ecclesial organisation in Mosul Archdiocese
The archdiocese since 2003 has become the epitome of Christian decline in
Iraq with the situation in the city particularly challenging and faced with
difficulties related to the conduct of Christian life in the context of very
rigorous  expressions  of  Sunni  law  and  culture.  The  resilience  of  the
Chaldeans  to  remain  deliberately  weakened  through  violent  persecution
more destructive than any other city of Iraq with the exception of Baghdad
evidenced most clearly in the martyrdom of Archbishop Paulos Faraj Raho
and Fr Ragheed Ganni and his sub-deacons.
127 By way of comparison in 2013 the Archbishop of Erbil had responsibility for c.
35,000 Chaldeans (a figure similar to the Chaldean population of the Nineveh region in
1913)  and  had  no  appointed  auxiliary  or  suffragan  bishops  for  assistance  in
administering the community.
                                                              254
In this context, we are fortunate to have data from Mosul, due to the
many difficulties with which parish life is associated in and around the city.
The earliest  figures for the Archdiocese come from 1870 in the town of
Telkef which has held a pre-eminent position in Chaldean life. The lack of
data from Mosul itself in this period owing to the relative youth of some of
the parishes in Mosul city – as Chaldean institutions – due to the long term
dominance of the Church of the East in the city until the nineteenth century. 
The increase in the number of baptisms in the city as seen in graph
10  was tied to  economic growth in  Mosul  but  also  a  feeling of  relative
security  with  which  the  city  was  associated  in  terms  of  freedom  from
violence during the Iraqi-Kurdish wars. Nonetheless, Chaldean life in Mosul
was  not  straightforward.  The  context  of  residing  in  an  area  which  was
staunchly and actively Sunni restricted Christian social life. It being related,
for example, how during the 1940s and 1950s that certain areas of the city
were avoided by Christian students when walking to school as an openly
hostile reaction could be expected from the Muslim inhabitants.
Mosul (city)
As of 1959 the following Chaldean churches were in use in the city: 
Mar Isha'ya 
Mar Shemon as-Safa (St Peter the Apostle) 
Mar Gewargis 
Mar Meskinta the Martyr (Chaldean cathedral and patriarchal seat to 1950) 
Mar Pethyon 
Mar Yusif 
Umm al Ma`una (Our Lady of Perpetual Succour) 
The convent church associated with the Dominican religious128
As of 2013:
Mar Ishya
128 For an in-depth historical and architectural account of all the churches see Fiey
(1959, passim)
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Mar Meskinta the Martyr
Umm al Ma`una
Al-Tahira
Cathedral of Mar Polos
Mar Ephrem (closed and severely damaged)
Holy Ghost (closed)
Mart Mariam (closed)129
The parishes in Mosul appear to have had generally stable populations until
the invasion of 2003 from which time they have trailed off to subsistence
level. It is notable that even at times when population expansion might be
expected it is not uniform across the city with, for example, Mar Ephrem,
Mar Yusif and Mar Ishiya's baptismal rates declining after the Gulf War yet
those of Perpetual Succour and Mar Polos increasing. A state of affairs for
which an explanation is not readily forthcoming as direct fieldwork could
not be carried out to the city. It is possible as Perpetual Succour was a very
well  known centre  of  Chaldean activity  and Mar Polos the archdiocesan
cathedral that resources were especially concentrated in these parishes.
Holy Ghost parish
The growth and decline of Holy Ghost church from 1997–2008 in large part
due  to  the  inspirational  leadership  of  some  of  the  clergy  including  Fr
Ragheed Ganni but whose martyrdom in 2008 marked the  de facto end of
the use of the church and it appears in the following years the departure
from Mosul  by a  substantial  proportion  of  the  then  remaining Chaldean
population. As available information about Fr Ragheed and his parish are
more well developed than any other his experience and the church of the
Holy Ghost will be used as a brief case study for the Chaldean community
in Mosul. 
The  first  indication  of  a  violent  change  in  circumstances  for  the
129 Source: clergy of the Diocese of Mosul
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native Christians of Mosul130 was in August and December 2004 where the
cathedral of Mar Polos and the bishop's residence were attacked. The wider
context for Moslawi Chaldeans was the city's rise to prominence as the main
hub  for  the  organisation  of  Baathist  and  Islamist  anti-Coalition  forces
following the March 2003 invasion. Mosul's Sunni Arab character coalesced
with these two groupings and one fed off the other creating an environment
in which the Islamists could be relied on as the ``muscle'' and the Baathist
element as the ``brains''. That both were willing to work together indicative
of the loss of secularist mentality among the Baathists during Husain's final
years in power and a  milieu in which party stalwarts  such as Tariq Aziz
could not comfortably have mixed.
The pressure on the Christian presence and identity as a whole to
Mosul became increasingly intense. The campaign against Fr Ragheed and
his parish being pursued in a consistent and combative manner suggesting
that his leadership qualities and charisma were acknowledged as a threat and
obstacle to advancing an Islamist paradigm. Yet even in a context where the
payment of  jizya was established there continued efforts to see the violent
diminution of the Christians and the obligation for the Sunni population to
become involved in a seemingly widespread ambivalence to their removal.
Facing persecution from a section of the population even violent attacks are
in  some  respects  incomparable  with  the  withdrawal  of  normal  social
interaction by neighbours and the demonisation of your community on an
ideological basis which weakens social bonds to the point where violence
against you is regarded as a normative means for conducting social relations
and the resolution of difference.
The church of the Holy Ghost was seriously damaged by terrorists to
the point of closure in August 2004. The damage sustained it was hoped
could be repaired and within a year the church could be back to full use.
However,  at  the  time  at  which  parish  activity  was  returning  to  a  more
normal state in 2006 it faced four attacks during September and October
with Mass being celebrated in the basement under police protection. One
Chaldean stating in September 2006 after one of the attacks , ` ``Our faith is
a challenge to violence. The militias fear us because our faith is stronger
130  A group of protestant missionaries had earlier been murdered in 2003.
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than their bullets''  '.  (Asianews.it 2006a) Such a response characterising a
redemptive  approach  to  the  suffering  which  was  experienced  through
claiming the difficulties which they experienced the Chaldeans in a position
to offer their spiritual action with a Faith that could overcome the world. (1
John V:4–5). Moreover, exhibiting in a very strong way the characterisation
of martyrs and witnessing their Faith – and bravery – to those who sought
their removal. 
October  2006  also  saw  a  particularly  distressing  incident  which
brought into focus the difficulties facing priests: Fr Polos Eskander of the
Syrian  Orthodox  Church  was  kidnapped  and  beheaded  in  Mosul.  The
manner of his death to become an increasing method of murder used by the
Islamist  forces  and  was  a  brutal  manifestation  of  the  policy  which  the
Islamists  would  use  to  destroy  the  community  from  the  top  in  highly
publicised  incidents  ensuring  that  any  feelings  of  security  were  entirely
destroyed among the Christian population. Another method was to weaken
the  institutions  which  supported  the  churches  in  their  contributions  to
Moslawi society and to deny the Christians opportunity for presenting the
significance of their presence to wider society. Caritas Mosul was forced to
close in November 2006 following demands for the payment of protection
money with the implication that refusal would result in violence. Despite the
focus of the work being on supporting the homeless and clients of whom
ninety  percent  were Muslim Caritas  faced little  alternative  option  but  to
suspend its work indefinitely. (Asianews.it 2006b)
The  situation  continued  to  be  tense  into  the  next  year.  On  Palm
Sunday 2007 a police station near to Holy Ghost church was attacked and
shots could be heard by those inside the church. Fr Ragheed described the
situation:  `  ``At this  point  we felt  like Jesus  when he entered Jerusalem
knowing that the Cross would be the consequence of His love for man...So
we offered our own suffering as a token of love for Jesus.'' '  (Asianews.it
2007) Meeting persecution in this way one of the few means by which the
Chaldeans could still positively respond to their situation. Entering into the
Passion of Christ and sharing in this a mentality which could strengthen the
Chaldeans spiritually if  not materially resolve their  situation.  Union with
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Christ  being  that  element  of  their  lives  which  the  faithful  could  not  be
denied by their attackers and permitted them to enter into the suffering of
Christ in a very particular and real manner.
It was also enough for attackers to act violently if infrequently to
alter the conduct of Christian life. We should recall violent incidents did not
necessarily happen every day but were sufficiently regular and serious for a
sense  of  normality  to  be impossible  to  retain  and ecclesial  life  becomes
obliged to alter as a result. 
The perceived necessity to expedite Mosul's  transformation into a
Sunni enclave through territorial expansion and the expulsion of supposedly
alien persons also underlay efforts to weaken the Christian presence. As the
lay and religious elements of being a Chaldean are inseparable it was not the
case  that  simply  by  hiding  their  religious  activities  or  closing  all  the
churches  the Chaldeans  could  maintain  their  livelihoods in  the city.  The
option with which they were being presented was to leave or remain and
suffer  until  Islamists  effaced  the  Christian  ethos,  culture,  people  and
material heritage of the city.131
In the aftermath of Fr Ragheed's death and then that of Abp Raho
attacks on churches but also harassment, assaults, kidnappings and murders
of community members increased in number and the deterioration of life led
only  the  very  resilient  to  remain.  If  your  culture  and  presence  is  being
effaced and less than fifty miles away is relative security in the Kurdish
administered provinces in which a Chaldean ecclesial culture in which you
can  take  a  full  part  is  being  developed  other  than  with  a  very  strong
ideological belief in the necessity of staying and heroic fortitude what will
you do?
Such  degree  of  persecution  far  from without  precedent  in  Sunni
contexts. Muslim violence against Christians for an indefinite period with
the  purpose  of  eradicating  their  presence  a  feature  of  Tamerlane's
campaigns, the rule of some Abbasid and Mongol leaders and exemplified
in  the  1915–1918 massacres.  Suggesting  that  violent  methods  for  Sunni
expansion in territory and the alteration of culture to a Sunni paradigm are
131 To my knowledge the majority of Moslawi churches – of all denominations – were
attacked at least once from March 2003–June 2014.
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effective – the loss of an East Syriac presence in eastern Asia Minor the
clearest testimony. Whether Mosul's Islamists in 2003 were fully cognisant
of these precedents and their significance to the Chaldeans is not known but
the manifestation of violence to rub away an irritation to the sacred space in
which Sunni culture could be enforced was the practical outcome of their
actions  and in  accord  with  these  historical  attempts  to  deny a  Christian
difference  in  Mesopotamian-Iraqi  societies  inspired  by  religious
motivations.
Conclusion: Mosul (city)
As has been noted above the deaths of Raho and Ganni should have been
more  concerning  to  external  and  interested  powers  to  Iraq.  The  lack  of
response  or  ambivalence  to  their  fates  seemingly  making  their  deaths  a
justifiable aspect of the new Iraq. Removing Chaldean leaders consequently
brutalising  the  Church  as  a  whole  and  denigrating  the  ecclesial  offices,
archdiocese and parish which the two men represented. The assumption that
Chaldeans as Christians and as Catholics are not only inferior but that their
inferiority permits such treatment and grants legitimacy to Sunni led actions
and  the  cultural  victory  of  sharia inspired  principles  and  the  territorial
expansion of the Sunni umma.
Telkef
Telkef may be a relatively young East Syriac community to the Nineveh
plain  with  the  town's  foundation  perhaps  only  taking  place  in  the  late
fourteenth  or  early  fifteenth  century  possibly  owing  to  the  trend  of
patriarchs from Yahballah III onwards to reside in northern Mesopotamia
and the consolidation of  the  East  Syriac  communities  in  the region.  (Cf
Wilmshurst 2000, 205) In a Chaldean context the town had its status inflated
to that of a diocese by Sulaqite patriarch Abdisho IV in 1562 who compiled
a list of East Syriac sees supposedly loyal to him in an attempt to impress
the Holy See of the vitality of his ecclesial organisation.  (Fiey OP 1965b,
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II:359) It seems unlikely Telkef held Chaldean diocesan status at that time in
actual fact but perhaps Abdisho named a cleric as titular bishop of the town
and Chaldean sympathies seem to have stuck with it  being the first  East
Syriac community in the Nineveh region to become majority Chaldean in its
ecclesial  affiliation  with  several  Chaldean  patriarchs  subsequently
originating from the town. Joseph II of the Amidite line, for example, was
born  there  in  1667  and  a  Chaldean  inclined  group  of  clergy  signed  a
document rejecting their supposed ``Nestorian'' errors in 1719 presumably
with the intention of impressing local Latin missionaries of their desire for
recognition in  the Chaldean community.  (Wilmshurst  2000,  224–225;  Cf
Fiey OP 1965b, II:360)
Certainly we can recognise Telkef's significance to the Chaldeans in
the nineteenth century with it providing a range of clergy to the community:
lay and monastic. (Wilmshurst 2000, 223, 226) The town's position between
Mosul  and Rabban Hormizd a  convenient  ``halfway point''  between two
centres of East Syriac activity. Moreover, as Mosul's East Syriacs largely
retained their allegiance to the legitimist faction into the nineteenth century
whereas Telkef acted as a point of Chaldean concentration in the East Syriac
heartland and the consolidation and expansion of the community in union
with the Holy See in Nineveh took place at this juncture.
The significance of the town to the Chaldeans in the early twentieth
century was seen with major reconstruction work started on the main Telkefi
church of Mar Kyriakos which on completion, in 1931, meant it was one of
if not the largest church in Iraq at that time.  (Fiey OP 1965b, II:367) The
necessity  of  expansion  of  church  facilities  both  to  reinforce  Chaldean
identity, to incarnate the Chaldean presence in Telkef and to meet the needs
of  the  population  which  was  steadily  expanding.  Nonetheless,  a  striking
feature of the baptismal data from Telkef is the inconsistency of the number
of  baptisms  for  much  of  the  era  1870–1940  even  if  the  growth  of  the
community is clear in general terms with it peaking by the 1950s. This is
partly  tied  to  the  violence  which  marred  life  during  the  era:  direct
persecution,  wars  and  their  knock-on  effects  but  also,  it  seems  likely
affected  by  the  agricultural  economy  around  which  so  much  of  life  in
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Mesopotamia-Iraq revolved particularly prior to modern urbanisation. We
do well  to recall  the significance of the conduct of day-to-day life when
affected by the success or failure of crops each year with subsequent knock-
on effects on the number of children born. That being said the Chaldeans, of
all the Christians in Iraq, were in the most stable position with regards to
ecclesial structures during the early twentieth century which suggests why
Telkef was expanding at such a rate in the years prior to the First World War.
This  then  may be  a  cause  for  the  restoration  of  the  level  of  population
relatively  rapidly  even  during  the  difficult  years  of  Iraqi  risorgiomento
which the new state  underwent  in  the 1920s and 1930s.  By contrast  the
decline  of  the  Telkef  parish  has  been  far  less  volatile  with  the  1960s
signalling  a  rapid  change  with  only  the  Iran-Iraq  War  era  indicating
something of a revival and this only transitory. In 1957 there were 7,307
inhabitants of which the majority were Chaldean – Fiey noting that there
were 900 Chaldean families in the town in 1961 which likely accounted for
well  over  half  the  total  population.  (Fiey  OP 1965,  II:355  n.  1)  This,
however, a decline from the population size at the end of the Ottoman era
(8,000 Chaldeans in 1913) reflecting migration to Mosul and further afield.
(Wilmshurst 2000, 199) A demographic change in this instance driven by
the free choice of the community and not a reactionary policy driven by
conflict  or  persecution  with  Telkef's  baptismal  rate  beginning  to  rapidly
decline  from the  start  of  the  community  wide  transfer  of  population  to
central and southern Iraqi cities in the 1960s.
Karamles
I  do  not  have  data  for  Karamles  prior  to  the  1960s  so  it  is  difficult  to
determine if it was affected in the same way as Telkef but given it retained a
relatively  stable  baptismal  rate  to  the  1990s  I  suggest  the  population  of
Karamles perhaps had less of a tradition of migration among its community.
Telkef having been famous for the entrepreneurial nature of its community
and propensity for migration. One example being the substantial control of
riverboat transport services in central and southern Iraq by former residents
                                                              262
of the town since the nineteenth century.
Karamles is of some significance as one of the earliest known East
Syriac communities in the Nineveh plain from at least 562. (Fiey OP 1965b,
II:401) The  town  was  brought  to  prominence  during  the  leadership  of
Patriarch Denha II (1336–1381) who moved the patriarchal see there from
Baghdad and it is possible that Denha was himself consecrated patriarch in
the town. (Cf Wilmshurst 2000, 184) Whatever position Karamles may have
held in  the East  Syriac ecclesiastical  order its  relegation from the extant
written records until the 1560s perhaps suggestive of a loss of significance
and reflection of the general East Syriac qualitative decline in the fifteenth
century.  The  re-emergence  in  the  written  record  due  to  the  copying  of
manuscripts in the town especially from the early eighteenth century with
Chaldean manuscripts at least from the 1720s with a Dominican missionary,
P. Lanza OP, arriving in Karamles in 1765. (Wilmshurst 2000, 219; Fiey OP
1965b,  II:405) The  mid-eighteenth  century  marks  a  consolidation  of  the
Latin and Chaldean presence to the town with the church of St Barbara –
possibly  the  first  explicitly  ``Catholic''  church  in  Mesopotamia  –  dating
from the mid-eighteenth century.  (Fiey OP 1965b, II:405) As of 2013 this
church  was  largely  no  longer  used except  as  a  shrine  with  local  people
having a strong devotion to the martyr. The current main church is that of St
Addai which was built in 1963.132
As  of  2013  Karamles  is  recognisably  a  Chaldean  dominated
settlement and has since 2003 not faced an overt difficulty in sustaining a
Chaldean culture. Departing migrants have been replaced by new arrivals
with  the  town  in  fact  growing  in  size  over  the  ten  year  period  from
approximately  500  families  (c.  2,500  people)  to  820  families  (c.4,000
people).133 Karamles political status was related to its geographical position
as being on the border of KRG and ICG spheres of influence. The town's
budget is granted by the ICG governor of Mosul but allowances are also
received from the KRG. The efforts by the Kurds to gain further influence
132 Other extant, if little used, churches include Mart Mariam and Mar Gewargis. The
churches  of  Mar  Yonan,  Mar  Youkana  and  the  Church  of  the  Forty  Martyrs  were
destroyed by the Persian ruler Nadir Shah in 1743.
133 Chaldeans are not the only religious community with about 35 Shabak families
also resident. A community which largely describe themselves as following a type of
Shiism.
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among the Christians come through permitting Syriac to be taught in local
schools but also including Kurdish in the curriculum. There was no especial
opposition  to  Kurdish  language  instruction  expressed  and  it  is  entirely
pragmatic to take on the language of the dominating temporal power and
something which the East Syriac community have always done. However, in
so doing in the immediate the Chaldeans are unsettled because their political
allegiance is theoretically still to the Mosul governorate which has an Arab
Sunni ethos  strongly opposed to  alternative foci  of linguistic,  cultural  or
religious expression.
In  2013 for  the  Chaldeans  of  Karamles  until  there  was  a  lasting
resolution in political control over the town their identity remained in flux –
inhibited in adhering to an official allegiance to either ICG or KRG. As we
have seen  a  situation  far  from uncommon in  the  Chaldean communities
across  the  borders  of  the  Kurdish and Iraqi  administered  provinces.  The
situation is similar as for those East Syriacs who were resident on the border
of  empires  during  periods  of  Roman-Sasanian  conflict  and  diplomatic
intrigue – both empires holding points of contention for the Christians who
could  identify  with  both  through  culture,  religion  and  language.  The
Chaldeans  of  Karamles  in  2013,  for  example,  looking  to  Mosul  and
Baghdad as historical centres of their religion and yet separated from them
in  a  similar  way  perhaps  to  Christians  who  having  fled  theological
disagreements in the Roman world entered the Sasanian Empire and looked
back to Antioch or Nicaea as once great bastions of their religious culture
and beliefs yet finding a degree of security for their Christology under the
Sasanians  in  the  same way that  Christians  under  KRG influence  gained
physical security.
Conclusion: Archdiocese of Mosul
In not having had the opportunity to visit Mosul itself the portrayal of the
Archdicoese is  far  from complete.  Yet  in  documenting the Mosul  region
even without Mosul we are able to illuminate the reality of East Syriac life
and Christians' radical and enforced separation from Iraqi society as a whole
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which  is  largely  so  alien  to  Mesopotamian-Iraqi  history.  Indeed,  the
approach  to  the  progressive  exclusion  of  Christians  from  supposedly
Muslim ``lands'' is unusual outside of specific mosques or some cities in the
Arabian peninsula. This cleaving of the Christian presence in Mosul itself
completed by Da'esh's expansion from June 2014. An expansion ending the
region's continuous Christian presence since at least the sixth century.
The  Mosul-Nineveh  region  is  one  of  contrasts  with  the
sectarianisation  of  society  and  then  its  homogenisation  by  Sunni
communities to one religious culture incapable of meeting the challenge of
or incorporating difference. Such a set of circumstances reflecting both the
resilience and weakness of the East Syriac communities. Resilience insofar
as it has taken nearly 1400 years for the East Syriac communal presence to
be extinguished and weakness in the realisation that Sunni Islam without
some acquiescence to difference or sense of restraint can become a vehicle
for violent transformation of society – something which the Chaldeans are
unable to oppose. East Syriacs able to freely organise and operate with the
assumption  of  Muslim  temporal  powers  having  appreciation  of  their
difference but in the contemporary era with reduced populations have no
means of materially securing their position (via a militia) nor the support of
an external power sufficiently sympathetic to physically defend them. When
the  assumption  of  Sunni  superiority  became  actualised  through  the
implementation  of  sharia and  encouragement  to  jihad by  Da'esh  the
Chaldeans  of  Mosul  discovered  the  Muslim population's  ambivalence  to
their situation was transformed quickly into acceptance of their removal and
complicity in the re-ordering of the social order.
It  will  be  challenging  to  recover  the  Chaldean  ecclesial  identity
which was created and developed in Mosul in its fullness. The city used to
be looked to for leadership, now it represents a material Chaldean defeat and
withdrawal  from  Iraqi  society.  A  resurrection  of  Chaldean  life  to  the
Nineveh region for the time being impossible, however, this does not mean
the  community's  historical  contributions  will  be  extinguished  from  East
Syriac  life  and  ecclesiology.  Intangible  metaphysical  notions  of  what  it
means to be a Chaldean of Mosul cannot be so easily excised from history
as church buildings.  St  Athanasius  whilst  writing during the Arian crisis
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referred to the true victory which his faithful could expect over those who
had materially occupied ecclesial property: 
`May God comfort you. I know moreover that not only this thing saddens you, but also
the fact that while others have obtained the churches by violence, you are meanwhile
cast out from your places. For they hold the places, but you the Apostolic Faith. They
are, it is true, in the places, but outside of the true Faith; while you are outside the
places indeed, but the Faith, within you. Let us consider whether is the greater, the
place or the Faith. Clearly the true Faith. Who then has lost more, or who possesses
more? He who holds the place, or he who holds the Faith? Good indeed is the place,
when the Apostolic Faith is preached there, holy is it if the Holy One dwell there.'
(Athanasius 1891, 550–551)
Is such a scenario so alien to those Chaldeans now forced into exile and 
pushed to the borders of Iraqi society because of their Christianity?
6. The Chaldean community in Jordan
As we have noted Chaldean population movement on a large scale has been
a constant factor in the community's history in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. Consideration will now be given of migration external to Iraq to
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
Iraqi Christian migration to Jordan has been mentioned in studies by
Sassoon  (2009) and  Chatelard  (2002) but  without  consideration  of  the
particular  Jordanian  context  and  its  importance  to  the  eastern  and  Latin
Catholic communities nor the ecclesiological significance of the Chaldean
presence  to  Jordan.  Estimates  have  been  given  to  as  many  as  30,000
Chaldeans transferring through or residing in Jordan since 2003 but to my
knowledge  no  study  has  considered  the  importance  of  Jordan  to  the
Chaldeans. This lack of study is reflected in the lack of attention with which
the Chaldeans of Jordan have been afforded by their own hierarchy with
only one Chaldean chaplain resident in the country at any one time and this
despite the spread of the population throughout the country and not just to
Amman where the chaplain is resident.
Studies on the effects of Iraqi Christian migration to north America
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and continental Europe have been completed and it seems an optimum time
to provide an opening for studies of eastern Catholic migrants to Jordan and
to introduce a widening of the scope of studies undertaken by Atto (2011),
Hanoosh  (2008) and  Sengstock  (1974) and  to  place  migration  into  the
context of church history rather than allowing it to remain purely considered
from an anthropological or sociological perspective.
A sense  of  ecclesiological  self-awareness  even  if  not  explicitly
understood as such is nourished through the built and natural environment in
which  one  resides.  To  be  removed  from this  and  to  traverse  significant
distances geographically and culturally the sense of self and attachment to
religious identity can be altered. In instances where Chaldeans migrate to
North  America  and  Australasia  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Europe  this
displacement  appears  not  to  entail  as  extensive  separation  from  the
community or Chaldean religious identity. The overall size of the Chaldean
presence and its incarnation in the American environment very strong, for
example, in Detroit and San Diego with California also home to the only
Chaldean seminary (Mar Abba in El Cajon) outside of Iraq.
In Jordan the population is faced with the challenge of retaining its
cohesion as a Chaldean ecclesially oriented group when several other more
easily accessible communities can be attended. The situation is compounded
by the lack of an ecclesial structure and proximity of trauma to the conduct
of day-to-day life in refugee camps to the humiliation of being obliged to
accept low paid jobs despite formerly higher socio-economic status in Iraq.
The lack of structure in the immediate term and having been faced with
relocation weakens the ability to maintain an expression of identity in an
often alien environment. When the reason for leaving Iraq is primarily due
to religious identity to find a lack of structure with which to uphold religious
identity  in  the  diaspora  is  a  substantial  issue  of  concern  and  for  the
continuance  of  or  desire  to  remain  part  of  the  Church  and  express  a
Chaldean identity.
Jordan  has  historically  served  as  a  transfer  point  for  Christian
migrants and in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war an increased trend began
for families to travel there either directly from Iraq or via Syria prior to
onward travel to the West. Overshadowing the Chaldean presence in Jordan
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is  the  sense  that  the  community  is  foreign  by  never  having  seen  an
established  Chaldean  ecclesiastical  organisation  and  the  complicated
relationship  which  has  existed  between Iraqi  and Jordanian  governments
since the foundation of each state after the First World War. Both countries
ruled by members of the Hashemite family but Jordan, unlike Iraq, retaining
its  monarchy to the present.  Despite the sometimes fractious relationship
between the two countries a substantial minority of Iraqis have resided in
the Kingdom with Jordan becoming a prominent home for Iraqi political
exiles during the rule of Saddam Husain. The geographical proximity and
Western influenced culture of Jordan with less strongly enforced paradigms
of Arab nationalism meaning it was perceived as a more ``liberal" option
than  Iraq  for  those  whose  views  and  personal  ties  clashed  with  that  of
Husain and the Iraqi Baath Party.
Shared  by  Jordan  and  Iraq  was  a  broadly  sympathetic  attitude
towards the maintenance of their Christian populations among the political
élites. Seen, for example, in the affection which the present monarch, King
Abdullah II,  continues to hold the work of the churches in Jordan which
contribute large cultural, economic and educational influence to Jordanian
society with Christians forming about five percent of the total population.
There is also an awareness that the Jordanian monarchy is one of the de jure
guardians of the Holy Land and its various shrines – notwithstanding the
state of Israel's occupation of East Jerusalem – a rôle which the monarchy
takes  very  seriously  and  widens  his  interest  in  the  Jordanian  Christian
constituency. The stake which the Jordanians have in this rôle is bound up
with maintaining the Christian population of Jordan and another reason for
resolving to defend a type of religious pluralism in the Kingdom. 
Chaldean origins to Jordan
Prior to the late nineteenth century no Chaldean presence to the Transjordan
region  is  recorded  and  an  East  Syriac  presence  to  the  Holy  Land,
particularly to Jerusalem, appears to have lost an ecclesiastical structure by
the early eighteenth century.  (See Brock 2006) However, it seems unlikely
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that East Syriac pilgrims would have perceived this as a reason not to travel.
The  first  arrival  of  Chaldeans  seems  to  have  been  from the  late
nineteenth century and consolidated with the establishment of a Patriarchal
Exarchate in 1908 by Emmanuel II Thomas. It is possible an increase in the
Chaldean population took place at the end of the First World War with the
opportunity  for  a  complete  break  with  the  tragic  events  in  northern
Mesopotamia and eastern Asia Minor during the war provoking some to
travel to Transjordan. The familiarity with British Imperial influence to and
in  Mesopotamia  also  perhaps  a  cause  of  increased  interest  in  migrating
there. 
Whether  the  Chaldean  patriarchal  vicar  of  Jerusalem would  have
responsibility also for the Chaldeans in Transjordan is unclear. Following
the loss of East Jerusalem to the state of Israel it seems plausible he would
have split his duties as required.134  Certainly until 2002 there was no formal
Chaldean ecclesial structure in Jordan with those resident either attending
Latin or other eastern Catholic communities. It is unclear when the regular
celebration of the Chaldean liturgy began but I presume at least from the
1990/91 Gulf War that a priest would visit to minister to the community. 
April  2002  saw  the  establishment  of  the  Chaldean  Patriarchal
Vicariate for Jordan under the leadership of Fr Raymond Moussali who has
remained as the incumbent priest to the present. The community is focused
on the parish of the Sacred Heart in Jebel al-Weibdeh, Amman out of which
is operated the usual liturgical services;  Sunday school and more regular
informal educational classes and serves as a point of contact for Chaldeans
resident in Amman and Jordan more widely.135
134 There  were  four  patriarchal  vicars  for  the  period  1908–2011.  Bishop  Ishaq
Khoudabash initially, followed by Fr Boutros Sha'ya (1955–1978). His successors were
not Chaldean: Fr Henri Gouillon (1980–1990) and Fr Paul Collin (1990–2011). Please
note that owing to the extremely limited information on this subject area I have been
unable to confirm the dates of Bishop Ishaq's time as patriarchal vicar other than some
period of 1908--1955. Even the usually comprehensive directory maintained by the
Latin community from where some information was gained is not clear on this matter.
(Directory of the Catholic Church in the Holy Land 2012, 110)
135 It was notable that there were no members of the Church of the East encountered
during fieldwork. In discussion with NGO workers it was stated that they did not have
a  presence  at  least  in  Amman.  This  is  possible  but  with  the  size  of  the  Chaldean
population I would suggest it is more likely there was a limited awareness of ecclesial
difference than that the Church of the East is absent entirely. The Christian culture of
                                                              269
The status of the Chaldean community in the 
Jordanian Christian context
The situation for Chaldeans in Jordan is difficult. Heavy reliance on their
continued presence is placed on the hospitality of the monarchy; Christian
Jordanian society and the general trend for the Hashemite Kingdom to be
viewed as a point of transfer for Christian communities. The situation is also
aided by the tradition of Jordan acting as a point of refuge for large numbers
of displaced persons in the Levant especially Palestinians. That being said a
wider concern is as to the physical capability of Jordanian society to retain
its  cohesion  through  introducing  any  more  people.  There  is  a  fear  of
repeating problems which occurred with Palestinian population movement
to the Kingdom in 1948 and 1967 and to the growth of stateless groups
within  Jordan's  borders  and over  which  the  Jordanian  state  has  de facto
responsibility. (Jaar 2008)
The general culture of Jordan is towards permitting the presence of
migrants on a substantial scale. In practice and when faced by the competing
influences in the region of surrounding governments and the demands of
refugee groups each of which has specific requirements to be met the social
and geographical space which the Kingdom has to offer can appear to be
close to being overwhelmed. The situation of the state in holding together
Jordanian  society  and  its  response  to  the  refugees  is  alleviated  to  some
degree by the preponderance of related NGOs to Jordan and through the
assistance of the churches in pastoral and material needs.
To  ensure  a  Jordanian  identity  to  the  nation  disincentives  for
migrants to arrive and/or incentives for migrants to become Jordanian must
be employed. Inhibiting a narrative which portrays Jordanian society as the
home for  migrants  in  general  in  the  Levant  is  key.  It  seems likely  that
Jordanian society – by its openness to Christianity and recognition of the
anti-sectarian nature of most Christian migrants – would be capable to hold
Jordan can be perceived as very Latin/``Catholic" in atmosphere so this is possibly a
reason why members of  the Church of  the East  would prefer  to  travel  to  Syria  or
Lebanon in the first instances where a greater plurality of Christian culture exists or if
travelling to Jordan to swiftly migrate onward (if possible) to the diaspora hubs in the
USA, Europe and Australasia.
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all those Christian Iraqis who wish to reside there. Opening the border in an
unrestricted manner to large new populations of Shia and Sunni migrants
from  Iraq  and  Syria  by  way  of  comparison  would  likely  not  be  so
compatible to the efforts of the King and the state to foment a Jordanian
society  relatively  accepting  of  distinctive  groups  who  are  accepting  of
religious plurality.
The Jordanian situation in general is not hopeful for the Chaldeans in
the long term if they are unable to depart for another location. In the short
term Jordan is a safe haven for Iraqi Christian refugees, however, if they
remain  beyond  six  months–one  year  in  the  country  their  opportunities
decrease and a loss of momentum to move onwards is engendered. Legal
residence to Jordan after a six month period requires payment of a fine on a
daily basis to remain. As noted above the economic opportunities even for
those  who  could  strongly  contribute  to  Jordan  are  limited  with  an
atmosphere of killing time underwritten by a sense of hopelessness – at least
on a natural level – to their situation. To rejuvenate their presence in Jordan
then not practically a solution given the lack of a pre-existing community on
such  a  scale  or  ecclesial  structure  on  which  to  build  and  a  reason  for
Chaldean submergence into other churches in the Kingdom.
Insofar as the Kingdom is a generous host the ability or interest in
grasping the differences of need for Iraqis and in turn for Iraqi Christians is
limited. Indeed, what more could be expected of the Kingdom given that
which  it  has  already given.  The situation  such as  it  is  would  appear  to
require  sufficient funds to support  those displaced but  the basic  material
requirements even were they accomplished do not provide a solution to the
societal issues which the migrant presence creates. A Jordanian attempt to
retain the coherence of its population is to not give the legal classification of
``refugee" to forced migrants. This insures the Jordanian population against
losing their own sense of identity. Yet, it inhibits the migrants from seeking
to place  themselves  as  Jordanian  subjects  which Chaldeans  in  Iraq have
sought to do reflecting their belief in the importance of a natural level of
patriotism and a desire  to  support  the society in  which  they reside.  The
rapidity of change is also something with which the Chaldeans in Jordan
and  Jordanian  society  has  been  ill  equipped  to  deal.  The  Chaldean
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ecclesiastical  presence  never  having  had  to  contend  with  such  a  large
community has on balance not been able to incarnate a Chaldean ethos and
distinctive contribution to the Kingdom.
The Chaldean community is sustained largely through the efforts of
the  Latin  Patriarchate  of  Jerusalem  in  Jordan.  Whereas  the  Chaldean
ecclesial presence is sustained through the office of the Chaldean patriarchal
vicar. The distinction is important for it notes the theoretical and practical
aspects which can lead to the inflating of the ecclesiastical appointments
with power and influence they do not possess. Also suggestive of the crisis
which the Chaldean diaspora in Europe will face if efforts are not made to
regularise  their  situation  through  the  creation  of  a  clearer  ecclesiastical
organisation  which  provides  a  basis  around  which  identity  –  communal,
cultural  and  ecclesiological  –  can  be  founded.  For  the  organisational
situation to  remain  as  it  presently exists  inviting stagnation  and likely a
solely reactionary approach to events instead of grasping the initiative to
secure a future for Chaldean ecclesial identity (as an abstract concept) and
the  interest  of  the  community  to  remain  wholly  Chaldean  in  religious
identity than becoming submerged into a Latin Catholic-Western Christian
milieu.
The status of ``refugee" would also imply the Jordanian state has a
duty of care for the populations which ``migrant's" implication of choice in
movement does not necessarily imply. This division enforced through severe
limits on employment and higher than normal fees for medical treatment.
These are pragmatic policies adopted by the Jordanians if not popular ones.
The physical restrictions of Jordanian geography and the limited material
resources such as water, which is an issue of increasing concern, regulate in
a very clear manner how Jordan can meet the needs of its refugee-migrant
populations.
Church  involvement  in  support  for  Iraqi  Christian  migrants  has
become necessary due to the lack of distinction made by secular NGOs of
the particular difficulties with which Christians are faced. In collating the
number of migrants entering Jordan the UNHCR, for example, makes no
record  of  each person's  religion.  Without  an awareness  of  the  causes  of
migration and forced displacement NGO responses focus on alleviating the
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material conditions in what might be thought of as a neutral manner. Yet
given the disproportionate numbers of Iraqi migrants who are Christians the
lack  of  specific  understanding  of  at  least  their  broad  narrative  is  to  the
detriment of a long-term resolution of their status in Jordan and a basis for
Christian communities responding to their needs.
Jordan's Christian environment from the Catholic perspective is an
anomaly in  the Middle East.  Surrounding countries'  Catholic  populations
largely part of one of the eastern Catholic churches whereas most Jordanian
Catholics are Latin. The balance of population has altered with the arrival of
refugees but the Latin ecclesial structures and associated charities remain
very  strong  contributors  to  addressing  the  needs  of  Christian  refugees
beyond the purely basic needs of housing and food.136
The variety  of  NGOs/charities  involved  varies  in  size  and in  the
apostolate  which  they  pursue.  The  more  well  established  organisations
include  Caritas  and  the  Jesuit  Refugee  Service  but  vary  also  to  more
personal initiatives such as the Messengers of Peace (MoP) led by Fr Khalil
Jaar a priest  of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem which was formed in
early 2007 to aim at alleviating the particular  circumstances of the Iraqi
refugees  in  Jordan.  At  which  time  the  situation  in  Iraq  –  civil  war  –
determined the Iraqi presence to Jordan was in the first place of concern and
also a time before which the rebellions in Syria had begun and which would
later lead to a shift in regional and international focus on to the displaced
Syrian populations.
Reliance on the initiative of individuals or small groups to relieve
their situation as a result of the weak ecclesial presence which the churches
predominate  to  Iraq  have  in  Jordan.  The  Syrian  Catholic  population  in
Jordan,  according to  AP figures jumping from 960 in 1990 to 10,298 in
2000 before dropping again in 2013 to 1,506. Such a change of population
in such a relatively short space of time emblematic of the difficulties which
eastern Catholics were faced with and without a readily available solution to
meet  those  needs  unless  hierarchical  intervention  occurred.  For  the
Chaldeans this appears to have been lacking with the change of population
136 Material support for non-Christians is also provided to those who approach 
Christian led charities.
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to Jordan at least as great. Collected during fieldwork from May–June 2013
estimates  from the  Chaldean  chaplain  were  20,000 (2002–2006);  40,000
(2007); 5,000–7,000 (2008–2012) and 5,000 (2013). The rapid change in
population  size  from 2008  accounted  for  by  resettlement  outside  of  the
Middle East.137
The MoP rôle has been to alleviate physical need but also to attempt
to ensure the issue of persecution of Christians is acknowledged by secular
NGOs  and  to  ensure  Iraqis  are  equipped  to  navigate  the  UNHCR  and
Jordanian  state  bureaucracies.  The  former  and  engagement  with  it  the
cornerstone of movement outside of Jordan and asylum in the West. Other
charitable work also included summer and holiday programmes for young
people to provide some type of normality of schedule to be extended and
alleviate the trauma which many have experienced. This is combined with
services  to  alleviate  psychological  difficulties  with  which  young  people
have  been  affected  leading  also  to  developmental  and  speech  disorders
and/or arising due to missing out on a more normal educational pattern and
experience of social relations.
With the introduction of the Syrian crisis to the regional status quo
of the Levant the situation for the Iraqi displaced persons at a time when
their situation was beginning to be better understood was deprecated.138 The
immediate needs once MoP began operating in April 2007 was the provision
of extra food, heaters and blankets – basic supplies – for six months to 1,600
Iraqi  families.  A number  which  increased  to  2,000 families  by February
2008.  Of  those  who  approach  the  charity,  Fr  Khalil  states  seventy-five
percent are Christian who have not found succour from Muslim led NGOs
or awareness of the particularities of their situation from the UNHCR. Some
effort has been made by UNHCR representatives to better comprehend the
Christian scenario through meeting with refugees and Christian charities but
this  does  not  appear  to  have  impacted  upon  the  day-to-day  operations.
137 In  this  instance  I  suggest  AP figures  for  the  Chaldean  Patriarchal  Vicariate  in
Jordan are indicative not definitive with the population rising from nought to 7,000
between 2000 and 2010. It may simply have been a case of the  AP's figures taking
some time to be collated prior to establishing a more accurate record. (Roberson CSP
2014)
138 The  change  again  in  the  Iraqi  situation  from  June  2014  re-emphasising  the
persecution  of  Christians  but  not  having  conducted  fieldwork  in  the  Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan since mid-2013 unknown as to the exact effects.
                                                              274
Through  the,  noted,  refusal  to  record  the  religion  of  the  displaced  the
UNHCR  continues  to  restrict  the  narrative  of  forced  displacement  to
universal causes of movement such as war or economic hardship as opposed
to  the  reality  of  a  layered  narrative  determined  by  a  variety  of  factors
including  anti-Christian  persecution  and  criminal  behaviour.  As  average
resettlement  time (i.e.  onward migration  from Jordan)  can  be  up  to  two
years the intervening period requires support of charities such as MoP to
ensure the survival of refugees until they are able to secure asylum. The
length of time to reach resettlement dependent on the willingness to accept
refugees  and  the  capability  of  UNHCR  to  expedite  the  administrative
process. Suggestions of deliberate delay in this process by UNHCR have
been variously raised and were noted as an issue arising even prior to the
start of the Syrian crisis.139
Conclusion: Chaldean presence to Jordan
Attempting to  write a  basic historical  outline of the Chaldean Church in
Jordan  can  be  a  tangential  process  whereby  discussion  of  the  migrant-
displacement overrides what earlier aspects of this thesis have focused on:
ecclesiastical  organisation,  dioceses  and  bishops  and  more  definitive
numerical outlines. Where the ethos of the church resides for Chaldeans in
Jordan is diffused throughout the community because the Chaldean ecclesial
presence to Jordan is weak. Nonetheless, it is important to avoid portraying
the  community  as  weak  without  a  hierarchy  because  the  survival  of
Chaldean  religious  identity  is  reliant  on  community  adherence  to  the
essential aspects of the Church. However, a hierarchy provides a definitive
outline to the community and a clear point of recognition and establishes a
place for the Chaldeans in Jordanian society. 
Political considerations may be a leading cause to prevent this with
the creation of an Iraqi led Christian community in Jordan likely of concern
to the Jordanian state which if open to the Christian presence is still desirous
of  managing  this  presence  and  the  creation  of  other  constituents  in  the
139 Waiting time for some has been up to seven years.
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manifestation of further Christian plurality. Outside of this issue there seems
little necessary cause for not elevating the vicariate to diocesan status given
its size by population equals or far exceeds other dioceses in Iraq: Basra
once one of the five major ecclesiastical provinces of the East Syriac church
in Mesopotamia as of 2013 reduced to a few hundred people. The relative
ease of establishing a Chaldean diocese in Australia or Canada by way of
comparison due to the lack of religious literacy which Western states have
and  the  limited  awareness  of  the  significance  of  eastern  Christian
communities in their borders. 
The Chaldean Church, however, in administering its community in
the Kingdom seemingly at a loss as to the most effective means to respond.
This also forms part of the context in which the Jordanian and Iraqi states
have  acted  through  avoiding  acknowledging  in  public  the  scale  of  the
changes in their respective populations. Insofar as both have to retain wider
political and societal stability their implicit denial of population movements
effects  the  Iraqi  state  as  it  demonstrates  the  failings  of  the  new  Iraqi
government to retain a plural culture and instead to be driven by a sectarian
milieu with limited interest in effecting real change to support non-Muslims
to remain.
Thesis Conclusion
This study has been a wide ranging survey of the Chaldean Catholic Church
highlighting  in  particular  its  ecclesiological  identity  and  historical
development. Through outlining the Church's ecclesiastical organisation in
Mesopotamia-Iraq  I  have  reflected  on  the  incarnation  of  Chaldean
ecclesiology in that environment and the significance of Chaldean ecclesial
structures  to  the  realisation  of  a  Chaldean  difference  within  the  plural
societies of west Asia to the early twenty-first century.
Even in the context of the original research which is expected of a
thesis in presenting a Chaldean ecclesial history it has been challenging to
build on the few foundations for this exact area of study. I am aware also of
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the  thesis'  limits  and  even  despite  presenting  an  overview  of  Chaldean
ecclesiology and ecclesiastical organisation much work remains to be done
not least of which is a far more comprehensive historical study of Chaldean
parishes  in  the  Diocese  of  Zakho-Amadiya  and  the  Archdioceses  of
Baghdad, Basra, Kirkuk-Sulaymaniya and Mosul. In the latter case such a
study certainly impossible for the indefinite future.140 
Nevertheless, in noting these limits it is especially important given
the circumstances since June 2014 and the advance of Da'esh to represent
the Chaldeans in academic research: one has to start making observations
from some vantage point at some time. The material destruction which has
been  experienced  perhaps,  even  if  only  in  a  limited  manner,  may  be
ameliorated  by  documenting  the  community  and  widely  realising  the
historical  strength  of  Chaldean  culture  and  the  East  Syriac  Christian
tradition in and to Mesopotamia-Iraq.
Mesopotamia-Iraq and the patriarchal office's 
influence on Chaldean identity formation
The Mesopotamian environment has been fundamental to the formation of
Chaldean  identity  with  the  languages,  cultures,  settlements  and  peoples
integral to the Chaldean sense of being and the manifestation of Chaldean
ecclesiological thought. Would the Chaldean Church be the same without,
for example, having been present to Baghdad and Mosul and at the centre of
the transformations of civilisations in west Asia? The East Syriac tradition
and the patriarchal office in particular has been fortunate to have had a seat
at the window of history affording a view of societal change and often the
opportunity to influence and be a part of implementing change. Indeed, if
the  patriarch  had not  been present  to  Baghdad and within  the  milieu of
Sasanian, Abbasid, Mongol, Ottoman and Baathist élites Christian influence
would have been severely curtailed. By way of comparison we can consider
140 Another useful line of enquiry would be to investigate the processes which took
place  in  the  incorporation  of  pre-existing  East  Syriac  dioceses  into  the  Chaldean
ecclesiastical structure: how exactly, for example, how did the see of Mosul become
Chaldean?
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the negligible status in  the political  order which the Yazidis  or Turkmen
have  had  owing  to  their  geographical  concentrations  outside  of  central
Mesopotamia-Iraq and this despite both groups having populations roughly
equal to or larger than the East Syriacs to the twenty-first century.
Running through Chaldean history the use of Syriac has also bound
together the community and its identity even to the present and maintained a
boundary  around  Chaldeans  apart  from  the  surrounding  population.  A
boundary  necessary  to  defend  and  uphold  their  community  but  also
consolidating the Church's status as a bearer of some of the most ancient
liturgical traditions of the apostolic churches and increasing its significance
to external observers.
Yet it was not always apparent what features of the Chaldeans made
the community distinctive within the East Syriac tradition for at least the
first  150  years  of  its  existence.  It  is  perhaps  easier  to  circumscribe  the
Chaldeans from the post-First World War era because ``to be a Chaldean''
became more  clearly  delimited:  it  was  to  be  largely  Arab  linguistically,
Catholic  in  a  broad  sense,  increasingly  urban  and  acquiescent  to  the
contemporary  government.  During  the  Chaldeans'  formative  period  there
was no definitive point of coagulation around which the community formed
beyond the figure of the patriarch and a notion of being in union with the
episcopal successor of St Peter in Rome. Once a clearer particular sense of
Chaldean-ness developed through the direction of the Josephite patriarchs
and latterly figures such as Joseph VI Audo did a Chaldean identity emerge
as  a  distinct  aspect  of  the  East  Syriac  tradition.  This  is  not  to  say  that
distinctive communal formation and the separation of Chaldean and Church
of the East factions in the East Syriac community did not exist. These did
form and as I have suggested from the evidence of the patriarchal funerary
inscriptions at Rabban Hormizd an awareness of Christological difference
was  present  following  the  establishment  of  the  Sulaqite  patriarchal  line.
This, however, is distinct from the creation of a Chaldean identity and as to
what was a Chaldean ecclesiological model.
I have largely avoided the use of the term ``Catholic'' in the thesis in
describing the Chaldean process of ecclesiology and identity formation. It is
a difficult term to apply to communities who I suggest likely never viewed
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themselves as distinct from the Latin West or juridically broken away from
the See of Peter. This is why I would characterise Sulaqa's intentions and
those  of  many  of  the  East  Syriac  patriarchal  claimants  to  the  late
seventeenth  century  as  re-engaging  their  relationship  with  the  Pope  as
Patriarch  of  the  West  than  perceiving  the  need  to  rectify  their  situation
through  the  creation  of  an  eastern  Catholic  rite.  It  was  only  with  the
establishment of the Josephite line and Latin missionary instruction that the
Holy  See's  Tridentine  perception  of  itself  and  its  view  of  extending
jurisdiction  over  all  apostolic  Christian  communities  that  East  Syriac
communities  were  fully  recognizant  of  the  implications  of  becoming
Chaldean and by implication reliant on the contemporary pope as the chief
source of ecclesiastical authority.
Furthermore, as I have indicated, it was Joseph VI Audo that first
grasped and held  to  an  awareness  of  the  notion  of  the  Chaldeans  as  an
eastern Catholic community in union with the Holy See and with sufficient
will to defend the notion of the Chaldeans as an ecclesial  body with the
rights and prerogatives of the successor to the Church of the East and for the
patriarchal  office  representing  the  contemporary  successor  of  the
Catholicos-Patriarch of Seleucia-Ctesiphon. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of
such an ecclesiology and as a key aspect of Chaldean identity only fully
manifested once it was widely held by the community and at least assumed
as part of their heritage. As for the church to function ecclesiology also had
to have a basis from the bottom up even if the ideals which Audo pursued
were encouraged from the top down.
In these efforts in creating a Chaldean ecclesiology inclusive of the
East  Syriac tradition the Chaldeans became the chief  maintainers  of  this
ecclesial culture to Iraq. The four characteristics suggestive of this position
are the following:
1. The  Chaldeans'  ecclesiastical  organisation  assumed  the  legitimist
patriarchal  lineage  and the  institutions  of  the  community  such as
Rabban Hormizd monastery. In so doing imbibing the resources of
the Church of the East and through gaining the legitimist patriarchal
lineage becoming  the inheritor  of  the successor  to  the see of  the
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Catholicos-Patriarch of Seleucia-Ctesiphon. 
2. The  celebration  of  a  diverse  cultural  heritage  which  predates  the
Chaldean origins of the 1550s and the belief in the continuation of
East Syriac tradition among the Chaldeans. The ability to embrace a
variety  of  ideals,  sub-ecclesial  identities  and  cultures  within  the
Chaldean  ecclesial  community  resulting  from,  I  suggest,  a  dual
inheritance: from the East Syriac tradition's spread across Asia and
incarnation  in  local  contexts  and  also  that  of  the  Tridentine
missionary zeal which if seeking to convert the world also sought to
engage with local cultures and peoples and assimilate them into the
Holy See's jurisdiction.
3. Chaldeans have largely eschewed narrow ethnic identities alien to
the  East  Syriac  tradition's  international  and heterogeneous  nature.
Where  there  have  been  identities  adopted  this  has  not  prevented
incorporation of other nations and cultures into the incarnation of
Chaldean life: one does not have to be an Assyrian to be a Chaldean
nor  is  the  Chaldean  Church  an  ethnically  defined  ecclesial
community.141
4. The Chaldean patriarchs have followed the precedent for a model of
church-state  relations  in  existence  since  the  Sasanian  era.
Recognising  the  importance  of  engaging  with  the  established
political  order and not  a withdrawal  from it.  Furthermore,  largely
retaining a  presence in  the centre  of  political  power in  the states
which have governed Mesopotamia.  The Ottoman era,  however,  a
notable exception to this, yet, even during this era residing close to
or in Mosul the chief provincial city in the area in which the majority
of East Syriacs resided. 
141 Patriarch Bidawid responding to a question regarding ethnicity in the East Syriac
community stated the following: `I personally feel once you lock a church into a single
ethnicity,  you end that church. My church and the church of the Assyrians are one
church. If I come today and state that this is an Assyrian church or a Chaldean church, I
am in effect terminating this church. In our history, our church did not stop among
Assyrians, but spread Christianity in Turkey, Afghanistan, China, Southern Asia, Tibet,
among others, and had millions of followers. So a person, who is a Christian and is a
member of our church cannot be necessarily called an Assyrian, but they can all be
called sons of the Church of the East. We have to separate what is ethnicity and what is
religion. This is very important.' (Quoted in Petrosian 2006, 116–117)
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Zones of Chaldean ecclesial influence in Iraq
I turn now to conclusions regarding the fieldwork and study of the Chaldean
situation in Iraq and especially the northern dioceses in 2003–2013. 
I  have  opened up discussion  of  the  notion  of  zones  of  Chaldean
ecclesial influence in Iraq as a result of the 2003 invasion. All the bishops of
the northern dioceses have seen the expansion of their pastoral remits and
none more  so  than  Bashar  Warda  of  Erbil.  Through the  combination  of
political and social factors his rôle has become the second most influential
office in the Chaldean hierarchy in Iraq. This is not a position for an East
Syriac bishop in Erbil to be entirely unprecedented – we recall the city was
home to metropolitans of the ecclesial province of Adiabene from the fifth
century. It is novel in the Chaldean community with since its foundation in
1968 to 2003 the proximity of Alqosh and Mosul limiting Erbil's ecclesial
influence. The enmeshing of the city as the Kurdish capital and status as the
premier  settlement  under  KRG  administration  since  2003  raising  its
importance  in  the  economic  and  political  order  to  the  same  status  as
Baghdad is to the ICG. As a whole parallel context the Erbil and Baghdad
Archdioceses  reflect  the  separation  of  the  KRG  and  ICG's  paradigms
generally. 
Whilst it is difficult to ascertain an exact figure for those Chaldeans
remaining  resident  in  Baghdad  the  largest  proportion  of  Chaldeans  now
reside outside Iraq or in the northern dioceses with ecclesial influence to a
large extent following the population out of Baghdad. Aside from the status
which is attached to the patriarchal office Baghdad as an archdiocese retains
a weakened status in  the Chaldean ecclesiastical  organisation aside from
properties and remaining religious institutes. The transfer of population and
hence  material  resources  to  the  north  along  with  the  seminary  reducing
reliance on the patriarch's oversight and the attendant influence which the
patriarchal  office  holds.  The  north  now  as  the  chief  zone  of  Chaldean
ecclesial  influence  having  to  adjust  to  the  realities  of  this  situation.
Nevertheless,  the  patriarch  still  retains  the  key  access  to  the  centre  of
political power and the ecclesiological significance of the link to the See of
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Seleucia-Ctesiphon through his presence. Moreover, the patriarch is still the
patriarch with key links to the resources of the Holy See and the wider
Syriac communities which his office affords. Since the expansion of Da'esh
from  2014  the  challenge  has  been  to  maintain  the  office  away  from  a
position of redundancy in the face of violence and to formulate a response to
the entire removal of the Christian presence from the area of Iraq north of
Baghdad to just south of Alqosh. 
The  distance  whether  geographical  or  from  the  patriarch's
jurisdictional  influence  an  issue which  is  not  unusual  to  the  East  Syriac
tradition. In many circumstances the devolution of decision making powers
to  the  local  bishop  was  obligatory  when  immediate  methods  of
communication  were impossible.  This  principle  of   ecclesial  subsidiarity
was historically as important to East Syriac communities in Akra as to Khan
Balik in their day-to-day management. In the modern Iraqi Chaldean context
it also became more apparent during the final years of Bidawid and Delly's
leadership which saw a substantial  loss of patriarchal  oversight.  Sako as
patriarch appears to want to re-affirm a stronger rôle for his office but as the
northern bishops since the Gulf War (1990/91) have been obliged to act to
an extent on their own initiative in the resolution of ecclesial affairs this is a
difficult trend to alter.
There  is  no  active  attempt  within  the  Iraqi  clergy  to  instigate  a
schism but owing to force of circumstances declension of the Church even
within Iraq's borders is becoming manifest. The emergence of northern Iraq
as an enclave in which the majority of Iraqi Christians now resides very
challenging  to  Sako's  participation  in  the  direction  of  Chaldean life  and
working relationship with the state in an as intimate manner as many of his
predecessors such as Emmanuel II Thomas. 
A key  aspect  of  effective  East  Syriac  church  governance  in  the
majority Muslim context has also been access to patronage via the state or
an external supporter such as the Holy See or British Empire. Without an
``in''  to the civil power East Syriac patriarchs struggled to maintain their
communities  –  we  consider  the  qualitative  decline  of  the  Sulaqite
patriarchate and community by the early nineteenth century and its relative
revival with British imperial and ecclesial support. With the decline of the
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Chaldean population size and thus influence less can be requested by the
patriarch from the state whilst expectations by the state for Chaldeans to
contribute to Iraqi society are also lessened. Different circumstances have
emerged for those under KRG administration with the appropriation of some
of the patron-client relations by Christian political parties previously within
the church hierarchy's domain. With the relatively new status of the KRG
and its de facto independence emphasised from 2003 its ability to deal with
other  institutions  I  suggest  saw  a  preference  for  engaging  with  other
explicitly political bodies similar in organisation and background. To engage
with  a  Christian  ecclesial  body  as  the  chief  representative  group  of  the
community may have been something which KRG officials were challenged
by and sought instead the realisation of a different level of engagement. This
altering over time through recognition of the more comprehensive nature of
ecclesiastical structures to sustain the Chaldean communities on a day-to-
day basis and likely an occasion for re-assessment of how the KRG was to
engage with non-Muslim communal organisations.
The Holy See and the Chaldeans
I have indicated that the Holy See since the Second Vatican Council has
largely  withdrawn  its  interventionist  rôle  in  Chaldean  affairs  which
characterised the two ecclesial bodies' relations to the end of the nineteenth
century. We can note how the Chaldeans have turned to the Holy See for
pastoral  oversight  during  the  difficulties  of  electing  Patriarch  Bidawid's
successor and looked to the contemporary pope as a figure to highlight their
situation especially since 2003 within the western Christian milieu.
This withdrawal of direct action in Chaldean affairs in accord with
the ecclesiology of  a  Catholic  communion of  sui  juris churches  focused
upon the institution of the Holy See as the visible head of the communion
and arbiter in ecclesial affairs. This new ecclesiological model distinct from
the Tridentine paradigm which had proposed a Catholic Church of rites with
the pope as leader of this church.
John Paul II and Benedict XVI both demonstrated an awareness of
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the importance, however, of retaining a close fraternal relationship with the
Chaldeans whereas it is as yet difficult to discern how Francis I views his
responsibilities to the eastern Catholic churches – having made no particular
or general statements beyond seeking to alleviate difficult circumstances for
those in the Middle East and Ukraine-Donbass it remains to be seen what he
envisions as the rightful place for his oversight in their affairs.
I suggest the Chaldeans despite their  sui juris status are somewhat
uncomfortable with the lack of more resolute direction from the Holy See
on the particular issues with which they are faced given the precedent for a
close  relationship  between  the  community,  Latin  missionaries  and  the
papacy. We could perhaps regard the Chaldeans as a prototype Tridentine
eastern Catholic community at their foundation with over time increasingly
direct Latin guidance as to their ecclesiology and identity. With the change
following the Second Vatican Council to a more ``hands-off'' approach by
the Holy See and Latin institutions the Chaldeans have struggled to regain a
clear working relationship and as to the limits of the remit of the Chaldean
patriarch in ecclesial affairs and as to how much reliance should be placed
upon the pope for guidance and decision making. On a day-to-day basis the
patriarch  leads  the  church  but  with  any  intentions  to  radically  alter  the
relationship between the  East  Syriac  communities  perhaps  reliant  on the
acquiescence  of  the  Holy  See.  We  note,  for  example,  Louis  Sako's
suggestion in June 2015 for a united East Syriac patriarchate of the Church
of the East and Chaldean Church going so far as to state his willingness to
resign his own position to make way for a preferred unity candidate were it
to  engender  the  security  of  the  East  Syriac  Christian  communities  and
support their long term survival to the Middle East. (Valente 2015)
Sako's five point plan is as follows:
`1.  The current Patriarchs: Louis  Raphael  Sako, Patriarch of  the Chaldean Catholic
Church, and Mar Addai II, Patriarch of the ancient Church of the East, would submit
their resignations without any conditions, but their desire for unity.
2. The Bishops of the three churches would meet to choose a new Patriarch.
3. The elected Patriarch should have assistants from each branch to enhance the “weft”
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(the permanent Synod).
4. The Patriarch and the Synod would leave national interests to the laity, because the
church should be open to everyone and concerned with the best interests of all.
5. The Patriarch and the Synod would prepare for a General Synod to develop a new
road-map for The One Church of the East.' (Sako 2015)
Sako's suggestions raise numerous issues not least of which is whether the
Holy  See  would  perceive  there  to  be  no  remaining  theological  or
ecclesiological difference between the Church of the East and the Chaldeans
and therefore assent to a new arrangement.  Furthermore,  how would the
Holy See form a clear relationship with a sui juris church with which it is in
communion if the chief source of communion – the patriarch – radically
alters the existing model of church governance? Does an eastern Catholic
patriarch have the canonical right to resign his office with the intention of
ecclesially uniting with another community of the same ecclesial tradition?
Is  the  situation  in  Iraq  so  acute  for  East  Syriac  Christians  that  this  is
acceptable from the perspective of the Holy See?
Given the current vacancy (as of August 2015) in the patriarchate of
the Church of the East perhaps this is an optimum time to effect such a
change and it  is  not  without  a  precedent  of  sorts.  We may compare  the
unification of the legitimist and Josephite patriarchal lineages in the 1820s
taking advantage of the death of the Josephite claimant to advance the cause
of Yohannan Hormizd's patriarchal claim.
What  is  perhaps  most  notable  about  Sako's  proposal  is  not
necessarily  the  implication  of  the  de  facto status  quo of  the  same
ecclesiology  of  the  churches  but  the  willingness  to  deprecate  his  own
position in  time of crisis and restore the structures of the Church of the East
under a united patriarch. The overall proposal and its implications requires
an  extended  academic  assessment  which  we  cannot  offer  in  a  thesis
conclusion.  Nevertheless, we are fortunate that Mar Awa Royel, the Church
of  the  East's  bishop  of  California  has  offered  an  extensive  and  erudite
response  to  Sako's  proposal  and  its  connotations  for  East  Syriac
ecclesiology and begins to explore whether such a union of the churches is
practically  possible  given  their  respective  views  on  East  Syriac
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ecclesiastical organisation.  (Royel 2015) Royel whilst open to discussing a
possible resolution concludes that Sako's parameters are not yet acceptable
to the Church of the East in its contemporary form and that his proposal
cannot  fully  fit  with  what  he  perceives  as  traditional  East  Syriac
ecclesiology primarily due to Sako's view of the necessity for any future
united East Syriac church to be in full communion of unity and faith with
the Holy See. (Royel 2015, 1, 6)
We  are  presented  with  two  differing  versions  of  East  Syriac
ecclesiological thought: (1) Sako perceiving the Chaldeans to be an heir to
the East Syriac tradition and in no way outside of it or that formal union
with the Holy See contradicts in any way Chaldean or East Syriac ecclesial
independence. Indeed, the ecclesial link with the Holy See is normative and
not a novelty. (2) Royel regarding his community as effectively the principle
true  maintainer  of  the  East  Syriac  traditions  with  the  Chaldeans  having
detracted from this through union with the Holy See and their willingness to
``submit''  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  papacy.  Royel  keen  to  maintain  and
sustain the identity and character of the East Syriac tradition in the Church
of  the  East  and  as  he  perceives  it  to  secure  it  from  errors  which  an
authoritative rôle for the contemporary pope and ability to intervene in East
Syriac affairs may present. (Royel 2015, 2–3)
Certainly Royel provides sustained and well reasoned argument for
his  position  and  that  of  the  Church  of  the  East  throughout  his  article
highlighting, for example, the fractious relationship between Patriarch Audo
and  Pope  Pius  IX.  Nonetheless,  and  despite  Royel's  long  standing
involvement in modern ecumenical discourse on behalf of the Church of the
East  with the Holy See and education in  Latin Catholic  universities  and
institutions he does not appear to suppose that the authoritarian  rule which
the papacy may once have asserted over eastern Catholic communities has
been  in  considerable  decline  since  the  Second  Vatican  Council  and  the
primus inter pares papal rôle he perceives as acceptable for any Church of
the  East-Holy  See  formal  relationship  and  in  accord  with  East  Syriac
ecclesiology is already in de facto existence.  (Royel 2015, 5–6)
We must, however, consider that Royel perceives that he has a duty
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to defend and uphold the traditions he regards as essential to East Syriac
identity and ecclesiology – full ecclesial independence for the community as
led by the Patriarch as integral to all its actions and its very existence.142
Indeed,  his  article  makes  evident  a  strong  belief  in  the  independent
missionary activity of the Church of the East throughout Asia as divine in
origin and that he is looking to defend and uphold the Church from good
intentions and a well formed intellect and conscience than a notion of being
desirous of  retaining traditional  ecclesiology for its  own sake.  It  will  be
crucial  to  the  future  of  the  East  Syriac  communtiy  as  a  whole  whether
Chaldean or Church of the East to see how the new patriarch of the Church
of the East will choose to advance ecclesial reconciliation or indeed Sako's
response to Royel's critique. As Royel notes without a patriarch he is not in
a position to determine and speak on behalf of his community in a definitive
manner and that any decision will perhaps take far longer to be reached than
may have been possible in early eras when the community was far more
geographically concentrated and centred and incarnated in a Mesopotamian
environment. (Royel 2015, 6) With the diaspora growing ever stronger and
more diverse with a plurality of opinion as to the proper future course of the
Church of the East and with the political and economic difficulties in Iraq
itself  the contemporary  reconciliation of  the  churches  of  the  East  Syriac
tradition may face a far longer and more challenging journey towards unity
than was possible in the 1820s.
The Chaldean presence to Iraq in the context of the 
rise of Da'esh
The Chaldean situation since June 2014 has been perilous in the extreme.
The  events  which  have  seen  the  extinction  of  the  Christian  presence  in
Mosul and much of the surrounding Nineveh plain and horrifying physical
persecution  of  a  truly  brutal  type  revealing  the  worst  excesses  of  man's
142 Nonetheless, it is possible that in fact Royel is perhaps far more sensitive to the
potential advantages which a relationship with the Holy See could bring to a united
East Syriac patriarchate. Although he titles the article as a personal reflection he is also
obliged  to  defend  the  formal  ecclesiological  position  of  the  Church  of  the  East
regardless of his own perceptions as to a suitable resolution.
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fallen  nature.  Formulating  an  effective  response  to  Da'esh  aside  from
through  physical  military  engagement  seemingly  impossible.  At  a
fundamental  level  how ought  you to constructively engage with a  group
who seeks to kill you with society at large broadly ambivalent or opposed to
your continued presence?
The events for the Chaldeans are one among many persecutions of a
similar type insofar as a Sunni power has aimed at the denigration of their
position  and  violent  removal  of  their  community  from society  but  also
different as since 2014 one entity has aimed at a coerced transformation of
society from one paradigm – with a relative openness to societal plurality –
to another with the loss of or inclination to resolve ``difference'' in any way
but through violence. For the Chaldeans their position is compounded by the
widespread ambivalence of the Muslim population both Sunni and Shia, the
instability  which  the  community  experienced  prior  to  these  events  –  we
must recall Iraq has been at war or under economic sanctions since 1980 –
and the lack of an external power with the will or capability to intercede on
their behalf.
A comparative context was the removal of the Chaldeans from Asia
Minor  in  1915–1918  and  the  coerced  delocalisation  of  the  church  then
experienced. The response to this broadly similar to the outcomes so far in
the expansion of Da'esh with it appears the ancient see of Mosul becoming a
titular diocese  in partibus infidelium much like those of Mardin, Gazarta
and Seert with the making and un-making of the existing Middle Eastern
political order since the Arab Spring beginning to appear on the same scale
and level of impact as the loss of the Ottoman order after the First World
War. If this is such an epoch shattering set of circumstances the subtleties
and niceties of social relations are easily lost. Those such as the Chaldeans
who offered a  distinctive and often subtle  difference  unable to  extend a
response which secures their community through force and instead reliant
on the good will  and co-operation of those who can accommodate them
such as the KRG.
The  Chaldeans  were  fortunate  under  the  Iraqi  monarchy  to  find
leaders willing to involve them in the creation of the new state. From the
start  of  republican  rule  in  1958  this  was  gradually  lost  with  a  loss  of
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awareness to the particular qualities which they contributed as a Christian
body  to  Iraq.  The  lack  of  a  reliable  ally  within  Iraqi  society  and  the
factionalisation  of  Iraq  into  a  society  of  conflict  instead  of  stability
fundamental in weakening their ability to respond. The Chaldean openness
to being diverse, vertically integrated members of society something which
sectarian cliques could not cope with nor comprehend. These qualities from
2003 typified by their communal willingness to live within a predominantly
Islamicised  and  political  unstable  environment  accepting  the  restraints
which this placed on them but still to offer their contributions and qualities
in a process of communal and individual self-sacrifice. 
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Appendix A: Maps, Tables and Graphs
The maps, tables and graphs referred to in the text are provided below.
Maps 1 and 2 are taken from
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Church_of_the_East_in_the_Middle_Ag
es.svg>
and
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Hoodinski#/media/File:Church_
of_the_East_provinces_10_c.svg>  
with both having been licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
Share  Alike  3.0  Unported  license  (CC  BY-SA  3.0)
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/> 
and most recently updated by the Wikipedia user `Hoodinski'.
I developed Maps 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7  from data available at Open Street Map
<http://www.openstreetmap.org> and made available in this thesis under the
Open Database License (OdbL). For further details of this license and use of
map  data  please  refer  to:  <http://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright>  and
<http://opendatacommons.org/licenses/odbl/1.0/> The original map data is
©  OpenStreetMap  contributors  and  available  under  the  Open  Database
Licence  and  the  cartography  is  licensed  under  the  Creative  Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike  2.0  license  (CC  BY-SA).
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/> 
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Map 1: Ecclesial provinces of the Church of the East in the tenth century
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Map 2: The Church of the East at its greatest extent in the Middle Ages
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Map 3: Northern Iraq, eastern Turkey, northern Iran and principle sites of 
East Syriac-Chaldean activity from the sixteenth century
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Year Mar Bethune Sacred Heart Holy Ghost St Joseph 
(Karrada)
2005 39 67 22 59
2006 29 54 22 64
2007 18 18 12 61
2008 19 33 6 37
Table 1: Baptismal records from selected Baghdadi parishes, 2005–2008
Year Families
2000 2,100
2001 2,225
2002 2,365
2003 3,615
2004 3,965
2005 4,289
2006 5,465
2007 6,450
Table 2: Number of Chaldean families in Ankawa 2000–2007143
Erbil Mosul Zakho-
Amadiya
Alqosh Kirkuk-
Sulaymaniya
Ankawa-Erbil Telkef Aradin Teleskef Sulaymaniya
Shaqlawa Karamles Duhok Alqosh
Armota Qaraqosh Zakho
Qusenjaq Feshkhabur
Inishke
Deir Abon
Mangesh
Table 3: Principle villages/towns (by diocese) visited during fieldwork in 
October 2013 in which a Chaldean presence was found
143 Facisimile copy accessed in Ankawa, October 2013
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Year Number of persons
1969 7,600
1980 9,650
1990 12,530
1999 12,000
2000 11,492
2001 11,330
2002 11,750
2003 12,000
2004 12,200
2009 20,000
2012 30,000
Table 4: Chaldean population in the Archdiocese of Erbil (1969–2012)144
Year Families
2008 6,865
2009 7,160
2010 7,475
2011 7,865
2012 8,240
2013 8,670
Table 5: Total number of Chaldean families in Ankawa by year 2008–
2013145
144 Source AP
145 Source Erbil Archdiocesan records
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Graph 1: Number of  Chaldean baptisms and weddings in Ankawa 1885–
2012
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Graph 2: Ankawa Chaldean population growth 2000-2013
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Map 4: Erbil and surrounding region
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Graph 3: Number of baptisms in Armota, Shaqlawa and Qusenjaq 1950–
2012
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Year Kirkuk Sulaymaniya
1949 9,000 -
1966 - 360
1970 6,150 -
1980 4,256 861
1985 - 500
1990 5,470 -
1999 5,050 400
2000 5,115 403
2001 5,050 430
2002 5,095 450
2003 5,040 450
2004 5,700 200
2006 5,600 -
2007 7,000 -
2009 - 550
2010 - 550
2013 7,831 -
Table 6: Chaldean population in the dioceses of Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya 
1949–2013146
146 Source AP
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Year Number of Catholics
1958 1,636
1970 550
1980 150
1990 245
1999 176
2000 192
2001 263
2002 271
2003 300
2004 310
2006 508
2009 1,051
2012 1,190
Table 7: Chaldean population in the Diocese of Akra 1958–2012147
147 Source AP
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Year Zakho Amadiya
1949 11,300 -
1959 - 6,783
1970 11,165 8,580
1980 7,400 2,500
1990 - 1,500
1998 6,548 2,452
2001 6,048 2,452
2002 12,000 2,000
2003 12,500 2,000
2004 12,700 -
2006 - 4,000
2009 26,000 3,800
2010 12,555 -
Table 8: Chaldean population in the dioceses of Zakho and Amadiya 1949–
2010148
148 Source AP
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Graph 4: Number of baptisms and weddings in Amadiya Diocese 1950–
2013
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Church, Settlement Families Persons
Mar Gewargis, Bir Sivi 295 1314
Sacred Heart, Beidar 74 283
Mar Gewargis, 
Shakfdale
20 88
Mar Keryakos, 
Sharanesh
42 180
Virgin Mary, Zakho 180 817
Mar Gewargis, Zakho 220 908
Mar Auraha, Livo 135 560
Virgin Mary, Dashta 
Takh
4 15
Mar Yusif, Badja 23 86
Mar Ithalaha, Duhok c. 500 c. 4,000
Bakhoula 2 10
Al, Mansouri, Mansour 30 130
Mar Gewargis, 
Mangesh
300 1,200
Table 9: Chaldean population of the Diocese of Zakho by settlement (Group
A), 2012149
149 Source Zakho Diocesan records
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Church, Settlement Families Persons
Mar Yusif, Nefkendala 54 243
Mar Auraha, Merga 
Soor
26 109
Virgin Mary, Hezaywa 58 273
Mar Tishmooni, Berga 19 65
Virgin Mary, 
Feshkhabur
151 584
Mansour Depol, 
Avzerouk
32 166
Sacred Heart, Deir 
Abon
125 485
Virgin Mary, Qarayola 58 236
Church of the Martyrs, 
Suriya
9 35
Mar Gewargis, Sheuze 162 659
Mother of Mercy, 
Simele
54 251
Totals (Groups A & B) 2, 573 12,697
Table 10: Chaldean population of the Diocese of Zakho by settlement 
(Group B), 2012150
150  Source Zakho Diocesan records. Other settlements now under the jurisdiction of
the Diocese of Zakho-Amadiya and principally from the Amadiyan area of ecclesial
influence  include:  Komane  (320  people);  Araden  (c.  240  people);  Inishke  (c.450
people);  Amadiya;  Romta;  Korrabin;  War;  Adna;  Dawoodia;  Tinna;  Martabiya;
Hamzikh; Sorka and Beydano. Without estimates for these settlements in the Amadiyan
area I cannot provide a complete estimate derived from fieldwork for the Chaldean
populations of northern Iraq as of October 2013. That being said through utilising AP
figures for that period and preceding years an approximation can be made and which is
outlined in Appendix C. As we have seen, however,  AP figures are not always to be
relied  upon for  complete  accuracy.  It  is  my impression  that  the  overall  quality  of
accounting for population by those responsible among the community for providing
population  data  has  improved  since  2003  with  the  intention  to  realise  a  more
comprehensive picture of the Chaldeans and to document their situation.
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Graph 5: Baptisms at Mar Gewargis parish, Zakho 1989–2013151
151 Source Zakho Diocesan records
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Map 5: Zakho-Duhok and surrounding region
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Year Number of persons
1970 13,000
1980 13,000
1990 13,500
1999 16,190
2000 16,500
2001 17,000
2002 15,000
2003 17,947
2004 17,487
2006 20,820
2009 32,070
2012 22,300
Table 11: Total Chaldean population in the Diocese of Alqosh, 1970–2012152
Town Number of families
Alqosh 1,240
Teleskef 1,450
Baqofa 115
Batnaya 900
Sheikhan 140
Jambur 56
Sharifiya 27
Bet Handawiya 35
Naseriya `a few families'
Total c. 3,963 (c. 18,000 people)
Table 12: Chaldean population in the Diocese of Alqosh, October 2013 by 
settlement153
152 Source AP
153 Source Bishop Maqdassi of Alqosh
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Graph 6: Number of baptisms and weddings in Teleskef 1950–October 
2013154
154 Source Alqosh diocesan records
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Map 6: Central and southern Iraq
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Year Population
1959 82,000
1969 9,285
1980 6,700
1990 2,600
2000 2,500
2001 2,500
2002 2,500
2003 2,500
2004 2,500
2006 2,600
2007 1,000
2012 850
Table 13: Chaldean population in the Archdiocese of Basra 1959–2012155
155 Source AP
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Graph 7: Baptisms in the Archdiocese of Basra 1867-2012156
156 Source Basra Archdiocesan records
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Year Number of persons
1980 250,000
1990 481,000
1999 151,000
2000 151,000
2001 155,000
2002 145,000
2003 140,000
2004 130,000
2006 145,000
2007 135,000
2012 150,000
Table 14: Chaldean population, Archdiocese of Baghdad, 1980-2012157
Year Our Lady of 
Sorrows
Our Lady of the 
Rosary
Mar Yusif 
(Karrada)
1900–1910 2,172 0 8
1911–1920 1,190 0 26
1921–1930 3,673 51 85
1931–1940 4,112 103 282
1941–1950 5,973 Not possible to 
read figure
282
1951–1960 9,558 303 1,720
Totals 27,398  >469 2,306
Table 15: Baptisms in Chaldean parishes in use prior to 1958 – Archdiocese
of Baghdad158
157 Source AP
158 Source Baghdad Archdiocesan records
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Graph 8: Baptisms Baghdad parish group A 1958–2012159
159 Source Baghdad Archdiocesan records
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Graph 9: Baptisms Baghdad parish group B 1958-2012160
160  Source Baghdad Archdiocesan records
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Year Population
1969 17,000
1980 18,500
1990 19,850
1999 20,000
2000 20,000
2001 20,500
2002 21,105
2003 50,000
2004 20,600
2009 16,815
2013 14,100
Table 16: Chaldean population, Diocese of Mosul, 1969–2013161
161 Source AP
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Graph 10: Baptisms - Archdiocese of Mosul, 1870 - October 2013162
162 Source Mosul Archdiocesan records
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Map 7: Mosul and surrounding region 
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Appendix B: Overview of the Iraqi political 
system post-2003
Iraq  is  in  principle  a  ``federal  parliamentary  representative  democratic
republic''  with an elected head of state  (the President)  with an executive
consisting of the Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers. The legislature
which elects the President and Prime Minister is formed of two parts in the
Iraqi Parliament:
The Council of Representatives (i.e. the lower house)
The Federation Council (i.e. senate/upper house)
The Council of Representatives initially had 275 members from 2006–2010
but from the 2010 Parliamentary elections was expanded to 325 MPs.
The majority of MPs are elected via the greatest percentage of votes
received with additional compensatory seats for those who may otherwise
not  be  represented  due  to  not  attaining  sufficient  votes.  For  example,
numerical minorities such as the Christians or Yazidis. 
Iraq  has  over  40  active  political  parties  but  not  all  are  represented  in
parliament. The main political blocs in the Iraqi parliament as of 2014 were:
• State of Law Coalition (Islamic Dawa Party)
• Al-Muwatin (Shia Islamist)
• al-Wataniya (Secularist)
• al-Ahrar (Shia Islamist – following the religio-political direction of 
Muqtada al-Sadr)
• KDP (Kurdish nationalist)
• PUK (Kurdish socialist nationalist)
• Gorran – Movement for Change (Kurdish liberal secularist)
• Muttahidoon (Sunni conservative)
• al-Arabiya (Sunni conservative)
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Within the Iraqi parliament the political blocs often (but not always) 
represent a coalition of parties with shared interests. For example in the 
parliamentary election of 2010 the State of Law Coalition had al-Maliki's 
party the Islamic Dawa Party as well as smaller ones such as the Islamic 
Union of Iraqi Turkomen. 
On the ballot paper each person votes for parties in their order of 
preference within the bloc. Parliamentary seats are then assigned in 
proportion to their ranking as per the electors' ballot papers – a so called 
open list electoral system. This may seem a somewhat complicated system 
by comparison with the first past the post system used in Britain, for 
example, but it is perceived to grant voters more chance to influence 
election outcomes and a fairer representative spread of the parties in 
parliament.
Below parliamentary level political power is further devolved upon 
the 19 provinces of Iraq each of which has its own elected representative 
council and which are further split into the 120 districts of Iraq. Three of the
provinces are officially under the control of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) and also --- until June 2014 --- large parts of Kirkuk, 
Sulaymaniya and Nineveh provinces.
Another layer of political representation in Iraqi Kurdistan is the 
Kurdish Parliament which has 111 members and in which Christian political
activity is particularly closely engaged. The Kurdish President is Massoud 
Barzani (also leader of the KDP) and the Prime Minister is Nechirvan 
Barzani (a senior member of the KDP).
Elections for the Kurdish parliament most recently took place in 
2013 with the KDP, PUK and Gorran gaining the largest share of the seats 
(80/111) with the Assyrians having five reserved seats and the Armenians 
one. This compares, for example, to the Turkomen who between them are 
reserved five seats.
• Assyrian Democratic Movement 2 MPs
• Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council 2 MPs
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• Sons of Mesopotamia 1 MP
• Armenian independent candidate, Berunt Nissan Markos, 1 MP
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Appendix C: Chaldean population estimate in 
northern Iraq, 2013
Total number of families/persons by diocese (October 2013)
• Alqosh c. 3,913 / 17,069
• Akra 165 / 743
• Erbil 8,610 / 38,745
•  Mosul 3,539 / 15,926
• Zakho 2,721 / 12,245 (in 2012) 
• Sulaymaniya 195 / 878
• Amadiya c.850 / 3,800 (estimates from AP figures)
Total from figures obtained  19,143 Chaldean families. Assuming average
family  size  as  4.5  persons163 =  total  Chaldean  population  c.  89,500  in
northern Iraq.
If we consider total population (not families) figures from Roberson
in the  AP (2010) for the years 1990, 2000, 2010 and our own data from
2013  we  can  estimate  the  following  approximated  comparisons  in  table
17:164
Diocese 1990 2000 2010 2013
Alqosh 13,500 16,190 32,070 17,069
Akra 230 176 1,051 743
Erbil 12,314 12,000 20,000 38,745
Mosul 19,800 20,000 16,815 15,926
Zakho 7,000 6,548 26,000 12,246
Amadiya 2,000 2,452 4,000 3,800
Sulaymaniya 500 400 440 878
Total 55, 344 57,766 100,486 89,407
Table 17: Number of Chaldeans in northern Iraqi dioceses 1990–2013
163 A figure given by several priests during my visit to northern Iraq.
164 Roberson can be accessed here: <http://www.cnewa.org/source-  i mages/Roberson-
eastcath-statistics/eastcatholic-stat13.pd  f> 
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